IR 05000315/2008005
| ML090220096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/2009 |
| From: | Jamnes Cameron NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB6 |
| To: | Rencheck M Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-005 | |
| Download: ML090220096 (28) | |
Text
January 21, 2009
SUBJECT:
D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT; 05000315/2008005; 05000316/2008005
Dear Mr. Rencheck:
On December 31, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 8, 2009, with Mr. L. Weber and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74 Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000315/2008005; 05000316/2008005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
DISTRIBUTION See Next page
Letter to
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000315/2008005; 05000316/2008005; 10/01/2008 - 12/31/2008; D.C. Cook Nuclear
Power Plant, Units 1 & 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 remained in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, during the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power during the entire inspection period.
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems due to their risk significance or susceptibility to cold weather issues:
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank Systems
- North and South Fire Protection Storage Tank and Piping Systems
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 East and West Main Steam Enclosures
This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparations sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Readiness For Impending Adverse Weather Condition - Winter Storm Warning
a. Inspection Scope
On Monday November 17, 2008, a winter storm warning was issued for high winds and heavy snow squalls in the vicinity of the plant. The inspectors observed the licensees preparations and planning for the predicted significant winter weather. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and discussed potential compensatory measures with control room personnel. The inspectors focused on plant managements actions for implementing the stations procedures for ensuring adequate personnel for safe plant operation and emergency response would be available. The inspectors conducted a site walkdown including walkdowns of various plant structures and systems to check for maintenance or other apparent deficiencies that could affect system operations during the predicted significant weather. The inspectors reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems due to their risk significance or susceptibility to the impending winter weather:
- Fire Protection Pump House
- Screen House Area Ventilation System
- Supplemental Diesel Generator and Switchgear Enclosures
The inspectors also reviewed CAP items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
This inspection constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:
- Unit 1 available equipment options for core cooling strategy
- Unit 2 East Residual Heat Removal Train
- Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, UFSAR, TS requirements, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:
- Fire Zone 1E and 1F, Unit 2 East and West Containment Spray Pump Rooms
- Fire Zone 16, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Room
- Fire Zone 17C, Unit 1/2 Corridor to Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms
- Fire Zone 50, Unit 2 Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning Vestibule
- Fire Zone 17B, Unit 2 West Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Room The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted five quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents, including the UFSAR and engineering calculations, to identify licensee commitments.
The specific documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the failure of the fire suppression systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant areas to assess the adequacy of watertight barriers and verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments:
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Switchgear Room Cable Vaults This inspection constitutes one internal flooding sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
On October 28, 2008, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed operator requalification examinations to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate Technical Specification actions.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Quarterly Evaluations(71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant system:
- Supplemental Diesel Generators The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for SSCs (Structures Systems Components)/functions classified as (a)(2) or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization.
This inspection constitutes one quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
- Emergent maintenance on October 10 through 12, 2008, to replace Unit 2 east essential service water pump.
- Planned maintenance during the week of November 10, on M2 breaker in the 345 kilo volt switchyard, Unit 1 plant air compressor and surveillance testing on Unit 2 west train of residual heat removal.
- Planned maintenance on November 21 through 25, 2008, on transformer 4 in the 765 kilo volt switchyard, Unit 2 east component cooling water train and Unit 2 east centrifugal charging pump.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted three samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- AR 00826854, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Injection Pump Replacement
- AR 00839241, Identified Air / Gas Void in Piping
- AR 00841815, Unit 2 RHR Check Valve Seat Leakage
- AR 00839239, Identified Air / Gas Void in the Unit 1 North Safety Injection Train Piping
- AR 00839240, Identified Air / Gas Void in the Unit 1 South Safety Injection Train Piping
- AR 00841539, Inadequate Masonry Block HELB Barrier The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
This operability inspection constituted six samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification:
- U1 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Vessel Vent Assembly The inspectors compared the temporary configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation information against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system. The inspectors also compared the licensees information to operating experience information to ensure that lessons learned from other utilities had been incorporated into the licensees decision to implement the temporary modification. The inspectors, as applicable, performed field verifications to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed; the modifications operated as expected; modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the temporary modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how extended operation with the temporary modification in place could impact overall plant performance.
This inspection constituted one temporary modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing for the following activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
- Unit 2 east essential service water pump replacement;
- Unit 2 east centrifugal charging pump preventive maintenance;
- Unit 1 plant air compressor corrective maintenance;
- Unit 2 Train A solid state protection system logic card replacement; and
- Unit 12 east diesel driven fire pump replacement.
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion), and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted five post-maintenance testing sample as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Outage Activities
.1 Unit 1 Forced Outage
a. Inspection Scope
Unit 1 remained in a forced outage, which commenced on September 20, 2008, when the main turbine was manually tripped due to high vibrations and a resultant fire in the main generator. The inspectors conducted outage inspection activities, which included:
assessing the licensee's control of plant configuration and management of shutdown risk; reviewing configuration management to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth with respect to shutdown risk; and, verified that systems required for decay heat removal were appropriately controlled. Outage inspection activities will be completed when Unit 1 is returned to service.
An inspection sample was not completed during this inspection period.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:
- Unit 2 West Centrifugal Charging Pump Surveillance Test (in-service testing)
- Unit 1 CD Diesel Generator Fast Start Surveillance Test (routine)
- Unit 2 CD 250 VDC Battery Quarterly Surveillance Test (routine)
- Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Flow Resistance Surveillance Test (routine)
- Unit 2 West Residual Heat Removal Train Surveillance Test (in-service testing)
- Unit 2 Train A Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safeguards Reactor Trip Breaker and Solid State Protection System Automatic Trip/Actuation Operational Test (routine)
The inspectors observed in plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency were in accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted four routine surveillance testing samples and two in-service testing samples as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Emergency Plan Revision 26 and implementing procedure PMP-2080-EPP-101, "Emergency Classification," Revision 12 were implemented based on your determination, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q),that the changes resulted in no decrease in effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan as changed continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors conducted a sampling review of the Emergency Plan changes and a review of the Emergency Action Level changes to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
This Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on October 28, 2008, which required emergency plan implementation. Licensee emergency preparedness personnel had pre-designated that the opportunities for the Shift Manager to classify the event and make required notifications would be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance.
The inspectors verified that the Shift Manager classified the emergency condition and completed the required notifications to state and local police authorities in an accurate and timely manner as required by the Emergency Plan implementing procedures. The inspectors also observed the post-training critique to verify that licensee evaluators appropriately identified performance deficiencies. Documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
This emergency preparedness drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program
a. Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; that evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations are included in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of January 2008 through June 2008 although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted.
The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, self assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.
This review constituted a single semi-annual trend inspection sample as defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: In-Depth Apparent Cause Evaluation
a. Scope
The inspectors selected the following action request for an in-depth review:
- In-Depth Apparent Cause Evaluation, AR 00835671, Undesired Transfer of Inventory from the Unit 2 Volume Control Tank to the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank The inspectors discussed the evaluations and associated corrective actions with licensee personnel and verified the following attributes during their review of the above apparent cause evaluations and other related documents:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause and previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem, commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem; and
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem.
The above constitutes completion of one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176, Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin
Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of TI 2515/176 was to gather information to assess the adequacy of nuclear power plant emergency diesel generator endurance and margin testing as prescribed in plant-specific TS. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's TS, procedures, and calculations, and interviewed licensee personnel to complete the TI. The information gathered for this TI was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation on December 17, 2008. This TI is complete at D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant; however, TI 2515/176 will not expire until August 31, 2009. Additional information may be required after review by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
- On January 8, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L.
Weber, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
- A telephone exit for TI 2515/176 was conducted with Mr. R Lingle, System Engineering Manager, and other licensee staff on December 1, 2008. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
- A telephone exit for the annual review of emergency action level and emergency plan changes was conducted with the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Coordinators, Ms. C. Graffenius and Mr. D. Walton on November 13, 2008. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- S. Adkins, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing Coordinator
- L. Bush, Operations Manager
- J. Gebbie, Plant Manager
- C. Graffenius, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Jensen, Site Support Services Vice President
- C. Hutchinson, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- C. Lane, Engineering Programs Manager
- Q. Lies, Engineering Director
- J. Newmiller, Licensing Activities Coordinator
- J. Nimtz, Licensing Activities Coordinator
- P. Schoepf, Manager Nuclear Regulatory Compliance
- D. Walton, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- L. Weber, Site Vice President
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
NONE
-
Discussed
NONE