IR 05000335/1991005
| ML17223B154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1991 |
| From: | Mcguire D, Tobin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223B153 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-91-05, 50-335-91-5, 50-389-91-05, 50-389-91-5, NUDOCS 9104110217 | |
| Download: ML17223B154 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/91-05 and 50-389/91-05 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 Nest Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket NoseI 50-335 and 50-389 s
Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
February 26-28, 1991 Inspector:
P M I% I(l<
o i
,
en>or a egu s
nspector Team member:
D.
H.
T mpson, Safeguards Inspector Approved by:'I David R. McGuire, Chief Safeguards Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards p 7- /
ate igne lei 1Date'Si gned SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection was conducted in the area of the licensee's Fitness for Duty Program as required by
CFR Part 26.
Specifically, the licensee's Policy, Program Administration and Key Program Processes were reviewed using NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/106 "Fitness for Duty - Initial Inspection of Implemented Program" dated July 11, 1990.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations were not identified.
Based upon the NRC's selective examination of key elements it was concluded that the licensee is satisfying the general performance objectives of
CFR Part 26.
Several strengths were noted in-the licensee's FFD Program as identified in this FFD report.
One Inspector Followup Item was identified relative to the need to more frequently conduct random drug tests on weekends.
(IFI 91-05-01)
5'104110217 910326 F'Dt>
ADOC)r, 0<000 3-s
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D.
(
R.
- G C.
- A
- R.
B.
C.
- K.
- K.
V.
J.
K.
C.
J.
- G P.
J.
J.
L.
- N.
C.
- J
- E
- J
- W.
Beck, Fitness for Duty (FFD) Technician, Industrial Medical IMC), Plant St. Lucie (PSL)
Behre, Fire Protection Supervisor, PSL Bossay, Plant Manager, PSL Clanton, FFD Technician, IMC, PSL Cummings, FFD Supervisor, Corporate, Florida Power and Ligh Euglemaier, Manager, guality Assurance, FPL Fekety, Nuclear Energy Abakysts, FPL Green, Secretary, EBASCO, PSL Green, Medical Review Officer, IMC, FPL Harris,, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations, FPL Heulell, ISC Technician, PSL Hughes, Supervisor, Catalictic, PSL Kirthtein, Assistant FFD Coordinator, PSL Lamb, Administrative Specialist, PSL Luchka, "Speak-Out," Coordinator, PSL Madden, Licensing Coordinator, PSL YicCullough, Manager, Training, FPL O'onnor, Wakenhut, PSL Robinson, FFD Courier, Med Pool Corporation, FPL-Rodriques, Employee Assistance Coordinator (EAP),
FPL Ross, Manager, Services, PSL Stroud, Training Specialist, PSL Ta'lley, Site FFD,Coordinator, PSL Weinkan, Nuclear Licensing, FPL West, Manager, Nuclear Security, FPL White, Security Supervisor, PSL Corporation t (FPL)
NRC Resident Inspector
- S. Elrod, St. Lucie, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Licensee's Written Policy and Procedures Prior to
CFR Part 26 this licensee had a
FFD Policy which included drug testing for pre-employment, pre-access and on a
random (ten percent)
basis, in addition, supervisors received FFD training.
All test results were evaluated by a Medical Review Officer (MRO) and there was an Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
Currently,,Nuclear Policy (NP No. 400) titled
"Fitness for Duty," Revision No.
2 dated January 18, 1991, is a.four page
statement of the licensee's FFD "Objectives and Required Actions" which was signed by the Nuclear Division President.
NP No.
400 addresses all the criteria identified, in Parts 26. 10 and 20.
Procedure JNSC-FFD, Fitness for Duty Program Description, Revision 5,
dated January 22, 1991, is the key implementation document (42 pages)
which details duties and responsibilities of-Corporate, site and contract personrel.
Other procedures are available for-such topics as follow-up testing, reporting to NRC, specimen collection, EAP and appeals.
The licensee's procedures are detailed to the degree that they specify the fiscal instrument (check or money order) to be used by an employee in paying for the testing of a frozen sample.
Program Administration/Management The licensee's Corporate Manager of Nuclear Security is the singular authority who administers the FFD Program.
He reports directly to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations, and is assisted by a
Corporate Fitness for Duty Coordinator.
The EAP Administrator is also a
proprietary employee at the Corporate level.
.At each of the'.,two nuclear plants there is a proprietary FFD Site Coordinator and an Assistant.
The.MRO, his assistant, and the Collection Facility Technicians are contractors.
Drug testing during irregular hours is done by the Site Emergency Medical technicians who also are contractors.
Resource Allocation The first two days of this three-day inspection were spent at Plant St. Lucie during which the inspectors observed three technicians providing day-to-day implementation of duties at the site collection facili'ty.
Based upon observations, discussions, and a review of training records the inspectors concluded that the technicians were'rained and qualified as appropriate and were proficient in their functions.
The technicians are housed at the onsite site collection facility, exterior to the protected area, within the site's Medical Station.
They are attired in distinct matching uniforms which contributes to the overall professionalism of the facility.
It appeared to the inspectors that adequate floor space, office equipment, storage facilities and collection paraphernalia have been allocated for the on-duty collection of specimens.
Auxiliary Intoximeters are readily available, as are three private bathrooms and one bathroom for disabled personnel.
While the Medical Station is continuously open to employees, the collection facility is locked during irregular hours.
On two occasions, the inspectors observed an exit door from the collection facility to be opened and unattended.
This normally secured door leads out from the facility into a hallway in the Medical Station.
While other parts of the
IV
collection. facility were occupied (reception and records areas)
the parts of the facility vulnerable to trespass were the private bathrooms and the areas in which the specimens were split and custody begun.
Part 26 only requires that.during specimen collection there be security of the collection facility, however, the licensee agreed that the reason the door was locked was to preclude unauthorized entry and to expedite pedestrian traffic following the collection effort.
The licensee took immediate measures to ensure the security of this exit door.
The inspectors verified that during these two occasions the previous specimens were secured in locked refrigerators.
Proactive Neasures In accordance with FFD procedures (FFD-1 and FFD-2) the licensee will, upon receipt of a confirmed test, conduct a supervisory review of an individual's current work assignment to identify any safety, quality or regulatory concern.
A similar review may also be conducted by the Site guality Control Department.
Prior to termination (or denial of access for contractors)
the Site FFD Coordinator will attempt to interview all personnel having confirmed tests to determine any weaknesses in the licensee's overall FFD program.
The Site FFD Coordinator is authorized to inform a worker's supervisor if the worker registers any blood alcohol concentration that is below, the cutoff level of.04.
This notification is performed prior to the worker returning to his shift.
Also, at the site level, the formal
"Speak Out" program coordinates allegations and employee concerns (to include termination of employment interviews) which include topics relative to the licensee's FFD efforts.
The licensee has in the past used several canines for searches of the protected area, primarily for explosives detection, but also having a
deterrent effect to drug possession.
At the Corporate Office, several investigators are on the staff of the Manager of Nuclear, Security to expedite information from the law enforcement community or other such allegations.
Em lo ee Assistance Pro ram EAP)
The licensee's EAP ~Administrator is a proprietary employee, badged for unescorted site access who has focused the EAP on "inpatient coverage."
Employees (or retir~ees)
and their families seeking EAP may receive a
maximum of eight counselling sessions through a contract EAP professional or unlimited assistance through the licensee's internal EAP.
With the recent addition of, one office (or counsellor)
near the Plant St. Lucie facility there are now 21 offices, seven of which are in close proximity to the licensee's two nuclear plants.
There is a highly publicized 800 telephone number which allows employees to contact these State licensed Nental Health Counsellors, some of whom are bilingual.
These
"Naster
Level" Counsellors have emergency lists of nuclear managers to contact in the event the Counsellor evaluates an individual as a threat to self or the public.
Because the EAP Administrator has trended the program over the last two years 'the licensee presented statistics reflecting an increase in referrals for substance abuse, or dual diagnosis, from 13=in calendar year 1989 to 18 in 1990.
During the same period self-referrals increased by one from 11 to 12.
During the last seven months of 1989 and continuing throughout 1990, employees using the contract Human Affairs International Counseling Service have increased from 81 to 183, or approximately 150 percent.
Through extensive use of newsletter articles, pamphlets and home mailings the licensee publicizes the confidentiality of its EAP services.
Communication is also assured through the EAP Administrator's attenda'nce at
"brown bag" lunches, and various monthly safety meetings with the different trades.
4.
Training/Policy Communication Based upon input from the Resident Inspectors attendance at FFD training prior to January 3,
1990, and upon the results. of limited interviews conducted during this inspection, it appears the licensee's Policy and Program were wel,l comtqunicated to the workforce.
The licensee utilized a variety of medium to educate the employees and contractors on the FFD program; newsletters or articles in the newspaper, memorandums and a
combination of pamphlets and booklets were utilized in this effort.
Initial and Supervisor training appears to have adequately covered the licensee's Policy, safety hazards, role of the HRO, EAP, drug abuse recognition, behavioral observation, escort duties, and the role of supervisors.
The licensee interprets
"sup'ervisor" to include coordi-nators, foremen, chief electricians, watch en'gineers or any personnel having someone reporting to them.
Through a
series of proceduralized matrices the licensee trained supervisors in their role for. testing, handling allegations, call-outs, appeals and the role of the MRO.
Additionally, the licensee tracked the most commonly asked questions in the critique of each session.
These questions were addressed in the special mail out regarding the five hour abstinence, effects of legal and over the counter drugs, and the call-out procedure.
Attendees at the FFD training classes included the President, Nuclear Division, and the Site Vice President.
The inspectors noted that the interviewees remembered their FFD training relative to EAP, chain of custody, call-out procedures and appeal ~
'
Key Program Process Identification/Notification Every weekday the licensee's Site FFD Coordinator, or Assistant, will request a
random draw of approximately 12 to 15 names (depending on plant population)
from the computerized Nuclear Employee Plant Access (NEPA)
data bank.
NEPA is the licensee's management system for all personnel with unescorted access to either of the two nuclear stations and those who may respond to the offsite Emergency Operation Facility.
Two passwords and one user identification code are necessary to perform this draw.
This safeguard prevents one Site FFD Coordinator from entering into the data base for the other site.
As mentioned earlier in this report, the collection facility is a locked area inside the Viedical Station during non-regular hours.
Once the draw has been printed out the Site FFD Coordinator then compares it to the work schedules of plant employees.
The printed list of candidates is eventually sent to the Corporate FFD Supervisor who insures everyone has been tested or that a supervisor has documented excuses such as vacation, leave, jury duty, etc.
If a candidate is within 100 miles of any of the four collection facilities he is expected to report for testing.
An additional safeguard measure prevents the Site FFD Coordinator from drawing any additional lists with different candidates.
The Corporate FFD Supervisor gets a computer printout by date and time of the draw having occurred.
Thus he is aware of the lists (not names of candidates)
having been printed out at the site.
Given the various work shift schedules, the Site FFD Coordinator attempts to organize the daily tests with emphasis placed on those candidates scheduled for weekend work to be tested on the weekends.
A candidate unavailable or who has infrequent access will be held for seven days to await his arrival onsite.
Once a supervisor is notified the employee is given two hours to arrive at the site collection facility where positive identification by photograph and social security number is verified.
~Testin The inspectors noted that'he licensee uses a
Drug and Alcohol Consent Form which has a "partial list of common therapeutic drugs" such as analgesics and antitussives.
This helps the candidate in listing the drugs ingested over the last 30 days as required by the Rule.
The inspector further noted that employees furnish 100 milliliters of urine which when poured into'wo other containers (one for testing and one for the frozen sample) still allows the technician to have enough urine
~
'1
left over for measuring the temperature.
This alleviates some candidates'oncern that residual substances were left on the thermometer from a prior candidate'
col lection.
. During this inspection the licensee advised that three drugs were being deleted from the panel because rarely were they being found and local police agencies were not experiencing them very much.
Barbiturates, benzodiazpine and methaqualone are the three deletions.
The licensee's initial cutoff level for amphetamines is '300 ng/ml (versus the NRC's 1000 ng/ml), for cannabinoid the licensee uses an initial cutoff level of 50 ng/ml (versus the NRCs 100 ng/ml) and 10 ng/ml for confirmation (versus the NRCs 15 ng/ml), for opiates the licensee uses a confirmation cutoff level of 200 ng/ml (versus the NRCs 300 ng/ml).
Randomness During calendar year 1990 the licensee tested 106 percent of Plant St. Lucie's population which was approximately 1449 individuals tested, or 2220 collected samples.
Random repeat tests were as follows:
Once Twice Three times-Four times Five times Six times
'902 individuals 375 individuals 131 individuals 31 individuals 9 individuals 1 individual The inspectors reviewed test data beginning in January 1,
1991 until February 26, 1991 and noted that of the 16 weekend days testing was performed on one Saturday (two people)
and one Sunday (two people).
Thus of the 275 random tests so far in 1991 there were only four done on weekend days.
Further inquiry revealed that late in 1990 the licensee trended its random testing data and realized few tests were being performed on weekends because most candidates didn't work on weekends.
For example, according to the licensees tracking system which trended months, days of the weeks and times of the days between March 1 and September 23, 1990 there were. 1642 tests of which only 26 occurred on weekends.
In calendar year 1990 four of ten holidays experienced random testing.
On February 18, Presidents Day, a federal holiday, the licensee conducted two random tests.
The licensee's effort to prevent "safehavens" on weekends will be considered in Inspector Followup Item (No. 91-05-01).
Sanctions and A
eals A positive test for alcohol or illegal drugs results in termination, or, in the case of a contractor, the sanction is denial of access.
Refusal to test, possession of alcohol on the licensee's property and possession of illegal drugs on or off the job also results in terminatio Currently, the licensee has not applied these sanctions to a member of the bargaining unit as these sanctions are being grieved through arbitration.
For these employees the'anctions of Part 26 apply.
Audit The licensee has conducted guality. Assurance audits of the Testing Laboratory Facilities, the YRO and the corporate and site testing facilities.
From March 28 to June 15, 1990, the licensee audited the FFD Program as administered by its Corporate Manager, Nuclear Security, at the St. Lucie and Turkey Point sites.
It should be noted that an audit was previously conducted as documented in gAS FFD-89-1.
The FFD program audit was divided into the following categories:
general provisions, procedures, policy, communications and awareness training, training of supervisors and escorts, contractors and vendors, chemical testing, employee -assistance programs, management actions and sanctions, appeals, protection of information, inspection, records and reports, audits, MRO, and laboratory facilities.
Six findings ("noncompliance" )
were identified as were six concerns identified.
However, the audit team concluded that FPL's FFD Program had been effectively developed, implemented and documented by Nuclear Energy's Security Organization.
The inspector reviewed the FFD audits as well as the program manager'
response to the findings and concerns and concluded that the guali ty Assurance appeared thorough and well documented.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 28, 1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The licensee was complimented for having a
FFD Program which satisfies the general performance objectives of Part 26.
Several strengths were discussed; FFD training, EAP treatment, FFD staffing and facility, NEPA safeguards, more stringent cutoff limits, fulltime MRO, and various proactive measures.
The inspector's concerns over weekend testing were also discussed with the licensee who favorably responded to the effect that additional testing would be made.
No dissenting comments were received from the license ~
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