IR 05000303/2004027
| ML17299A314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, 05000303  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1985 |
| From: | Ball J, Hernandez G, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299A312 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-85-16, 50-529-85-10, 50-530-85-07, 50-530-85-7, NUDOCS 8506050171 | |
| Download: ML17299A314 (15) | |
Text
8506050i7i 8505i3 PDR ADOCK 05000528'(
PDR U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License No.
50-528/85-16, 50-529/85-10, and 50-530/85-07 50-528, 50-529, and 50-530 NPF-34 Construction Permit Nos.
CPPR-142 and 143 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project Post Office Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit Nos.
1, 2, and 3.
Inspection Conduct d:
h 3 - April 27, 1985 Inspectors:
fern enior Resident Inspector siis)pC Date Signed
<<
iris'pproved By:
~Summa r Ball sident Inspector L.
. Miller, Chief R
ctor Projects Section No.
Date Signed
/a Date Signed Ins ection from March 3 - A ril 27 1985 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/85-16 50-529/
85-10 and 50-530 85-07 Areas Ins ected:
A routine, onsite inspection by the Construction Resident Inspectors of activities related to the as-built configuration and documentation of the Unit 2 Essential Spray Pond System, close out of a followup item related to containment liner plate installation records, examination of licensee action on I. E. Information Notice No. 85-10, and on Construction Deficiency Report Number 85-03.
The inspection involved 373 inspector hours onsite by two NRC Resident Inspectors.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified (Failure to perform inspections related to the installation of electrical pull boxes and man holes, see paragraph 6c).
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
E. E.
-D.
BE
"W. E.
D. B.
W. F.
A. C.
L. A.
"C. N.
D. E.
T. A.
'"R. J.
S.
G.
J.
C.
A. T.
K. R.
M. L.
W.
W.
D.
M.
H. L.
W. J.
Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production Ide, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager Quinn, Licensing Manager Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager Souza, Assistant Corporate Quality Assurance Manger Russo, Quality Assurance Audits/Monitoring Manager Fowler, Quality Control Manager Shriver, Quality Systems Engineering Manager Burgess, Field Engineering Supervisor Penick, Quality Assurance Monitoring Supervisor Sherrin, Quality Document Review Group Supervisor Ramey, Quality System Supervisor Daley, Quality Assurance Engineer Provost, Quality Assurance Engineer Montefour, Quality Assurance Engineer LeBoeuf, Quality Assurance Engineer Green, Quality Assurance Engineer Gratza, Quality Assurance Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Co oration (Bechtel)
W.
S.
W.
AJ
"T.
-"H.
H.
J.
R.
G.
J. Stubblefield, Project Manager M. Nickell, Project Superintendent G. Bingham, Project Engineering Manager L. Black, Chief Resident Engineer L. Horst, Project Field Engineer R. Hawkinson, Project Quality Assurance Manager A. Foster, Project Quality Control Engineer A. Mear, Assistant Project Quality Control Engineer Waddington, Assistant Project Quality Control Engineer Ruff, Lead Electrical/Instrumentation Quality Control Engineer Griffin, Lead Civil Quality Control Engineer
<:Denotes personnel attending the NRC Exit Management Meeting conducted on April 30, 1985.
The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspectio.
Plant Status Unit One:
Post Core Hot Functional Testing continued.
The reactor coolant system was heated to 565 degrees F
and pressurized to 2250 psi.
Initial criticality was scheduled for the end of May 1985.
Unit Two:
Unit 2 has a scheduled fuel load date of December, 1985.
Construction completion of Unit 2 was estimated at 99.5/ by the, licensee.
Unit Three:
All major components and equipment have been installed.
The major activity ongoing is the installation of electrical cable and instrumentation terminations, which was estimated at 80/ complete.
Unit 3 has a scheduled fuel load date of March, 1987.
Construction completion of Unit 3 was estimated at 94.6/ by the licensee.
3.
License Action on Ins ector Identified Followu Items:
Closed Followu Item No. 50-529 85-01-0
"Containment Liner Plate Installation Records."
During a previous inspection, the inspector determined the licensee had not prepared a summary sheet of inspections performed on the containment cylindrical liner plate, or inspections performed on containment liner penetration plates.
However, the licensee was able to produce supporting documentation which indicated that all required inspections had been performed.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed completed summaries which the licensee had committed to prepare based on the available supporting documentation.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee close out of NCR No.
CC5029, under which this work was accomplished.
The inspector determined that work was accomplished as stated by the licensee.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations from NRC requirements were identified, 4.
Licensee Action on I.E. Information Notices - Unit Nos.
2 and
0 en I.E. Information Notice No. 85-10 Su lement No.
"Post Tensioned Containment Tendon Anchor Head Failure."
The NRC on March 8, 1985, issued Supplement No.
1 to I. E.
Information Notice No. 85-10, providing additional information regarding,
"(1) the failure of an additional anchor head (from a different fabrication lot control number),
(2) the discovery of water within the greas'ed tendon system, and (3) the preliminary determination of the cause of the failures as provided by Alabama Power Company for Farly Unit No. 2."
Discussion with licensee representatives indicated they have not formally responded to the NRC on this Information Notice.
However, the licensee's inquiries into the concerns identified in the original I.E. Information Notice indicated the failures of the field anchor heads at the Byron (1979)
and the Bellefonte (1975 and 1976)
plants had been previously identified to the licensee and their tendon installer, Western Concrete Structures.
Western Concrete Structures performed a load testing program on July 28 and August 14, 1980.
The testing consisted of loading the anchor head specimen to 120 percent of guaranteed ultimate tensile strength (GUTS) for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and loading until failure.
The results of the tests indicated that the tendon anchor heads would perform their design function.
Discussion with NRC technical personnel indicated that due to the discovery of moisture accumulation in the tendon grease cap at these plants, the suspected cause of the failure was believed to be hydrogen stress cracking (HSC).
The conditions for hydrogen stress cracking to occur are when high strength steel is subjected to sustained tensile stresses and a source of hydrogen is available.
Testing by Alabama Power Company indicated that a corrosion cell was% -,.-
established inside the tendon grease cap which produced the source of hydrogen.
The source of water in the tendon grease cap has not been specifically determined.
However, further discussions with NRC technical personnel indicated that as more information is received from the different plants and the cause of the tendon anchor head failures is positively determined, an additional supplement to Information Notice No. 85-10 will be issued.
In March 1984, the licensee completed the first year inservice inspection of Palo Verde Unit No.
1 and found no defects or cracks in the anchor heads.
The third year inservice inspection for Unit No.
1 is due December 1985, and the first year inservice inspection for Unit No.
2 is due on February 1986.
These inspections will provide another examination on the Palo Verde tendon anchor heads within a relatively short time which will provide additional information on whether the concerns expressed in the Information notice are germane to Palo Verde.
The Information Notice remains open, pending the receipt of new information related to the tendon anchor head failure's and their relation, if any, to Palo Verde.
Seismic Se aration Criteria In January 1985, the licensee verbally notified the NRC Resident Inspectors that they were evaluating a potentially reportable condition in Unit 2 related to seismic separations (gaps)
between internal structures or attachments and the containment shell.
Interferences could lead to possible damage to safety-related systems and possibly prevent their proper functioning during a design basis event.
On February 8, 1985, the licensee formally notified the NRC of a potentially reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e),
and documented this as Deficiency Evaluation Report No. 85-03.
The licensee also informed the NRC that they were examining this condition for applicability to Unit No.
1.
Subsequent engineering examinations of field condition
~
'
and evaluation of identified discrepancies in Unit 1 determined that none of the identified discrepancies would prevent or interfere with the operability of any safety system in Unit l.
Subsequent discussions with the licensee on this subject determined that a three to six inch seismic gap between internal and containment shell structural components Vere detailed on Civil Structural drawings since March 9, 1977.
Further, during a field verification examination by a Bechtel home office engineer in February 1983, and subsequent examinations, a number of failures to maintain the seismic gap requirement were discovered.
Subsequent to these discoveries, Design Change Packages Nos.
1SC-ZC-125, 2SC-ZC-125, and 3SC-ZC-125, were initiated for all three units to correct the identified discrepancies.
Because of the confusion on the exact sequence of events regarding this issue, the licensee was requested to provide a chronology of events regarding the seismic gap problem.
Additionally, on March 21, 1985, at the request of the licensee, a meeting was held in Walnut Creek, California, wherein the licensee presented additional information.
This included that further evaluation of DER No. 85-03 had determined the DER not to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
requirements in February 1983 for Unit l.
At this meeting, the licensee'ommitted to issuance of a final report on this subject to further clarify why this problem occurred, whether any other areas exist where the licensee failed to implement design requirements, and to clarify when Engineering issues Nonconformance Reports for discrepancies identified by Engineering.
This item is unresolved pending review and evaluation of the licensee's final report on this subject.
(Unresolved Item No.
50-529/85-10/01)
6.
Review of As-Builts: Unit 2 As-Built Verification:
This inspection compared the as-built condition of the Unit No.
Essential Spray Pond System, with design, installation and quality assurance documents.
A.
Areas Reviewed:
1.
Pi in S stem Installation.
The following documents and areas were reviewed: piping and instrumentation diagrams, piping plans and isometrics, pipe support drawings, large and small pipe installation control cards, construction inspection plans for installation of embedded piping systems, vendor pipe spool fabrication records, shop and field welding records, certified material test reports, flange bolt torquing data sheets, and valve installation records.
The physical inspection of the piping runs included piping location, size, configuration, pipe support location, type, and,
~
'I
valve location and orientation.
The installation of the following pipe spools and associated pipe supports (totaling approximately 500 feet of piping for the Essential Spray Pond system, Train "B") was examined:
Pi e S ool Numbers:
2-SPB-022-S001 through S004 2-SPB-023-S001 and S002 2-SPB-025-S010 through S020 2-SPB-030-S001 through S003 S041 through S043 2-SPB-032-S011 through S013 and S016 2-SPB-049-SOOl through S004 2-SPB-050-S001 through S002 Location:
Essential Spray Pond-B Essential Spray Pond-B Essential Pipe Tunnel Essential Spray Pond-B Pump House Diesel Generator Bldg.
Diesel Generator Bldg.
Essential Spray Pond-.B Valve Pit The installation of the following valves was also examined:
Valve Number:
2JSPB-V012 2JSPB-HCV-46 2JSPB-HCV-48 2JSPB-HV-50A 2JSPB-HV-50B 2JSPB-HVC-134 2JSPB-HCV-136 Essential Spray Pond B Pump Outlet Check Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Essential Spray Pond B Spray Header Inlet Essential Spray Pond B Spray Header Bypass Diesel Generator B Jack Water Cooler Inlet Diesel Generator B Jack Water Cooler Outlet 2.
Electrical S stem Installation.
The following documents and areas were reviewed:
elementary and cable block diagrams, cable code and cable scheme numbers, single line diagrams, cable type and identification, including separation color and cable markers, E 580 computer program sorts for routing, iden-tification of cables at tray points, actual and allowable tray fillat tray points, and size and type of cable, physical separation criteria, including raceway and tray
designations, conduit and tray arrangement.
drawing, raceway installation cards, cable installation cards, and cable installation specifications.
The physical inspection of the cable runs included a determination of size, type, routing, protection, separation, identification, loading, cable supports and cable spacing.
The actual cable installation and routing was compared to the design as determined from the E580 computer program and the cable installation cards.
The installation of the following power, control and instrument cables, totaling approximately 10,000 feet for the Essential Spray Pond system, Train "B" were examined:
Cables:
2ESP01BC1CA 2ESP01BC1RG 2ESPOlBC1RH)
RI,RJ 2ESP06BClKA)
RA 2ESP06BClRC 2ESP06BC1RD 2ESP07BClKA)
RA 2ESP07BC1RC 2EHS07BC1KA E ui ment:
Essential Spra'y Pond Pump/Motor B 2M-SPB-P01 480V Motor Control Center 2E-PHB-M3227 Essential Spray Pond Pump/Motor B Space Heater 2M-SPB-P01H Spray Header Inlet Valve 2J-SPB-.HV-50A Spray Header Inlet Bypass Valve 2J-SPB-HV-50B Spray Header Inlet Valve 2J-SPB-HV-50A Spray Header Inlet Bypass Valve 2J-SPB-HV-50B Spray Header Inlet Bypass Valve 2J-SPB-HV-50B Essential Spray Pond Pump House B Exhaust Fan 2M-HSB-301 To Iocation:
4160 V Switchgear 2EPBB504C 4160 V Switchgear 2EPBB504C4 4160 V Switchgear 2EPBB504C 480 V Motor Control Center 2E-PHB-M3223 480 V Motor Control Center 2E-PHB-M3223 Safety Equipment Status System 2J-ESB-C01 480 V Motor Control Center 2E-PHB-M3224 Safety Equipment Status System 2J-ESB-COl 480 V Motor Control Center 2E-PHB-M3214 B.
A licable S ecifications and Procedures:
The following specifications and Work Plan Procedures/equality Control Procedures (WPP/gCI) governing the installation of
y
piping and electrical cables were reviewed during this inspection:
13-PM-204 WPP/QCI 202.0 13-EM-300 13-EM-301 13-EM"303 WPP/QCI 251.0 WPP/QCI 254.0 13-E-ZAC-50 C.
F~indin s:
Specification for Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems Piping Systems Installation Installation Specification for Electrical Cables in Cable Trays Installation Specification for Electrical Cables in Conduit and Duct Banks Installation Specification for Electrical Cables,and Raceway Identification Raceway Installation Cable Installation Conduit and Tray Notes, Symbols and Details and 13-E-ZAC-80 On March 1, 1985, the inspector found a leaking weld on line 2-SPB-022, an eight inch diameter stainless steel pipe inside the Unit 2 essential spray pond.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee identified four pin hole leaks in Train "B" of the Unit 2 south spray pond, 55 in Train "A" of the Unit 2 north pond, and three in Train "B" of the Unit 1 south pond, for a total of 62 pin hole leaks.
Positive identification by the licensee of Gallionella (a metal-attacking bacteria)
and the nature of pitting indicated the probable cause of the leaks was microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) induced by stagnant water.
The licensee submitted a report on this to the NRC on April 3, 1985.
This report is being evaluated by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
2.
Bechtel Work Plan Procedure/Quality Control Instruction 251.0
"Raceway Installation" Appendix I, Revision 18, Section B-5, item 3, requires verification that, "...the proper type and size of pull boxes, man holes, hand holes, terminal boxes and/or receptacles have been installed per
'applicable drawings.
Section B-5, Item 16 further requires verification that, "... cable in electrical man holes is properly supported and racked."
Review of records related to the installation of man holes in Unit 2 through which cables to the essential spray pond pump house and valve pit are run, revealed that although construction was completed in March 1983, the man holes had not been inspected.
Noting the delay in the performance of these inspections, the inspector was prompted to review inspection records for man holes in Unit 1.
The inspector found that these inspections also
~
had never been completed.
The man holes involved are lEZV06AKEM02, lEZV06AKEM03, lEZV06AKEM04, lEZV06BKEMOl, lEZV06BKEM02, and 1EZV06BKEM04.
Review of system turn over records for Unit 1 do show that the licensee had documented that these inspections were not complete.
However, the licensee failed to schedule this work for completion.
Similarly, the inspector found two other instances in which the licensee had not performed the inspections required by WPP/gCI 251.0
"Raceway Installation."
Specifically, pull boxes installed with conduits 2EZCAEBRC01 and 2EZJ3ACRX07 were not inspected at the time the associated conduits were.
The licensee is currently taking action to assess the extent of this problem.
(Reference:
licensee's Corrective Action Report CAR CA 850072).
Failure to perform these inspections is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" which states, in part, that, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings."
(Violation Nos.
50-528/85-16/Ol and 50-529/85-10/02).
7.
Ins ection Tour of Site:
On a weekly basis,'he inspector and licensee representatives toured the site to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of components, tagging and identification of material.
No violations or deviations with NRC requirements were identified.
8.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met on April 30,'985, with licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1.
The scope of the inspection and inspection findings as noted in this report were discussed.
The licensee acknowledged the apparent violation, as described in paragraph 6C of this repor I" p 0