IR 05000285/1978011

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Insp Rept 50-285/78-11 on 780821-25.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Procurement,Preparation for Refueling, Plant Operation,Safety Injection Sys Reset Procedures & Electrical Equipment
ML19256A078
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun 
Issue date: 09/07/1978
From: Boyter N, Johnson W, Madsen G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19256A075 List:
References
50-285-78-11, NUDOCS 7811030036
Download: ML19256A078 (7)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-285/78-11 Docket No. 50-285 License No. DPR-40 Licensee:

Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station - Unit 1 Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: August 21-25, 1978 Inspectors:

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'W. D. Johnson, Reactor dnspector Date f\\ Cbv s A /w N. C. Boyter, Reactqr Inspector Date tbc_M 9[7/77 Approved By:

'G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations Date and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Sumary Inspection on August 21-25, 1978 (Report No. 50-285/78-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of procurement, preparation for refueling, plant operations, Safety Injection System reset procedures, and environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment. The inspection consisted of 69 inspector-hours on-site by tw NRC isnpectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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-2-DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • R. L. Andrews, Plant Manager R. Berney, Stores Clerk L. J. Dugger, Reactor Engineer J. K. Gasper, Senior Engineer, Technical Services W. G. Gates, Operations Supervisor L. T. Kusek, Supervisor, Technical D. E. Lundy, Electrical Foreman R. Mueller, Electrical Engineer, Technical Services G. R. Peterson, Supervisor I&C and Electrical S. C. Stevens, Manager, Operational Technical Support Services C. F. Vanecek, Shif t Supervisor
  • Attended exit interview.

The inspectors also talked with and intervievaJ several other licensee employees during the inspection. These included reactor operators,

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maintenance technicians and office personnel.

2.

Procurement The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities in purchasing and handling compor.ents, materials and supplies used for safety related functions to verify conformance with the licensee's approved Quality Assurance Program.

The inspector reviewed the following purchase orders and associated recei.pt inspection packages:

Purchase Order Number Itw 37494 Spare cage for HCV 425A, B, C, D 36565 Lockout relay 36118 B-10 proportional counters 36571 Incore detector seal nuts 35438 Battery charger power transformer No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3.

Preparation for Refueling The inspector reviewed the licensee's prccedure for the receipt and inspection of new fuel, Special Procedure NFR-1, Revision 3, August 5, 1977. The inspectu,' observed licensee employees unload and inspect

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-3-two fuel assemblies. New fuel handling activities were conducted in accordance with the approved procedure, using checklists from Nuclear Material Accountability Procedure Number 1 (NfG-1) to document the new fuel inspection.

Item E of Form B of these check-lists is an enrichment check. This portion of the checklist was noted to be outdated. A licensee representative agreed to update this form.

(0 pen Item 285/250)

The inspector reviewed the data packages for the fuel shipments received on August 12 and 16,1978.

The data packages for subsequent shipments will be reviewed during a future inspection.

Fuel transfer and core reconstitution and verification procedures will be reviewed during a future inspection. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Review of Plant Operations a.

Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records:

Shift Supervisor's Log, June - August 1978 Control Room Operator's Log, June - August 1978 Control Room Log Sheets, June - August 1978 Auxiliary Building Log, June - August 1978 Jumper Log, June - August 1978 Tag Log, Current Sheets Night Order Book, June - August 1978 Operations Incident Reports, June - August 1978 Plant Performance Computer Log, June - August 1978 Surveillance Log, June - August 1978 These logs and records were reviewed to verify conformance to plant procedures and to conform that Technical Specification reporting requirements and Limiting Conditions for Operation were met.

While reviewing Surveillance Logs (FC-71), the inspector observed recorded values of azimuthal power tilt (Tq) which were in excess of the limit of 0.03 specified by Technical Specification 2.10.4(4).

Licensee representatives explained that this calculated Tq was obtained from the excore detectors, which are calibrated to the incore detectors. The :alibration is perfonned in accordance with SP-RPS-5 entitled "Excore Detector Symmetric Offset Recalibration." When this calibration is performed using the best estimate of the actual existing To obtainea from incore measurements, the resultant indicated excore Tg may exceed 0.03 due to inherent calibration errors.

In this case, a Night Order Book entry had been used to inform the operaters that an

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-4-indicated excore Tq of 0.036 (for example) would correspond to an actual Tq of 0.03.

On another occasion, the calibration was perfomed assuming that no azimuthal power tilt existed at a time when the best estimate of Tq from incore measurements was about 0.02.

This resulted in indicated excore Tq being less than actual Tq requiring a Hight Order Book entry to inform the operators that an indicated excore Tq of 0.023 (for example) would correspond to an actual Tq of 0.03.

This calibration was perforr..ed on July 18, 1978, but the Night Order Book entry was not made until July 21, 1978.

The inspector expressed concern that the present method of assuring compliance with Tq limits would lead to operator con-fusion and uncertainty. Licensee representatives agreed and informed the inspector of several possible corrective actions which were under consideration. The inspector will review this item in a future inspection.

(0 pen Item 285/251)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b.

Plant Tours At various times during the inspection, the inspectors observed plant operations in the Control Room. Control Room manning and equipment status were found to be in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors toured accessible areas of the auxiliary building, and made the following observations:

General cleanliness was satisfactory.

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No fire hazards were observed.

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No excessive fluid leaks or piping vibrations were observed.

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Seismic restraints and pipe hangers appeared to be in

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satisfactory condition.

Selected valves were observed to be in the required

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positions.

Selected equipment status tags were verified to be correct.

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Control Room Operators were knowledgeable in annunciator

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status.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

IE Circular 78-08 The inspector discussed IE Circular 78-08, " Environmental Qualifications of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants," with licensee representatives and reviewed the licensee's actions and conclusions concerning this circular. The initial resJonsibility for the circular has been assigned to the licensee staff, aut the review

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-5-of the referenced material in the circular was limited by the licensee's lack of a majority of the references. The inspector provided copies of the reference material for reproduction by the licensee. The references in the circular describe specific deficiencies in safety related electrical equipment which the licensee can use for comparison to his plant circumstances. When this review and comparison is complete the inspector will review the results and any possible corrective actions needed.

A licensee representative informed the inspector that the review was expected to be completed by January 1,1979.

(0 pen Item 285/252)

6.

IE Bulletin 78-06 OPPD's letter of July 5,1978, responded to IE Bulletin 78-06 entitled

" Defective Cutler-Hammer, Type M Relays With DC Coils." This response concluded that no such relays were in use or planned for use in safety related systems at Fort Calhoun Station. The inspector reviewed this response and the internal memos which outlined the scope of the investigation which formed the basis for. the above conclusion. This item is considered closed.

7.

IE Bulletin 78-10 OPPD's letter of August 10, 1978, responded to IE Bulletin 78-10 entitled

"Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Supressor Accumulator Spring coils."

The inspector reviewed this response and the results of the snubber inspection and testing performed during the 1977 refueling outage.

This item is considered closed.

8.

Followup On Deviation (Closed) Deviation (Inspection 78-08):

Failure to review pump test data collected during ISI testing within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> as required by Section XI, Subarticle IWP-3200 of the ASME B&PV Code. The licensee has informed station supervisors of this code requirement and directed them to forward all inservice test results to Plant Engineering so that timely review will be performed. Over a longer period of time, ISI test procedures will be revised tu include a sign-off for review within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

9.

Survey of SIS Reset Feature and Associated Procedures The objective of this inspection effort was to determine whether the licensee's written procedures describe all necessary operator actions to sustain operation of the emergency diesel _ generator and related engineered safety features after a loss of off-site power following a LOCA, and subsequent to a safety injection system rese.

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-6-a.

Introduction Many of the current PWR control system designs include an SIS reset feature that, if actuated, will prevent automatic resequencing of engineered safety featt.re equipment until the signals which initiated the SIS have been cleared, or in some cases until the reactor protection system breakers have been reset. A 1977 survey of PWR diesel generator load sequencing in the event of loss of off-site power following a LOCA and subsequent to SIS reset resulted in a finding that many PWR's do not have written emergency prc:edures setting forth the necessary corrective operator actions after SIS reset.

b.

Scope of Inspection The inspector interviewed licensee representatives, reviewed emergency procedures, and reviewed logic diagrams to verify that written procedures are available that identify:

(1) The specific operator actions necessary to manually restart the required engineered safety features if a loss of off-site power or an accident occurs after the SIS has been reset and before the engineered safety feature (ESF) equip-ment is returned to the automatic starting sequence mode.

(2) The specific operator actions required prior to SIS reset to prevent any equipment from moving out of its emergency mode when SIS is reset.

c.

Inspection Findings

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The ESF equipment is actuated by either a low pressurizer pressure signal or a high containment pressure signal for which the operator would follow either the Emergency Procedure EP-5 for the Loss of Coolant Accident or EP-6 for High Containment Pressure. Both

7 2dures, with prior shift supervisor'r approval, provide detailed steps with prescribed order for reset of the ESF. The design of the syrtem and the order of reset prescribed in the procedures are such that the SIS equipment cannot he secured or repositioned unless the reset is complete. Therefore, after an SIS actuation signal, all components of the SIS are either in operation or in a mode for automatic actuation in response to an SIS signa.

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-7-One additional step is needed to completely realign the containment ventilation / isolation systems, but the lack of this step does not jeopardize the automatic actuation of the SIS system. A licensee representative steced that the emergency procedures will be revised to include this step.

(0 pen Item 21:/253)

10. Exit Interview The inspectors met with Mr. R. L. Andrews on August 25, 1978, ar.d summarized the s'. ope and findings of the inspection.

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