IR 05000335/1986002

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/86-02 & 50-389/86-01.Corrective Actions:Operating Personnel Instructed to Shut Auxiliary Bldg Doors When Found Open
ML17308A213
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/07/1986
From: WOODY C O
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: GRACE J N
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
L-86-154, NUDOCS 8604210155
Download: ML17308A213 (4)


Text

~ll~P.O.BOW029100MIAMI,FL33102FLORIDAPOWR&LIGHtCOXIPANYI7)986L-86-150Dr.3.IVelsonGraceRegionalAdministrator,RegionIIU.S.IVuclearRegulatoryCommission101MariettaStreetIV.W.,Suite2900Atlanta,Georgia30323

DearDr.Grace:

Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketIVos.50-335and50-389InsectionReort86-02/01Florida.PowerRLightCompanyhasreviewedthesubjectinspectionreport,andaresponseisattached.Thereisnoproprietaryinformationinthereport.Verytrulyyours,C.O.WoGroupePresidentIVuclearEnergyCOW/PLP:deAttachmentcc:HaroldF.ReisPNS-LI-86-111t8bO+OQCH,0>pg101>500~~PopLl:1PEOPLE...SERVINGPE.>~~<

ATTACHMENTSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389lnsectionReort86-02/OlFinding:FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)paragraphs9.0,airconditioning,heating,coolingandventilationsystem,and9.0.3.1,ReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB)ventilationsystems,statethe'designcriteria/objectivesforthesesystemsasfollows:a.provideairflowareasoflowpotentialradioactivitytoareasofprogressivelyhigherpotentialradioactivity(withexteriordoorsclosed),b.assurethattheventilationsystemoperationduringnormaloperationdoesnotcauseanannualoffsitereleaseofgaseousradioactivityfromtheplanttoexceedlimitsallowedby10CFR50,AppendixI,c.ventilationairexhaustedfrompotentiallycontaminatedareasisfilteredfortheremovalofparticulatesasrequiredtosatisfy10CFR50,AppendixI,andd.airexhaustedfromtheshieldbuildingannulus,fuelhandlingbuildingandreactorauxiliarybuilding(mainventilationsystem)isfirstfiltered,andthendischargedtotheenvironmentthroughventstacksinordertofacilitateanoverallmeasurementofgaseousreleasesandtopreventpotentialcontaminationofventilationairintakes.Contrarytotheabove,onNovember15,1985,theseFSARdesigncriteria/objectivescouldnotbemetinthatseveralRABexteriordoorswereblockedopenandtheRABventilationlineupwasimproper,i.e.,buildingpressurewaspositivewithairflowfrominsidetooutside.Response:1.FPLhasinstru'ctedtheoperatingpersonneltoshutdoorswhenfoundopen.ManagementpersonnelhavebeendirectedtotakestepstoensuretheirpersonnelareawareoftheneedtomaintaintheReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB)doorclosed.2.FPLconsideredthatthesubjectfindingwascausedbyinattentiontodetailbyallsitepersonnelregardingthemaintenanceoftheRABdoorsintheproperposition.FPLhasdeterminedthattheincreasedattentiongiventhisareashouldprecluderecurrence.3.FPLhasinstructedGuardForcePersonneltocloseRABoutsidedoorsduringroutinesecuritychecksornotifytheOperatingShiftSupervisorifunabletoclosedoor.