IR 05000312/1990005
| ML20043E006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1990 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043E005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-90-05, 50-312-90-5, NUDOCS 9006110352 | |
| Download: ML20043E006 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION V
Report No:
50-312/90-05
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Docket No.
50-312
License No. DPR-54'
Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District u
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14440 Twin Cities Road
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Herald, California-95638-9799
Facility Name: ' Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station i
Inspection at:
Herald, California (RanchoSecoSite)
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I Inspection conducted: March 3, 1990 through April 14, 1990.
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Inspectors:
A.-J. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector I
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C. J. Myers, Resid nt Inspector Approved By:
. I dW M7 3 P d -
Date Signed
H. Wong, ChiefV Reactor Projects Section(/
7 Summary:'
j Inspection between March 3 and April 14, 1990 (Report 50-312/90-05)
Areas Inspected: This. routine inspection by the: Resident Inspectors; involved j
the. areas of operational safety verification, health physics and security observations, engineered safety features system walkdown, maintenance,
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surveillance and testing, quality assurance and followup items..During this inspection. Inspection Procedures 71707, 71710, 61726, 62703, 92701, 92702, 93702, 86700, 30702 and 30703 were used.
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Results:
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General Conclusions:
An observed. weakness.was. found-in the control of t'roubleshooting activities.
Significant Safety Matters: None.
.Sumary of Violations or Deviations:
No violations or deviations were noted.
Open Items Sumary: None.
u 9006.110352 900523
{DR ADOCK 05000312
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted l
Licensee Personnel D. Keuter, Assistant General Manager (AGM), Nuclear
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- J. Shetler, Deputy AGM j
- S. Crunk, Manager, Nuclear Licensing f
P.- Bender,' Manager, Quality and Safety P. Turner, Manager, Support Services
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- P.'Lydca, Manager, Nuclear Plant D. Brock, Manager, Nuclear. Maintenance-
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W. Peabody, Manager, Technical Services
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L. Houghtby, Manager, Nuclear Security M. Bua, Nuclear Radiation Protection J. Delezenski, Supervisor, Regulatory Coodination, Licensing Other licensee employees contacted. included technicians, operators, mechanics, security, and office personnel.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on May 8,1990.
2.
-_0perational Status of Rancho Seco The plant started this inspection period shutdown and defueled with all
fuel assemblies stored in the spent' fuel pool.
Layup activities continued during the period... The. licensee's major effort continues to be focused on the developement of long-term layup procedures. Work.
continued towards the completion of layup for the reactor coolant system and the decay heat removal; system.
Current staffing levels as of May 1,1990 remained stable at approximately 560 total plant personnelJwith 36 licensed operators-H (25 SR0s and 11 R0s).
After the end of this inspection period, tae licensee announced the selection of S. David Freeman to replace Dtvid Boggs as SMUD General
Manager effective June 4,1990.
- 3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors reviewed control room operations which included access
control, staffing, observation of system alignments, procedural m
adherence, and log keeping.
Discussions with the shift supervisors and operators indicated an understanding by these personnel of the reasons for annunciator indicationt, abnormal plant conditions and maintenance work in progress.
The inspectors also. verified, by observation of valve i
and switch position indications, that emergency systems were-properly
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aligned as required by technical specifications for the defueled condition of the plant. Control room staffing remained-in accordance-with Technical Specification requirements.
The ::urrent number of
,l licensed operators is 25 SR0s and 11 R0s,
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Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings, including exterior areas,
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were made to assess equipment conditions-and plant conditions. Also, the-
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tours were made to assess the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. The inspectors also observed plant-housekeeping and cleanliness, reviewed potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards practices.
During work activities, it appeared that the health physics managers were conducting plant tours and monitoring work in progress. They appeared
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aware of significant-work which occurred during this period-,
The inspector's review of Radiation Work Permits (RWP) revealed that the RWP did include: job description, radiation levels, contamination, airborne radioactivity (if expected), respiratory equipment, protective clothing, dosimetry, special equipment, RWP expiration, health physics (HP) coverage, and signatures. The RWP radiation and contamination i
surveys were kept current. Employees understood the RWP requirements.
The inspectors observed-that personnel in the' controlled areas were wearing the proper dosimetry and perscnnel exiting the controlled areas:
were using the monitors properly.
Labeling of containers' appeared
appropriate.
The inspectors walked down portions of the protected and vital area boundaries to ensure that they were intact and that security personnel
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were peoperly posted where known deficiencies existed. The inspectors also observed protected areataccess control, personnel-. screening, badge issuing and maintenance on access control equipment. Access control-was observed. Personnel entering with packages were properly searched and access control was in accordance with licensee procedures.
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inspectors observed no obstructions in the isolation zone which could conceal a person or interfere with the detection / assessment system.-
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L Protected area illumination appeared adequate.:
y In suninary, operations staffing appeared adequate for the defueled.
condition of the plant.
Plant equipment continued to be maintair.ed in a graded approu.h dependent on its cicssification.
p No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
During the inspection period '.e' inspectors walked down the Spent Fuel
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Pool Cooling System and Auxiliary Building Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
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L System.
The inspectors concluded that:
All observed hangers and supports were properly made up and aligned.
- Housekeeping was adequate.
- No excessive packing leakage was observed on valves.
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Major system components were properly labeled, lubricated and.
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cooled.
No excessive leakage was apparent.
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Instrumentation appeared to be properly -installed.-
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No out of calibration gauges were identified.
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Flow path components appeared to be in the correct position.
- Required support systems were available,
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Proper. breaker and switch positions were verified, l
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No ~ violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
g tr Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed
and reviewed to ascertain that.they were conducted in accordance witha Technical Specification. requirements..
The following surveillance activities were observed:
a SP.451B Quarterly Channel Test of Reactor Building Purge Vent
and Auxiliary Building Stack Effluent Flow Rate Devices.
STP.1314 Spent Fuel Pool Leak Detection and-Repair.
- The following items were considered during this review:
testing-was in-accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of
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the affected components were accon,11shed; test results conformed with TS
and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the.
individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or engineer perfoming the test recorded the data-and'the' data was in agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any.
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities for the systems and components listed below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in-
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accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specifications.
Epoxy repair of spent fuel pool (SPF) leak.
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Installation of replacement flow instrumentation for.SFP
leakage.
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Troubleshooting of the teitium-activity contamination.
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The following items were consideied during this review:
The limiting
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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
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inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed
prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls _ were-
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implemented; and firr.t prevention controls were implemented.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Followep of Events (93702)
a.
Discrepancy in Tritium Activity Level in: Samples-The inspector reviewed an event involving a discrepancy identified
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by the licensee in the tritium activity level-in samples taken prior i
to release of processed, liquid effluent.
On April 22, 1090, while preparing to rele&se the contents of the north retention basin, the licensee noted a~ discrepancy between the tritium activity level of a sample from the basin (approximately.
10E-05microcuriespermilliliter).andaprevious--samplefrom~the
"B". Regenerative Holdup Tank (RHUT) (less than 10 E-06 microcuries per milliliter) which had been drained:to the basin. The activity
1evel in the basin was higher than that sampled.in the "B" RHlfT despite having been diluted in t% Dasin. While the activity level
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was still acceptable-for release of the basin contents, the licensee investigated the cause of the discrepancy and found that additional-tritiated water had been drained to the RHUT after sampling. The-
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additional water appears to have come from the Demineralized Reactor
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Coolant Storage Tank (DRCST), which contained activity of
approximately 10 E-02 microcuries per milliliter,;through the
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Nitrogen System piping due to a leaking check valve in the Nitrogen
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System. The licensee initiated three Potential-Deviations From a
Quality (PDQs) documents to resolve the= problem and were continuing
r their investigation.at the end'of the report period.-
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The inspector reviewed the circumstances of the event and walked down the affected portions of the Nitrogen System and Radwaste Handling System. The inspector found the licensee's investigation to be thorough and their preliminary root cause evaluation to be'
adequate. The licensee had identified a procedural deficiency in
the procedure for securing the Nitrogen! System which did not-
adequately isolate the Nitrogen System from those components served
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by the Nitrogen System.
In addition, a potential valve ic.isalignment -
during switching between RHUTs in service was identified as-contributing to the event due to ambiguous position-indication. The inspector observed that the licensee had promptly corrected the ambiguous valve position indication to preclude a recurrence of the l
event.
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i The~ inspector observed th6t the licensee's procedure A.34, Auxiliary Gas System Operation, did include a valve line-up as part of the guidance' for securing the nitrogen supply from the distribution ~
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system..However, in discussions with.the licensee personnel,'the r
. inspector found that the Operations department was using procedure A.34 at that time to troubleshoot the location and cause of a-suspected nitrogen leak.
Despite the potential personnel safety i s
hazard associated with accumulation of nitrogen gas in confined-spaces, the inspector.found that there had been no PDQ initiated.
reporting the problem.
Rather, the inspector found that=the i
Operations department was troubleshooting to investigate.the cause of excessive nitrogen consumption. However, there was no written r
troubleshooting plan developed or reviewed for the troubleshooting,
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actions.
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The' inspector expressed concern that the lack of a contbolle' d; _
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systematic approach to troubleshooting may have contributed to this event by not affording the problem adequate visibility and- _.
independent review to assure that the troubleshooting activity was:
appropriately controlled, i
At the exit meeting, the licensee acknowledged the_ inspector's concerns and agreed to review the adequacy of their control over troubleshooting activities within the scope of.the PDQ resolution-for the higher than ' expected tritium level event.-
l The inspector found the licensee's actions'to be adequate.
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No violations or deviations were identified, b.
Auxiliary ~ Building' Effluent Flow Element The inspector followed up on a. reported deficiency involving ths-
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auxiliary building stack effluent flow element. FE-15045. The' flow element measures the actual gaseous effluent flow for purposes.of-determining the activity being_ released. When the instrumentEisi
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inoperable, default values. corresponding to the maximum system flow j
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are substituted.to conservatively over-estimate the actual discharge
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until the instrument is returned to service.
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On March 28,~1990, Surveillance Procedure SP-451B to calibrate. _
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FE-15045-was due.
However, because'of a potential personnel safety--
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hazard associated with access to the instrument location which ~would involve movenient over the side of the' top of the reactor building, Operations personnel would not perform the surveillance until appropriate modifications could be made to provide for adequate.
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The inspector observed the precarious personnel, access hatchway-from-
the top of the reactor building and found that it did pose a hazard
particularly in high winds. The-inspector found that the personnel hazard had been reported in a Potential Deviation from Quality.
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The licensee _ initiated a Design Change Package (DCP) to install I
handrails around the access port as part of the disposition to the.
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PDQ._ In addition, a Technical Specification waiver was submitted to i
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utilize default values for effluent flow continuously.
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The inspector found the licensee's action.to be adequate.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Spent Fuel Pool Leakage (86700)
On March 22, 1990, the licensee completed repairs to the spent fbel pool (SFP) to stop a small leak of ap)roximately six gallons per day through the liner of the pool, which 1as persisted since 1974.. The inspector observed the repairs and discussed the procedure with
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licensee Engineering personnel.
The. repair consisted of tne -
underwater application of an epoxy sealant (Koppers-A-788 Splash Zone toQound) around ten suspect areas in the cask pit where embedded. studs for the cask catcher beam were seal: welded to the
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liner.
The licensee had' identified these areas as_ suspect in review of original construction records. The: epoxy compound had been-previously used-as a.SFP liner seal at another utility. According.
to the licensee, the epoxy was originally formulated for. coating _
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piers at oil' terminals in tidal zones which are alternately wetted
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and dried. According-to the manufacturer the epoxy compound will e
cure in water temperatures of at least 50 F.
The epoxy was-encapsulated around the suspect seal weld areas by-the use of a-
special skirted nut which was threaded onto the stud by a diver.
Subsequent.to the repair, the licensee observed a significant reduction in leakage to approximately 1/2 gallon'per day, although
not totally eliminated. The licensee is continuing their investigation to-locate the source of the leakage, concentrating
their attention on visual examination in the area of the stop log.
At the end of the inspection period, licensee Engineering was
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evaluating the continuing scope of work.
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The inspector found the licensee's action to be adequate.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Meeting Attendance (30702)
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The inspector attended the regularly scheduled meeting of the licensee's-
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Board of Directors on April 5, 1990.
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9.
Followup (92701)
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L The inspectors reviewed the status of NRC open items at the Rancho Seco and concluded no additional items could be-closed at this time.
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10.
Followup on Notices of Violation (92702)
j The inspector followed up on the licensee's January 8,1990 and March 21, l
1990 responses to a Notice of Violation concerning. inadequate work
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control during-the' removal of the auxiliary fuel handling bridge from the'
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reactor. building - Based on'the information supplied by the licensee, the inspector concluded that a design change package had been initiated in
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parallel with the work activity and that the required 50.59 review was
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performed. prior to fuel movement.
Based on this information, Violation A was withdrawn. -This closes Enforcement Item 89-15-01.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's1 corrective actions in response to Violation B and found'them to be adequate. This closed Enforcement Item 89-15-02.
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11. Exit Meeting (30703)
The inspector met with licensee' representatives (noted in paragraph 1) at various times during the report' period and formally on May 5,.1990. The-scope and findings of the inspection activities' described in this report
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