IR 05000271/2004007
| ML051730155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/22/2005 |
| From: | Collins S Region 1 Administrator |
| To: | Thayer J Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| EA-04-174 IR-04-007 | |
| Download: ML051730155 (6) | |
Text
June 22, 2005
SUBJECT:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Special Inspection Report No. 50-271/04-07)
Dear Mr. Thayer:
This letter refers to the NRC special inspection conducted between April 22 - August 27, 2004, at the Vermont Yankee (VY) Nuclear Power Station, which reviewed the circumstances associated with a failure to account for two irradiated fuel rod pieces that were not in the location specified in the records. The special inspection was a follow-up to an earlier inspection conducted by the NRC in March 2004, during which the NRC inspectors identified that Entergy and its predecessor (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) did not perform an adequate accounting of the two fuel rod pieces, which were believed to be located inside two stainless steel pipes welded vertically within an uncovered 5-gallon stainless steel container on the bottom of the spent fuel pool. In response to this NRC finding, you used a borescope to look inside these two pipes, and discovered that the two pieces were, in fact, not in the container.
As a result, you initiated an investigation, and on July 13, 2004, both pieces were found in a liner resting sideways on the top edge of a channel rack in a different location in the spent fuel pool.
The inspection report, which was sent to you on December 2, 2004, identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 74.19 involving the failure to adequately account for special nuclear material (SNM). The results of the NRC special inspection, including the apparent violation, were discussed with you and other members of your staff on November 23, 2004. During the closeout discussion, we informed you that the apparent violation was being considered for escalated enforcement action. Subsequent to providing you with our inspection report, the staff communicated with the Commission and then concluded that the application of traditional enforcement was appropriate in this case, in part, based on the lack of a Significance Determination Process (SDP) specific to this circumstance.
In a telephone conversation on June 16, 2005, Mr. Brian Holian, NRC Region I, informed Mr. John McCann, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance, that we believed that we had sufficient information to make our final enforcement decision regarding the apparent violation. However, Entergy was given the option to request a predecisional enforcement conference or to provide a written response. Mr. McCann informed the NRC that Entergy did not desire to attend a predecisional enforcement conference nor provide a written response.
Mr. J. After careful consideration of the information developed during our inspections, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in NRC inspection report 50-271/04-07. Specifically, between January 1980 and July 13, 2004, two irradiated fuel rod pieces were not in their proper location in the spent fuel pool as detailed in your inventory records. In addition, during that time, you failed to ensure that either (1) the fuel rod pieces remained there; or (2) the records indicated the new location of the pieces after they were moved. You also failed to conduct adequate inventories of the location of the two fuel pieces.
This finding did not have any actual safety consequences since the fuel rod pieces remained in the spent fuel pool the entire time that the violation existed. Nonetheless, the two spent fuel rod pieces were misplaced in the spent fuel pool for over 24 years without being identified during any of the periodic inventories. As a result, the possibility of these irradiated fuel pieces being mixed with other irradiated components and shipped offsite to a burial site was increased. As such, the staff considers this to be a significant failure of your material control and accounting (MC&A) program designed to prevent or detect the theft, loss or diversion of strategic SNM.
Therefore, the NRC has concluded that this violation should be characterized as a Severity Level III violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $60,000 (the amount in effect at the time of discovery) is considered for a Severity Level III violation.
Because your facility has not been the subject of any Severity Level I, II or III violations within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit for Corrective Action is warranted. Your investigation for the missing fuel rod pieces, and your physical inspection process of the VY spent fuel pool was thorough and complete, and your root cause analysis was acceptable. You also took appropriate actions to correct the violation and prevent recurrence. Your primary corrective actions included: (1) updating and verifying that the records were accurate for the two fuel pieces; (2) performing a complete physical inventory of all SNM at Vermont Yankee; (3) conducting an Entergy Corporate assessment of the Vermont Yankee MC&A process; (4) revising the Vermont Yankee MC&A procedure; (5) establishing a multi-disciplined team to evaluate and recommend future improvements to Vermont Yankees MC&A process; and (6) strengthening your Quality Assurance oversight and assessment of Vermont Yankees MC&A process.
Based on the above, application of the normal civil penalty assessment process under traditional enforcement would not result in issuance of a civil penalty. The NRC did consider whether to exercise discretion and impose a civil penalty in this case given the length of time that the violation existed. However, since the two fuel rod pieces never left the spent fuel pool, the NRC has decided not to exercise discretion to propose a civil penalty in this case.
However, similar violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is adequately addressed in the referenced inspection report.
Therefore, you are not required to respond to the violation documented in the enclosed Notice unless the description herein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position.
In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
Mr. J. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Samuel J. Collins Region I Administrator Docket No. 50-271 License Number: DPR-28 Enclosure: Notice of Violation cc w/encl:
G. J. Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, Entergy Operations M. R. Kansler, President, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
J. T. Herron, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer O. Limpias, Vice President, Engineering C. Schwarz, Vice President, Operations Support J. M. DeVincentis, Manager, Licensing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Operating Experience Coordinator - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station J. F. McCann, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance M. J. Colomb, Director of Oversight, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
J. M. Fulton, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
S. Lousteau, Treasury Department, Entergy Services, Inc.
Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass.
J. E. Silberg, Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman LLP G. D. Bisbee, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau J. Block, Esquire J. P. Matteau, Executive Director, Windham Regional Commission M. Daley, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc. (NECNP)
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff G. Sachs, President/Staff Person, c/o Stopthesale J. Sniezek, PWR SRC Consultant R. Toole, PWR SRC Consultant Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee State of Vermont, SLO Designee
Mr.