IR 05000331/2009006

IR 05000331-09-006, on 08/31/2009 - 09/18/2009 for Duane Arnold Energy Center; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection

ML093020633
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	10/29/2009
From:	Robert Daley Engineering Branch 3
To:	Costanzo C Duane Arnold, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold
References
IR-09-006
Download: ML093020633 (26)

Text

October 29, 2009

SUBJECT:

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000331/2009006(DRS)

Dear Mr. Costanzo:

On September 18, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Duane Arnold Energy Center. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 18, 2009, and on October 6, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

As a result of your intent to adopt the National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805 Code, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition, as defined by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 48(c), the inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection - NFPA 805 transition Period (Triennial),

dated May 9, 2006. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety-significance was discovered that involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC-identified finding was not associated with a finding of high safety-significance (Red) and was entered into your corrective action program. The finding met only two of the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) for a licensee in NFPA 805 transition, therefore, Enforcement Discretion is not being granted for this finding which will be cited in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Duane Arnold Energy Center.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.

50-331;72-032 License No.

DPR-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000331/2009006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III==

Docket No:

50-331;72-032 License No:

DPR-49 Report No:

05000331/2009006 Licensee:

FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC Facility:

Duane Arnold Energy Center Location:

Palo, Iowa Dates:

August 31 through September 18, 2009 Inspectors:

Z. Falevits, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead

G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Winter, Reactor Inspector

Approved by:

R. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000331/2009006; 08/31/2009 - 09/18/2009; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Routine

Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding was discovered that involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety-significance and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications, Paragraph 5.4.1.d, for the failure to identify an adverse trend in performing fire watches required as compensatory measures to address identified fire protection impairments; including potential multiple spurious operations vulnerabilities and an unanalyzed condition in Appendix R analysis.

Specifically, the licensee failed to implement requirements in Procedure PI-AA-01 that would have ensured the proper implementation of the Fire Protection Program in accordance with ACP 1412.4. The improper implementation of Procedure PI-AA-01 resulted in numerous instances in which the licensee failed to issue and implement Fire Watch Surveillances as required by ACP 1412.4, Section 3.1, Paragraph (7)(a). Upon discovery, the licensee initiated an Apparent Cause Evaluation after entering this finding into their corrective action program as CAP 069822.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to implement fire protection procedure requirements could have complicated plant safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The issue was of very low safety-significance based on the relatively short duration involved and that only one defense-in-depth element (barriers) was affected by the impairments for which the fire watches had been established. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) for the CAP component because the licensees trending program failed to ensure that information from the CAP and other assessments in the aggregate are periodically trended and assessed to identify adverse trends. The Licensees Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) 001984, dated September 23, 2009, attributed the apparent cause of the missed fire watches adverse trend to a programmatic failure in the licensees trending program, which failed to assign the responsibility for reviewing potential adverse trend issues to a specific position or individual. Consequently, the licensee failed to identify the aggregate trend which was identified by the inspectors.

(Example P1.(b)), (Section 1R05.11b).

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05TTP)

Florida Power and Light (FPL) Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center, in a letter to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated July 11, 2006, committed to adopt the NFPA 805 Standard, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition, as defined by 10 CFR 50.48(c) for the Duane Arnold Energy Center. The NFPA 805 Standard establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for fire protection programs at nuclear power plants. The standard incorporated both deterministic and risk-informed, performance-based concepts. The deterministic aspects of the Standard are comparable to traditional requirements. However, the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program requires an in-depth nuclear safety circuit analysis for equipment identified for nuclear safety functions such as safe shutdown.

Because the conversion and licensing process to NFPA 805 Standard was expected to identify and address a variety of issues that were normally the subject of the triennial fire protection baseline inspection, the NRC modified the fire protection inspection program and Enforcement Policy for licensees in transition to NFPA 805. As a result, this inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial), dated May 9, 2006.

Associated with the transition to NFPA 805, when a certain finding not associated with a finding of high safety-significance meets the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48), the violation would receive enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensees fire protection programs defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

• preventing fires from starting;

• rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; and

• providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant.

The inspectors evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plants fire protection program and post-fire safe shutdown systems. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that:

(1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant;

(2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability;

(3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition;

(4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features;

(5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant was ensured;

(6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and

(7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensees PI&R program.

In addition, the inspectors review and assessment focused on the licensees post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRCs regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors, with assistance from a Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA), used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) to select several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire areas and fire zones selected for review during this inspection are listed below and constituted four inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05TTP.

Fire Area Fire Zone Description RB3 03B 786 Reactor Building - South Hatch Area (ASD Area - 1C390 and 1B34 SD Panels, Procedure AOP-915)

RB3 03D 786 Reactor Building - MG Sets Room TB1 08H 757 Turbine Building - 1G-31, A EDG Room East PH2 016B 761 Pumphouse A RHRSW and ESW Pump Room

.1 Shutdown from Outside Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of control room evacuation.

The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire area selected for review. Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The review also included the fire safe shutdown analysis to ensure that all required components in the selected systems were included in the licensees safe shutdown analysis.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis, normal and abnormal operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that rely on shutdown from outside the control room. This review included verification that shutdown from outside the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.

The inspectors also examined the operators ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing post-fire shutdown procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the actions.

The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report and the licensees engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, technical specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and deviations) to determine the licensing basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis.

The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and NFPA codes to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation such as NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA codes to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

In accordance with IP 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection - NFPA 805 transition Period (Triennial), dated May 9, 2006, this section of the IP was suspended for facilities in NFPA 805 transition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample bases, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors also conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

(1) Failure to Identify and Address an Adverse Trend in Performing Required Fire Watches

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, having very low safety-significance (Green) involving the licensee's failure to ensure that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement fire protection program Procedure ACP 1412.4, Impairments to Fire Protection Systems, Revision 55, requirements, in that numerous required fire watches which were initiated as compensatory measures for identified fire protection impairments, including mitigation of potential spurious operation of safe shutdown (SSD) components, were not performed (were missed), in the 12 months prior to this inspection.

Description:

The inspectors reviewed the licensees compensatory measures initiated to address fire protection impairments identified by the licensee analyses of plant fire protection safe shutdown systems design. Some of the identified issues included potential multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities and an Appendix R SSD unanalyzed condition, in an event of a fire.

Procedure ACP 1412.4, Impairments to Fire Protection Systems, provided guidance, requirements and administrative controls for maintaining the integrity of the fire protection systems including implementing fire watches as compensatory measures.

The inspectors identified an adverse trend related to implementation of fire watches used as interim compensatory measures to address licensee identified fire protection impairments; including multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities. Specifically, from September 9, 2008, to September 1, 2009, corrective action program (CAPs) 060115, 060226, 061342, 063065, 065986, 068682 and 069415 were issued to document and address missed fire watches. The missed fire watches were contrary to the requirements of Procedure ACP 1412.4. In addition, from June 1, 2009 to September 1, 2009, the licensee initiated five Fire Protection Impairment Requests (FPIRs) to document multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities and one FPIR concerning an unanalyzed condition in the Appendix R SSD analysis. For example, the inspectors were concerned that the missed fire watch identified in CAP069415 defeated the compensatory measures put in place because of the discovery of potential multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities and discovery of an unanalyzed condition in the Appendix R SSD analysis. Also, the inspectors noted that similar issues related to missed fire watches were identified in CAP035462, dated March 29, 2005.

The licensee viewed the missed fire watch occurrences individually (narrow scope) and failed to identify and address the adverse trend and the causes that resulted in additional missed fire watches. The licensees past evaluations attributed the missed fire watches mostly to poor communications, lack of resources and lack of management oversight.

The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform a trend analysis and an extent of condition for this issue as required by Procedure PI-AA-01, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 1. The procedure stated, in part, that a successful corrective action program will be based on the effective implementation of 13 critical attributes. In addition, the procedure emphasized that significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQ) represent a challenge to safe operations and require the engagement of the senior management team to ensure effective resolution and that Corrective Action Program data will be periodically reviewed in a systematic fashion to identify performance trends.

During the inspectors review of the seven CAPs issued for missed fire watches, the inspectors determined that these CAPs, in some cases, identified individual FPIRs initiated for multiple fire areas. For example, CAP 069415, dated September 1, 2009, documented multiple FPIRs which delineated multiple fire zones requiring hourly fire watches. This CAP identified 16 different fire zones requiring hourly fire watches as compensatory measures for impairments and multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities.

Based on this review, the inspectors concluded, that the licensee has failed to implement three of the following critical attributes identified in Procedure PI AA-01 as follows: (1)the effective monitoring and management oversight,

(2) the formal analysis and trending of data, and

(3) that CAP data will be periodically reviewed in a systematic fashion to identify performance trends.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that failure to implement fire protection program procedure requirements to conduct fire watches as compensatory measures for identified impairments in lieu of meeting Appendix R requirements and the failure to implement critical attributes/requirements contained in Procedure PI-AA-01, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 1, to correct this trend of deficiencies was a performance deficiency. Specifically, these compensatory measures were initiated to address fire protection impairments, potential multiple spurious operation vulnerabilities and an unanalyzed condition in Appendix R SSD analysis. Some of these deficiencies were discovered during NFPA 805 transition. These compensatory measures put in place were designed to fulfill the fire protection programs concept of defense in depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that could occur.

The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating system cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the failure to perform the assigned compensatory measures (fire watches),and to identify the adverse trend concerning missed fire watches defeated the compensatory measures that the NRC relied upon for allowing discretion for circuit issues and vulnerabilities identified during licensees NFPA 805 fire protection transition analysis, could have potentially compromised the ability to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a fire in any of the fire zones where the fire watches were missed.

In accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 3b the inspectors determined the finding degraded the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. Therefore, screening under IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, was required. Due to the complexity associated with evaluating six separate instances under IMC 0609, Appendix F, the inspectors and a Senior Reactor Analysts, with the concurrence of regional management, chose to evaluate this issue using IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. One of the seven instances, documented by CAP 065986, involved a fire door where fire watches had not been performed for approximately a week during which fire watches were required. However, the door was a supervised door. As such, the inspectors determined that the failure to perform fire watches in this instance was comparable to a low degradation which would screen to Green under IMC 0609, Appendix F. Of the six remaining instances identified where fire watches had not been completed, five of the instances were for one-hour durations, and one instance was for a three-hour duration, for a total of eight hours in duration. Based on the relatively short duration involved and that only one defense-in-depth element (barriers)was affected by the impairments for which the fire watches had been established, the inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety-significance, i.e., Green.

A Senior Reactor Analyst has reviewed this significance evaluation and regional management has concurred with the significance evaluation.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) for the CAP component because the licensees trending program failed to ensure that information from the CAP and other assessments in the aggregate are periodically trended and assessed to identify adverse trends. The Licensees Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) 001984, dated September 23, 2009, attributed the apparent cause of the missed fire watches adverse trend to a programmatic failure in the licensees trending program, which failed to assign the responsibility for reviewing potential adverse trend issues to a specific position or individual. Consequently, the licensee failed to identify the aggregate trend which was identified by the inspectors.

(Example P.1(b)).

Enforcement:

Technical Specifications, Paragraph 5.4.1.d, required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering Fire Protection Program Implementation. Procedure ACP 1412.4 is a written procedure implementing the fire protection program. Procedure ACP 1412.4, Section 3.1, Paragraph (7)(a)required that applicable Fire Watch Surveillances be issued continuously or hourly, as required. Procedure PI-AA-01, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 1, ensures that corrective actions are effectively implemented for concerns involving implementation of the fire protection program.

Contrary to the above, from September 9, 2008, through September 1, 2009, the licensee failed to implement requirements in Procedure PI-AA-01 that would have ensured the proper implementation of the Fire Protection Program in accordance with ACP 1412.4. Specifically, the improper implementation of Procedure PI-AA-01 resulted in numerous instances in which the licensee failed to issue and implement Fire Watch Surveillances as required by ACP 1412.4, Section 3.1, Paragraph (7)(a). The missed fire watches resulted in defeating the compensatory measures put in place to address licensee identified fire protection impairments; including potential multiple spurious operations vulnerabilities and an unanalyzed condition in Appendix R, SSD analysis.

The licensee has been transitioning to NFPA 805 and therefore the NRC-identified violation was evaluated in accordance with the criteria established by Section A of the NRCs Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) for a licensee in NFPA 805 transition. The inspectors determined that for this violation:

(1) the licensee would not have identified the violation during the scheduled transition to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 48(c);

(2) the licensee had established adequate compensatory measures within a reasonable time frame following identification and would correct the violation as a result of completing the NFPA 805 transition; however, the missed fire watches would defeat these compensatory measures

(3) the violation was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts; and

(4) the violation was not willful. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the violation did not meet criteria

(1) and criteria

(2) of the four criteria established by Section A above and enforcement discretion does not apply. Because this violation was of very low safety-significance and it was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CAP 069822, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000331/2009006-01).

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On September 18, 2009 and on October 6, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Costanzo and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report inputs discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

M. Allen, NOS Supervisor

S. Catron, Manager Licensing

R. Cole, Performance Improvement Manager

C. Costanzo, Site Vice President

D. Curtland, Plant Manager

J. Dubois, Engineering Programs Manager

G. Ellis, Fire Protection Supervisor

R. Hanson, Engineer (Appendix R)

E. Harrison, Operations Support Staff

S. Huebsch, Engineering Supervisor - NSSS/ECCS

B. Kindred, Security Manager

K. Kleinheinz, Maintenance Manager

B. Klotz, NFPA 805 Project Manager

M. Lingenfelter, Engineering Design Manager

B. Murrell, Engineer/Analyst - Regulatory Affairs

J. Parker, Fire Protection Instructor

T. Pegg, System Engineer

C. Schantz, Administration Specialist

J. Shriver, Administration Specialist

J. Schwertfeger, Security Operations Supervisor

R, Sullivan, Fire Protection Coordinator (Fire Marshal) - Operations

J. Swales, Engineering Supervisor - Mechanical Design

L. Swenzinski, Engineer/Analyst - Regulatory Affairs

P. Watkinson, Administration Specialist

T. Weaver, System Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Orlikowski, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Daley, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 3

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

05000331/2009006-01 NCV Failure to Identify and Address an Adverse Trend in Performing Required Fire Watches (Section 1R05.11b.(1))

Discussed

None