IR 05000335/1986005
| ML17308A212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1986 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A211 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-86-05, 50-335-86-5, 50-389-86-05, 50-389-86-5, NUDOCS 8604020583 | |
| Download: ML17308A212 (11) | |
Text
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vr UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/86-05 and 50-389/86-05 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light<Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos,:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos,:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 nior Resident Inspector Inspection Conducted:
Febr ary ll March 10, 1986 e
Inspect s:
R.
V.
le k,
S Da e
igned H.
E. Bibb, Resident Inspector Approved by:
S.
A. Elrod, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date S>gned D te igned SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection entailed 176 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification (TS)
compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities, Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees K. Harris, St.
Lucie Site Vice President
"0 ~ A. Sager, Plant Manager
"J.
H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
"T, A. Diliard, Maintenance Superintendent
"L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor R. J.
Frechette, Chemistry Supervi'sor C.
F. Leppla, Instrumentation and Control ( ICC) Supervisor
~C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
H.
F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor G. Longhouser, Security Supervisor
"N. G.
Roos, Quality Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
"Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 12, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Potential Enforcement Matters On February 25, the resident inspector attended an enforcement conference held in Miami at the Florida Power and Light corporate office.
The subject of the conference was the potential overexposure of an individual while performing, steam generator sludge lancing during the Unit 1 refueling outage completed in December 1985 (ref.
IE Report No. 50-335/86-01).
The unexpected exposure resulted due to the difference in the doses recorded by the self-reading dosimeter and the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), both of which were positioned on the individual's arm.
The licensee presented calculations and assumptions utilized in showing that an actual overexposure did not occur.
Region II is reviewing the matter and will further address it in future correspondenc Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant houseke$ ping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS).
Valve, breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 2 component cooling water (CCW) system and the Unit
AC and DC electrical distribution systems to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability'nd equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications were performed on the following Unit
and
systems:
auxiliary feedwater, chemical volume and control system and high and low pressure safety injection systems.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift tupnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
On February 19, plant management notified the resident inspectors of a
problem with the Unit
sodium hydroxide tank level discovered on February 13, with interim corrective actions taken on February
and 15.
The nuclear operator (NO) is required to record the Unit 1 sodium hydroxide tank level once every four hours on the NO Unit 1 log sheet.
Tank level is required to be between 64.5 and 82.25 inches to meet the TS volume
requirement of between 4010 and 5000 gallons.
The top of the tank sight glass is at 71 inches.
The NO log sheet for February
showed levels of 70 inches for each of the four-hour log entries.
Log entries made on February 13 were in the form of a note which stated that the tank. level was out-of-sight high as read by the sight glass.
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The Quality Control (QC) Department noted the change in tank level and the out-of-sight high condition during their daily log sheet review and immediately notified the Chemistry Department Supervisor and the Nuclear Plant Supervisor that they suspected tank in-leakage.
A chemistry sample was taken and verified dilution of the sodium hydroxide concentration to 22 percent by weight.
The TS requires a
minimum concentration of between
and 32 percent to be verified once every six months.
The tank was partially drained, then refilled with concentrated sodium hydroxide in order to restore the tank level and sodium hydroxide concentration to within the TS limits.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee confirmed tank in-leakage from the refueling water tank (RWT) in a reverse direction (backflow) through an eductor, check valve, and two solenoid valves.
The RWT is located at a
higher elevation than the sodium hydroxide tank which results
.in an approximate 20 psig pressure differential or back-pressure due to gravity.
The licensee is evaluating the need for repairs and/or additional sampling/testing to ensure that the problem does not recur.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operation (LCOs)
and results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
Haintenance Observation Station maintenance acti vities on selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met, activities were
'ccomplished using approved procedures, functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities (Plant Work Orders):
Unit 1 IAC PWO-6583 PWO"6565 PWO-6553 LCV-9006 Sequence of Events Recorder -
PM 1B1 Reactor Coolant Pump, delta-P
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Unit 2 Mechanical PWO-2563 PWO-2553 PWO-2542 2C Charging Pump Packing Leak FCV-2210Y Boric Acid System FCV-3306 Shutdown Cooling Loop 8.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that TSs were being met and that the public health and safety were properly considered.
The following LERs are considered closed; an asterisk indicates that an in-depth review was performed.
Unit
335/86-01 Spurious Containment Isolation Actuation Signal During Maintenance Unit 2 389/85-10 Reactor Shutdown Required Inoperable Control Element Assembly.
On December 26, 1985, with power at
percent, a reactor shutdown was required per TS 3. 1.3. lee when an individual control element assembly (CEA) was declared inoperable due to failure of its drive mechanism upper gripper coil.
A reactor plant cooldown was initiated to effect repairs to the CEA upper gripper coil.
During the reactor plant cooldown and depressurization a personnel error resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) because an operator failed to block the SIAS when required.
All engineered safety features functioned as designed.
No water was in'jected into the reactor coolant system (RCS)
because RCS pressure remained above the shutoff head of the high pressure safety injectiori (HPSI) pumps.
The CEA upper gripper coil was replaced and the unit was returned to service.
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Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions, proper access controls and badging, and adherence to procedures,
On March 5, 1986, the resident inspectors, along with NRC Headquarters'ecurity representatives, attended a
presentation and practical demonstration of the licensee's proposed measures for complete enclosure of the site security perimeter.
The meeting did not result in NRC approval or denial of the licensee's proposal.
The NRC is reviewing the matter; it will be further addressed in futurW"correspondence.
Surveillance Observations During the inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations to be in compliance with selected TS requirements'ypical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and OC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accompli shed, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and'esolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following survei llances were observed by the inspectors:
Unit 1 ILC 1-1400050, R29 Reactor Protection System Monthly Functional Test Unit 2 ILC 2-1400050, R12 - Reactor Protection System Monthly Functional Test I&C 2-1220052, R6
- Linear Power Range Safety and Control Channel Monthly Calibration Independent Inspection Effort Ouring the inspection period the resident inspectors performed a review of the Unit 2 pump and valve inservice test ( IST)
program.
The resident inspectors familiarized themselves with the program and assessed, in general, what valves. are included in the program and what tests are required for those. valves.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the testing requirements for flew check valves.
The inspectors noted that check valves are in most cases tested periodically to verify that the valves will permit flow in the normal direction.
Additionally, some check valves (e.g.,
containment isolation)
are also tested for back-leakage.
Although not listed in the IST program, certain check valves which are considered reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves (ref. Unit 2 SER, supp.
3),
are required by the TS to be tested for back-leakage.
In summary, the only check valves which are required to be tested for seat leakage which are included under the Unit 2 IST program are containment isolation valves.
It should also be noted that certain check valves, although not in the IST program, are periodically disassembled and inspected under the inservice inspection (ISI) progra.
Inspection=and Enforcement Information Notice (IEIN) Review
The inspectors previously reviewed IEIN 85-94 as documented in Inspection Report 50-335,389/85-36.
The IEIN covered the potential for disabling ECCS due to a failure or loss of pump minimum flow paths.
Unit I was. found to have one common flow path for the two low pressure safety injection (LPSI)
pumps and three high pressure'afety injection (HPSI)
pumps.
Two motor operated valves (MOVs), in series, provide automatic isolation of the minimum flow line on a
containment sump recirculation actuation signal (RAS).
The two MOVs are normally open with control power de-energized which ensures that the MOVs will remain open unless deliberate operator actions are taken.
In summary, because control power is de-energized with the minimum flow MOVs open no active single fai lure could occur which would isolate the ECCS pump minimum flow path.
The inspectors also reviewed the Unit 1 emergency procedures and verified that the minimum flow path isolation MOVs are required to be shut prior to initiation of the RAS.