IR 05000286/2005009
| ML053570003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2005 |
| From: | Doerflein L NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR-05-009 | |
| Download: ML053570003 (19) | |
Text
December 22, 2005
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 3 - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000286/2005009
Dear Mr. Dacimo:
On November 18, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a safety system design and performance capability team inspection at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 (IP3). The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on November 18, 2005, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspection team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000286/2005009
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Mr. Fred Dacimo
REGION I==
Docket No.
50-286 License No.
DPR-64 Report No.
05000286/2005009 Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Northeast Facility:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 Location:
295 Broadway, Suite 3 Buchanan, NY 10511-0308 Dates:
October 31, 2005 - November 18, 2005 Inspectors:
S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
K. Diederich, Reactor Inspector J. Krafty, Reactor Inspector J. Kulp, Reactor Inspector T. Sicola, Reactor Inspector J. Chiloyan, NRC Contractor Approved by:
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
ii
iii Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000286/2005009; 10/31/05 - 11/18/05; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3;
Engineering Team Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by five inspectors from the NRCs Region I Office and an NRC contractor. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
==1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (SSD&PC) (IP 71111.21)
1. Inspection Basis
==
The NRC team performed an inspection to verify that the selected safety systems would achieve their design and performance capability. The inspection effort reviewed the licensee's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of selected safety systems to perform the current design basis functions. The scope of the teams inspection also included non safety-related structures, systems and components that provided functions required to support the selected systems safety functions.
The systems reviewed during this inspection were selected by the inspection team using information from the licensees and NRCs probabilistic risk analysis models. The models were used to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components in the mitigating system and barrier integrity cornerstones. The team also used deterministic criteria in the selection process by considering previous SSD&PC sample selection, recent inspection history, site problem history, and operational experience. The two systems selected for review were:
- High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) System
- Component Cooling Water (CCW) System The inspection included review and examination of support systems, such as electrical power, instrumentation, and related structures and components. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that were used by the licensee to support the performance of the selected safety systems and associated support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria utilized by the NRC inspection team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), applicable industry codes and standards, as well as industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs. The team also assessed the licensees ability to monitor the system for age related degradation that could result in the system failing to fulfill its design requirement. A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report.
2. System Needs
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the following attributes of the two systems and associated support systems: Process Medium, Energy Sources, Controls, Operator Actions, and Heat Removal. The inspectors verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensee commitments, design basis documents, vendor technical manuals and plant drawings.
A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment. The attributes were verified to meet system requirements as described below:
Process Medium. The team verified that the HHSI and CCW systems would supply the required flow rate and pressure during transients and design basis events, and that sufficient water sources were available to meet requirements.
Energy Sources. The team verified that electric power, control power and air supplies for the HHSI and CCW systems would be available during postulated design basis events; and were adequate to energize/actuate the associated equipment.
Controls. The team reviewed the automatic and manual controls for the HHSI and CCW systems to assure that the automatic and manual control functions would be available for initiation, control and shutdown actions. Additionally, a review of alarms and indicators was performed to ensure that operator actions could be accomplished in accordance with the design assumptions.
Operator Actions. The team reviewed normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with the HHSI and CCW systems to verify that selected operator actions assumed in the design bases could be completed. The team placed particular focus on those operator actions that were risk significant as identified in licensee and NRC risk documents. Additionally, the team verified that operators were able to manually initiate the systems, monitor components and system indications, automatically or manually control system functions, and shutdown the selected systems.
Heat Removal. The team verified that room ventilation systems provided sufficient heat removal capability for the HHSI and CCW systems to maintain acceptable environmental conditions in the room. Additionally, the team verified temperature rise on system components due heat generated by the system was limited such that component temperature qualification was not exceeded.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3. System Condition and Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the following attributes of the HHSI and CCW systems and associated support systems: Installed Configuration, Operation, Design, and Testing.
The inspectors verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensee commitments, design basis documents, vendor technical manuals, calculations and plant drawings. A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report. The attributes were verified to meet system requirements as described below:
Installed Configuration. The team confirmed that the installed configuration of the HHSI and CCW systems were in agreement with design basis assumptions by performing detailed system walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of piping and instruments; component material condition; licensee identified deficiencies; the placement of protective barriers; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; physical separation of redundant trains; and provisions for seismic and other pressure transient concerns.
The team compared their observations of the currently installed configuration of the systems with the design and licensing bases to assure that the system would be capable of functioning during plant transients or accident conditions. Additionally, the team determined if the licensee had identified system deficiencies and entered them into the corrective action program.
Operation. The team performed a procedure walk-through of selected manual operator actions to confirm that the operators had the ability, access and tools necessary to accomplish actions credited in the design basis. The team verified that the performance of operations procedures was consistent with the design and licensing bases.
Design. The team reviewed the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation design of the HHSI and CCW systems to verify that the systems and subsystems would function as required under design conditions. This included a review of the design basis, design changes, design assumptions, calculations, boundary conditions, and models as well as a review of selected modification packages. Instrumentation was reviewed to verify appropriateness of applications and setpoints based on the required equipment function.
Additionally, the inspectors performed limited independent calculations and analyses in several areas to verify the appropriateness of the design values.
Testing. The team reviewed records of selected periodic testing including In-Service Testing, post maintenance tests and calibration procedures. The team verified that the results obtained by system and component testing adequately demonstrated that the systems met operability requirements. The test results were compared against system calculations, drawings, and procedures. Test results were also reviewed to ensure automatic initiations occurred within required times and that testing was consistent with design basis information.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. System Components
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected several risk significant components in the HHSI and CCW systems to ensure equipment at the component level met design requirements. The components selected for detailed review included:
- Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST);
- RWST Level Control/Indication System;
- CCW pumps and heat exchangers.
The team inspected the following attributes of the HHSI and CCW components:
Component Degradation, Environmental Qualification, Equipment Protection, Input/Output, and Operating Experience. The team verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensee commitments, design basis documents, vendor technical manuals, calculations and plant drawings. A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report. The attributes were verified to meet system requirements as described below:
Component Degradation. The team reviewed the licensees maintenance and operations procedures to determine how potential age related degradation of the selected components was monitored and corrected. The team verified that component and/or component materials replacement are scheduled prior to exceeding its expected qualified life or allowed number of cycles. Additionally, the team verified that deficiencies that could potentially reduce the life expectancy of the components, such as boric acid corrosion, were evaluated and corrected.
Environmental Qualification. The team verified that the equipment was qualified to operate under the environment in which it could be subjected under normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that the HHSI and CCW components were qualified to operate within normal and accident environments. These included a review of the temperatures, pressures, humidity and radiation fields in which selected components could be exposed.
Equipment Protection. The team verified that the HHSI and CCW system components were adequately protected from natural phenomenon and other hazards, such as high energy line breaks, fire, floods or missiles. The team reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that system components were adequately protected from those hazards identified in the UFSAR that could impact their ability to perform their safety function.
Input/Output. The team verified that the HHSI and CCW system components input and output were adequate to provide the required signal to the receiving component during event or accident conditions. The team reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that system components were adequately designed to ensure component status information required to enable operators to make decisions and signals used for control of equipment operation as described in the UFSAR would be present during events.
Operating Experience. The team verified that insights from operating experience of similar systems had been reviewed and adequately evaluated by the licensee for the HHSI and CCW systems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of HHSI and CCW system problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design or qualification issues. In addition, condition reports written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The lead inspector presented the inspection results on November 18, 2005, to Mr. F Dacimo and other members of Entergy staff. The team reviewed proprietary information during the inspection, which was either returned to Entergy or was destroyed. The inspection team verified that this inspection report does not contain proprietary information.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
- E. Anderson, Design Engineer
- J. Bencivenga, Design Engineer
- W. Bloss, Licensing Engineer
- R. Burroni, Assistant Operations Manager
- L. Cerra, Design Engineer
- T. Chan, System Engineer
- T. Czerniewski, Supervisor, Engineering
- G. Dahl, Licensing Engineer
- T. Dempsey, Design Engineer
- R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor
- E. Firth, Corrective Action Program
- J. Herrera, System Engineer
- C. Ingrassia, System Engineer
- M. Johnson, System Engineer
- K. Lo, Design Engineer
- A. Mihalik, Programs and Components Engineer
- B. Monahan, Superintendent, Nuclear
- T. Moran, Component Engineer
- S. Petrosi, Supervisor, Engineering
- H. Robinson, Design Engineer
- D. Shah, System Engineer
- R. Sutton, System Engineer
- M. Tesoriero, Supervisor, Programs and Components
- M. Troy, Supervisor, Engineering
- F. Weinert, Design Engineer
- J. Whitney, System Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None.