IR 05000271/1993081
| ML20059G314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1993 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Reid D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| EA-93-243, NUDOCS 9311080064 | |
| Download: ML20059G314 (5) | |
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License No. DPR-28 Docket No. 50-271
Mr. Donald Reid Vice President, Operations Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169
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Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
Dear Mr. Reid:
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-271/93-81, AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) FINDINGS RELATIVE TO THE SEPTEMBER 3 AND 9,1993 FUEL HANDLING EVENTS
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The subject NRC inspection report was previously provided to you in our letter dated October 14, 1993. The report identified several findings that we considered as " Contributing
Causal Factors." Relative to those findings, we are particularly concerned with the significant weakness in management oversight of fuel handling activities that had allowed many of the measures intended to prevent a fuel handling accident to become degraded. Procedures were not used and were not adhered to, and supervisors did not ensure that procedures were followed.-
Appropriate training was not provided for fuel handling equipment modifications. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation management did not communicate expectations and provide aggressive oversight of fuel handling activities.
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On September 21,1993, a public exit meeting was held with you and other members of your -
organization to' discuss the preliminary findings of the AIT and the findings of your own. event
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investigation. In that meeting your staff presented the team's evaluation and analysis of the September 3 and 9,1993 fuel handling events, including preliminary corrective measures taken or planned. We have also reviewed your corrective action plan submitted to the NRC by letter dated September 22,1993. We have considered the information and the corrective measures, and we have determined that several apparent violations occurred as described in the enclosed summary, which should be considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with "The t
General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement
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Policy),10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. Proposed enforcement action is pending the completion of NRC review of this matter. Accordingly, no Notice of Violation is presently being issued'
for these inspection findings. The number and characterization of the apparent violations as
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described in the inspection report and the enclosure to this letter may change as a result of
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further NRC review.
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Mr. Donald Reid
This matter was discussed with you in a telephone conversation with Mr. James Linville of my
staff on November 2,1993, and an enforcement conference to examine these apparent violations has been scheduled in NRC Region I on November 23, 1993. The decision to hold an
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enforcement conference does not mean that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action
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will be taken. The purposes of this conference are to discuss the apparent violation, including the cause and safety significance; to provide you with an opportunity to point out errors in our
inspection report, and identify corrective actions, taken or planned; and to discuss any other information that will help us determine the appropriate enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. In addition, this is an opportunity for you to provide any information concerning your perspectives on (1) the severity of the violation (s), and (2) the application of
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the factors that the NRC considers when it determines the amount of a civil penalty that may le assessed in accordance with Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No response regarding these apparent violations is required at this time.
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in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", a copy of this letter and
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its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Thank you for your cooperation.
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Sincerely,
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Orldrial SQned By:
N r m T, thitin j Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure: As Stated
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I Mr. Donald Reid-
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cc w/ encl:
R. Wanczyk, Plant Manager
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J. Thayer, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
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L. Tremblay, Senior Licensing Engineer, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
J. Gilroy, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
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R. Gad, Esquire
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G. Bisbee, Esquire
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R. Sedano, Vermont Department of Public Senice T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Public Document Room (PDR)
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Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
K. Abraham, PAO (2 copies)
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NRC Resident Inspector
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State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee State of Vermont, SLO Designee
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j
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NOV 2 1993
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Mr. Donald Reid
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Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
E. Kelly, DRP J. Shediosky, DRP D. Holody, ES J. Durr, DRS J. Beall, OE H. Eichenholz, SRI - Vermont Yankee M. Oprendek, DRP bec w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):
V. McCree, OEDO D. Dorman, NRR W. Butler, NRR bec w/ encl (AIT REPORTS ONLY):
The Chairman Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Remick Commissioner de Planque J. Taylor, EDO T. Murley, NRR DCD (OWFN PI-37) (Dist. Code #IE10)
A. Chaffee, NRR/ DORS /EAB E. Jordan, AEOD INPO P. Boehnert, Chairman, ACRS K. Raglin, AEOD RI:DRP RI:
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ENCLOSURE SUMMARY OF NRC INSPECTION FINDINGS (AIT REPORT 50-271/93-81)
CONSIDERED FOR ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION I
During fuel handling activities associated with Vermont Yankee Refueling Outage XVII, events occurred on September 3 and 9,1993 that were caused by significant weaknesses in management oversight. Clear management expectations did not exist for the required level of use of refuel procedures. The AIT found a general lack of knowledge of, and widespread instances of failure
to adhere to procedure OP 1101 by operators, engineers, and supervisors. 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that conditions adverse to
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quality are promptly identified and corrected. Plant administrative procedure AP 0007, Revision 1, " Corrective Action Reports," requires, in part, that root cause determinations be performed to identify the fundamental reason (s) for a problem which when corrected, will minimize the
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probability of recurrence.
Vermont Yankee Technical Specification 6.5 requires that procedures involving safety shall be adhered to. Plant operations procedure OP 1101 (Revisions 21-23), " Management of Refueling Activities and Fuel Assembly Movement," is written pursuant to Technical Specification 6.5.
Procedure OP 1101 requires, in part, that during fuel handling (a) the Reactor Engineer (RE)
and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall visually verify fuel grapple closure; (b) the Refuel i
Platform Operator shall attempt to rotate the control console one way and then the other to verify that the fuel assembly is grappled; and, (c) the SRO shall halt any activity in the event of an unusual or abnormal occurrence.
Also,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.9.3, requires, in
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part, that instructional briefings be held with members of the refueling staff prior to executing refueling procedures.
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On September 3,1993, the RE and SRO assigned to the refuel platform did not verify that the grapple was closed and the Refuel Platform Operator did not rotate the console to verify proper grappling. That console rotation was apparently not performed for other previous fuel moves.
j Also, prior to September 3,1993, briefings for refueling operations were not conducted. The j
failure to perform these actions contributed to conditions resulting in the dropping of a fuel assembly on September 3. In addition, on September 9, the Senior Reactor Operator did not halt refueling activities following indications that a fuel assembly had been inadvertently lowered i
onto core internals; a condition classified as " abnormal," per procedure OP 1101.
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i OWICIAL RECORD COPY