IR 05000335/1991006
| ML17223B162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1991 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223B161 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-91-06, 50-389-91-06, NUDOCS 9104230165 | |
| Download: ML17223B162 (29) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 APR06 199/
Report Nos.:
50-335/91-06 and 50-389/91-06 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagle'r Street Niami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
March 18-22, 1991
+(Ag Inspectors:
4m~
,
). Testa W.
N. Sartor License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Accompanying Personnel:
L. Cohen,'h.D.
Aw d t:,4A~
W.
H. Rankin, Chief Emeraency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards D te sgne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise.
Selected areas of the li.censee's emergency response facilities and organization were observed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures in providing for the health and safety of the public and onsite personnel during a
simulated emergency.
This two-day full participation ingestion exercise was conducted on March 20-21, 1991, between the hours of 8:00 a.m.
and 2:00 p.m.
The NRC participated with full Regional Base and Site Teams and a Headquarters Response Team.
'I Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
9104230165 910405 PDR ADOCK 05000355
The following strengths were identified in the licensee's emergency organization:
Excellent Operations Support Center pre-job briefings for reentry teams.
Excellent demonstration of command and control in the Emergency Operations Facility, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Control Room.
3:
Concise, informative and comprehensive periodic status briefings by the Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center.
Comprehensive NRC site response team briefing by the Rec'overy Manager at the Emergency Operations Facilit REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- T AD ensuing enance Ashley, Scenario Development Contractor Bohlke, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Lic Boissy, Plant Manager Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor Burton, Operations Superintendent Casto, Emergency Preparedness Chi lson, Principal Engineer Church, Chairman, ISEG Coste, Nuclear Engineering Supervisor Danek, Manager, Corporate Health Physics Dyer, Supervisor, Maintenance guality Control Englmeier, Site Quality Manager Frecutte, Chemical Supervisor Geiger, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance Goldberg, President, FPL Nuclear Division Grazio, Director, Nuclear Licensing Harris, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Heffelginger, Outage Management Hosmen, Director, Nuclear Engineering Kaminska, Operations Superintendent, Turkey Point Mayer, Staff Security, Mercer, Health Physics McCullough, Manager, Nuclear.Training McLaughlin, Plant Licensing Superintendent Mothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Mullins, guality Assurance Auditor Patrissi, guality Assurance Pell, Assistant Plant Vice President Princevalle, Emergency Preparedness Rogers, Assistant Superintendent, Electrical Maint Sager, Plant Vice President Stewart, Technical Staff Varldes, Design Control Lead Engineer Veenstog, Nuclear Information Supervisor, CC-GC Walker, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Walker, Operations Instructor Walls, equality Assurance Ware, Training West, Technical Staff Supervisor Wunderlick, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
Other Organizations U.S.S.R.Visitors
- A. Davidov, Senior Specialist, GPAN
"A. Kontsevoi, Head General Dept.,
MAEP
- V. Kromov, Head, Regional Inspections, GPAN
"A. Mazalov, Head, General Dept.,
GPAN
"A. Shtangeev, Deputy Head, General Dept.,
MAEP Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- F. Congel, Director, Division of Radiation, Protection and Emergency Preparedness, NRR/DREP
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- G. Fowler, International Programs
- M. Scott, Resident Inspector
"Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a'major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG;0654.
The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the exercise.
The final exercise data and message package was distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held March 19, 1991.
The scenario developed for this two-day ingestion pathway exercise was detailed and fully exercised the licensee's emergency organization.
The exercise began during the regular day shift at about':00 a.m.,
with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, in the middle of core life's Unit
was in day 12 of a
30 day scheduled maintenance outage.
The initiating event on Unit 2 was a previously unidentified crack in a flange-to-nozzle weld on Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEOM) No.
91 that begin to leak reactor coolant to the containment at approximately 70 gpm.
Conditions degraded and complicating events of a fire and a
medical emergency occurred.
A General Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations were made to the State and local agencies.
Oay 1 of the exercise concluded at about 3:00 p.m.
The ingestion pathway events were continued on Day
commencing at 8:00 a.m.
and terminating at about 2:30 p.0 The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed adequate interactions between the controllers and the players, no controller prompting was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for
.emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff were available to respond to an emergency pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(1),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representa-tives.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or cortinuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff were avai lble to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC),
the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and Emergency News Center (ENC).
Real time staffing ano activation of the EOF and ENC were not demonstrated for this exercise.
These real time activities were not exercise objectives.
At each response center, the required staffing and assignofent of responsibility was consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654; ( 1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support, organization interactions.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff were available to fill key functional posi ions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through mobilization of additional day-shift personnel.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS)
assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator (EC)
promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager..
The Plant Manager became the EC and directed site activities from the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure No.
310022E titled "Classification of Emergencies" was used to promptly identify and proper ly classify the scenario simulated events.
The Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency notifications were timely, correct and by procedure.
The Alert was declared at about 8: 15 a.m.
due to a leak of approximately
gpm at the CEDM NO. 91.
A fire occurred at about 9:05 a.m.
in the emergency 4160V electrical bus ZB3.
A medical emergency occurred at about 9:50 a.m.
when an operator trainee slipped and fell sti i king his head.
He also received a lacerated contaminated arm wound.
At about 10:00 a.m. the leaking weld failed on CEDM No.
and the flange separated from the nozzle resulting in a leak of approximately 1200 gpm.
The condition for a Site Area Emergency had been met.
Conditions degraded, water level decreased, fuel damage occurred and the Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRMS)
increased sharply.
The General Emergency Action Level was met when the CHRRMS reading exceeded 1.46x10'/hr.
The Day
exercise was terminated at about 3:00 p.m.
High Pressure Safety Injection and Low Pressure Safety Injection had reflooded the vessel and terminated fuel damage.
Discussion of recovery and reentry began as release rate declined.
Day 2, the ingestion portion of the exercise, continued with the field monitor events and data evaluation, and recovery discussion with the State and Federal agencies.
The exercise concluded at about 2:00 p.m.
on the second day.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations were established.
This ar'ea wa's further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(5),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II,E of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and,local response organizations'nd to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Notifications of the State and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following the. classification and declaration of the emergency event.
The Alert Notification System, consisting of 75 Sirens, for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) was actuated during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(8),
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that adequate communication existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities'adio communications between
'the Field Monitoring Teams and TSC were monitored and the inspector observed that adequate sample positioning control of team radiological doses was evident.
Radio communications were crisp and teams were expeditiously dispatched.
Communications during the fire drill and medical drill were monitored and found to be effective'.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.HE The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities.
No major equipment deficiencies were observed.
Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
a Control Room - The exercise control room was established in the main control room of Unit 2 on a table in the back with telephones available for communications.
The inspector.observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, control room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required response to the simulated emergencies.
Emergency procedures were available and followed.
The designated exercise shift supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation in plant condition and promptly and con.inuously prioritized response activities.
The simulated
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contaminated injured operator trainee was handled expeditiously and offsite notification to the ambulance and hospital was made in a
timely manner.
Effective command and control were demonstrated by the shift supervisor.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The plant manager, who became the Emergency Coordinator (EC),
demonstrated effective command and control and provided periodic informative briefings on plant status to TSC staff.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities and responsibilities.
Checks for contamination and habitability were performed and additional dosimetry for facility staff were distributed.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
The'nspector observed that following the request for activation, personnel responded promptly to staff the facility.
The inspector observed that adequate health physics controls were demonstrated to preclude the spread of contamination when teams returned from their work jobs to the OSC.
The inspector also observed that checks for contamination in the OSC were conducted periodically.
Reentry teams being dispatched to various work activities received excellent health physics and industrial safety briefings.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
-
The EOF was staffed and activated by pr e-staged response personnel, The facility staff was familiar with their emergency duties, authorities and emergency responsibilities.
~ The EOF was provided with adequate equipment to b
support the assigned staff.
Security access control was observed t e appropriately established and maintained.
Status boards and other oraphic aids were strategically located and appropriately maintained.
The command and control was evident in the EOF; particularly noted by the staff's interaction and awareness of timeliness required for Emergency Classification and Notifications after the EOF was activated and the Protective Action Recommendation deci sionmaking process, The EOF was effective in the assumption of its responsibilities by providing timely information to the offsite agencies, NRC and Press thereby permitting the TSC to concentrate on the plant.
The Recovery Nanager provided a
comprehensive and timely status briefing to the NRC Site Team when they arrived.
Emergency News Center (ENC) - The ENC was staffed and activated by pre-staged response personnel.
The inspector observed the preparation of news releases and the preparation of material for briefings.,
h'ith the exception 'f several minor information i nconsi stencies ( later corrected)
the facility dispatched plant events in a,timely manner.
The facility staff were familiar with
their ENC duti es and responsibi 1 ities.
conducted using actual and mock media.
Press briefings were No violations or deviations were identified.'ccident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radioological emergency condition were in use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(9),
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering ass'essment of plant status, damage caused by the simulated events, and an assessment of the radiological hazard to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Onsite and offsite radiological environmental monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plurne'adiological effluent data was received and reviewed in the TSC and coordinated with EOF staff.
A source term problem caused by a scenario defect caused a temporary dose calculation difficulty. After the problem was recognized and remedied, calculations proceeded smoothly.
Reasonable agreement of dose value among the State, licensee and NRC assessment teams was achieved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exerci se Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brouaht to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV. F of Appendix E to 10'CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The licensee. conducted a series of post-exercise critiques on March 20, 21, and 22, 1991.
Critiques were held with players, controllers, and management.
The management critique was attended by exercise controllers, observers, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and planned improvement items.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guideli'nes cited above.
No violations or deviations were identifie ll.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite -agencies during the exerci se will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
12.
Action on Previous Inspector Findings (92701)
There were no open items to review for closure.
13.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 22, 1991, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Propriet y
'n ormation is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the license FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT
~
1991 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MARCH 20/21, 1991 2.2 The St, Lucie Nuclear Plant (PSL)
1991 emergency preparedness evaluated exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Cotmnission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization
, Facilities.
Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1,
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of,Nuclear Power Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives, The Plume Exposure Pathway portion of the exercise willbe conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
Scenario events willescalate to postulated core dam'age and subsequent simulated release of radioactive material to the environment.
The following objectives for the PSL portion of the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
1.
Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency Action Level (EAL)parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
B.
Demonstrate the abilityto alert, notifyand mobilize Florida Power and Light (FPL) emergency response personneL 2.
Demonstrate the capability to promptly notify the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), State and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classi6cation.
3.
Demonstrate appropriate procedures for both initial and follow;up notiQcations.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to State, Local and Federal Authorities.
FPL/PSL 22-1 91EX
(Continued)
B.
Haahmthm (~
'.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to State, Local and Federal Authorities concerning radioactive releases in progress.
C.
Demonstrate staKng and activation ofEmergency Response Facilities (ERF).
2.
Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities.
3.
Demonstrate the timely activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC).
4, Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Center (ENC).
5.
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of designated emergency response equipment.
V Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communications equipment.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over the emergency response activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
8.
Demonstrate the abilityof each facilitymanager to periodicaHy inform facility personnel of the status of the emergency situation and plant conditions.
9.
Demonstrate provision of periodic updates regarding plant casualty status to Off-Site Radiological Monitoring Teams.
FPL/PSL 22-2 91EX
(Continued)
C.
(Continued)
10.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of Emergency Coordinator
'esponsibilities from the Nuclear Plant Supervisor to designated senior plant management and transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities to the Recovery Manager.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly and accurately tran'sfer information between Emergency Response Facilities.
12.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and OSC to coordinate the deployment of emergency teams.
13.
Demonstrate the availability of qualiGed personnel and timely organization of reentry teams to assist in accident assessment and mitigation.
14.
Demonstrate the capability for development of Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) for the general public within the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
15.
Demonstrate that PARs can be communicated to State and Local Authorities within the regulatory time constraints.
16.
Demonstrate the abilityto integrate emergency'response activities with Federal emergency response personnel.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to support State and Local Plume Ingestion Pathway activities (EOF only).
D.
Demonstrate the coordinated gathering of radiological and non-radiological (meteorological)
data necessary for emergency response, including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys and samples.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to perform dose assessment.
FPL/PSL 2+2~3 91EX
(Continued)
D.
3.
(Continued)
Demonstrate the abilityto compare onsite and off-site dose projections to Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs)
and determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
4, Demonstrate the ability to provide dosimetry to emergency response personnel as required and adequately track personnel exposure.
5; 6.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to onsite emergency workers, as appropriate to radiological conditions.
7.
Demonstrate the decision making process for authorizing emergency workers to receive radiation doses in excess of St. Lucie Plant administrative limits, as appropriate.
8.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the Qow of information regarding off-site radiological consequences between radiological assessment personnel'stationed at the TSC and EOF.
Demonstrate the ability of Geld monitoring teams to respond to and analyze an airborne radiological release through direct radiation measurements in the environment.
10.
Demonstrate the collection and analysis of air samples and provisions for effective communications and recordkeeping.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the Qow of information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel.
2.
Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
FPL/PSL 91EX
(Continued)
E.
(Continued)
3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of public information with Federal (NRC), State and Local Government Agencies as appropriate.
4, Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiation medical emergency in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid and Personnel Decontamination Team to respond to a medical emergency, administer Qrst aid and survey for contamination on a simulated contaminated injured individual.
3.
Demonstrate the capability to arrange for and obtain transport and off-site medical support for a radiological accident victim.
Demonstrate the ability of Lawnwood Regional Medical Center personnel to treat an injured and/or contaminated patient.
5.
Demonstrate the administrative means to document and monitor status of a medical emergency victim.
G.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Fire Brigade to respond to a simulated Qre emergency in a timely and appropriate manner.
H.
Emluaiha 1.
Demonstrate ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas requiring improvement or corrective action.
FPL/PSL 22-5 91EX
(Continued)
Areas of the PSL Emergency Plan that will~ be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1.
Site evacuation of non-essential personnel 2.
Onsite personnel accountability 3.
Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignments willbe demonstrated by rosters).
4.
Real time activation of the EOF and ENC. (Emergency response personnel willnot be allowed entry to the facilities until an appropriate time in the scenario, but willnot be required to transit real-time from Mami due to time limitations in the exercise.)
5.
Actual drawing of a sample utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
FPL/PSL 2.24 91EX
0,
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT 1991 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MARCH 20/21, 1991 3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY 3.1,1 Brief Narrative The scenario begins with a leak in a cracked Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM)
nozzle.
The coolant leaking into containment at 60-70 gallons per minute (gpm) causes reactor cavity'leak alarms, containment atmosphere radiation alarms and increasing containment temperature and pressure.
When the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak is quantified and verified to be greater than 50 gpm but less than 132 gpm, an ALERTshould be declared and a controlled reactor shutdown begun.
A fire in emergency 4160V electrical bus 2B3 disables Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) on the "B" side. A blockage of the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) suction isolation valve, I-MV-07-1A,caused by a cracked stem results in no water source to and no supply from the "A" train of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS).
The cracked CEDM nozzle separates from the reactor head, increasing the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) approximately 1200 gpm. A SlTE AREAEMERGENCY should be declared on the loss of RCS inventory greater than 132 gpm. With no High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) or Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) the reactor vessel begins to drain down. With no Containment Spray (CS) and only two operable containment coolers, containment pressure and temperature rise.
Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) inject, but the water in the reactor vessel continues to boil off. As the vest:1 water level goes below indicating range and the top of active fuel uncovers, fuel damage and liberation of hydrogen from zirc-water reaction begins.
Radioactive material is released to the containment from fuel gas gap release (approximately 80%) and fuel overheat (approximately 25%). Containment High-Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRMs) begin to increase rapidly. Radioactive material is released to the Shield Building through design-basis containment leakage (5% per day -- approximately 9 cubic feet per minute [cfm]) resulting in releases of radioactivity to the environment through the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS). When CHRRMs exceed 1.46X10'/hr, a GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared.
The buildup of hydrogen in the containment beyond the explosive threshold results in a hydrogen "burn" that spikes containment pressure and breaches the containment to the Shield building through the containment vacuum equalization line. The containment depressurizes to the Shield Building and SBVS release rates increase dramatically.
The manual opening of the RWT isolation valve on the "A"side of ECCS restores source water to "A" train of HPSI, LPSI and CS. The reflooding of tlie reactor vessel with HPSI/LPSI stops fuel damage, The spraydown of containment with CS reduces temperature and pressure, halting the leakage of containment source to the Shield Building.'hield Building ventilation radiation readings begin to decline.
FPL/PSL 3.1-1 91EX
3.1 NARIMTIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Detailed Narrative Initial conditions establish Unit 2 operating at 100% power, in the middle of core life.
Power history has been full power operation for the last 180 days.
Unit 1 is in day 12 of a 30
'day scheduled maintenance outage.
The "A" side of 4160v (4Kv) power is tagged-out on Unit 1. Demand on the system is moderate with and anticipated peak of 12,000 MWe. Service area conditions are normal.
Weather has been sunny and mild for the last week with occasional late afternoon and evening showers.
Forecast is for partly cloudy skies, temperatures in the upper 70's and occasional showers for the next four days. Cuaent temperature is 78'ith winds from the East-northeast at 5-10 mph.
At 0800, a previously unidentified crack in a fiange-to-nozzle weld on Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) ¹91 begins to leak reactor coolant to the containment at approximately 70 gpm. Within minutes, a reactor cavity leak high annunciator and a high alarm on the containment atmosphere radiation monitor particulate channel indicates the leakage.
At 0815 containment atmosphere radiation monitor iodine channel and containment air cooler high temperature alarms have occurred and containment temperature is increasing.
Operators start additional charging pumps and quantify the leak through charging-letdown mismatch.
Operators should enter Off-Normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) 2-0120031, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
When the leak rate is verified to be greater than 50 gpm but less than 132 gpm, an ALERT should be declared in accordance with (IAW) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) No. 3100022E, Classification ofEmergencies, EVENT/CLASS ALERT 1.A.
ABNORMALPRIMARY LEAKRATE RCS leak reater than 50-m radioactive material release to containment atmos here Charging/letdown mismatch or measured RCS leakage indicates greater than 50 gpm but less than 132 gpm RCS leak.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) should make the ALERTdeclaration as soon as the leak rate is estimated, assume the role of Emergency Coordinator (EC) and perform notifications IAW EPIP No. 3100021E, Duties and Responsibilities ofthe Emergency Coordinator. Operators begin a controlled reactor shutdown (10 to 15 MWe/min) IAWTechnical Specifications (Tech Specs)
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 3/4.6.2, Action a.: "Be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
FPUPSL 3.1-2 91EX
3.1 NAIUMTIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Detailed Narrative (Continued)
At 0900, fire alarms at Delta 2.07.01 and 2,07.02 (Unit 2 Zone ¹7 A&B)occur. Trouble alarm occurs for the 480V 2B2 loadcen'ter.
The Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) is dispatched to investigate the alarms.
Within minutes, the SNPO reports verification of fire and smoke in the Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB) 43'levation in the vicinityof the 2B2 and 2B3 electrical panels.
The 2B2 loadcenter trips, At 0915, the 2B3 4160V emergency bus trips.
Operators should enter ONOP No. 2-0910054, Loss ofa Safety Related A.C. Bus. The EC/NPS should refer to Procedure No. 2-1800023, Fire Fighnng Strategies.
The 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and cross-tie beakers cannot be closed onto the 2B3 bus on the one attempt IAWONOP No. 2-0910054.
Tbe Fire Team responds and fights the fire.
By 0915, containment pressure has gradually increased to the high containment pressure trip setpoint of 3 pounds per square inch, gauge (PSIG) due to the continuing leakage from the CEDM nozzle.
Three out of four trip signals are in, Operators manually trip the reactor prior to the impending automatic trip function.
On the trip, Control Element Assembly (CEA) ¹91 does not fullyinsert.
Operators should enter Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) No. 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Acrions and EOP No. 2-EOP-03, LOCA.
'I By 0930, increasing containment pressure causes a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS).
On the MSIS, steam bypass to the main condenser is lost, so cooldown continues on the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs). On the SIAS, the available "A"train High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump starts, but immediately pumps its available suction water back to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) through the minimum flow line. The unknown closure of the "A" train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) RWT isolation valve I-MV-07-1A,caused by a stem breakage between the motor operator (indicating "open" both locally and remotely) and the valve disk (closed), prevents all "A"train ECCS systems from taking suction on the RWT. The
"A" HPSI pump runs dry and a mechanical seal leaks, slinging water into the HPSI pumproom.
At 0945, the fire in the emergency alternating current (AC) 2B3 switchgear is out.
Damage assessment and recovery action begins.
When the Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) is dispatched to investigate the problem with the "A" HPSI pump, he willfind his on-shift trainee who has slipped and fallen on the wet metal grating in the HPSI pumproom.
The injured and contaminated operator trainee willinitiate the radiological medical emergency portion of the exercise when he is discovered by the SNPO in the walkway of the -0.5'levation of the Unit 2 Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB).
FPL/PSL 3.1-3 91EX
3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Detailed Narrative (Continued)
At 1000, the leaking weld on ¹91 CEDM fails, the CEDM and flange separate from the nozzle. The RCS leak increases to approximately 1200 gpm, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
to the containment A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared IAW EPIP No.
3100022E, Classification ofEmergencies, EVENT/CLASS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.A ABNORMALPRIMARY LEAKRATE LOCA neater than the ca acit of char in
/
Iium~s I.
RCS leakage greater than 132 gpm.
EC should perform requited notifications IAWEPIP No. 3100021E, Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator.
By 1015, the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) indicates the reactor head is fullyvoided and voiding is beginning in the plenum.
Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) begin to inject.
By 1030, SITs have fully injected, RVLMS has been maintained up to level ¹5 in the plenum.
Shortly, the RVLMS level begins to drop ag'ain.
With no SITs, no power to the "B" train of ECCS and no source water to the operable "A"train of ECCS, the RVLMS indicates full voiding by 1035.
At 1100, the uncovered upper fuel region of the core begins to release gas gap activity and fuel overheat begins to cause zirconium-water reactioc liberating hydrogen.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRIVvis) increase sharpiy.
Containment hydrogen increases sharply.
FPLJPSL 3.1-4 91EX
3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Detailed Narrative (Continued)
By 1115, fuel damage has peaked at approximately 80% of gas gap release and 25% of fuel overheat: Containment hydrogen concentration has reached 5%. CHRRMs have exceeded 1.46X10'/hr.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared IAW EPIP No. 3100022E, Classification of Emergencies, EVENT/CLASS GENERAL EMERGENCY 1,A ABNORMALPRIMARY LEAKRATE A release has occurred or is in ro ress
~resultin in:
Containment High Range Radiation monitor greater than L46X10'/hr (Post-LOCA monitors greater than 1000 mr/hr if 'HRRM inoperable).
EC should perform required notifications IAWEPIP No. 3100021E, Duries and Responsibilities ofthe Emergency Coordinator.
Design basis leakage of the containment into the Shield Building results in increasing Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS) radiation readings and release of radioactive material to the environment.
At 1300, the problem with the RWT isolation valve on the "A" side has been resolved by lifting the motor operator off the broken stem and manually opening the valve disk. RWT water source has been restored to the "A" train of ECCS.
Before "A"Containment Spray (CS)
can be initiated, a hydrogen "burn" occurs in the containment.
The resulting pressure wave passes through stuck-open containment vacuum relief system inboard check valve I-V-25-20 and dislodges outboard flow control valve FCV-25-7 disk, allowing containinent atmosphere to leak into the Shield Building. As the containment atmosphere equalizes to the Shield Building before the one operating train of CS can have effect, radiation readings external to the ShieId Building and SBVS release rates increase sharply. By 1315, Field monitoring teams and dose assessment personnel begin to evaluate the release through radiation readings in the field.
By 1400, HPSI/LPSI injection have reflooded the vessel and terminated fuel damage.
Containment Spray has scrubbed and cooled the containinent and the reduction in containment pressure is eliminating the release to the Shield Building, Shield Building Ventilatioa radiation readings begin to decline.
Field monitoring activities continue, The emergency response teams continue to stabilize the reactor, verify safe shutdown and evaluate containment, integrity, Discussions of recovery and reentry should begin as the release rate continues to decline, FPUPSL 3.1-5
.
91EX
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT 1991 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUA'IEDEXERCISE MARCH 20/21, 1991 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TME
,EVENT 0730 Initial conditions establish Unit 2 operating at 100% power, in the middle of core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 180 days.
Unit 1 is in,day 12 of a 30 day scheduled maintenance outage.
The "A"side of 4160v AC is tagged-out on Unit 1 ~
Demand on the system is moderate'ith and anticipated peak of 12,000 MWe.
Service area conditions are normal.
Weather has been sunny and mild for the last week with occasional late afternoon and evening.showers.
Forecast is for partly cloudy skies, temperatures in the upper 70's and occasional showers for the next four days. Current temperature is 78'ith winds from the East-northeast at 5-10 mph.
0800 An previously unidentified crack in a flange-to-nozzle weld on Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) ¹91 begins to leak reactor coolant to the containment at approxiinately 70 gpm, Within minutes, containment atmosphere radiation monitor alarms and reactor cavity leak high annunciator indicates the leakage.
0815 Containment air cooler high temperature alarms have occurred and containment temperature is increasing.
Operators start additional charging pumps and quantify the leak through charging-letdown mismatch.
ALERT is declared.
Controlled reactor shutdown begins at 10-15 MWe/inin.
0900 Fire alarms at delta point numbers 2.07.01 and 2.07.02 (Unit 2 Zone ¹7 A&B) occur.
Trouble alarm occurs for the 480V 2B2 loadcenter. 2B2 trips.
0905 Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) verifies fire. Fire alarm is sounded and Fire Team is dispatched.
FPL/PSL 3.2-1 91EX
TIME 3,2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
~ EVENT 0915 2B3 4160V emergency bus trips.
The 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and cross-tie breakers cannot be closed onto the 2B3 bus on the one attempt IAV'NOP 2-0910054.
The Fire Team responds and fights the fire.
Due to increasing containment pressure and impending high containment pressure trip, operators manually trip the reactor.
On the trip, Control Element Assembly (CEA) ¹91 does not fully insert.
0930 Increasing containment pressure causes a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS)
and a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS). On the MSIS, steam bypass to the main condenser is lost, so cooldown continues on the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs). On the SIAS, the available "A" train High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump starts, but immediately pumps its available suction water back to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) through the miniinum flow line.
The "A"HPSI pump runs dry and a mechanical seal leaks, slinging water into the HPSI pumproom.
0945 (Approx.)
The fire is out.
SNPO is dispatched to the HPSI pumproom to investigate the RWT flow problem.
An operations trainee has slipped and fallen on the wet metal grating in the HPSI pumproom.
The injured,trainee staggered out into the -0.5'levation walkway of the Unit 2 RAB and collapsed.
The SNPO finds the injured person and makes notificatio'of the injury.
0950 (Approx.)
The First-Aid Decon team is dispatched to the injury scene.
1000 The leaking weld on ¹91 CEDM fails, the CEDM and flange separate from the nozzle. The RCS leak increases to approximately 1200 gpm, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) to the containment.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
FPI/PSL 3.2-2 91EX
3,2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
TIME EVENT 1000 (Approx.)
C The injured operator is examined by the First-Aid Decon Team, triage and radiological assessment is performed.
Off-site'medical
. assistance is required and the individual is contaminated.
Off-site medical facility is informed, ambulance ordered and injured individual prepared for movement to the off-site treatment facility.
1030 (Approx.)
The injured individual has been transported to the off-site medical facility by ambulance'.
SITs have fullyinjected, Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) has been maintained up to level ¹5 in the plenum.
Shortly, the RVLMS level begins to drop again. With no SITs, ao power to the "B" train of Emergency Cote Cooling Systems (ECCS) and no source water to the operable "A" train of ECCS, the RVLMS indicates full voiding by 1035.
1100 The uncovered upper fuel region of the core begins to release gas gap activity and fuel overheat begin's to cause zirconium-water reaction, liberating hydrogen.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRMs) increase sharply.
Containment hydrogen increases sharply.
1115 Containment hydrogen concentration has reached 5%. CHIVES have'exceeded 1.46X10'/hr.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared.
Design-basis leakage into the Shield Building has produced low levels of release through the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS). Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) are generated on plant conditions.
FPL/PSL 3.2-3 91EX
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
TIME EVENT 1300 A hydrogen "burn" occurs in the containment.
The resulting pressure wave passes through stuck-open containment vacuum relief system inboard check valve I-V-25-20 and dislodges outboard flow control valve FCV-25-7 disk, allowing, containment atmosphere to leak into the Shield Building. As the containment atmosphere equalizes to the Shield Building radiation readings external to the Shield Building and SBVS release rates increase sharply. PARs are upgraded based upon plant conditions.
A Mechanical Maintenance (M/M) repair team is successful in opening the RWT suction isolation valve, I-MV-07-1A, "A" train HPSI, LPSI and CS are restored.
1400 HPSI/LPSI injection have reflooded the vessel and terminated fuel damage.
Containment Spray has scrubbed and cooled the containment and the>>reduction in, containment pressure is eliminating the release to the Shield Building.
Shield Building Ventilation radiation readings begin to decline.
Field monitoring activities continue. The emergency response teams continue to stabilize the reactor, verify safe shutdown and evaluate containment integrity. Discussions of recovery and reentry should begin as the release rate continues to decline.
'500 Termination of Plume Exposure Pathway Play FPL/PSL 3.24 91EX