IR 05000298/1991001
| ML20217B706 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1991 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217B694 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-91-01, 50-298-91-1, NUDOCS 9103120189 | |
| Download: ML20217B706 (19) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-298/91-01 Operating License: OPR-46 Docket:
50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (sPPD)
P.O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 Facility Name:
Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
Inspection At: CNS, Net.aha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: January 8 through February 19, 1991 Inspectors:
W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector G. A. Pick, Resident Inspector R. V. Azua, Project Engineer Approved:
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PNj. ilarrell, Chief, Project Section C Date Inspection Suma_ry Inspection Conducted January 8 through February 19,=1991 (Report 50-298/91-01)
Areas Inspectad: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety veritication, maintenance-and surveillance observations, Three Mile.
Island (TMI) action plan followup, onsite follewup of written reports, followup of previously identified inspection items, and followup of a 10 CFR Part 21 report..
Results:
The personnel errors that caused the Grc,up VI isolation and the inadequate
surveillance testing performance indicated a lack of attention to detail.
This root cause was similar to that identified in a previous inspection report; however, each error was considered isolated. These examples of the failure to follow procedure are being issued as a noncited violation (paragraph 3.d).
e, was proactive (prompt and thorough response to a false positive drug test
The licensee's paragraph 3.b).
The plant power reduction, main condenser tube leak repair activities, and
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the plant power increase were conducted in a conservative, controlled manner (paragraph 3.e).
9103120189 910304 PDR ADOCK 05000290
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The postmaintenance testing specified after completion of maintenance
activities was appropriate for the work performed.
Special instructions were written to provide guidance for critical step performance
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A qualified technician did an excellent job of transferring the safety.
- significance of the work perfonned to the trainee (perdgraph 4).
Personnel conducted the surveillance activities in accordance with
. procedures. Proper radiological practices were followed (paragraph 5).
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The radiolog(ical protection and-security programs were adequately implemented paragraphs 3.g and 3.h).
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Housekeeping was _ maintained at an excellent level (paragraph 3.f).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- J. M. Meacham, Division Manager of Nuclear aerations
- E. M. Mace, Senior Manager of Staff Suppon
- R. L. Gardner, Senior Manager of Operations
- C. M. Estes, Acting Senior Manager Technical Support Services
- J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager
- M. A. Dean, Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor
- J. R. Flaherty, Engineering Manager
- R. A. Jansky, Outage and Modifications Manager
- H. T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager
' *R. Brungart, Operations Manager
- M. E. Unruh, Maintenance Manager
- L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist The inspectors contacted other personnel.
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on February 19, 1991, 2.
Plant Status The plant oprated at essentially 100 percent power from January 8-31, 1991.
On February 1, the licensee decreased power to locate and isolate a main condenser tube leak. The licensee returned the plant to full power on February 2, where it remained throughout this inspection period.
3.
gerational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Control Room Observations
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The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection _ period. Proper control room staffing was maintained and control room professionalism and decorum were observed. Discussions with operators determined tnat they were cognizant of plant status and aware of the reason for each lit annunciator. The inspectors observed selected shif t turnover treetings and noted that infonnation concerning plant status and planned evolutions was properly connunicated to the oncoming operators. The inspectors routinely verified, by visual inspection of emergency core cooling system valve indications, that the systems were maintained in a standby condition.
The inspectors observed that all required Technical Specification (TS)
limiting conditions for operation were properly documented and tracked by the control room staff.
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b.
False Positive Drug Test On December 24, 1990, the licensee reported a false positive drug test result to the NRC. The test involved a for-cause test specimen,
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Consequently, on January 11, 1991, the licensee conducted an unannounced investigation at the test laboratory. Tt
'icensee concluded that an administrative error resulted in swe,, mg of test specimens. The licensee further concluded that the error war due to a request by the medical review officer that the laboratory bypass
the imunoassay screen test and perform only a gas chromotography/ mass spectrometry (GC/MS) test. This test sequence placed the laboratory outside its normal operating procedures and created a greater potential for error. Elimination of the immunoassay screen test data prevented comparison with the GC/MS test results.
The licensee requested that the laboratory take corrective actions.
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The corrective actions included revising procedures for saccimen processing under unusual circumstances and implementP.g t1e use of
'bar codes on specimen bottles to prevent mistakee, Additionally, the licensee contracted with a different inboratory that uses bar-coded specimen bottles. The licensee planned 9 submit a supplemental report with updated information on the co,7ective actions to the NRC l
by March.1.
c.
Inadvertent Group VI Isolation On January (7,1991, during performance of SurveillanceSP) 6.3.7.5, " Reac
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Monitor. Source Check," Revision 14,. a Group VI isolation (reactor.
' building isolation / standby gas treatment system initiation) occurred.
The root cause was determined to be ir.4 :ention to detail and
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personnel errcr.
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Aqualifiedinstrumentationandcontrol(ILC)techniciancompleted jumper installation for the Train A test while providing guidance to a trainee. A different trainee insta!1ed the jumper, under the guidance of the qualified technician, for the Train B test; however, neither the technician nor.the trainee noticed that the jumper was placed in the Train A cabinet instead of the Train B cabinet.
Consequently, as the test proceeded, the Group VI isolation occurred.
The licensee determined that, although the procedure was being used,
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_ the technicians did not verify that the labeled jumper connections matched those specified in the procedure.
The licensee counseled the technicians. The plant manager issued a memo to the plant staff on January 8 discussing complacency. The memo reiterated management expectations and cautions that were discussed in a similar memo issued in October 1990. Additional corrective actions included incorporating this event into the 1&C industry events training.
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The licensee issued Licensee Event Report (LER)90-001 describing this event. The inspectors will review the implementation of the licensee's corrective actions during routine followup of LER 90-001.
This issue is considered part of the noncited violation discussed in paragraph 3.d (below).
d.
Failure to Follow the Procedure for Alignment of the Fire Protection System On January 9,1991, during a control room observation, the inspector noted that a fire protection system flow serification test was not properly perfomed. The test was controlled by SP 6.4.5.15, " Fire Protection System Flow Verification After impairment," Revision 8.
The test was intended to verify that the fire protection system was returned to normal alignment af ter maintenance activities were performed.
The inspector determined that the individual perfonning the test had received incorrect instructions from control room personnel.
Subsequently, the individual correctly performed the system alignment using the procedure. Discussions with personnel indicated that instructions were given by control room personnel from memory of the r
I previou; SP revision. The shi#t supervisor counseled the individuals involved, reiterating the need to use plant procedures.
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The two examples of the failure to follow a procedure to implement a surveillance test is a violation of NRC requirements; however, the violation was not cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) were satisfied since the violation involved issues of minor safety significance and the licensee took immediate corrective actions to address both issues.
The shift supervisor promptly reprimanded the individuals involved.
The operations supervisor conducted discussions with each operations
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crew stressing the policy of following the guidance in procedures, e.
Repair of a Condenser Tube Leak On February 1,1991, the inspector observed licensee activities related to identifying and plugging a main condenser tube leak. The
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condenser tube leak became apparent when reactor coolant conductivity
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steadily increased. The leakage into the primary system was estimated
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to be 2.1 gallons per minute. The licensee decreased power to stop I
the reactor coolant conductivity rise. Subsequently, the conductivity peaked at 0.53 micrombos. The licensee further decreased power to
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make a main condenser entry. Prior to entry into the condenser, health physics personnel conducted a prejob briefing, surveyed the I
area, and set up an ingestion area. lhe ingestion area provided a location for the craftsmen to drink fluids to combat heat stres,
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-6 Maintenance imediately. identified a large tube leak, but continued to leak check the tube sheets to verify that all tube leaks were identified.
.The inspecter monitored activities related to release of the clearance order. The operators followed proper radiological practices. After completion _of the repairs, the operators increased reactor power in a controlled manner, f.
Plant Tours The inspectors performed periodic tours of the reactor plant to verify proper system lineups and cleanliness. The inspectors periodically verified that electrical lineups were maintained for components needed to mitigate an accident. The inspectors determined that plant housekeeping was maintained at an excellent level throughout this inspection period, g.
Radiological Protection Observations The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's-
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radiological protection prograr were properly implemented.
Radiation
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. physics personnel were observed touring work areas to ensure that the
. raciological protection program was properly implemented. Radiation
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work permits contained appropriate infonnation to ensure that work
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could-be performed in a safe and controlled manner.
h.
Security Observations The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle, personnel, and package searches. Vehicles wore properly authorized and controlled or escorted within.the protected area- (PA).
The inspectors conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory measures were properly implemented, as required. Personnel access-was observed to be controlled in accordance with established
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procedures. The PA barrier was'. adequately illuminated and the isolation zones were free 'of transient materials.
Conclusions-
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The. personnel errors that caused the Group VI isolation and the inadequate SP performance indicated a lack of attention to details. This root cause was similar to that identified in a previous report; however, the cause for each individual occurrence was not the sane. This did not appear to indicate a breakdown in management controls. The licensee's prompt and
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thorough response to the false positive drug test was proactive. The power reduction, main condenser tube leak repair activities, and plant power increase were conducted in a conservative, controlled manner.
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4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
a.
Repair of a Hich-Voltace Power Supply On January 17, 1991, the inspector observed IAC technicians perform a postmaintenance test on Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) E.
I&C technicians determined that the high-voltage power supply for IRM E was unstable during performance of SP 6.1.17A, "lRM Calibration and Functional Test (Mode Switch in Run)," Revision 7.
The I&C technicians found a bent center pin in the high-voltage power supply connector. The postmaintenance test consisted of performance of the applicable sections in SP 6.1.17A.
The technician properly connected the test equipment.
The inspector determined from discussions with the technician that he was familiar with the SP, including its purpose and limitations.
b.
Replacement of a Pressure Switch During the period January 30 through February 1,1991, the inspector observed I&C technicians perfonn maintenance activities needed to replace pressure switch (PS) NBI-PS-102B.
The pressure switch actuates the alternate rod injection (ARI) and anticipated transient without scram / recirculation pump trip (ATWS/RPT) protection functions when sensing high reactor pressure conditions.
During performance of SP 6.2.8.3, "ARI and-ATWS/RPT Reactor Vessel High Pressure Calibration ano Functional Test," Revision 15, the licensee determined that the pressure switch oscillated at the trip point within the tolerance band. The SP was completed satisfactorily; however, a maintenance work request (MWR) was generated to replace the faulty switch with a spare. The replacement activities were implemented by MWR 91-0209.
The inspector monitored the bench calibration of the replacement PS.
The switch was calibrated in accordance with a data sheet using values obtained from the SP. The technician verified that the switch setpoint was repeatable.
Special instructions specified the lifting and landing of power leads for the instrument, torquing the mounting bolts, buttsplicing the leads, and purging air from the instrument
line. The postmaintenance testing included an inservice leak test and operability verifica!. ion in accordance with SP 6.2.8.3.
The ISC technicians performing the maintenance familiarized themselves with the work instructions prior to performing the maintenance.
The technicians checked to ensure that there was no power to the instrument prior to disassembly.
Proper radiological practices were followed. Test equipment and tools were within calibration.
The qualified technician explained to the trainee the instrument function and the extra precautions needed, since there is a potential for t
causing a reactor scram when valving these instruments in and out of servic. _.
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Conclusions The postmaintenance testing specified was appropriate for the work pe rfomed.. Special instructions were written to provice guidance for critical step performance. The qualified I&C technician did an excellent job of transferring information about the safety significance of the work perfonned to the trainee.
5.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
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a.
Leak Rate Testing of a Vent Valve On January 22, 1991, the inspector observed a mechanical engineer perform local leak rate testing (LLRT) on a drywell vent valve. The LLRT was performed in accordance with Special Test Procedure 90-269,
" Primary Containment Purge and Vent Valve LLRT," Amendment 1.
The test is performed on the purge and vent valves quarterly because of excess leakage concerns expressed by the NRC. After obtaining two complete cycles of data, the data will be provided to the NRC.
If the results are determined to be satisfactory, testing in accoraance with Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 can resume.
The engineer was knowledgeable about the regulatory requirenents for conducting the LLRT. The test equipment was properly connected. The flow method for. determining leakage failed to provide satisfactory
~ data due to minimal leakage; therefore, the engineer used the pressbre decay method for determining the leak rate. The leakage was found to be zero.
Review of the test results for other valves determined them to be satisfactory. No problems were identified.
b.
Testing of the' Automatic Depressurization System Pressure Switches On January 31, 1991, the inspector observed I&C techniciens perform the monthly functional test of the pressure switches that actuate the automatic depressurization system (ADS) low-low set (LLS) logic.
This TS-required test was implemented in accordance with SP 6.1.12
" ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional / Functional and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run)," Revision 8.
The ADS LLS function reduces the number of safety / relief valve (SRV) actuations by actuating 'a pair of SRVs at a lower pressure for a greater length of time.
The technician utilized proper radiological controls while working at
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the contaminated instrument rack.
Proper reviews and approvals were.
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obtained prior to. start of the test. Test. instruments utilized were within their calibration due dates.
c.
' Inservice Testing (IST) of a Service Water Pump On January 31, 1991, the inspector observed a licensed operator perform the IST for service water Pump C.
This TS-required test was m
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1 perfonred in accordance with SP 6.3.18.3, " Service Water Surveillance Operation," Revision 24 This IST was performed at en increased frequency because pump differential pressures have been in the alert range.
The licensed operator properly lined up the system flow path through the reactor equipment cooling heat exchanger, minimizing system perturbations. Good communications were maintained among test personnel.
d.
Functional Test of a Diesel Generator On February 5,1991, the inspector observed operators perform the monthly functional test of Diesel Generator (DG) No. 2.
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TS-required operability test was performed in accordance with SP 6.3.12.1, " Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 30.
The licensed operator properly started and synchronized the DG to the grid. Review of the completed SP verified that the recorded performance data met the acceptance criteria.
Conclusions Personnel conducted the surveillance activities in accordance with procedures.
Proper radiological practices were followed.
System perturbations during flow testing were minimized. Good communications were maintained.
6.
TMI Action Plan Followup (TI 2515/65)
a.
(Closed)1.A.1.1.3:
This item required each licensee to provide an on-shift STA to aid the shift supervisor. The STA position required a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and required specific training in plant response to transients, plant design and layout, and capabilities of control room instruments.
In a letter, dated April 1, 1982, from D. D. Vassallo, Chief, Operating Reactor Branch No. 2, to J. M. Pilant, Director, Licensing and Quality Assurance, the NRC determined that the licensee's STA program was acceptable. One exception to the program acceptance was the issuance of TS for STAS.
On March 19, 1990, the NRC issued Amendment No. 132 to Operating License DPR-46 that incorporated TS requirements for on-shif t STAS.
The TS change also specified STA qualification requirements.
The inspector reviewed the training program description f or the STAS and found the program to be comprehensive. Position-required lesson plans included academic basics, including heat transfer and fluid
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flow; systems training; transient and degraded core analysis; and emergency response training. Also, the inspector reviewed the licensee's task-to-training matrix for STAS..
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The inspector. verified that the STA academic and technical requirements met the action plan requirements. Review of CNS Procedure 0.21, "Shif t Technical Advisor," Revision 4. determined
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that the STA program-complied ~with regulatory requirements. The procedure provided for administration and implementation of the STA' #
-prcgram-including STA duties and responsibilities. No problems were identified.
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b.
(Closed)'THI'I.A.1.3.1:
Shift Manning Overtime Limits This item required the licensee to set limits on overtime to prevent fatiguing key licensee personnel. The NRC specified guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 82-12. " Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours."'
In a letter, dated April 2,1982, from D. B. Vassallo to-
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J. -M. Pilant. the_ NRC approved licensee actions concerning their
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shift manning overtime policy.
The inspector verified that licensee Procedure 0;12, " Station
- Overtime and Recall of Standby Personnel," Revision 4, _ implemented the TS overtime requirements and verified that the overtime limits agreed with the requirements of GL' 82-12.
No problems were
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(Closed) Item I.A.2.1.4:
Immediate Upgrading of Reactor Operator (RO)
and Senior-Reactor Operator.(SRO) Training and Qualifications
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A letter, dated March 28, 1980, from H. R. Denton, Director, Office
.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to all licensees specified experience j-requirements for SR0s. The requirements included holding an R0-license for a minimum of 1 year, with -4' years of power plant experience, or-being degreed with 2 -years of nuclear plant experience,
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training as an extra person on shift. Additionally,-the R0 and.SR0
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training must include information on heat transfer, fluid flow, and
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thermodynamics.
In a letter, dated December 9,1982, from D. B. Vassallo to J. M. Pilant, the NRC detemined that licensee-activities for upgrading R0 and SRO training was acceptable.
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The inspector determined that the Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Program Administrative Guide, Revision 3, and Training Program Description 0202, "NRC Licensed Personnel Initial and Continuing Qualification Program," Revision 6, implemented the above experience
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The inspector verified that the licensee implemented the requirements specified by this item. No problems were identified.
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(Closed) Item I.C.5:
Procedures For Feedback of Operating Experience to the Plant Staff This item required the licensee to establish a program for processing industry experience information and assessing its applicability to the facility.
In a letter, dated April 2,1982, from D. B. Vassallo to J. M. Pilant, the NRC approved licensee actions concerning feedback of operating experience.
The inspector determineo, from the review of plant procedures, that the licensee established a program for feedback of operating experience to plant personnel. Additionally, the licensee developed guidance for identifying and disseminating CNS operating experiences that might have generic implications for the industry. The licensee established a procedure for conducting an annual effectiveness evaluation of the operating experience program.
The inspector reviewed the training department programs and procedures for incorporating industry events into training sessions and lesson plans. The procedures specified responsibilities for conducting the evaluations. The process provided the means to screen extraneous information and make changes to plant docunents.
No problems were identified.
e.
(Closed) II.E.4.1.2:
Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations Tr.is item required plants using containment atmosphere purge systems for postaccident combustible gas control to provide dedicated containment penetrations to meet the redundancy and single-failure requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. and to size the penetrations to satisfy the purge system flow requirements.
In a letter, dated June 1,1982, f rom D. B. Vassallo to J. M. Pilant, the NRC determined the licensee actions that changed the manual drywell/ torus vent bypass valves to remote, manually-actuated, motor-operated valves to be satisfactory.
The inspector reviewed the design change that implemented the modification.
Plant procedures, training materials, TS, and crawings were changed to reflect the new configuration. No problems were identified.
f.
(Closed) Item II.F.2.4:
Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling This item required the licensee to ensure that ar, unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication for inadequate core cooling existed.
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The NRC issued GL 84-23. " Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in Boiling Water Reactors (BWR)," on October 26, 1984.
The GL outlined the importance of BWR water level instrumentation for controlling feedwater, actuating emergency systems, and providing the operators information that was used as a basis for actions to ensure that adequate core cooling existed. The NRC staff proposed several modifications in GL 84-23 that would improve the reliability and accuracy of the level instrunents.
By letter, dated May 31, 1985, the licensee connitted to implement one of two proposed modifications to the reactor vessel instrument cold reference legs. The modifications consisted of:
(1) rerouting the cold reference legs to minimize the vertical drop of the reference leg, or (2) installing a reference-leg core spray injection system. Additionally, NPPD would replace mechanical level indication with analog level transmitters. The licensee scheduled the modification for the 1988 refueling outage.
In a letter, dated August 21, 1985, from Mr. D. B. Vassallo to Mr. J. M. Hlant, the NRC concluded that completion of the above commitments was acceptable.
In a subsequent lecter, dated August 28, 1987, from W. O. Long, Project Manager, Project Directorate IV, to G. A. Trevors, Division Manager Nuclear Support, the NRC concurred with the licensee's reevaluation, dated July 6,1987, that justified deferring indefinitely the changeout of mechanical water level instruments based on their reliable service history.
During the 1988 refueling outage, the licensee installed a reference-leg core spray injection system in accordance with Design Change 87-113, " Reactor Water Level Reference Leg."
The design change provided a means for a licensed operator to remotely inject water into the cold reference leg under high drywell temperature conditions.
The inspector verified, by control panel and field walkdowns, that the reference-leg injection system was installed in accordance with
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the design change. The inspector reviewed the instrument operating, emergency operating support, ano the system surveillance procedures.
Each of the procedures contained clear, concise instructions. No problems were identified.
g.
(Closed) Item II.K.3.57:
Identify Water Sources Prior to Manual Activation of the ADS This item required the licensee to identify available water sources prior to manually actuating the ADS. This item remained open awaiting verification of procedure changes that addressed the
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availability of a core standby cooling system, low-pressure source of makeup water prior to manually actuating ADS.
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In October 1985 the NRC approved the licensee's submittal, dated August 1985, that provided the emergency operating procedures written-in accordance with the BWR Owner's Group (BWROG) Emergency Planning Guidelines (EPG), Revision 3.
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In 1990 the licensee implemented BWROG EPG, Revision 4, which was approved by the NRC on September 12, 1988. When implementing the EPG, Revision 4, the licensee changed from dual column text to flowchart
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emergency operating procedures.
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The inspector verified that the flow chart emergency operating procedures required the operator to ensure that a low-pressure source of water was available prior to emergency depressurizing.
Additionally, the inspector verified that Emergency Procedures 5.2.1,
" Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," Revision 19, and 5.7.5.1,
" Loss of All Site AC Power Station Blackout," Revision 6, contained information ensuring that a low-pressure source of water was available.
No problems were identified.
h.
(Closed)ItemIII.D.3.3.2:
Improved Inplant Iodine Instrumentation Under Accident Conditions The licensee was required to provide equipment and associated training and procedures for accurately determining the airborne iodine concentration within the facility where plant personnel may be present.
This item was reviewed in.NRC Inspection Report 50-298/81-17 and clo. sed in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/82-32.
7.
Onsite Followup of Written Reports (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed to determine that corrective actions were accomplished and that actions were taken to prevent recurrence, a.
(Closed)LER88-010: Core Spray System Suction Valve Failed to Close The design of the=Limitorque SMB-0 operator was found to have a motor-pinion gear installed incorrectly. The gear installation for the SMB-0 model valve is the reverse of the gear-installation for other valves. The gear in the SMB-0 valve can be installed in either orientation and, if incorrectly installed, would not be revealed during postmaintenance testing.
The licensee installed a new pinion gear in the effected valve, and the valve operability was fully restored.
The licensee inspected all other valves installed in safety-related applications for correct gear orientation. Two additional valves were identified that had the same type of problem. The problems were corrected by toe licensee.
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The licensee revised Maintenance Procedure 7.2.50.5, "Limitorque SMB-0 Through SMB-4 Valve Operators Removal, Disassembly, inspection, Rework, Reassembly, and Installation," to add a quality control checkpoint for independent verification that the pinion gear is installed correctly.
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and noted no problems, b.
(Closed)LER89-006:
Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air l
Conditioning (HVAC)DesignConcerns This LER reported the concerns identified in Unresolved Item 298/8710-07. See paragraph 8.d for additional information, c.
(Closed) LER 89-007:
Service Water (SW) System Design Flow Rate Concerns The NRC's Safety System Functional Inspection, conducted in May and June 1987, identified a concern that the SW system flow rate to the DGs would be inadequate during a design basis accident with coincident loss of offsite power and failure of DG No. 2 to start.
The licensee reviewed their data and detennined that the flow rate to the DGs would be adequate, but the DG room fan coil unit (FCU) flows could not be met.
The inspe tor reviewed the licensee's corrective actions. The licensee performed special tests to determine the DG room temperature profiles and heat gains. Subsequently, calculations determined that the FCus would maintain the temperatures within design limits for temperature sensitive devices.
The inspector identified no problems.
d.
(Closed) LER 89-008:
Insufficient Operator Guidance to Ensure that Adequate Service Water Flow During the Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident This event was previously reviewed, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-289/89-03. The report noted that the licensee had identified the root causes ano had implenented the oppropriate corrective actions; therefore, this LER is consicared~ closed.
e.
(Closed)LER89-014: Unplanned Actuation of Groun 'll Isolation The unplanned actuation of the Grnup VI isolation was due to a loose terminal strip, instrument power lead connection to the conmon terminal for the reactor building ventilation monitor trip auxiliary unit.
When the terminal connection was discovered to be loose, the technician verifieo that all other connections were tight.
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addition, all terminal strip connections, approximately 9000, in other panels were checked to verify tightness.
- The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to address this event. No problems were noted.
f.
(Closed)LER90-007:
Inoperability of the SW Pump Room Halon Fire
. Suppression System On June 20, 1990, during functional testing of the SW pump room fire suppression system, the main and reserve Halon tanks failed to actuate in the automatic mode of operation. The licensee tested the tanks because they were filled on June 19. The tanks had discharged
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on June 17 when a 1.ightning strike occurred near the plant.
After the sp 'ous discharge, the licensee switched to the reserie tank but did t conduct a functional test of the reserve tank ~
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actuation 109 Investigation by the licensee identified a failed
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control board.
The licensee installed a new control board and returned the defective board to the manufacturer.- The system was inoperable for approximately 3 days without the licensee's knowledge.
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The inspector verified that procedure changes were. implemented. The changes required that fire watches be posted, after being made inoperable, until the system was proven operable. The procedure als'o
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required the functional testing of the system logic if the system initiates or the control panel alarm cannot be cleared. No problems
were identified.
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(Closed) LER 90-008, Revision 1:
Surveillance Procedures Not Performed Within Required Intervals On July-6, 1990, during review of surveillance records, the licensee identified two instances of surveillance procedures being performed outside of the required interval. SPl6.3.10.22. "Drywell Sump Accumulator Check. Valve Test," exceeded the 25 percent TS extension by 15 days, and SP 6.4.5.6, " Fire Detection System Circuitry Operability," exceeded the 25 percent extension by 23 days. The SPs were required quarterly and semiannually, respectively.
On September 11, during followup to LER 90-008, Revision 0, the licensee determined that SPs 6.3.17.4, " Control Room Energency Fan HEPA Filter Leak Test," and 6.3.17.5, " Control Room Emergency Fan Charcoal Leak,-Charcoal Sampling and Fan Capacity Test," exceeded the 25 percent extension beyond the annual test frequency by 13 days.
SPs 6.3.17.4 and 6.3.17.5 were scheduled to be performed by an outside testing organization. The test organization did not perform the SPs, as scheduled.
Subsequently, the system engineer scheduled the tests for June 13 failing to recognize that the TS tine limits would be exceeded.
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The licensee determined the root cause to be a computer scheduling system deficiency, in that only the surveillances scheduled were listed. Any missed or overdue surveillances from previous weeks would not be listed. Additionally, the surveillance coordinator failed to issue the SPs to the performing organization.
The licensee counseled both the system engineer and the surveillance
coordinator regarding the need for accurate SP scheduling. Licensee
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review of surveillance records identified no other instances of missed SPs. The computer-based system was modified to ensure that SPs continue to be listed until they are performed.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions. An additional report was created that supplenents the weekly scheduling
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printout. The supplemental reports were requested daily and provide
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the surveillance coordinator with a list of procedures that need to L
be completed and a list of recently completed procedures. No l
problems were identified.
h.
(Closed)LER90-011: Unplanned Automatic Scram Due to a 345-kV Ground Fault l
The cause of the grcund fault on the 345-kV grid was a result of a
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power cable to a temporary construction elevator being blown across the power line during high winds, i
Corrective actions taken by the licensee included verification of proper operation of the transmission system protective relay, inspection of the transmission line, and inspection and testing of the normal, startup, and main transformers. The licensee also relocated the temporary construction elevator away from the vicinity of the power lines.
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to address l
this event.
No problems were noted during the review.
L 8.
Followup of Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a.
(Closed)OpenItem 298/8110-03:
STA Training Program This item was opened to track the approval of the CNS STA training l
program by the NRC. as part of TMI Item I. A.1.1.3.
The NRC approved the STA training program in a letter, dated April 1,1982, from
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D. B. Vassallo to J. M. P11 ant. No problems were identified. See paragraph 6.a for additional information.
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(Closed) Open Item 298/8110-04: Upgrading of R0 and SRO Training Qualifications This item was opened to track the approval of the R0 and SRO training program requirements by the NRC, as part of TMI Item 1.A.2.1.4.
The l
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NRC approved the R0 and SR0 training programs in a letter, dated December 9,1982, from D. B. Yassallo to J. M. P11 ant. No problems were identified.
See paragraph 6.c for additional information.
c.
(Closed) Open Item 298/8113-41: Develop a Dose Calculation and Assessment Methodology
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This item was opened pending licensee developnent of a dose
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calculation and assessment methodology that included noteorological factors, source characteristics, building configurations, and realistic transport and diffusion estimates. The capability was to be outlined in a technical bases document. The licensee developed
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f and implenented the model including the technical bases, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/85-09.
The inspector verified that the licensee's current technical manuals
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I described the upgraded atmospheric dose assessment model ( ADAM). The inspector verified that the ADAM system had primary and backup sources of information. The upgraded ADAM system allowed the I
licensee to input information if tho noteorological system was unavailable. The ADAM system accessed all required meteorological parameters and calculated the possible release from specific onsite and offsite points. No problems were identified.
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I d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 298/8710-07: Control Building HVAC Design l
Concerns This item concerned the use of nonsafety-related ventilation in the critical switchgeer and battery rooms. On a loss of offsite power, l
the HVAC would be lost and could cause the loss of safety-related i
equipment. A previous inspection reviewed the use of portable HVAC
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equipment. Calculation involving room temperatures resultir.g from
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the worst case accident scenario were also reviewed.
The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and the justification for continued operation utilized to allow full-power operation without a safety-related HVAC.
The inspector verified that Appendix R. issues related to the safety-related HVAC installed in the critical switchgear and battery rooms were resolved. A previous l
inspection identified no problems with the design change that l-implemented the installation of the safety-related HVAC.
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The generic concern of the adequacy of HVAC will be addressed during
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the design basis reconstitution effort. The inspector reviewed the program description and the controlling procedures. The inspector's review identified no problems.
e.
(Closed) Violation 298/9029-01:
Failure to Follow a Maintenance Procedure From review of completed fERs related to ASCO solenoid valves, the inspector identified problems in four instances, two safety-related
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and two nonsafety-related.- The licensee failed to attach special work' instructions with proper quality control-(QC) hold points as required in Maintenance Procedure 7.2.49, "ASCO Solenoid Yalve-Maintenance," Revision 3.
The licensee reviewed the violation with maintenance department personnel and issued a memo emphasizing the necessity for complying
- with station procedures. The licensee change.d the procedure to provide'better guidance and clarify QC review requirements.
The inspector verified that the procedure changes wero implemented.
The procedure specified who could sign as a QC reviewer and added an attachment for documenting required special instructions. No problems were identified.
f.
-(Closed)InspectorFolloupItem 298/9034-01:
Emergency Lighting Evaluation A reactor scram and partial loss of offsite power occurred on October 17, 1990, when a temporary elevator power supply 4ble created a ground fault on the 345-kV offsite power line. During the event, several lighting problems were identified in nonsafe shutdown areas of the plant.- The licensee conducted an evaluation of emergency lighting'. The primary concerns were personnel safety and ability to operate balance-of-plant equipnent. The evaluation
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results determined that the licensee was in compliance for safe shutdown equipment but identified concerns in several nonsafe shutdown areas. The licensee staff proposed that these lighting concerns be added to the 1991 refueling outage scope.
During the exit-meeting, conducted on February 19, 1991, the plant r,anager comitted to the inspector that the lighting concerns needed-for a safe _ plant shutdown will be addressed during the 1991 refueling outage. No additional concerns were identified.
9.
Followup of 10 CFR Part 21 Reports (92701)
A Part 21 report (Region-IV Reference 89-012) concerning potential
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failure of Limitorque SMB-00 and SMB-000 cam-type torque switches was reviewed to verify that the licensee had taken actions to address the-issues identified in the report.- In response to the report, the
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. licensee replaced the torque switches in 44 safety-related Limitorque valves. The replacement switches were constructed with metallic spacers instead of the fiber spacers that were identified as a problem in-the Part 21 report. The_ licensee now only stocks torque
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switches that have the metallic-spacer construction.
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and noted no i
problems.
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10.. Exit Interview An exit meeting was conducted on February 19, 1991, with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
During this interview, the inspectors reviewed the scope and. findings of the inspection.
Other neetings between the inspectors and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns. During the exit meeting, the licensee did not identify as
, roprietary, any information provided to, or reviewed by, the
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inspectors, l