IR 05000277/1990003
| ML20012D446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1990 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012D445 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-90-03, 50-277-90-3, 50-278-90-03, 50-278-90-3, NUDOCS 9003270336 | |
| Download: ML20012D446 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
Report Nos. 50-277/90-03 & 50 278/90-03
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Docket Nos.10-177 & 50 278 License Nos. DPR-44 & DPR 56 t -
Licensee:
Philadelnhia Electric Company Post Office Box 7520
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Philadelphia. Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. Units 2 & 3
Inspection At: Delta. Pennsylvania i
Inspection Conducted: February 7-8, 1990 k.
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%, iD Team Members:
C. Z. Gok!)n, Regional Team Leader date '
C. Conklin, Region 1 J. Jamison, Battelle, PNL F. Kantor, NRR J. Lyash, SRI, Peach Bottom Approved By:
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W. J. Lazart(j, Chief, EmergencyY dhte Preparedness Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on February 7-8.1990 (Report Nos. 50-277/90 03 &
50-278/90 03)
l-Areas inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness (EP) inspection and observation of the licensee's full participation annual emergency preparedness exercise
conducted on February 7,1990. The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I, headquarters, and contractor personnel.
Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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9003270336 9003t2 I)
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PDR ADOCK 05000277 L"
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DETAILS
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1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives and support personnel attended the exit meeting held on February 8,1990.
C. L Adams, Director, Emergency Preparedness (EP)
G. F. Daebecker, Manager, Nuclear Support E. P. Fogarty, Manager, Nuclear Support J. F. Franz, Plant Manager R. R. Gallagher, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator N. E. Gazda, Supervisor, Nuclear Services Training J. P. Gerhart, Corporate EP R. A. Kankus, Superintendent, Business Unit R. Z. Kinard, Branch Lead, Corporate EP D. P. LeQuia, Superintendent, Plant Services G. P. McCarey, Supervisor, Health Physics Technical Support D. R. Odell, Supervisor, Chemistry F. A. Polaski, Assistant Operations Superintendent J. M. Rullo, Director, Security D. M. Smith, Vice President, Peach Bottom T. L Stone, Supenisor, Health Physics J. R. Winzenried, Staff Engineer N. L Yost, Shift Supenisor K. P. Zimrnerman, Supervisor, Fire Protection During the conduct of the inspection, other licensee personnel were interviewed
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and observed in performance of emergency response duties, j
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Peach Bottom full participation exercise was conducted on February 7,1990,
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from 4:00 p.m. until 11:30 p.m. Response actions of personnel from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of Maryland were demonstrated in the Emergency Operations Facility and observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities
The exercise objectives, submitted to the NRC Region I on November 6, 1989 were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On December 8,1989 the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency
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l Prior to this year, the licensee used contractor support to develop and issue the scenario data and events. One of many significant EP program
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changes recently implemented was the licensee's initiative to independently j
prepare the scenario package and coordinate activities with all exercise j
participants and observers. This included NRC, FEMA, and state and local authorities.
In general, the NRC review of the scenario revealed the submittal to be complete in most areas. However, several inadequacies were identified with regard to lack of detail in operations data and descriptions of
activities associated with inplant repair and corrective actions. As r
a result, significant revisions were made to the scenario and events data.
l Following the changes, it was determined that the revised scenario would i
provide for adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provide the opportunity for
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licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the
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NRC as in need of corrective action. NRC obsen>ers attended a licensee l
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briefing on February 7,1990 and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario. Suggested i
NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee and were also discussed during the briefing.
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2.2 Exercise Scenario
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The exercise scenario included the following events:
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1. Fire in Diesel Generator Building; i
2. Icing of auxiliary transformers;
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3. Freezing of emergency cooling towers; 4. Station Blackout;
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5. Increase in drywell pressure and radiation levels; 6. Core uncovery and severe fuel damage;
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7. Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment;
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8. Declaration of Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications; and 9. Recommendations of protective measures to offsite authorities.
o The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite
emergency response facilities.
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2.3 Activities Observed
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During the_ conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made
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detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency L
organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of
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emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. Several concerns were identified in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) relating to exercise control and data delivery, causing delays in making critical l'
assessments.
The following activities were observed:
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1. Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; 2. Direction and coordination of the emergency response; f
3. Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies;
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j 4. Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 5. Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of
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protective action; l
6. Provisions for in plant radiation protection;
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7. Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; 8. Maintenance of site security and access control; 9. - Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 10. Performance of firefighting activities;
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11. Assembly and accountability of personnel; 12. Provisions for communicating information to the public; and 13. Post-exercise critique.
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3.0 Classification of Exercise Findings Emergency preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows:
3.1 Exercise Strengths Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's response that provide strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
3.2 Exercise Weakness An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of
preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the Emergency Plan in the area observed (in the event of an actual emergency). Existence of an exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public.
3.3 Areas for Improvement An area for improvement is a finding which did not have a significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, but should be evaluated to determine whether corrective action could improve any programmatic or performance area.
4.0 Exercise Observations
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
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4.1 Control Room
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The following exercise strengths were identified.
1. Good innovation to develop individual procedures for valve lineups to
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provide additional water into the core and for restoration of power.
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2. Thorough knowledge was demonstrated by the shift manager regarding l
overall plant status, direction of the accident sequence, and familiarity with Emergency Action Ixvels (EAL).
3. Communications among control room staff and between other emergency response facilities were clear and easily understood.
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No exercise weaknesses were identified.
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The following area for improvement was identified.
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i 1. System problems were observed while using Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
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communications lines during initial notifications.
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4,2 Technical Supoort Center (TSC)
The following strengths were identified.
1. After the Alert classification, TSC staffing was quickly accomplished.
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2. Logs, notebooks, and status boards were used effectively to record and L
communicate status, decisions, and actions taken.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
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1. Despite degraded plant conditions such as low reactor water level, high drywell radiation readings, inability to makeup water, loss of diesel generator, and imminent core damage, the General Emergency was classified on " General Conditions" rather than specific EAL's.
2. The specific failures that caused the loss of offsite power were never clarified.
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3. The Emergency Director and TSC staff did not show complete awareness of
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4. No estimate of time of core uncovery, beginning of core damage, and the associated need to enter into a core melt sequence was clearly expressed.
5. The necessary amount of makeup water needed to maintain core cooling was not clear.
4.3 Operations Sunport Center (OSC)
The following exercise strengths were identified.
1. Periodic status briefings were given by the OSC Coordinator to OSC staff, and briefings given to inplant repair teams were thorough.
2. Firefighting activities demonstrated by the onsite fire brigade were efficient and considered all potential hazardous conditions.
No exercise weaknesses were identified, f
The following area for improvement was identified.
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1. Near the end of the exercise, an unnecessary delay was encountered by the maintenance team assigned to close the valve in obtaining authorization for radiation dose extensions.
4.4 Emercency Operations Facility (EOF)
The following exercise strengths were identified.
1. EOF staff displayed good knowledge in coordinating degraded plant parameters with radiological assessment and were able to promptly assess the impact of potential offsite releases.
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2. Effective management of offsite field teams was demonstrated which included obtaining information on changing meteorological and radiological conditions.
3. Discussions and interfaces with State and local officials were beneficial and resulted in offsite authorities obtaining a complete description of the accident.
l No exercise weaknesses were identified.
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The following areas for improvement were identified.
I 1. Confusion was observed between licensee and Pennsylvania and Maryland staffs regarding the status of Protective Actions (PA) implemented by each State. Also, State PA implementation is not visual:y displayed in the EOF.
2. ERP-317, " Determination of Protective Action Recommendations", is not organized in a manner which allows information on evacuation time estimates (ETE), population distribution, and special facilities within the EPZ to be obtained.
5.0 Licensee Action on Previousiv Identified items
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Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, the items identified during the previous emergency exercise (Inspection Report Nos.
50 277/8917 and 50 278/8917) were acceptably demonstrated and are closed.
6.0 NRC Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on February 8,1990 during which the licensee's lead controllers summarized observations from the exercise. The critique was thorough and documented deficient areas in need of corrective action. The licensee indicated that critique items would be tracked in their internal open item tracking system, 7.0 Exit Meeting
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Following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. Team observations made during the exercise were summarized.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations were observed. Although there were areas L
identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they i
could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.
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