IR 05000289/1983011
| ML20023E164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1983 |
| From: | Barr K, Conte R, Keimig R, Paolino R, Richards S, Thonus L, Young F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023E163 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-83-11, NUDOCS 8306150008 | |
| Download: ML20023E164 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.
50-289/83-11 Docket No.
50-289 License No.
DPR-50 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: March 29, 1983 - May 12, 1983 5)S w 5/B3/83 Inspectors:
F.
u g, Regent Inspector (TMI-1)
date signed AxbEvY.bd&t.
D3 K.4 hrr, Rad iation Specialist ddte' signed
'84 d,k slas/es
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R. g S
ogres'dentInspector(TMI-l)
date signed 0,
$f C 3/ V3 n
A R. Paolino, Lead Redctor Engineer date signed
3/[83 S. Richards, Reactor Engineer ddte signed hhw Sf?1l6'3 L. Thonus, Re ide Inspector (TMI-2)
date signed
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Approved by:
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4.2 - #1 ff. Keimig, Act gC f, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2C, No. 2 Inspection Summary:
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Inspection conducted on March 29 - May 12, 1983, (Inspection Report Number 50-289/83-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection,by site and region-based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; plant operation (shutdown) including steam generator repairs; restart modifications; and review of small break analysis. The inspection involved 198 inspector-hours.
Results: No violations were identified.
r306150008 830602 PDR ADOCK 05000289
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Details 1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities (GPU) Nuclear Corporation R. Barley, Lead Mechanical Engineer, TMI-l J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Director, TMI-l D. Ethridge, Radiological Engineer, R& ECD R. Fenti, Quality Control (QC) Manager, Nuclear Assurance Division (NAD)
J. Gulati, Project Engineer, Technical Function Division (TFD)
R. Harper, Corrective Maintenance Manager, TMI-1 T. Hawkins, Manager TMI-1, Startup and Test, TFD W. Heysek, Supervisor Mod /0pr, NAD N. Hollerbush, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer, NAD H. Hukill, Director and Vice President TMI-l
- C. Incorvati, QA Auditor, NAD G. Kuehn, Manager, Radiological Controls TMI-1, R& ECD S. Levin, Acting Director Maintenance and Construction Division (M&CD)
M. Nelson, Supervisor Review Pregram, TMI-l F. Paulewicz, Mechanical Engineer, TMI-1 J. Pearce, Mechanical Engineer, TMI-1 J. Piazza, Piping Engineer, TFD ti. Ross, Manager Plant Operations, TMI-l H. Shipman, Operations Engineer, TMI-l R. Shaw, Manager Radiological Engineering TMI-1, R& ECD C. Shorts, Liaison Group Site Supervisor, TFD
.C. Smyth, Manager TMI-l Licensing, TFD
- C. Stephenson, Licensing Engineer, TFD R. Szczech, Licensing Engineer, TFD R. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director TMI-1 D. Tuttle, Radiological Controls Field Operations Manager, R& ECD Other operations, maintenance, quality assurance and administrative personnel were also interviewed.
- denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (289/80-22-40 and 42): Management issues relating to ventilation system flow balancing and testing.
Based on discussions and interviews with onsite and corporate personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee had initiated adequate management attention to important to safety ventilation systems. Areas ^ reviewed included personnel assignment, knowledge and experience; coordination between onsite and corporate engineering organizations; and the licensee's methodology used in identifying and resolving problems with the ventilation system.
Prior to restart, the licensee intends to make system modification and obtain technical data, as a result of the flow balancing / system testing, to determine compliance with Technical Specifications. This will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection prior to restart (289/83-11-01).
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-3-(Clo' sed) Inspector Follow Item (289/82-BC-17): Helium (He) leakage testing of waste gas piping. The inspector reviewed the results of Surveillance Procedure 1303-11.29, " Waste Gas Disposal System Leak Check", performed on March 24, 1983. This test is a part of the leakage reduction program for systems outside containment, which is currently under review by NRC. The test identified leaks on two valve stems which were corrected; the valves passed a subsequent leak test. Accordingly the licensee has met the limited conditions specified in NUREG-0680, Section (Order Item) No. a for helium leak testing the waste gas system.
During the review of the licensee's test procedure, the inspector ncted that the procedure required only 10 ppm He inside the waste gas system which limits the sensitivity of the test to six standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH). Also it was noted that the test procedure did not require periodic field calibration against a standard leak rate. The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments. The adequacy of the test sensitivity will be reviewed as a part of the leakage reduction program (289/80-22-99).
(0 pen) NRC Bulletin (289/79 BU-27): Loss of Non Class IE Instrumentation and Control Power System Busses during Operations. With respect to the NRC Bulletin, the inspector verified that information and corrective action which included hardware and procedure changes and specific training were implemented as described.
Modifications to the plant were performed by Task LM38, LM43A, LM43B, and LM43C. A review of LM38, LM43C (see paragraph 4 for details) and LM43A (conducted in previous NRC inspection)-found that implementation of specific modification was in accordance with the requirements of the bulletin. Task LM43B has not been reviewed by the NRC, therefore this bulletin will remain open pending further inspection.
The licensee procedure review in response to this bulletin resulted in three new emergency procedures (EP 1202-40,41,42) being issued. The inspector reviewed the new procedures.for adequacy and found them acceptable.
In the area of training, the inspector reviewed the lesson plans and attendance records for each shift to assure that all licensed operators had received the minimum training on this subject. The inspector also verified that on shift training was being conducted on the new-emergency procedures.
Acceptance criteria for this training was based on training required by a related order issued on NRC Bulletin 79-27 to all Babcock and Wilcox plants except TMI. The inspector found that the licensee's training met the training requirements noted in the subject order and the NRC Bulletin.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/81-04-01):
Conduit support calculation / analysis. The licensee completed design calculation and analysis for conduit support no. 121-121 on June 5, 1981, with verification of data completed on November 17, 1981. The inspector confirmed data (GAI file code 1.527.3.6 pages 414.1 through 414.5) is complete and readily available.
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-4-(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/81-04-02):
Environmental Qualification of
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" Clark" relays. The inspector reviewed licensee / vendor data confirming material change to TB113 coil (clark relays) did not degrade relays for use at TMI. The test report indicated that. relays with TBil3 coils made from molded Hysol NG8 Epoxy will-withstand operating ambient environment temperatures of 71 C.
In addition, the licensee has revised the i
procurement specification PEQ-18 to establish requirements for these
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" Clark" relays.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (289/82-BC-37):
Installation of the Remote Shutdown Panels (LM-38). Modification review details are
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addressed in paragraph 4.
.The hardware changes were also a part of the licensee's commitments in response to the NRC Bulletin No. 79-27 (see 79-BU-27 above).
(0 pen)LInspector_ Follow Item (289/82-BC-48):
Installation of the Reactor Building Sump / Flood Level Indication. Modification review details are addressed in paragraph 4.
These are part of the safety related instruments to be installed by the licensee in response to NRC Task Action Plan (TAP) Item No. II, Post Accident Monitoring System. A post implementation safety review will be conducted by NRR per NUREG-0737 (TAP II.F.l(5)). This item remains to be resolved prior to restart pending the availability of documents to support safety grade qualification testing data.
3.
Plant Operations During Long Term Shutdown a.
Routine Review Inspections of the facility were' conducted to assess compliance with
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general operating requirements of Section 6 of Technical Specifica-tions in the following areas:
licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint including plant clecnliness; control of documents including log keeping practices; licensee implementation of the security plan including access controls / boundary integrity and badging practices; licensee. control of ongoing and special evolutions including control room personnel uareness of these evolutions; and implementation of radiological controls.
Random inspections of the control-room during regular and back shift hours were conducted. The selected sections of-the shift foreman's log and control room operator's log were reviewed for the period March 29,'1983, to May 11, 1983. Selected sections of other control room daily logs were reviewed for the period from midnight to the time of review.
Inspections of areas outside the control room occurred ~on April 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and May 3, 4, 6, 1983.
Selected licensee planning meetings were also observed. Maintenance and surveillance records were reviewed to support the verification of licensee action on previous inspection findings.
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-5-On April 1,1983, at 9:30 AM, a radiography source became disconnected in the unshielded position while the licensee was evaluating welds on prefabricated piping to be installed as part of high vent modification. The disconnection of the 92 curie Indium-192 source owned by Nuclear Engineering Services (NES), was
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immediately identified by the NES technician.
Immediate steps were taken by the licensee and contractor to prevent undue exposures to workers involved.
The source was reseated in its proper container under a special temporary procedure employing a four man team of health physics and radiography personnel using temporary shielding and long handled tools. Total exposure to the team was 198 mrem. Subsequent review by the inspector of radiation surveys, the recovery procedure and licensee's post recovery critique determined that the licensee had adequately conducted the evolution.
The repair process continued in both "A" and "B" Once Through Steam Generators (OTSG's) with completion of tube freepathing during this inspection period.
Preparation for the final bubble testing was started and is expected to be completed by May 16, 1983.
In addition to bubble testing on both OTSG's, tubes determined by the bubble test to be leaking will be removed from service. Subsequent to this evolution, the licensee plans on performing RCS cleanup which will take between four to six weeks.
Due to the significance and severity of the OTSG tube degradation, the inspector frequently observed various aspects of the repair process. On several occasions the inspector observed tube freepathing being performed in both OTSG's. A selected review of records, completed at the job site, was conducted. The adequacy of the procedures used at the time of observation was also reviewed.
In addition, discussions were conducted with several craftsmen and supervisors on different shifts to assess the knowledge level and understanding by key individuals.
b.
OTSG Quality Assurance Review As part of the OTSG's inspection, a review was performed to determine the effectiveness of the licensee quality assurance program associated with the repair of OTSGs. The inspector, on a sampling basis, reviewed various material nonconformance reports (MNCR) generated by OTSG work, special 0TSG procedures requiring QA involvement and daily interfacing of QA personnel and onsite OTSG repair task group.
In the area of Eddy Current Testing (ECT) data, the inspector noted that there was always at least one independent verification by QA and in most cases, there were two independent verifications of the data by a site engineer and a second by a QA inspector (such as in. the development of the master ECT computer list). All discrepancies noted by any reviewer were corrected by the original engineer compiling the data. These discrepancies were also required to pass through the same review tier as the original document.
During procedure implementation, the licensee required two individuals to check the data at the work site and an additional
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-6-post review of all' record sheets.
In addition to blast sequence record sheets, the licensee used updated tube sheet maps (as-built drawings) to maintain an independent account by QA of. tubes taken out of service. After each.;tep, the tube sheet map was compared against the blast sequence-sheets to assess the adequacy of these procedures..The licer.see made extensive use of prototype and mockup
training. Discrepancies were noted and corrected by the licensee.
Within the scope of the review, the inspector determined that adequate
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QA interface existed.
In addition, during the review of the ECT por-tion of the program, the inspector noted that GPUN had taken the initi-ative to train for certification their own Level III ECT inspector.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
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Pressurizer
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During the week of April 4 - 10, 1983, the licensee conducted several entries into the pressurizer for internal inspection as a result of identified corrosion in the power operated relief valve in February 1983. Before hydrolazing the tank internals, visual, video-(black and white), and photographic (color) surveys of the pressurizer internals were completed along with radiological surveys and the taking of surface scrape samples for laboratory analysis.
Subsequent to hydrolazing, additional-visual, video, and photographic surveys were completed.
The inspector reviewed these entries on a sampling basis to confirm
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licensee findings and verify implementation of selected sections applicable procedures specifically, Special Operating Procedure 83-033, dated April 1,1983, Pressurizer Entry.
j On the initial entry, yellowish deposits (purported to be sulphur)
were noted near a vent nozzle and on a U-bolt (spray nozzle support)
at the dome of the pressurizer.
Small amounts of a red deposit (purported to be iron sulfide) were noted on the pressurizer internal surface.
Small amounts of a rusty deposit were noted on
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the heater banks.
It appears hydrolazing was effective in removing the yellowish and
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rusty deposits and most of the red deposits on the walls of the pressurizer.
As expected,. general area radiation levels were an increasing
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gradient.from 5 mR/hr (gamma) at the manway at the top of the pressurizer to approximately 500 mR/hr (gamma) at the bottom of the pressurizer.
Preliminary dosimetry data-indicates that those who entered the pressurizer received exposures within NRC limits.
The licensee remains to complete a final report on the licensee event reports, which noted excessive PORV corrosion (LER 82-11 and 83-03), subsequent to laboratory analysis and review (289/82-LO-ll
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and 83-LO-03).
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-7-Results of the plant operations review indicated that the licensee continued to exhibit proper' managerial control of daily activities..
Housekeeping was, in general, adequate for the level of maintenance /
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modification work conducted.
Records were properly completed as sufficient evidence of activities performed.
4.
Restart Modification a.
Tack LM-38, Remote Shutdown Panel A review of Task LM-38 was perfonned to verify that the design provided is consistent-and meets the requirements delineated in NUREG-0680-(andsupplements). The purpose of Task-LM-38 is to provide the ability to monitor key parameters required to achieve a cold stutdown from outside the control room. -Parameters which are monitored shall be independent of the plants Integrated Control
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System (ICS). The design is comprised of two redundant class IE
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Each train has sensors, a signal conditioning cabinet and a control panel.
In addition, the remote shutdown-panel is used'to supply process variables to the control room that are independent of the ICS.
The inspector reviewed on a sampling basis, the documentation associated with the implementation of the modification including
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as-built drawings, test packages, field change request and the documentation associated with Engineering Change Memoranda Nos. S-156, S-237, and, S-269.
In addi, tion, a system.walkdown and visual inspection of-the installation of selected components was
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The inspector reviewed Field Change Request (FCR) No. C0012201, revision 1.
This FCR eliminated the sensing line slope requirements for several nuclear safety related level transmitters. installed as part of the modification. Licensee specification SP-1101-44-002 requires a i inch per foot slope..The FCR resolution stated that sufficient slope existed and that the slope requirement was therefore eliminated. The inspector questioned the documented method for resolution of the FCR and noted that the drawings do not delineate what is acceptable slope for inspection.by Quality Control. The FCR had received design verification concurring with the elimination of the slope specification. Licensee representatives agreed to further review the circumstances surrounding the resolution of the FCR. This item is unresolved (289/83-11-02).
The inspector reviewed portions of the licensee's corrective Maintenance Procedure 1420-Y-23, Installing Wire and Cable, to determine if the electrical installation portion of the modification was in accordance with procedure. The inspector noted that the procedure does not consider side wall pressure for the installation of cable.
Licensee representatives stated that cable installation for restart modifications has been conducted in accordance with GAI specification SP-5616, however, the licensee agreed that future
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-8-maintenance work may utilize the procedure and committed to further review the procedure and revise it as necessary. This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee action (289/83-11-03).
b.
Task LM-33, Engineered Safeguard Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
Reset from the Control Room Task LM-33 provides for the modification of the ESFAS to allow the operator to manually reset the trip logic for the high pressure injection, low pressure injection, and reactor building isolation initiation circuitry.
Prior to the modification, each bi-stable in the system had to be manually reset at the ESFAS cabinets located external to the control room. This modification was implemented at the request of the licensee's control room operators. The modification is beneficial, in that an operator is no longer required to leave the control room during ESF actuation to reset the logic bi-stables.
The inspector reviewed documentation associated with the modification including the Engineering Change Memorandum, the post work test procedure and results, and the as-installed drawings.
Selected portions of the modification were visually compared to the drawings to ensure correct wiring had been accomplished. The inspector also discussed the modification with several licensee personnel knowledgeable of the system.
No discrepancies were noted.
Based on the above review, the inspector considered review of the Task LM-33 to be complete.
c.
Reactor Building Sump / Flood Level Indicating System and Critical Plant Parameters Display
.A review of Task LM-8C and LM-43C was performed to verify that the design provided is consistent and meets the requirements delineated in the TMI restart program, applicable NUREG documents (and suppleraents). The purpose of Task LM-8C is to provide reactor building sump level and flood levels indication. The purpose of Task LM-43C is to provide indication of critical plant parameters independent of ICS/NNI in response to NRC Bulletin 79-27.
The inspector reviewed, on a sampling basis, documentation associated with the implementation of the modifications including as-built drawings, test packages, weld history, field change requests and documentation associated with; (1) LM-8C Engineering Change Memoranda Nos. S-133, S-186, S-144, and S-200; (2) LM-43C Engineering Change Memoranda Nos. S-278, S-232, and S-237.
In addition, a system walkdown was performed to verify th physical location of the installed system.
Visual inspection of selected electrical terminations was also performed.
Qualification data of Class IE reactor building sump and flood level indication systems components was not available for review onsite and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (289/82-BC-48).
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e-9-5.
Small Break Analysis Restart Items As a result of the TMI-2 accident, a subsequent small break loss of coolant analysis for TMI-l indicated a ncec to raise the low pressure reactor trip setpoint from 1800 psig to 1900 psig and the high pressure injection setpoint from 1500 psig to 1600 psig. The licensee commitment was noted in NUREG-0680, TMI-l Restart Safety Evaluation, Section C.l.d.
The NRC Inspection Report No. 50-289/81-21, documented a review of appropriate changes to facility procedures which identified these setpoints. During this inspection, data for the below noted surveillance procedures were reviewed to verify the setpoint change (nominal low pressure reactor trip at 1906 3.6 psig and nominal high pressure injection setpoint set between 1640 to 1650 psig).
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1302-5.2, 5.3, Revision 4, January 15, 1981, RPS[ReactorProtection Systemj High and Low RC [ Reactor Coolant] Pressure Channel Calibration; Data completed March 17, 1982
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1303-4.1, Revision 37, February 11, 1983, Reactor Protection System, Data completed May 3, 1983 1303-4.11, Revision 23, March 2, 1983, HPI [High Pressure Injection]
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and LPI [ Low Pressure Injection] Logic and Analog Channels; Data obtained June 21, 1982; May 4, 1983.
The inspector had no further comments on this area.
6.
Inspector Follow Items
' Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in the licensee's conduct of operation (hardware or programmatic) that could lead to a violation if left uncorrect.ed. These items may also relate to matters that require NRC verification of licensee completion as a result of TMI-l Restart Hearings or as a result of restart commitments made to the NRC.
Inspector follow items are addressed in paragraph 2.
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
Unresolved items addressed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 2 and 4.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 12, 1983, to discuss the inspection scope and findings.