IR 05000298/2001003
| ML032970222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/2003 |
| From: | NRC/EDO |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-01-003 | |
| Download: ML032970222 (2) | |
Text
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-298/01-03 IR 05000298/01-03; on 04/02-06/2001, onsite and 04/09-13/01, in-office; Cooper Nuclear Station; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Four issues identified during the inspection are discussed in the report. The significance of the issues is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined through the use of the Significance Determination Process as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.
CJohnson (4650)
PIM NRC NCV MS GREEN 04124101 01-03 71111.05 Failure to provide 20 feet separation between redundant service water systems
Green. The team identified a Non-Cited Violation in Fire Zone 20A (service water pump room) in which equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant following a fire was not separated by 20 feet horizontal distance, and there were intervening combustibles (Rubatex insulation) that were not part of an exemption, nor included in the licensee's engineering evaluation. This was not in accordance with Section IlI.G.2(b) of Appendix R.
This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 10075408 and 10076323. (Section 1 R05.2b)
This finding was of very low safety significance because the area-wide fire suppression and detection systems were not degraded, and the increase in combustible loading of the Rubatex insulation did not substantially increase the severity.
CJohnson (4650)
PIM NRC NCV MS GREEN 04/24101 01-03 71111.05 Failure to provide adequate emergency lighting to perform operator actions
Green. The team identified a Non-Cited Violation in Fire Zone 7A (control room basement)
in that emergency lighting was not aligned properly to adequately perform safe shutdown operator actions in accordance with Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 10076810. (Section 1 R05.7b)
This finding was of low safety significance because the operators would have available dedicated hand held lights that would assist them in performing required action CJohnson (4650)
PIM NRC NCV MS GREEN 04124/01 01-03 7111.05 Failure to Install detectors as committed to In the license
Green. The team identified a Non-Cited Violation in three areas (control room, diesel generator room, and the 1001 -foot elevation of the reactor building) in which the licensee failed to install detectors as documented in the safety evaluation report which was not in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(b). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 10078580, 10078607, and 10078606. (Section 4A05.2.1)
This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the number of mitigating systems remaining.
CJohnson (4650)
PIM NRC NCV MS GREEN 04124101 01-03 71111.05 Failure to perform calculations as required by NFPA Code 13 (1975)
Green. The team identified that on October 20, 1985, the licensee implemented modification design change MDC 85-48 in which they replaced 82-inch diameter sprinkler heads with 1/4-inch diameter sprinkler heads in the reactor recirculation pump motor generator set lube oil pump area (958-foot elevation of the reactor building) and in the reactor recirculation pump motor generator lube oil pump area (976 foot elevation of the reactor building). The licensee failed to perform calculations to ensure that the reduction in the diameter of the sprinkler heads did not adversely affect the suppression requirements in these fire areas, as required by the National Fire Protection Association Code 13. This was not in accordance with 1 0 CFR 50.48(b). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 10073757.
(Section 4A05.3.2).
This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, because there were no safe shutdown systems in the areas that could be affected by a postulated fire.