IR 05000331/1983007
| ML20024D442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1983 |
| From: | Clardy L, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024D435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-83-07, 50-331-83-7, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-04, IEB-82-1, IEB-82-2, IEB-82-4, IEB-83-01, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-04, IEB-83-1, IEB-83-2, IEB-83-4, NUDOCS 8308050028 | |
| Download: ML20024D442 (10) | |
Text
.
...
.
O U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-331/83-07(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-331 License No: DPR-49 Licensce: Iowa Electric Light and Power Company IE Towers, P. O. Box 351 Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At:
Palo, IA Inspection Conducted: April 26 through June 25, 1983 kk $YE h Inspector:
L. S. Clardy O<<lv / h l 9 93 Date o ff(
Approved By:
R. D. Walker, Chief,
/b )f N
,e Projects Section 2C Dste v
Inspection Summary Inspection on April 26 - June 25, 1983 (Report No. 50-331/83-07(DPRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; main-tenance; surveillance; startup testing, refueling and modified systems; plant operations; protective system trips; Licensee Event Reports; regional request; IE Bulletins; independent inspection; Part 21 reports; licensee meetings; and personnel changes. The inspection involved a total of 113 inspector-hours on-site by one NRC inspector including seven inspector-hours onsite during off-
shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, i
8308050029 830718 PDR ADOCK 05000331 G
_ _ _ _
.
-
. _ _, _,_, _ _ _
._
___
_. _.
_
_
.
.
DSTAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Mineck, Plant Superintendent-Nuclear D. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection / Security J. Vinquist, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Technical Support B. York, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Operations D. Teply, Operations Supervisor B. Miller, Technical Support Supervisor R. McCracken, Quality Control Supervisor In addition, the inspector interviewed several other licensee personnel including shift supervising engineers, control room operators, engineer-ing personnel, administrative personnel and contractor personnel (repre-senting the licensee).
- Denotes those contacted at the exit interviews.
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-05-01(DPRP)): Failure to meet Limit-a.
ing Conditions for Operation (LCO) for the diesel generators, high pressure coolant injection, and standby gas treatment systems. The licensee has taken adequate corrective actions to ensure repair work and testing does not inadvertently.make a system inoperable.
b.
(Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-05-02(DPRP)): Failure to follow pro-cedures for maintenance testing. The licensee has revised Adminis-trative Control Procedure (ACP) 1401.4 to provide guidance on when procedures are required. Training has been given on ACP 1401.4 and on safety related equipment post maintenance testing requirements.
c.
(Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-05-03(DPRP)): Failure to follow pro-cedures for log entries. The licensee has clarified ACP 1404.4 to specifically state logging requirements. Operators have been re-trained on the ACP.
d.
(Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-05-04(DPRP)): Failure to have ade-quate Shift Technical Advisor (STA) turnover procedures and delinea-tion of responsibilities. The licensee has modified ACP's 1201.6, i
1404.1, and 1404.4 to clarify turnover requirements and STA duties.
l (Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-05-05(DPRP)): Failure to have main-e.
tenance procedures for D/G fuel oil filter changeout. The licensee has written a repair procedure for filter changeout. The licensee now requires a procedure for safety related maintenance.
f.
(Closed) Noncompliances (331/82-07-02 and 82-18-01(DPRP)): Failure to lock valves in required positions. The licensee has implemented f
..
s
.
.
a procedural definition of a locked valve.
Procedures and instruc-tions which require locked valves have this definition included in them. The procedures and instructions also require independent veri-fication of the locked valves.
g.
(Closed) Noncompliance (331/82-08-01(DPRP)): Failure to correct Quality Assurance audit findings. The licensee now requires that audit findings cannot be closed based on commitments. Auditors were also reinstructed to ensure they review audit findings from previous inspections.
h.
(Closed) Open Item (331/82-13-01(DPRP)):
Inspection of the "A" Feedwater Regulating Valve air lines. The licensee inspected the air lines to_ verify there was no buildup of dessicant in them.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspec-tion period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emer-gency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview veri-fied that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and veri-fied implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspec-tion period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection, Diesel Generator, and Shutdowa Cooling systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed. portions of the radio-active waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting condi-tions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applica-ble; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to re-turning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were imple-mented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Turbine Bearing repair Intermediate Range Monitor repair Reactor Protection System Motor Generator (RPS MG) repair Following completion of maintenance on the RPS MG set, the inspector veri-fied that this system had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Standby Gas Treatment, Standby Filter Unit and Low Pressure Coolant Injection systems and verified that testing was performed in accor-dance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restora-tion of the affected components were accomplished, that test results con-formed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
l l
The licensee questioned the inspector on the NRC's position on calibra-tion of stopwatches. The inspector determined that in accordance with ANSI 18.7 (1976) Section 5.2.16, and NRR guidance (D. Eisenhut to R. Spessard letter dated January 12, 1983) that stopwatches used for technical specification or safety related testing require calibration, The licensee has developed and implemented an acceptable calibration t
program for stopwatches.
t No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
-
.
'
-
y
.:,}
.. - <
~,
,
~
.,,
yl
'.. ;.
y
.:7 /
'
.
-
,
.
.'
/
q
'
>
%.
.., ?.
-.,
.,
~
.-
.
s h
g p
.
.
-.,
y
_,
-
6.
Startup_ Testing. "Rqfueling
"
s
,-
-
,
-
-
~
'
,
.
,
The inspector verified the below listed testing was conducted in accor-dance with technically adequate procedures and that the facility was
~~*
operated within license limits:
-
,
,
_
,
Determination of Reactor Shut.dowa Margin
^..
Control Rod Drive Scram Time' Tests s-
-
-
Calibration of Local Power Range Monitors
'
-
APRM Calibration
-
-
\\
-
~
.
,
No items of noncomplignce or deviations were identified.
. '
'
.
. ' '
_
w
.
.
<.
"
7.
Startup Testing - M9dified Systems
'
'
"
,
s
,
-
.
.
m.
.
TheinspectorverifieAbhat;testingofmodifiedsystemswascondus.tedin
'
~
n.
..,
,.
,
,e viously established accepDnce. criteria.; hat' test results were within pre-accordance.with approvea pt.oc Qtref;and,
'
reviewed.
.'- '
The,following modifications were e,a'
'
'
w
-
.-
.
.
s, s.,
Change of Group 1 Containment ' Isolation aigtaal from double, low waters
'
% - C.,
level to triple low.
_
f
.
sN
-
.
,
,
.
4'
Change of Group 1 isolation pressure-setpoint from 88Q psig to
'
'
'
'
- -
f2
'
,,.
s 850 psig.
-
g
,
,. -,e
~
t
..,
,
Providing a dosble low setpoidt-1. sex, to non-Automat'ic Depres sri w
'
u
,
tion Safety valves.
..\\.
-
'
'
.,
.
..
,
,
Noitemsofnoncomplianceordeviatiopj.wereidentified.
,
.
r
% --
.
8.
Review of Plant Operations
.,
'
'
'
,
'
-
- c,
'
-
n
,
s The inspector verified that safety systems' toste:b o.r disturbed 'dulrihg 'th'e :
outage were made operable prior to startup.' 'The ' inspector also verified <
-;
,
j that plant startup, heatup, and a'pproych to criticality. was* con @cted in_"
~
l accordance with approved procedures an~d facility; Technical jpecifica$ ions.,g
\\
\\
-
l No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
'
C
'~
,
'
-
,.-
,
\\
+
.
?
l 9.
Protective System Trips
,
..
l
-
-
.;
,,
,
,
',
g Following the plant trip on Junt 3, 1983, the inspector ascertained'r'the
status of the reactor and safety ' systems by observition of control 150m M. '6 -
'
indicators and discussions with, licensee personngl concerning plant,
,
.,'
-
parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The
'..'
inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and re-l
..
viewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
- t
,
..
.
-
%
% V
%
,
m
-
- -
w
'
,
\\
v.
-.,
M P
.
.,
\\
s
.
,,=
\\
,
.
-
,
s
~
N 5-s s
,
~.
p 4.
'
Ku
-
. _ -
_
..
.. -
- - -
_.
_
-
_ -._.
.- -.--
.
e
- All systems responded as expected.
The plant was not returned to service during the inspection period due to turbine bearing vibration
,
problems.
On April 26, 1983 at 1:50 AM the' licensee placed the mode switch to shut-down, from refuel, upon completion of control rod drive friction testing.
Both "A" and "B" trains of the Reactor Protective System (RPS) should have
!
de-energized with a full scram occurring.
(The plant was in cold shutdown with all rods inserted.) However, only the "B" train tripped and "A" train remained energized. The licensee initiated a manual scram and both trains
'
de-energized (tripped).
The problem was traced to a bridge rectifier in the "A" RPS which on
,
initial installation had been connected improperly. Three connections had been tinned and crimped but never soldered correctly. The wires could be
moved and the rectifier voltage output would change. The "B" RPS side was-inspected and this condition was not present.
This rectifier supplies a signal to bypass the shutdown scram after two seconds so the scram signal can be cleared with the mode switch in shut-down.
If this shutdown scram is bypassed it is annunciated on a front
,
panel. When in shutdown the alarm should be in.
When the switch was
}
taken to refuel the alarm would clear because the shutdown scram would no longer be bypassed (if the circuitry were working correctly). The L
operators should have noticed that this alarm did not clear when the mode
,
switch was taken to refuel.
.,,
- '..
Under normal plant operating conditions if the situation were to occur
'-'
.
that the shutdown scram was bypassed the alarm would have annunciated.
L.
-
.
[
In any switch position all automatic scrams and the manual scram would
have worked (verified by licensee testing).
E'
The licensee has taken the following corrective actions:
,
! j '/
a.
Retrain operators on importance of verifying expected plant condi-
'
tions.
F,%,,.a
.
p
[
,,s b.
Quality inspected all RPS panels for loose wiring / correct termina-I tions.
~
c.
Ensured that their RPS preventive maintenance was adequate and com-
!
~
plies with all GE recommendations.
'
d.
All control room panels were checked for proper solder connections y
prior to startup.
s
,
I
.All safety related design changes this outage will be checked by
'
e.
L Quality Control and Post Maintenance Testing performed.
(This is
'
routinely done as required by licensee procedures.)
i-i i
i
.
Eh
6
,
y,
.,,,,,,..,,,.
--y-
,, -
-, - _
,,,.
,,,,.,,
y.
-,,,
_,,,.,-,,,,_,,
,y
.
.y.y
+,,, -, -
.,,,.m
--,-
3~.
--.
-w
,-
.
.
.
.
f.
Licensee will take comparative voltage checks before and after repair on both "A" and "B" trains.
(The problem was only in "A".
"B" was measured for comparison only.)
g.
Licensee verified by testing that all scrams function and that the "A" rectifier and RPS circuitry were not damaged.
On April 29, in cold shutdown, operators were draining through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system to radwaste to maintain reactor level within normal limits (3190"). When the level had reached the desired setpoint an operator secured drain flow (shut MOV 1936). The operator did not verify MOV 1936 shut; observe drain flow for a rate decrease; or watch reactor water level to see if it became stable. MOV 1936 was not or did not shut and a low level Reactor Protective System (RPS) trip was received. Subsequent operation of the valve revealed no problems with the valve.
Interviews with operators indicate that as a result of this event they are more cognizant cf plant evolutions and possible effects. The licensee should continue to stress the importance of all operator actions and possible results of their actions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to pre-vent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical
]
specifications.
82-64/03-0 Closed Standby Filter Unit (SFU) Heater Trip. The heater trip has been reset to 550 F in accor-dance with manufacturers guidelines. The trip I
sensor is located on the heaters. A second heater trip is provided on high air temperature at 125 F.
This sensor is upstream of the char coal filters. A similar design is used on the l
Standby Gas System. This also closes IE Informa-l tion Notice 83-25.
83-10/03-0 Closed Snubber Bushings Missing.
Installation, main-tenance, and surveillance procedures have been
,
j modified to ensure bushings are correctly in-
.
stalled and inspected. The bushings on all l
applicable snubbers have been replaced with bushings that cannot slip out or become mis-aligned.
, - _ - _.
-
..
- -.
. _ _ _ _
. _ _
.
.
83-13/01-0 Closed Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) Exceeded Allowed Leakage Rates. The licensee repaired and retested the valves satisfactorily. The licensee did not submit an LER until informed by the NRC that this was a reportable occurrence.
83-19/03-0 Closed Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Valve Inoperable.
The licensee determined that through personnel error the supply breaker for valve 2701 was opened. Two regional security specialists, a senior resident inspector, and a reactor in-spector were dispatched to the site to followup on licensee actions. The inspectors concurred with the licensee findings.
11.
Followup on Regional Requests Potential Unmonitored Failures in Class IE Switchgear The licensee provided information requested by the resident inspector concerning design, operation, and test information for breakers required to close to support safety related functions. The regional office will review this information.
Capped Pressure Sensing Lines Several recent events at Kewanee, Prairie Island and Arkansas Nuclear One have identified containment pressure sensing lines obstructed by caps, tape or other objects. The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for local leak rate testing and verified that adequate instructions were provided for the restoration of these lines subsequent to leak rate testing. During containment tours, the inspector observed no obstruc-tions present on these lines.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Eulletins listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility.
If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information dis-l cussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective l
action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
,
i
- _. _
.__
_ __. _.. _ _ _ _.
-
-
. _, _ _ __
_ _..
_
_
.
.
(Closed) IE Bulletins 82-01, 82-02, 83-01, 83-02 and 83-04: These bulletins were issued to DAEC for information only. The inspector verified the licensee reviewed the information and took any applicable precautions at DAEC.
(0 pen) IE Bulletin 82-04:
IR 331/83-03 (DPRP) erroneously stated the licensee uses Bunker Ramos electrical penetrations. The licensee does not use Bunker Ramos electrical penetrations. A regional specialist will followup on this item.
13.
Independent Inspection Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
During the inspection period the licensee determined that the PASS system could not, as designed, analyze for dissolved oxygen and hydrogen.
The system was designed by General Electric and is used in other BWR's.
The licensee developed an acceptable alternate method for using the PASS to analyze for dissolved oxygen and hydrogen. This method was discussed with Region III specialists and the resident inspector.
The licensee also determined that some Class II piping had been installed in the CASS system. Since this is a sample / instrumentation line it was installed with a 3/4 inch orifice in it to allow use of Class II piping.
The licensee has upgraded the piping to Class I.
The inspector discussed the process of upgrading with a Region III specialist and the licensee.
The licensee upgraded the piping in accordance with Class I requirements.
One Hour Report 'ng Requirements The inspector informed the licensee that if the plant is in cold shutdown and a system is not required to be operable, then a one hour report is not required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)1 or 5, if that system is found inoperable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
14.
Part 21 Followup The inspector verified the licensee has reviewed the applicability of Barten Models 763 and 764 transmitters thermal nonreliability at DAEC.
l The presently installed transmitters are not located in areas of, or in
accident conditions subject to, heat loading required for transmitter malfunctions. The licensee will track this item for any future correc-tive actions and recommendations through their design engineering work list.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l l
l
l
- -.
,
_ _ _. _
_ _
_
,,
.. _....
_
- _, _. _ _, _ _.
,
,., _ _. -
. - _ - _. -
r e
15. Licensee Meetings On June 21, 1983 the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
meeting was held in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. This meeting will be covered under a separate inspection report.
Subsequent to the SALP meeting, a followup meeting was held between Mr. J. G. Keppler and members of his staff and Mr.- S. Tuthill and members of his staff, to discuss licensee progress on the Regulatory Performance Improvement Program (RPIP). Licensee progress has been satisfactory and the licensee is meeting his commitments. The licensee continues to approach and implement the plan with enthusiasm.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
16.
Personnel Changes During the inspection period three licensee personnel changes were made.
Mr. L. Root was named Vice President Engineering, Mr. D. McGaughy was named Manager - Nuclear Division, and Mr. D. Wilson was named Manager -
Nuclear Fuels and Licensing.
Mr. Root now has cognizance of all Iowa Electric engineering. Although he is removed from direct corporate control over DAEC, he will still be in-volved in its operation.
Mr. Wilson's previous duties as Assistant Plant Superintendent - Radiation Protection and Security will be assumed by the plant superintendent until a permanent replacement is obtained.
17. Exit Interview Due to the length of the inspection and the diversity of areas inspected, the exit interviews were conducted on a weekly basis between the NRC inspector and the appropriate licensee personnel.
In each case the scope and findings of the individual inspection areas were summarized.
t
!
l i
,
10