IR 05000269/1991301
| ML15239A053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1991 |
| From: | Casto C, Ernstes M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15239A052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-91-301, NUDOCS 9110080057 | |
| Download: ML15239A053 (8) | |
Text
0REQt UNITED STATES S
- LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
o 101 MARIETTA STREET, x ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 ENCLOSURE 1 EXAMINATION REPORT -
50-269/91-301 Facility Licensee:
Duke Power Company Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Facility Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 Facility License Nos.:
DPR-38, 47, 55 Examinations were administered at Oconee Nuclear Station near Seneca, South Carolin Chief Examiner:
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Michael E. Ernstes Date Signed Approved By:
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'Charles A. Casto, Chief
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Date Signed Operator Licensing Section 2 Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Requalification examinations were conducted during the weeks of July 22, 1991 and July 29, 199 Written and operating examinations were administered to thirteen Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) and eleven Reactor Operators (ROs).
Twelve SROs passed the examinations and all eleven ROs passed. Six of the six crews evaluated passed the examination. Based on these results, 23 of 24 licensed operators (96%) passed the examinations. Based on the results of the examinations, the Oconee Requalification Program has been determined to be satisfactor Strengths in the Oconee Requalification Program were noted in the areas of crew teamwork and in evaluator identification of operator weaknesses on the simulator examination A weakness was noted in timeliness of preparation of exam materials (p.2),
reactor coolant pump vibration monitor system operation (p.3), and in simulator fidelity of Engineered Safeguard (ES) component controls (p.3).
9110080057 910B28 PDR ADOCK 05000269 V
REPORT DETAILS 1. Facility Employees Attending Exit:
H. B. Barron, Station Manager R. P. Bugert, System Operations Training Specialist L. V. Wilkie, Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station Training G. A. Ridgeway, Shift Operations Manager R. L. Sweigert, Superintendent of Operations P. M. Stovall, Operations Training Manager D. M. Covar, Nuclear Instructor R. R. Williams, Assistant Shift Supervisor 2. Examiners:
- M. E. Ernstes, NRC, Region II J. R. Nickolaus, PNL M. P. Lintz, PNL
- Chief Examiner Discussion: Program Evaluation Based on the examination results, the Oconee Requalification Program meets the criteria established in NUREG-1021, ES-601.C. (Revision 6), and has been determined to be satisfactory. The facility is permitted to administer the reexamination for returning the failed individual to licensed duties. However, an NRC administered examination will be required for license renewa Reference Material The reference material supplied by the licensee was reviewed and determined to be adequate to support the examinatio Proposed Examination The proposed simulator scenarios were short in duration. They were expanded during the prep week to include prioritization by the SRO, simultaneous malfunctions and alternate decision path The incorporation of the changes proposed during the prep week was not completed in a timely manner. This resulted in changes being discussed and implemented in some cases, just prior to exam administration. This was true for all portions of the exa There were JPM steps which were not properly validated resulting in the change in a step from critical to not critical after the exam had been administered. Similarly, actions identified as critical in simulator scenarios were determined not to be critical following the running of the scenarios during the exa Operator Performance During the simulator exams every crew had trouble reading the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) vibration monitor. Problems were exhibited by practically every operator attempting to read or operate the equipment. This problem had been identified in the January, 1991 initial exam and included in the exam report. The facility has not ensured adequate training on the operation of the RCP vibration monitoring system in order to eliminate operator errors. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50 269, 270, 287/91-301-0 A generic weakness was noted in the use of the RZ modules which are used to verify Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuatio Simulator Fidelity The team did not review the degree to which the simulator meets the operational requirements of ANS 3.5. However, they did observe several problems with the performance of the machin Subsequent to the examination administration and grading, a discrepancy between the simulator and the plant design was discovered by the facility. The plant design allows control of ES components from the main control board without taking the RZ module to manual if attempting to take a component to its required ES position. When attempting to take a component to a position other than its required ES position it is however, necessary to take the RZ module to manua The Oconee simulator is modeled such that it is required to take the RZ module to manual regardless of which position is being selected. Additionally, the Oconee training program trains operators based on this incorrect modeling of the system's operation. The simulator model and associated training do not accurately reflect the plant functions associated with controlling ES components through the use of the RZ panels. This is identified as IFI 50-269, 270, 287/91-301-0.
Exit Meeting:
At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with representatives of the plant staff indicated in paragraph 1, to discuss the results of the examinations and inspection findings. The examiners further described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the'
inspection findings listed belo Item Status Description/Paragraph IFI 50-269, 270, 287/91-301-01 Open Operation of RCP vibration monitor/
Paragraph IFI 50-269, 270, 287/91-301-02 Open Simulator fidelity/
Paragraph ENCLOSURE 2 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT This was the second requalification exam conducted at the sit Based on the examination results, the Oconee Requalification Program meets the criteria established in NUREG-1021, ES-601.C.2.b (Revision 6), and has been determined to be satisfactory. The facility is permitted to administer the reexaminations for returning the failed individuals to licensed dutie However, an NRC administered examination will be required for license renewa.
Reference Material and Proposed Examination The reference material supplied by the licensee was reviewed and determined to be adequate to support the examinatio JPMS - JPMs were found to be adequate as writte The exam team chose to substitute other JPMs from the bank for two of the proposed JPM Additionally the exam team wrote one JPM to be used. Two of the proposed JPMs contained "malfunctions" (i. e. the expected response to operator actions does not always occur).
The exam team also added malfunctions to four other JPMs. The final revisions of the JPMs for week two were not available to the NRC until the day prior to their administration. At this time it was noted by the chief examiner that the facility had not made all of the substitutions which had been requested during the prep week. The substitutions were then incorporated into the exa WRITTEN EXAMS - The pilot exam offered no modifications to the preparation or administration of the written exam The proposed exams required many change These changes and their subsequent validation were not completed prior to the arrival of the NRC examiners on sit This resulted in changes to the exams being made as late as the morning they were administered. Additionally there were two questions on a part B exam in which the recommended changes were not made. The following are other problems noted during the review of the Part A and Part B written examination questions:
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Topics for Part A and Part B exams were sometimes placed in the wrong sections. (e.g. systems questions on Part B exam)
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Questions were direct look-up Questions contained distractors that were not plausibl Questions involving calculations had such broad distractors that the questions would not discriminat.
Enclosure 2
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The parameter which is pertinent was referenced in the question focusing the operator's concern Questions could be answered from the information provided in the turnover informatio SCENARIOS - The proposed scenarios were reviewed in accordance with ES 604-1 of the pilot. Critical tasks were identified however, they were not assigned to a particular individua The facility exam team was slow to complete the requested changes to the scenarios following the prep week. The scenarios which were reviewed for week two of the examination had yet to be completed by Friday of week one. At this time the facility exam team advised the NRC examiners that one of the scenarios could not be run in the manner decided during the prep wee This necessitated selection and preparation of another scenario just two days prior to the simulator exams. Final copies of the simulator scenarios were still being made at the scheduled start time of the exams. In the future, necessary oversight will be required in order to ensure all examinations are finalized prior to the NRC exam teams arrival on site for the examinations. The following are other problems noted by the exam team which were corrected during the prep wee Scenarios were generally very short and would not come close to the run time of approximately one hour. Most seemed to be of 20 30 minutes in duration. The exam team added events to all scenarios in order to expand the scope of the simulator examinatio The number of scenarios was at the minimum of 2 The predictability of which scenario is being run was increased by only having equipment out of service that impacted the scenario (e. g. Keowee 00S = loss of all AC, ES channel in test =
inadvertent trip, EFW pump OS = loss of heat sink).
The exam team placed additional items out of service in the initial conditions to preclude thi There were few alternate decision paths found in the implementation of the EOPs. The expected response was obtained nearly every time. Once the event was identified it was a matter of following through the procedure with few decisions and little prioritization required. Additional malfunctions were added to all scenarios in order to meet the criteria in item #5 of the ES 604-1 checklist which ensures that the scenario is not too simpl Some of the tasks which the facility had identified as critical were eliminated. During validation by the NRC these events were found to have no safety significance. One example was a requirement to terminate depressurization prior to reaching saturated conditions. During the scenario, automatic High Pressure Injection terminated the pressure decrease making it impossible to fail this tas Enclosure 2 3 Operator Performance JPMs - A generic weakness was noted in the use of the RZ modules which are used to verify ES actuation. Operators failed to take manual control of equipment from the RZ panel leaving them unable to operate that component. This was demonstrated in both week In accordance with the pilot, two special JPMs were developed for the SROs who exhibited weaknesses in EOP usage. One operator failed one of these JPMs which when coupled with failure of one of the regular JPMs resulted in his overall failure of the examinatio WRITTEN EXAMS - All operators passed the written exams. Scores ranged from 82% to 100%. One question was deleted from the exam due to the fact that the lesson plan was in error and the method for venting the CCW system was being taught incorrectl SIMULATOR EXAMS - With the pilot program the NRC did not make individual evaluations during the simulator portion of the exam. There was a perceptible improvement in crew interaction. Each crew was given two scenarios and evaluated in accordance with the crew competencies presented in the ES-604 pilo All six crews were rated as satisfactory. Three operators were identified as requiring special JPMs to follow up on weaknesses demonstrated in the simulator. All three of these were SROs which exhibited weaknesses in EOP usag Every crew had trouble reading the RCP vibration monitor. Problems were exhibited by practically every operator attempting to read or operate the equipmen Problems included not selecting the correct pump to be read, misapplication of multiplication factors and misreading of which pump was in alarm. This problem had been previously identified during the administration of initial exams in January, 199 Operators do not make plant announcements while training. The facility explained that they do not require thi With the elimination of Emergency Action Level classification as a critical task there was a much greater delay in making the initial classification. The Operations Department is cautioned to monitor training to ensure classifications are being made in a timely manner and not being delayed due to the shift in emphasis on the evaluation The crews examined showed good team work in operating as a crew in making decision.
Examination Administration JPMs -
For this examination, seven JPMs were administered to each operator. There were no JPM questions. If weaknesses were identified during the simulator examinations, they were followed up during the
Enclosure 2
walkthrough portion of the exam with JPMs focusing on the problem are There were three JPMs where the operator did not meet the task standard for a given step which was identified as critical but the facility evaluator passed the operator citing that he met the intent of the ste An example of this was in CRO-99 in which the operators had a critical step to sound the Reactor Building evacuation alarm. Several operators did not complete this but were passed on the JPM since they made a plant announcement which was not a critical ste It was noted that the operations representative should have identified these changes to the JPMs during the prep wee NLO-9 requires the operator to check closed 2MS-176, Atmospheric Dump Drain. During the administration of this JPM it was noted that there is no such valv EP/2/A/1800/01, Enclosure 7.7 also lists this valve as being verified shu This discrepancy should have been noted during the validation and routine administration of this JPM. This problem raises question as to the effectiveness of the facilities review of both JPMs and plant procedure SIMULATOR EXAMS - The change to crew evaluations and a reduction by half of the number of evaluators on the floor resulted in a reduction in stress on the operators taking the examination. This was substantiated by comments received from operators taking the exa.
Evaluation of Facility Evaluators An evaluation of the facility evaluators was conducted. The NRC determined all facility evaluators to be satisfactory. There were a few instances of evaluators not giving the required cues during the administration of JPM With the NRC not performing individual evaluations during the simulator portion of the exam it is vital for the facility evaluators to ensure weaknesses are identified. The facility evaluators did a good job of going beyond the crew evaluation and identifying those individuals with performance deficiencies and ensuring proper remediation and retestin ENCLOSURE 3 SIMULATOR FIDELITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Duke Power Company Facility Docket No.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 Operating Tests Administered on:
July 23 through August 1, 1991 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute, in and of themselves, audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluation No licensee action is required solely in response to these observation During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed ITEM DESCRIPTION RZ panel Subsequent to an ES actuation the simulator model requires the "Manual" button on the RZ panel to be pressed in order to enable the controls on the main control boar This is only required for taking equipment out of its ES positio The controls on the main control board should work in parallel with the RZ controls when going to the desired ES position without depressing the RZ "Manual" butto Turbine Control It is not possible to fail open the turbine control valves Valves following a turbine tri LP-7 This valve could not be opened during one JPM without causing pump cavitatio Subcooling Can not be failed. It had to be covered with tape during Monitor one of the static exams to simulate being out of servic RB purge flow The scale on the recorder is incorrect.