IR 05000298/1979002
| ML19281A696 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1979 |
| From: | Constable G, Johnson E, Madsen G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19281A693 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-79-02, 50-298-79-2, NUDOCS 7903300026 | |
| Download: ML19281A696 (7) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-298/79-02 Docket No. 50-298 License No. DPR-46 Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection At:
Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: January 29 - February 1, 1979 Principal
< g,4 g zg [.q Insoector E. H. Johnson, Reactor Inspector Date y-
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,
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G.
L.~ Constable, Reactor Inspector Date Approved By:
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G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Date Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on January 29 - February 1,1979 (Report No. 50-298/79-02)
Areas Inspected _:
Routine, announced inspection of procurement and storage activities; calibration of safety-related instrumentation; procedures; review of plant operations; review of spent fuel storage pool modification; and followup on spent fuel storage rack weld cracks.
The inspection involved fifty-one (51) hours on-site by two (2) NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in five of the six areas inspected.
Two items of noncompliance (Deficiency - Failure to perform surveillance as required by TS 4.5.B.2 for an inoperable service water booster pump, paragraph 2; Infraction - Failure to store two quarts of flammable solvent in a metal safety can as required by Administrative Procedure, paragraph 2) was noted in one area.
So 7903 MOO 26
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-2-DETAILS Persons Contacted G. K. Adkins, Shift Supervisor C. S. Barrus, Mechanical Engineer P. J. Borer, Technical Assistant to the Station Superintendent R. Brungardt, Shift Supervisor M. E. Cashett, Shift Supervisor M. D. Cozzens, Stores Clerk P. F. Doan, Mechanical Engineer W. M. Durham, Stores Clerk H. A. Jantzen, Instrument & Controls Supervisor L. I. Lawrence, Maintenance Supervisor
- L. C. Lessor, Station Superintendent C. R. Noyes, Engineering Supervisor D. R. Overbeck, Administrative Assistant L. A. Parks, Electrician T. K. Sweet, Mechanic P. V. Thomason, Assistant to the Station Superintendent M. G. Williams, Operations Supervisor V. L. Wolstenholm, QA Specialist
- Present at the exit interview.
In addition to the above technical and supervisory personnel, the inspector held discussions with various maintenance, operations, technical support and administrative members of the licensee's staff.
1.
Plant Status During the period of this inspection, the plant was in routine power operation at approximately 95% power.
2.
Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the below listed plant log records, held discussions with shift personnel, observed control room and plant process instrumentation, toured accessible areas of the plant and observed routine operation, including routine radiological controls to determine that no abnormal conditions were present and that operations were being conduc'ted in accordance with license conditions and other NRC requirements.
The following is a list of the records reviewed:
Night Order Book, December 1,1978 through January 29, 1979
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Shift Supervisor's Log, November 27, 1978 through January 25,
.
1979
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-3-Control Room Operator's Narrative, November 27, 1978 through
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January 29, 1979 Jumper Log, All outstanding entries
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Control Room Log Sheets, December 1,1978 through December 12,
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1978 Auxiliary Patrol Log Sheets, December 1,1978 through December 12,
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1978 Special Instruction Log and Special Order Log, All outstanding
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entries Clearance Order Log, All outstanding entries
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Nonconformance Reports, November 22, 1978 through January 28, 1979
.
This area of the inspection included a tour of accessible areas of the plant to observe plant housekeeping conditions; that instrumentation was monitoring process parameters as required; that selected process parameters were ',vithin Technical Specification requirements; and that selected valves and operating switches were in the proper operate or standby positions.
During the plant tour, the inspector conducted a radiation survey of accessible plant area; using his own portable gamma meter to determine that radiation areas sere properly posted and controlled.
This inspection effort also included drop-in inspections of the control room to observe plant conditions and to verify proper shift manning in accordance with Technical Specifications.
During review of completed clearance orders, the inspector noted that on November 19, 1978, at approximately 0900, the 'B' RHR service water booster pump was placed out-of-service for scheduled maintenance.
Technical Specification 3.5.B.2 permits the inoperability of a single RHR service water booster pump during reactor operation provided the remaining pumps are operable.
Technical Specification 4.5.B.2 requires that the operability of the remaining RHR service water booster pumps be demonstrated imediately after determining that a single RHR service water booster pump is inoperable.
The inspector reviewed the shift supervisor's narrative and the control room operator's log to determine if the testing required by the above Technical Specification had been conducted.
The control room operator's log for November 19, 1978 indicated that the required surveillance test was performed at 1845 hours0.0214 days <br />0.513 hours <br />0.00305 weeks <br />7.020225e-4 months <br />. This was substantiated by the completed data sheet from Surveillance Procedure 6.3.20.1, "RHR Service Water Booster Pump and Valve Operability." The definition of imediate in the Technical Specification means that the required action will be initiated as soon as practicable.
_
Discussions of this event with the operations supervisor revealed that the required surveillance testing "ad not been performed during the day shift due to a misunderstanding of the system configuration
-4-required by the maintenance.
The inoperability of the
'B'
RHR service water booster pump was discovered during the swing shift and the surveillance test on the remaining pumps was then immediately performed. The inspector further noted that the failure to perform the required surveillance testing in the time frame specified in the Technical Specifications was not reported on a licensee's internal nonconformance report as required by Administrative Procedure 1.10.
The failure to perform the operability check on the remaining RHR service water booster pumps in a timely manner is in noncompliance with Technical Specification 4.5.B.2.
During the inspection of the reactor building on January 30, 1979, the inspectors noted a seven gallon grey plastic bucket on the refueling floor marked in felt pen " Danger - Alcohol." The bucket was covered with a 2' X 2' piece of plywood and contained what appeared to be two quarts of alcohol.
This bucket was still present on the refueling floor on January 31, 1979.
Section 1.6.8.18 of Procedure 1.6, " Personnel and Equipment Safety," requires that thinners, solvents and other flammable or combustible liquids that are to be used outside the paint or oil storage room be carried and dispensed from metal safety cans. The presence of the alcohol in the open plastic bucket on the refueling floor is contrary to the above procedure and constitutes an item of noncompliance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and Section 2.5 of the licensee's approved Quality Assurance Program.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area.
Several material discrepancies were noted however.
One 12 foot ladder was missing from ladder station #9 in the turbine building basement and a small quantity of lubricating oil had overflowed the base plate area of diesel generator #1.
These discrepancies were brought to the attention of the plant staff for correction.
3.
Procedures The inspector reviewed the technical content of the following procedures to verify that the procedure changes were in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and that the procedures could accomplish their intended purpose.
Procedure 1.4.11 Control Room 1.4.14 Refueling Floor Access While Vessel is Open 3.6 Requirements for Working Over or in the Reactor Vessel 5.3.5 Refueling Floor High Radiation 5.3.6 Area Radiation Monitor Alarms 7.3.11 Hoist Load Cell Set Point Adjustment or Check
.
-5-No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area.
4.
Procurement The inspector reviewed the licensee's procurement and material storage activities to verify that components, materials and supplies used for safety-related functions are purchased and controlled in accordance with approved procedures.
The following purchase orders were reviewed in detail to verify that the purchases had proper approval, that the material had proper documentary evidence to show that it met procure-ment requirements, that the material had been inspected on delivery, and that the material was supplied by an approved vendor.
P0 132489 ASCO Valve Parts - Diesel Generator Exhaust Bypass Valves P0 143573 Dresser Industry - Service Air Relief Valve Disc and Spring P0 135518 Off-Gas System - HEPA Filters P0 143575 CRD Solenoid Valves Nonconformance Report 1471 indicated that documentation of required test results did not arrive with material ordered on P0 145920.
The inspector verified that the subject material was properly identified and segregated from approved material.
The inspector reviewed the safety-related spare parts usage associated with MWR 78-12-153.
The MWR identified Purchase Order 112269 for 24 inch Hycar seat rings that were used during the maintenance.
The purchase order folder contained the supplier's recommendation for shelf life and storage requirements for the seat rings, which indicated that under ideal storage conditions the seat rings should have a shelf life of one to three years.
Based on the date of the purchase order (October 1976), the seat rings appeared to be about two years old. The inspector observed that all of the seat rings in storage at the time appeared to be in good condition.
A licensee representative stated that safety-related items with an established shelf life are being entered into a new computer system that will track expiration dates to facilitate timely reordering.
This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area.
5.
Calibration The inspector reviewed the records of the instruments and measuring devices used to conduct Surveillance Procedure 6.2.3.3.
The data indicated that an instrument numbered 2527 had been used to conduct the test, however, through discussions with the technicians it appears that this instrument was not and could not have been used to conduct
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-6-the test.
The actual instrument used was probably number 2507.
All instruments actually used for the calibration had been calibrated within prescribed intervals.
The incorrect notation was brought to the attention of the I&C supervisor.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
6.
Spent Fuel Rack Modifications The objective of this inspection effort was to review the licensee's modification of the spent fuel storage pool. This modification con-sists of replacing the existing spent fuel storage racks with the
, dense packed fuel storage rack to increase pool storage capacity.
The inspector reviewed receipt inspection records of the new spent fuel storage racks. These inspections were conducted between November 2, 1978 and November 13, 1978.
This receipt inspection included verification that boral sheets were in place and included random sampling of the fuel storage location dimensions using a dummy fuel cell.
This dimensional check consisted of 10 locations selected at random in 10 cacks; one-fourth of all locations in one rack; one-half of all locations in one rack and all locations in one rack.
The licensee noted no dimensional deviations during these inspections.
The licensee did, however, note during the receiving inspection that numerous welds on the storage racks exhibited crater cracking.
The existence of the crater cracking and the repair performed by licensee were reported to the NRC on January 4,1979, in a 10 CFR 21 report.
Followup on this item is reported in paragraph 7 below.
The inspector also discussed the moo.fication with various licensee personnel to determine that modification procedures were properly approved and were being adhered to.
On January 30, 1979, the inspector witnessed modification activities on the refueling floor including the installation of one of the new spent fuel racks in the spent fuel storage pool.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area of the inspection.
7.
Followup on Part 21 Report For Weld Cracks on Spent Fuel Racks On January 4,1979, the licensee issued a Part 21 report concerning weld cracks identified on high density fuel storage racks.
The purpose of this inspection effort was to determine that the event was properly evaluated, reported, that corrective action was taken as described in the report, and to evaluate the sufficiency of that corrective action.
During the receipt inspection of the spent fuel storage racks, licensee personnel noted crater cracks on some welds in the aluminum structure.
Nonconformance Report No. 5054, dated November 6,1978, was written
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..
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-7-to document these crater cracks.
An evaluation of the cracks was performed by the licensee's engineering vendor. The inspector reviewed the report from the vendor, dated November 10, 1978.
The vendor determined that the weld cracks occurred randomly throughout the structure, generally at weld end craters and were a maximum of approximately 3/8" long and extended through the weld throat thickness. The vendor summarized his recomended corrective action as follows, "b order to minimize the possibility of crack propagation, crevice corrosion and subsequent structural problems over the lifetime of these cracks, the NES recomends that these weld defects be removed by grinding and rewelding in accordance with the manufacturer's approved weld repair procedure." The licensee wrote Special Procedure 78-19 on November 13, 1978 fcr the evaluation and repair of spent fuel storage rack welds.
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During the period November 9 to December 13, 1978, the licensee per-formed the weld evaluation and repair program on all spent fuel storage racks.
Initially weld evaluation was to consist of 100%
visual inspection of all bottom and top grid welds followed by a 10%
random dye penetrant examination of welds an the top grid. All defects which were found, were to be ground out and checked by dye penetrant examination. Where the crack removal would reduce the weld length to less than that required by the storage rack drawing, a weld repair was to be performed under the Special Procedure indicated above.
During the dye penetrant examination of welds on the upper grid, the licensee discovered that 30% to 50% of the welds examined revealed new crater crack defects, although visual examination did not indicate such defects.
The licensee subsequently performed a 100% dye penetrant examination of all top and bottom grid welds and performed the required weld repair where applicable.
Following this repair program, one crack was noted adjacent to a weld that had been previously repaired.
The licensee performed a 100% inspection of all welds on all racks of a similar configuration.
No further defects were noted and all racks were released for installation.
The inspector determined that this event occurred as reported in the letter of January 4,1979 and that the corrective action was taken as described.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area of the inspection.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the Station Superintendent at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope of the inspection and the findings above were discussed.