IR 05000298/1992024
| ML20128G521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1993 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128G515 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-92-24, NUDOCS 9302160035 | |
| Download: ML20128G521 (11) | |
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
REGION IV
Inspection Report: '50-298/92-24 Operating License:
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Licensee:
Nebraska public power District
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p.0, Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 facility Name:
Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection At:
Brownville, Nebraska
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inspection Conducted: November 15 through December 26, 1992
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Inspectors:
R. A. Kopriva Senior Resident inspector W. C. Walker, Resident laspector C. J. paulk, Regional Inspector L. E. Elle:rshaw, Regional Inspector htt -
L Approved:
'J. E.kTiafd5' GTH WUJects section C-EIT Inspection Summary Areas insnected:
Routine, announced inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, corrective actions for violations followup, and licenseo event report followup.
Results:
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The inspectors identified a missing nut on the jacket cooling; water
restraint for Diesel Generator 2.
The licensee was responsive in.
correcting the problem and performing operability determination
(Section 2.2).
The111censee identified a missing nut from_ a residual heat removal pipe
restraint. Again, corrective actions and operability determination were performed in a timely manner (Section 2.3),
-A fire drill performance was good.
postdrill critiques appeared to be'
informative and accurate. There was no apparent management review of drill activities _or disposition of items (Section 2.4).
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A low voltage condition on-the 69 kV transmission line resulted in-
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declaring _the site emergency transformer inoperable.
Licensee actions-for correcting the. problem were good, and followup activities. appear to be_ thorough (Section 2./).
9302160035-.930205 PDRz,ADOCK 05000298 G-PDR &
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Maintenance activities were well planned, organized, and executed
(Section3.0),
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Summary of Inspectiopn findinqt:
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e Violation 298/9215-01 was closed (Section 5.1).
Unresolved item 298/9123-03 was closed (Section 6.1).
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Licensee Event Reports91-011 and 92-014 were closed (Section 7).
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Inspection followup Item 298/9224-01 was opened (Section 2.'8).
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Attachment:
Persnns Contacted and Exit Meeting
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PLANT STATUS Minimal powerDuring this inspection pe reductions took place onriod, the plant was surveillances line isolation (va.e., rod adjustments i
weekends to performoperating at or properly in accordance withlve functionality.), The routinenear full power.
technical requirementscontrol rod operabilit anomalies were noted.
power changes were p,erformed and main
OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICA steam and procedures.
2.1 No TION Control Room Observatio (71707)
lhe inspectors ns professionalism wereperiod and verifies thatobserved operational a proper out log book, and controlmaintained.
control room staffing andies throughout this ins and verified that appropri t Cont room balancerol room shif t supervisor le e pection of control room 2.2 a
Plant Tours made.
The inspectors toured v ere reviewed housekeeping was being m iarious areas adequate.
ntained.
of the plant to a
identified a loose 30, 1992 Housekeeping was generallverify that proper On November
, during a walkdown y found to be corner hanger used toof the diesel generatornut lying under the jacketof repair the hangersupport the jacket water pi i room.
The water piping in the nspectors To nut a p ng. ppeared to be from northwest An engineering analys,is wthe licensee removed th a U-bolt egraded during the repair period such that itas performed to verify thate U-bo
- afety function.
perable at all times duri The licensee the piping was upport.
concluded that the dieselcould not perform its int ng the ie inspectors reviewed Mai t not repair, pairs generator was ended and discu f3ased on this review a dn enance Work Reque esel generators,ssed the repairs the maintenance activitensee had addressed operabili with the engine 3 for the hanger
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smic discussion, er responsible for the ty concerns air. analysis for the diesel generator withThe inspectors a_lso y.
the diesel during perforit appeared that of Maintenance ovals were the obtained prior to, durinon the diesel was perform d the U-bolt hanger remov dreviewed the vity.
mance e
promptly and all necessa g, and after e for completion of the ry repair
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2.3 Residual Heat Removal Missing Nut on Pipe Restraint On November 30, 1992, the licensee was performing a routine walkdown of the reactor building. While inspecting the Residual Heat Removal B heat exchanger room, a loose nut was found on the floor.
The nut had come from the load pin
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for a seismic clamp on Structural Support RH-H42A which supports the 16-inch
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inlet piping to the Residual Heat Removal B Heat Exchanger.
The pin was fully engaged with the strut paddle and both clamp ears and had not been removed for any purpose.
The nut was replaced promptly upon discovery.
The licensee reviewed the impact of the discrepancy on the operability of the support and concluded that the support was operable for the following reasons:
Due to the pin's orientation (horizontal) it was not prone to fall out
and cause the strut paddle to disengage from the clamp.
The pin was loaded in shear only.
Since the pin was found fully engaged
with the strut paddle <'d clamp ears, =ts purpose was fulfilled.
If a seismic event had taken place, the friction loads created when the
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seismic loads were applied to the support would have locked the pin into place.
The inspectors verified the as-found condition of the seismic support, reviewed the seismic analysis, and discussed the operability determination with licensee representatives.
As a result of this finding, the licensee performed a walkdown of other similar systems within the plant to assure no other support pins were missing nuts.
The inspectors considered this to be a conservative effort by the licensee.
The inspectors also performed independent walkdowns of several other piping-systems and found no additional discrepancies.
2.4 Fire Drill Observation On December 1, 1992, the inspector observed the licensee conduct an announced fire drill.
The scenario involved a fire in the Diesel Generator 1 room.
The inspector noted that fire brigade members responded in a timely manner, set up the equipment necessary to fight the fire, and wore appropriate protection apparel to fight the fire. All equipment needed to fight the fire appeared to be present and properly connected.
A postdrill debriefing oas conducted by the station fire protection engineer.
The licensee noted that the radio needed by the fire brigade members in the diesel generator room was not functioning properly, thus making communications with the fire brigade leader impossible.
The hose connected to the fire cart needed to be longer to cover all areas located in the diesel generator room.
During the debrief of the drill, the shift supervisor raised a concern of the possible need for an auxiliary operator to stay in the control room to facilitate use of emergency plan implementing procedures, rather than accompanying the fire brigade.
The inspectors discussed with the fire
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To enhance management review and disposition of fire drill discrepancies,_the licensee instituted a mechanism to ensure management involvement / overview.
The licensee planned to send fire drill critiques to the technical staff manager for evaluation as an action and commitment tracking item and planned to place a copy of-the drill critique in-management routing, lhe quality assurance manager and members of his staff were interviewed to determine the number and scope of audits.and surveillances conducted of. fire drill activities.
The inspectors found that at least one quality assurance audit was conducted per quarter.
Several audit reports were reviewed by the inspectors and discussed with quality assurance management to determine how the audit findings would be addressed and resolved.
The audit report-findings which were reviewed were addressed in timely and complete manner.
Licensee fire brigade members performed their assigned duties in an efficient and professional manner.
2.5 Radiological Protection Observations During the performance of plant tours and other inspection activities, the inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's; radiological-protection program were properly implemented in conformance with facility-policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Radiation and/or contaminated areas were' properly posted and controlled.
Health physics personnel were observed to be touring work areas to ensure that proper-radiological protection practices 'and radiological control requirements were properly implemented. -The inspectors independently verified radiation levels-of waste materials packaged for disposal and monitored various areas within the reactor building.
No discrepancies were found.
2.6 Securit_Y Procram Observations During the performance of plant tours and other inspection activities, the-inspectors observed various aspects of the licensee's security program, such as responses-to door alarms, access control at the primary access point, and escort-controls.
There were no concerns or anomalies identified.
2.7 tow Voltane of the 69 kV Transmission Line On November 16,'1992, at approximately 8:57 a.m., the operators received a' low voltage' alarm for the emergency-transformer.
The licensee declared the emergency transformer inoperable, which placed the plant in a' limiting condition'for operation per Technical Specification Section 3.9.-.Upon
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investigation, the licensee discovered a low voltage condition on the 69 kV
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transmission line which supplied power to the emergency transformer, lhe low
voltage condition was caused by offsite electrical distribution lineup changes. A capacitor bank was placed into service which increased the line
voltage and cleared the under-voltage problem.
The licensee declared the transformer operable at 1:15 p.m.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
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response to the low voltage condition and concluded that the licensee's actions for correcting the problem were good and that their followup activities appeared to be thorough.
2.8 High Pressure Coolant injection Suction Valve Automatic Actuation Durino lest On December 9, 1992, while performing Surveillance Procedure 6.2.2.8.6, "PCIS Suppression Chamber Water Level Calibration Test," the high aressure core injection system pump suction automatically transferred to t1e suppression chamber (torus) from the emergency condensate storage tank.
The pump suction transfer occurred while backfilling the reference leg for Level Transmitter PC-LT-12.
The reference leg was common to two float switches, HPCI-LS-91A and-B.
When the reference leg was backfilled, the flow rate was too high.
The water could not drain out of the level switch (es) as quickly as it was being added, resulting in the float level for one or bcth switches to increase, causing the unplanned actuation.
A suction path to the high pressure coolant injection pump was maintained; therefore, the high pressure coolant injection system remained fully operable during the event.
The preferred suction path to the high pressure coolant injection system was restored approximately 15 minutes following the event.
On December 10, at 10:30 a.m., while the licensee was reviewing the deficiency report documenting this occurrence, the licensee determined that NRC notification was required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) because of an unplanned actuation of an engineering safety feature component.
The licensee completed the notification at 10:45 a.m.
The licensee responded well to the actuation event.
Although there was-a delay in reporting the event to the NRC, the licensee's deficiency report program caught the error, which was good.
Review of the' licensee's reportability evaluations for deficiency reports will be an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 298/9224-01),
3_ MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
3.1 Reactor _Aecirculation Motor / Generator Set Ventilation Fan Repair The inspector s observed o,rk activities associated with Maintenance Work Request 92-2709 to repair reactor recirculation motor / generator set Exhaust Fan HV-FAN-(EF-Rid). Operations personnel had identified several problems, including broken _ belts, a loose belt guard, and the exhaust damper did-not appear to close.
The mechanics found the top sheave worn and the belts werej off and broken.
Also, the belt guard was broken, A new-top sheave and belts
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The belt guard was weld-repaired and secured, lhe damper i
linkage was adjusted and lubricated.
It was noted that the adjusting linkage j
had been worn from normal wear and the licensee is reviewing for possible i
replacement. Also, the mechanics repaired a broken motor mount which secured
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the motor to the fan body.
On November 23, the mechanics had completed repairs and the exhaust fan was ready for testing.
On November 25, the operations department completed testing with satisfactory results and returned the exhaust fan to service.
The inspectors noted that repair work, welding, and operational testing was performed in accordance with Maintenance Work Request 92-2709 and the approved procedures.
3.2 Service Water Pump Seal Inspection The inspectors observed routine disassembly and inspection of Service Water Pump B.
The licensee had previously performed a modification of the cooling water to the service water pump seals.
The seals had been supplied cooling water from gland seal water system. The modification changed the seal cooling water source to the service water system.
The licensee declared Service Water Pump E inoperable and commenced disassembly of the pump seal.
Once the pump seal had been disassembled the licensee performed a visual and mechanical inspection on the pump seals and shaf t.
The inspection revealed minimum wear.
The licensee reassembled the pump seal, ran the pump successfully and, on November 19, the pump was declared operable.
The inspectors noted that the activity was performed in accordance with the work instructions.
3.3 Replacement of 1raversinq in-Core Probe Detector On November 20, the inspector observed the preparation for replacement of Traversing In-Core Probe Detector C.
The purpose of this effort was to correct erratic readings (i.e., zero to full scale) received while driving the traversing in-core probe detector into the reactor core.
The personnel involved in this effort adhered to the procedure requirements and maintained good communication and cooperation with health physics personnel.
Adherence to radiation protection principles was found to be good (i.e., preplanning was nntable in minimizing personnel stay times in area.)
In addition, work on the detector was postponed 3 days due to ALARA considerations.
Management oversight of this effort was apparent, lhe inspectors reviewed the completed calibration documentation and found it to be satisfactory.
4 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
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4.1 High Pressure Cooolant_ Injection diPCI) Pugmp Operability On November 25, 1992, the inspector observed the performance of Surveillance Procedure 6.3.3.1, "HPCI lest Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 39.
The liPCI pump operability test is a monthly test to assess the operational readiness of the HPCI pump.
The inspector determined that the procedure addressed the surveillance requirements of Technical Sper.ification 4.5.C.l.b.
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The inspector visually observed the condition and operation of the llPCI pump and observed the auxiliary operator take readings of pump flow rate and pressure.
Good communication was observed between the control room and the auxiliary operator lhe inspector observed good ALARA practices by the auxiliary operator and the health physics technician while obtaining various readings of the HPCI pump.
Upon completion of the HPCI pump operability surveillance, the auxiliary operator walked down the accessible parts of the HPCI system.
During the walkdown, two turbine exhaust line drain pot valves (A0V70 and A0V71) were observed to have slight packing leakage.
The auxiliary operator completed the proper maintenance work request forms for repair of the leaks.
The inspector also observed the quality assurance verification of the completed surveillance procedure.
All necessary signoffs were completed and no discrepancies were noted.
Good communication was noted between operations and other plant personnel.
Adherence to principles of ALARA were excellent and the health physics technician was thorough in assuring low radiation exposure during the surveillance.
5 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR V10LA110NS (92702)
5.1.(Closed) Violation 298]_9215-01:
St ate and _. l_ ocal Noti ficat ions _not f ompleted_ within 15 Minutes of the Declaration of Not if icat ion of Unusual iven.t_
This violation stated that the licensee failed to notify state organizations within 15 minutes of the declaration of an em.!rgency The licensee took the following corrective actions:
To improve communications with the control room, the licensee revised
Station Operations Review Committee Procedure 0.3 to allow the shif t supervisor to be involved in Station Operations Review Committee discussions which might affect the operational status of the plant.
1he licensee changed the answering service company used for the Missouri
State Emergency Management Agency, new pagers were procured, a backup State Emergency Management Agency duty officer was added, a revision was made to the duty officer's response manual concerning power plant emergency notification, and training for duty officers was instituted.
The licensee successfully tested the system on August 19, 1992, at
8 a.m., August 20 at 8 p.m.,
and September 1 at 8 a.m.
The inspectors reviewed the revision to Station Operations Review Committee Procedure 0.3 allowing shift supervisor participation in operability discussions, the documentation for the completed offsite communications enhancements, and the documentation f or the state not ifications tests.
The actions appeared to be appropriately completed,
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-9-l 6 FOLLOWUP (92701)
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6.1 1ClosedLUnresplved item ?9819123 03:
fGS Conduit Seals During a previous inspection, an inspector identified a concern that the licensee might not have documentation to demonstrate the qualification of EGS condui' mais in accordance with 10 CfR 50.49, " Environmental Qualification of Elects uipment important to Safety for Nuclear power plants."
Subsequent to that
.spection, the licensee provided an evaluation of the qualification test re, art that indicated the seals would be qualified for the environmental conditions to which they could be subjected, lhe inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation against the requirements of 10 CfR 50.49.
The inspectors found that the licensee's evaluation was acceptable to demonstrate the qualification of the conduit seals for use in the reactor building outside the drywell and in the standby gas treatment room.
7 ONSITE REVIEW 0F LICENSEE EVENT rep 0RTS (92700)
7.1 IClosedilicensee [ vent RepotL198LMall:
Lngineered Safety feature Irips Due to_ Spurious _1 rip _oL_]wo ReactorReactpr Prot Proteclion System Reactor Vessel Wa.terlyel jnstrument s
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This report documented an unalatned engineered safeguards features actuation during plant shutdown with tie residual heat removal system in the shutdown cooling mode of operation.
The spurious level signal occurred upon restoration from local leak rate testing on a core spray system.
A reactor protection system trip resulted in actuation of isolations for the reactor coolant system and reactor water cleanup system.
The actuation of the level instruments was caused by either introduction of air or water leakage into the instrument reference leg.
The hydraulic effects of the air bubble in the condensing chamber reference column resulted in tripping the reactor protection system level instruments.
The licensee's corrective actions included revision of local leak rate drawings to ensure that the reference leg is maintained full during local leak rate to;'ing of Core Spray subsystems A and [1.
The inspectors reviewed the revised drawings to verify that the identified changes were completed.
The licensee's actions appear to be adequate.
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.(Closed)l icensee Event RepAr.t_198/92-014 t_Hl_qh pressure Core in.jection Jnoperabilit y Due to an Oil teak in t he lurbinejjydraulic Cont _r_olsystem e
This report documented the licensee's discovery of an oil leak from the diaphragm area of the mechanical / hydraulic overspeed trip auto reset control assembly.
The valve was disassembled and two 1/4-inch through-wall slits, approximately 1 inch apart, were found on the edge of the diaphragm.
The diaphragm had been replaced in October 1991 and was scheduled for replacement every outage per the preventive maintenance program.
replaced and the manufacturer of the overspeed trip auto reset controlThe valve assembly was
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1he manufacturer of the diaphragm concluded that the failure was due to a material defect from the manufacturing process. (i.e.,
improper and nonunif orm coverage of the reinforcing material).
The manufacturer of the diaphragm was in the process of reviewing the defect for a 10 CFR Part 21 report.
The inspector verified documentation of correspondence between the licensee's supplier and the manufacturer concerning the defective diaphragm.
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i ATTACHMENl_1 1 PERSONS CONTACTED S. L. Bray, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist R. Brungardt, Operations Manager J. W. Dutton, Training Manager C. H. Estes, Management Trainee J. R. flaherty, Engineering Manager i
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R. L. Gardner, Plant Manager C. R. Hoeller, Acting Technical Staff Manager J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager R. L. Wenzl, NED Site Engineering Manager M. f. Young, Maintenance Supervisnr
The licensee personnel listed above attended the exit meeting held on December 28, 1992.
In addition to the p1rsonnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this
,iection period.
2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on December 28, 1992.
During this meeting,-the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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