IR 05000312/1978020
| ML19261D868 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1978 |
| From: | Faulkenberry B, Andrea Johnson, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261D857 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-78-20, NUDOCS 7906260547 | |
| Download: ML19261D868 (6) | |
Text
U. S. flVCLEAR REGULATORY C0fdISSI0fl
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0FFICE OF IllSPECTI0ft AND EllFORCEMEllT REGI0fl V Report flo.
50-312/78-20
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Docket flo.
50-312 License flo.
DPR-54 Safeguard Group Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility flame:
Rancho Seco Inspection At:
Clay Station, California Inspection Cont ted: flovember 16, 28, 29, 30 & December 6, 15 & 18, 1978 Inspectors:
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.7!78 Q. D. Johnson, Reactor /Jnspector Aate/ Signed Wm
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. Miller, Reactor Di'spector p4te Signed Mw
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. Johnston, Reactor
$w (pispector Ivlv7l7f DaydSiphed Q Woessner, Reactor Inspector Dat' Signed e
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B. H. Fa~ulkenberry, Section ' Chief Date Signed Approved By:
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B. H."raulkenb'erry, Chief, Rea' tor Date Signed c
Projects Section #2, Reagt'oT~0piirations and Nuclear Support Branch Summary:
Inspection November 16, 28, 29, 30 & December 6, 15 & 18, 1978 (Report flo. 50-312/78-20 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of refueling activities, maintenance, pipe support and restraint systems, followup vi previous inspection findings, followup on licensee event reports, refueling outa9a surveillance, and plant operations. The inspection involved 113 inspector hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
'R. Rodriguez, Manager, fluclear Operations
- P. Oubr6, Plant Superintendent
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- J. Sullivan, QA Engineer
- G. Schwieger, QA Director
- W. Ford, Supervisor Nuclear Operations
- M. Carter, Shift Supervisor
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- H. Heckert, Nuclear Engineering Technician
- J. Field, Plant Mechanical Engineer D. Comstock, Shift Supervisor W. Wilson, Senior Chemical and Radiation Assistant A. Anderson, Maintenance Foreman R. Lawrence, Plant Engineer The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering staff, shift supervisors, reactor operators and maintenance personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Refueling Operations Inspectors examined the master copy of STP-214
" Refueling Rancho Seco for Cycle 3."
All changes between this procedure and the draft copy examined on a previous inspection (see IE Inspection Report No. 50-312/78-18) were found to be consistent with the procedure intent, regulatory guidelines, and industry standards.
The final procedure had been reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Committee.
Completed portions of the refueling procedure, STP-214, and OPOP B.8, " Refueling," revealed that the following pre-fuel handling activities had been satisfied or completed, as re-quired:
technical specification requirements, refueling equip-ment checks and interlocks, ventilation and cooling system requirements, communication system tests, and radiation monitor checks.
Approximately six hours of activity on the refueling floor was observed by the inspectors. A senior licensed operator was present, as required'by technical specifications, and was direct-ing the movement of fuel. A procedure was present for fuel move-ment and communications were established between control room, 2313 218
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refueling floor, and the fuel storage building.
Observations on the refueling floor and control room disclosed that core monitoring, reactor mode (power to CRD systems), and fuel accountability (both assemblies and core components) were as required by technical specifications and procedures.
Core internals, leads, vessel studs, and closure bolts were observed to be adequately stored to protect against damage.
Housekeeping on the refueling deck appeared satisfactory.
Records indicated that containment integrity during refueling, vessel water level, and the boron concentrations in the refueling cavity and spent fuel pool were in accordance with the technical specifications.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Plant Operations An examination of OPOP B.1, " Plant Precritical Checks," and discussions with licensee representatives disclosed that plans exist to test all safety-related systems which underwent main-tenance, or were disturbed during the refueling outage.
Facility tours were conducted on flovember 15 and 29.
Radiation controls were established for the outage and contaminated and high radiation areas were posted. Housekeeping of the facility was in order throughout the areas toured. A control operator queried by an inspector on the annunciator panel was cognizant of the indications and equipment out of service.
Shif t super-visor logs, control operator logs, the refueling outage log, and trouble report lc] were reviewed by the inspectors from the period of flovember 15 through flovember 29. A review of tempera-ture and pressure recordings showed that the reactor cooldown was consistent with technical specifications requirements.
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Refueling * tage Surveillance 1.icensee prv 2dures for refueling outcge surveillance tests required by the facility technical specifications viere reviewed for proper licensee approvals and content. The procedural con-tent was found to be consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and adlinistrative controls.
The inservice reactor coolant system leakage test, including test manning, prerequisites, and use of the approved test proce-dures by qualified personnel, was observed.
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-3-Test data sheets were evaluated for results in comparison with acceptance criteria, and were found to be within those criteria.
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Reviews of the data sheets were done by the cognizant engineer and appropriate management personnel, and were signed off in accord-dance with procedures. Changes to test procedures were duly noted in the data packages and a forri attached for later Plant Review Coninittee review and approval.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance of Pipe Support and R_es_tr_aint_ Systems The licensee's functional testing of safety-related hydraulic shock suppressors (snubbers) was reviewed, and selected tests of the snubbers were witnessed, a.
Discussions with cognizant licensee staff revealed that eight out of 53 safety-related Bergen-Patterson snubbers failed to lockup during functional testing due to scored poppet-valve seats (referenced in SMUD Pseportable Occur-rence ?!o. 70-15). Seven of the inoperative snubbers, which were all Model HSSA, would not lockup in the retract direc-tion, while one would not lockup in the extend direction.
Five of the failed units were found to still have the pop-pet spring entrapped between the poppet and seat of the valve block. The licensee postulated that when its per-sonnel forcibly shortened the snubbers by slamming them against a floor or wall, sufficient offset thrust was exe-cuted on the poppet spring to wedge it between the poppet-valve seats. Reportedly, the snubbers were slammed by licensee personnel to shorten them to the correct installa-tion length following functional testing en a test stand.
This model snubber grows in length when unrestrained.
Consequently, some allowance for this growth after test-ing must be mada.
Typically, a temporary locking device may be installed on the snubber, or the snubber may be taken off the test stand somewhat shorter than needed for installation.
The licensee stated that the problem has been corrected by instructing maintenance personnel not to slam the snubbers, by installing a temporary locking nut on the snubber from the time it is removed from the test stand until it is reinstalled, and by adding written precautions against abusive handling during all phases of snubber maintenance, particularly reinstallation.
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-4-A conference was subsequently held with the licensee to develop a clear understanding of the licensee's proposed corrective actions for this occurrence. The licensee was informed that this occurrence was being examined by IE Headquarters personnel for its possible generic applica-bil ity.
Pending the conclusion of that review, the licensee has agreed to take certain actions which ere being specified in an Imediate Action Letter to the licensee.
b.
The licensee's informal lubrication of ball bushings on the ends of safety-related ITT Grinnel Snubbers was discussed with licensee and vendor representatives. Thebushinggare self-aligning and permit the snubber to acccmodate + 5 of misalignment due to angular motion of the snubber. The vendor's verbal recommmendation was that the bushings not be greased so long as the bonded molybdenum disulphide dry-film lubricant was adequate to lubricate the bearing.
The vendor's experience was that no greasing of the snubber bushings has been recessary.
However, the vendor recommended that if greasing of a bushing was begun, it should be t a-peated at each annual major outage to ensure continued lubrication of the bushing. Greasing vitiates the dry-film lubricant. The licensee representative stated that the vendor's recommendations covering the ball bushings of safety-related ITT Grinnel snubbers would be evaluated. This item remains open, and the licensee's evaluation will be examined in a subsequent inspection.
No items or noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Maintenance - Refueling Several maintenance activities scheduled for completion during the refueling outage were examined, including; hydraulic shock suppressor funtional testing, pressurizer code safety replacement, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff drain line modifications.
The system clearance procedures, preoperational testing requirements, and maintenance inspections by licensee and contractor personnel were reviewed.
The qualifications of the personnel who performed and inspected the hydraulic shock suppressor functional testing were examined.
Selected testing was witnessed.
The modifications to the reactor coolant pump seal leakoff drainline, done under Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 1840, changed the systems described in Figures 11.1-4 and 4.2-1 of 2313 221
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the Rancho Seco FSAR.
These modificaticns were begun during the refueling outage and the ECN indicated that no written safety evaluation of this modification to determine whether or
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not it constituted an unreviewed safety question was required.
When the inspector queried the licensee about this, the licensee stated that a written safety evaluation would be completed for the modification, as required by 10 CFR 50.59b, prior to reactor startup. This item remains open pending an examination of the licensee's written safety evaluation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Fire Protection Equipment Modifications The inspector examined the status of modifications to the facility fire protection system prescribed in Amendment flo.19 to the NRC Operating License for Ranch Seco.
The examination included the following:
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Engineering and corstruction schedule and the modifications completion status, b.
Constructior, inspection data reports.
c.
Nonconformance reports.
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Quality assurance audit records.
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Installed firedoors, instrumentation, smoke detectors, insulation, revised lighting and ceiling in computer room, and relocated fire hydrant and transformer.
With the exception of providing for radio communication inside the containment building and accomplishing the full 50^; of fire stop installations, all items required to be completed during the current outage have been or were scheduled to be completed prior to returning the reactor to routine operatinn. The licensee has requested relief from the above two requirements from NRR with the intent to have the items completed during the 1979 refueling outage.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the coaclusion of the inspection.
The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.
No items of noncom-pliance or deviations had been identified by the inspectors.
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