IR 05000298/1980011
| ML19337A923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1980 |
| From: | Madsen G, Spangler R, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19337A917 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-80-11, NUDOCS 8010010017 | |
| Download: ML19337A923 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-298/80-11 Docket No. 50-298 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601
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Facility Name:
Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection at:
Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: July 22-26 and August 4-7, 1980 Management Meeting Conducted: August 7, 1980
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Principal Inspector:
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- R.G. Spangle /,Re/ctorInspector,
' Da te Reactor Projects Section No. I Wade
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r rG. L. Madsen, Chief, RO&NS Branch Date
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's. E. Gagliardo, Chief, Nuclear Support i ate D
Section, RO&USB
- Present at Management Meeting of August 7,1980 Additional Accompanying Personnel:
V. L. Rooney, Project Manager, DOR, NRR
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Approved by:
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T. F. Westerman, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section #1, RO&NSB l
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8010010017
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 22-26 and August 4-7 1980 (Report No. 50-298/80-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of followup to previously
identified items, Local Power Range Monitoring (LPRM) calibration, core thermal power evaluation, followup on responses to IE Bulletins, followup on LER's, independent inspection effort and the Systematic Assessment of License Performance (SALP) management meeting. This inspection involved fifty-three (53) man-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Within the six (6) areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in five (5) of the areas. Within the area of independent inspection
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effort two (2) items of noncompliance were identified (infraction - failure to control fire doors in accordance with procedures, paragraph 5; infraction -
failure to maintain fire barrier integrity, paragraph 5). As a result of the SALP evaluation (Enclosure 2 to this report) no increase in the scope or fre-quency of inspection effort is planned.
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DETAILS SECTION 1.
Persons Contacted Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P. J. Borer, Operations Supervisor
- R. E. Buntain, Director of Power Supply M. F. Edgerton, Shift Supervisor
- C. R. Jones,1st Assistant General Manager
- L. Kuncl, Assistant General Manager L. I. Lawrence, Maintenance Supervisor
- L. C. Lessor, Station Superintendent C. R. Noyes, Engineering Support Supervisor R. O. Peterson, Reactor Engineer
- J. M. Pilant, Director Licensing and Quality Assurance
- E. N. Sloth, Director Environmeratal Affairs
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- J. Weaver, Licensing Manager
- Indicates presence at exit meetings.
- Indicates presence at the August 7 Management Meeting.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item 8008-03 (Inspection Report 80-08, paragraph 5):
Re-building of ITT Grinnell Hydraulic Snubbers utilizing k inch tubing.
ITT Grinnell has notified the licensee by letter dated June 13, 1980, of their endorsement of the licensee's program for rebuilding'2 inch cylinder hydraulic snubbers utilizing k inch tubing.
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3.
Local Power Range Monitoring System.(LPRM) Calibration The inspector reviewed procedures and data for the calibration of the Local Power Range M6nitoring System (LPRM) to verify:
that the calibration is technically correct and in accordance
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with the facility's procedures; that the calibrations have been taking place as required by the
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license.
Procedure 10.5, LPRM Calibration or Base Distributian Update, is the licensee's controlling document for conducting these calibrations.
This procedure conforms to guidance from General Electric and fully documents the LPRM calibration activities.
From discussions with the inspector, the Reactor Engineers appear to be technically competent in this area and.are aware of license requirements or plant conditions that necessitate scheduling an LPRM calibration.
The inspector's review included the data for LPRM calibrations conducted on June 7, 1980, and June 18, 1980.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identifie.
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4.
Core Thermal Power The inspector verified that the calculation of core thermal power is technic-ally correct and that the calibration of instrumentation associated with these computations is controlled.
Core thermal power is normally calculated
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by the process computer on an hourly basis and reviewed by the plant operator.
Procedure 10.3, Core Ther.al Power Evaluation, contains steps for performing the same computation by hand should the necessity arise. This procedure appears to be technically correct.
The calibration of instrumentation utilized in these computations is controlled under the plant surveillance program or the plant preventative maintenance program.
No items of non-compliance or deviation were identified.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort A.
Plant Tours
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On July 25, 1980 at approximately 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br />, the inspector found a breached fire wall penetration. This penetration is in the floor between the Cable Spreading room and the "B" DC Battery Charger and Switchgear room just to the right of the building pedestal on which
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panel RPSPPIA is mounted. The penetration was apparently breached
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during the installation of conduit number DC-25 as part of Major Design Change 76-2 which was completed June 10, 1977.
Technical Specification 3.19 requires that fire wall penetration seal integrity be maintained or a continuous fire watch be posted within one hour on at least one side of the penetration.
This failure as described above to maintain fire penetration seal integrity constitutes an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
The inspector also noted that surveillance inspections conducted since 1978 had not identified the above breached fire barrier.
The most recent surveil 7 lance inspection was conducted under procedure 6.4.5.2 and completed on August 21, 1979. The acceptability of the current surveillance procedure for fire penetration barrier inspections should be reviewed by the licensee in response to this item of noncompliance.
(8011-1).
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On July 26, 1980 at approximately 1640 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.2402e-4 months <br />, the inspector found the door to the HPCI room propped open with no fire watch posted.
This door has been labeled as a category three fire door.
Plant Administration Procedure 1.4.16, Control of Fire Doors, states:
"1.4.16.2.3 Category 3 - Fire Doors in Safety-Related Areas That Require A Fire Watch This category includes all doors within safety-related areas that are not common to the security system.
These doors will normally be maintained in the closed position.
If the door is equipped with an automatic closure device (fusible link) it may be left open and unobstructed without requiring a fire watch, but should be returned to the closed position as soon as practical
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If the door must be obstructed so as to present it from closing securely, a continuous fire eatch must be established within one (1) hour on at least one side of the door.
Special circumstances may allow the fire watch requirement to be waived by the Shift Supervisor."
When questioned, the Shift Supervisor indicated that he was not aware that the fire door was propped open nor that the fire watch require-
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ment had been waived.
Technical Specification 6.3.2 requires that
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implementing procedures for the fire protection program be adhered tc.
This failure to comply with the plant administration procedure noted above constitutes an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(8011-2)
B.
Temporary Changes to Procedures During the following inspection of the licensee's responses to IE
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Bulletins, the inspector noted an apparent inconsistency between Technical Specification 6.3.7 and Revision 4 of Administrative Pro-cedure 1.3, Procedures, with regard to the approval of temporary changes to procedures.
This item was discussed with the Station Super-intendent and will remain as an unresolved item.
(8011-3)
6.
Followup to IE Bulletins IEB79-27 Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation (Closed)
As a result of the licensee's review, several procedural changes were implemented and a Minor Design Change 80-39 has been completed to add as a minimum local voltage indication for critical instrument busses.
The procedures dealing with loss of instrument AC are:
Abnormal Procedure 1.4.6.7, Loss of NBPP
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Abnormal Procedure 2.4.6.8, Loss of AC-Instrument Power
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Emergency Procedure 5.2.6, Loss of Instrument AC
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From Discussion with the Operations Supervisor, it appears that these
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procedures could be consolidated and rearranged with regard to the power
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panels covered in each procedure.
For example, move CPP and CPP-1 from 5.2.6 to 2.4.6.3 and add CPP-2 to 2.4.6.8.
This item will remain as an open item (8011-4).
No major operational problems were identified for the loss of individual instrument power busses and it appears that the
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licensee's response and actions adequately address the concerns outlined in this bulletin.
80-02 Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipment (Closed)
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NPFU reviewed all Product Quality Certifications and deficiency reso-lutions on equipment furnished by Marvin Engineering Company for the feedwater sparger replacement.
In addition, the results of a GE, QA audit of Marvin Engineering were reviewed by the NPPD Manager of QA. All issues have apparently been satisfactorily resolved and nothing was identified
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that would impact on the equipment delivered to NPPD.
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8C-06 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls (Closed)
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The licensee's electrical drawing review indicates that all safety-related
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equipment remains in its emergency mode of operation following a reset
of the ESF signal. Station surveillance procedures have been modified j
on a one time basis to test the above actions. Of the twenty-four (24)
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tests so modified, four (4) remain to be done.
These will be completed
on the next normally scheduled surveillance, i
80-08 Examination of Containment Linear Penetration Welds (Closed)
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The licensee has identified several butt welds with backing bars that were not UT examined. Correspondence with Burns and Roe, the Architect Engineer, indicates that these welds were classed as categories C and D weld joints and under the applicable ASME Codes may*be examined by methods
other than UT.
No unsatisfactory results were identified by the NDE tests that were performed. The licensee intends no additional testing.
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licensee is apparently in conformance with tha ASME Code and Region IV's
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review of thia matter is complete. Any additional issues will be addressed by IE Headquarters.
80-0,9 Hydromotor Actuator _ Deficiencies (Closed)
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Six valves of the type identified in the bulletin are used in the ACAD system at Cooper Nuclear Station. Additional contact with the manufacturer revealed that these valves are not effected by the problems identified in the bulletin.
The licensee intends to modify his test programs to include i
these valves,
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80-11 Masonry Wall Design (Closed)
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No integral masonry ~ block walls exist in safety-related areas at Cooper
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Nuclear Station; hence, the actions in the bulletin are not applicable i
at this site.
l 80-13 Cracking in Core Spray Spargers (Closed)
The inspector reviewed Special Procedure 80-11, under which the visual inspection of the CS system was conducted.
No problems were identified.
80-14 Degradation of Scram Discharge Volumn Capability (Closed)
Procedure 6.1.14, Scram Discharge Volumn H1'gh Water Level Functional Test, has been modified to time the closure of the drain and vent valves on
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this systtw. The procedure requires the immediate notifications of the NRC if these valves are found inoperable.
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. lure of Seventy-six (76) of One-hundred-eighty-five (185) Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR (Open)
The inspector witnessed the manual scrac conducted on July 26, 1980, under CNS Special Test Procedure 80-09.
The scram occurred without incident.
The data required by thi: bulletin was collected, and no extended accumulation of water in the scram discharge header was found.
The scram discharge volume was emptied within approximately 10 minutes of the scram being reset.
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Followup on LERs
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The following LERs are closed based on discussions with licensee management or in office review:
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79-41 80-01 80-05 80-09
80-10 80-11
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80-15 80-16
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80-17
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80-18 80-19 80-20 80-23 8.
Manarecant Meeting The regional managers and the NRR Project Manager listed on the summary j
page held a meeting with the licensee managers indicated in paragraph 1 I
on August 7, 1980, at Cooper Nuclear Station.
The primary purpose of this meeting was to discuss the Region's annual evaluation of the licensee's i
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performance. The licensee's performance evaluation is provided as Enclosure 2 to this report.
In addition to presenting the evaluation, the regional managers also dis-cussed thn licensee's enforcement history and significant reportable events from the app.,.4;al period. These issues provided a partial basis for the licensee's evaluation.
The Regional Managers also discussed the following:
The implementation of the resident inspection program at
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Cooper Nuclear Station; The recent reorganization of Region IV Reactor Operations Branch;
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and The proposed NRC enforcement program.
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The NRR Project Manager, who was a member of the evaluation board, also discussed his perception of the licensee's performance.
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The licensee expressed no significant concerns regarding the appraisal findings; however, members of licensee management vocalized several concerns regarding the apparent duplicative efforts of NRC in evaluating licensees and the burden being placed on licensees in allocating their resources to meet expanding regulatory requirements and to maintain continued safe plant operations.
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Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required 'in order to ascertain whether they a re acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
An unresolved itea is discussed in paragraph Sb of this report.
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10.
Exit Interview Exit intertiews were conducted at the conclusion of each portion of this inspection.
The above findings were identified and discussed with the Station Superintendent.
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ENCLOSURE 2 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION COOPER NUCLEAR STATION AUGUST 1980 LICENSEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (OPERATIONS)
Facility:
Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Unit Identification:
Unit 1
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Docket No.
License No./Date of Issuance Unit No.
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50-298 DPR-46
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Unit 1
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Appraisal Period:
January 1, 1979 to August 6, 1980 Appraisal Completion Date:
August 6, 1980
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Review Board Members:
G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch (RO&NSB), RIV T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section //1, RO&NSB, RIV J. E. Gagliardo, Chief, Nuclear Support Section, RO&NSB, RIV V. L. Rooney, Project Manager, NRR
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R. G. Spangler, Reactor Insgzetor, Reactor Projects Section No. 1, ROENSB, RIV
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A.
Number and Nature of Noncompliance Items
- Noncompliance category:
Unit 1 Violations
Infractions
Deficiencies
- 3 not yet categorized
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Areas of Noncompliance:
Unit 1 Plant Operations
i Maintenance
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Radiation Protection
Fire Protection
Security
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Number and Nature of Licensee Event Reports Type of Events:
Unit 1
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Personnel errors
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Defective procedures
Causally-linked events
Licensee Event Reports Reviewed (Reports Nos.)
50-298/79-01 through 50-298/79-43 50-298/80-01 through 50-298/80-15 50-298/80-17 and 18
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50-298/80-20 through 50-298/80-22
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Escalated Enforcement Actions
Civil Penalties l
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Orders None
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Immediate Action Letters None
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Management Conferences Held During Past Twelve Months None
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Justification of Evaluations of Functional Areas Categorized as Requiring an Increase in Inspection Frecuency/ Scope (see evaluation sheets)
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N/A
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Inspection Frequency and/or Scope FUNCTIONAL AREA Increase No. Change Decrease 1.
Management Control X
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Plant Operations X
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Refueling Operations & Activities X
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Maintenance X
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Surveillance & Preoperational Testing X*
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Training X*
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Radiation Protection X
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Environmental Protection X
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Emergency Planning X
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Fire Protection X
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Security & Safeguards X
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Design Changes & Modifications X*
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Reporting X
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QA Audits X
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Committee Activities X
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Quality Control X
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Procurement X
- These areas are presently inspected on an extended interval due to past licensee performance.
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G. L. Madsen, Chief, RO&NSB, RIV
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