IR 05000289/1985023
| ML20138J259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1985 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138J254 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-85-23, NUDOCS 8512170472 | |
| Download: ML20138J259 (6) | |
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l-l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
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REGION I
L Report No. 50-289/85-23 L
Docket No.
50-289
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License No.
DPR-50 Priority
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Category C
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Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation
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P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Nar.e: Three Mile Sl.1n '-1
Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspectio'n Cond cted:
November 19 - 21, 1985 jado b Ah (1/4 /85~
Inspectors:
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C. Z.(Dordon, EPS, EP&RPB
' date R. Cook, Resident. Inspector, TMI-2 F. Kantor, DEPER, IE i-l T. Lynch, Battelle, PNL J. Pappin, Battelle, PNL W. Thomas, RI D. Trimble, Resident Inspector, Calvert Cliffs Approved by:
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T. L. K rpster,f hief
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Emergency Prepa(fedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 19-21, 1985 (Report Number 50-289/85-23)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on Novem-ber 20, 1985.
The inspection involved 222 inspector-hours by a team of eight NRC Region I, headquarters and contractor personnel.
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-Results: No violations were identified.
The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate-to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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8512170472 851211 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G
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OETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on November 21, 1985.
Baker, G. G., Manager, Environmental Controls, TMI Bedell, D. H., Manager, communications Services Bevelacqua, J. J., Manager, Emergency Preparedness, TMI-1 Christman, P. G., Manager, Plant Administration, TMI-1 Colitz, J. J., _ Director, Plant Engineering, TMI-1 Giangi, G., Manager, Emergency Preparedness Hassler, 0.V., TMI-1, Licensing Hildebrand, J. E., Director, Radiological Controls, TMI-2 Hukill, H. D., Director, TMI-1 Kuehn, G. A., Manager, Radiological Controls, THI-1 Levin, S., Director, Site Operations-TMI-2 Long, R. L., Director, Nuclear Assurance Shaw, R. P., Manager, Radiological Engineering, TMI-1 Toole, R. J., Director, Operations and Maintenance, TMI-1 The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers, and observers as they performed their assigned functions during this exercise.
2.
Emergency Exercise The Three Mile Island 1 Nuclear Station full scale exercise was conducted on November 20, 1985 from 2:30 p.m. until 9:30 p.m.
a.
Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on September 6, 1985 were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On October 7, 1985, the licensee submitted the com-plete teenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I rep-resentatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emer-gency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data by the licensee. The upgraded scenario allowed ad-equate testing of the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emer-gency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the op-portunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previ-ously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective actio.
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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 19, 1985, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in areas of operations, radiological controls, and technical support. These changes were also discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response ac-tivities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise-activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Malfunction of the Reactor Building purge exhaust valves;
Gradual reduction of Susquehanna River level;
Multiple steam generator tube failures creating a
primary to secondary leak; Coolant leakage into the Reactor Building;
Degradation of fuel cladding and fuel elements;
Release of radioactivity to the atmosphere; and
Declaration of unusual event, alert, site area emergency,
and general emergency classifications.
The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilities and also permitted the State and local governmental authorities to exercise their Emergency Plans.
b.
Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario
events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of
pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and record keeping;
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i Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration
p of protective actions; Provisions for in plant radiation protection;
Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys;
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Maintenance of site security and acc.ess control;
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Performance of technical support;
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Performance of repair and corrective actions; Assembly and accountability of personnel;
Provisions ~for communicating information to the public; and
. Management of' recovery operations.
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Exercise Observations
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The NRC team noted that the. licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency. organization, activation of the emergency response
. facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with l:
their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
Communications and information flow within and between each
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emergency response facility was performed effectively.
Personnel briefings were conducted in a timely manner by coor-
dinators in command of each emergency facility.
Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assign-
ments and demonstrating use of the emergency procedures, and in general, demonstrated they were competent in performing assigned functions.
The Emergency Support Director provided adequate direction and
control throughout the emergency and the interfaces with State
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and NRC officials were effective.
The Radiological Assessment Coordinators and assistants in the
ECC and EACC were able to perform offsite dose projections and calculations efficiently and accurately.
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d.
Open Items The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified
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some of theses areas):
The increase in the amount of activities taking place in the
Control Room and lack of security has the potential for exces-sive overcrowding during the initial stages of the emergency.
(50-289/85-23-01)
TSC status boards are not designed to permanently provide for
key plant and system parameters. (50-289/85-23-02)
Delays were observed in the TSC using the Parsippany Technical
Functions Center (PTFC) in providing engineering advice on purge flow, boron concentration, charcoal efficiency, and ductwork pressure limitations.
(50-289/85-23-03)
The air sample taken in the area of the Containment Atmosphere
Post Accident Sampling System was not representative of the actual breathing air space.
(50-289/85-23-04)
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The boat used for environmental monitoring is not initially
equipped with essential safety items such as adequate lighting, a reliable generator, and life preservers.
(50-289/85-23-05)
The health physics portion of the exercise did not allow ad-
equate challenges for testing emergency response actions of personnel in the area of radiological controls.
(50-289/85-23-06)
Information transmitted to the Emergency Support Director
caused confusion in the EOF regarding the status of the injured person. (50-289/85-23-07)
The logic diagram of Procedure 1004.7 indicates that offsite
doses which exceed the lower limit of EPA protective action guidelines should be considered as the first step when protec-tive action recommendations are initially formulated as opposed to first considering the potential for plant degradation.
In addition, the diagram does not provide for the key-hole concept when recommendations for evacuations are made nor does it iden-tify specific evacuation distances.
(50-289/85-23-08)
Deescalation from the general emergency classification did not
appear to be of any benefit either to offsite authorities, NRC representatives,'or onsite and offsite augmentation (licensee)
personnel. Also, during initial recovery efforts, deescalation does not identify appropriate actions each of these entities should take or provide specific instructions to affected popula-tions. (50-289/85-23-09)
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The recovery phase did not utilize procedure 2004.24 and entail
in depth discussions of short term vs. long term objectives with key EOF Coordinators.
(50-289/85-23-10)
e.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The licensee provided adequate demonstrations of deficient areas
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which were identified by NRC during the previous emergency exercise with the following exception:
The plant paging system for providing routine information and
emergency announcements is not audible in the auxiliary building. (50-289/85-23-11)
f.
Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 21, 1985, during which key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique appeared adequate in that'
licensee participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken) and areas in which improvements have been made.
Specific improvement areas which were identified related to tech-nical manuals inadequately used for engineering support, information flow to the Emergency Support Director and Radiological Assessment Coordinator, and access control / reporting of personnel to assigned facilities.
3.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that most previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the
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public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open items.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.