IR 05000269/1991002
| ML15224A758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1991 |
| From: | Belisle G, Binoy Desai, Poertner W, Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A757 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-91-02, 50-269-91-2, 50-270-91-02, 50-270-91-2, 50-287-91-02, 50-287-91-2, 72-0004-91-02, 72-4-91-2, NUDOCS 9103120076 | |
| Download: ML15224A758 (9) | |
Text
SREG UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/91-02, 50-270/91-02, 50-287/91-02, 72-4/91-02 Licensee:
Duke Power Company P. Box 1007 Charlotte, NC 28201-1007 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-4 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503 Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection Conducte : January 1-26, 1991 Inspectors:
H2
P. H. Skinner, Seni F Resi pt s ector Date Signed B. B. Desai, Resi I sp -to Date Signed W. K. Poertner, esid nt Ins ec or Date Signed Approved by: D G. A. Belisle, Sedtion ChiefDae Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved inspection on-site in the areas of operations, cold weather checklist, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation related activities; and followup on open item Results:
One licensee identified non-cited violation involving failure to provide changes in the Emergency Plan to the NRC was identified (paragraph 6).
In addition, the residents reviewed the licensee's actions concerning potential loss of both Keowee units due to single failure (paragraph 2c).
The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and conservative. A strength was noted in the licenee's Operating Experience Review program which led to the identification of this problem. A weakness was noted in the instrument air system in that detail flow diagrams are not available for this system (paragraph 2.d).
9103120076 910206 PDR ADOCK 05000269
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees,
- H. Barron, Station Manager D. Couch, Keowee Hydrostation Manager
- T. Curtis, Compliance Manager
- J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager
- B. Dolan, Design Engineering Manager, Oconee Site Office
- W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent T. Glenn, Engineering Supervisor 0a Kohler, Compliance Engineer C. Little, Instrument and Electrical Manager
- H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group B. Millsap, Maintenance Engineer M. Patrick, Performance Engineer
.D. Powell, Station Services Superintendent
- G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
- mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors P. Skinner
- W. Poertner
- B. Desai
- Attended exit intervie.
Plant Operations (71707)(71714)
a. General The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification log and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument & electrical (I&E), and performance personne *
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during weekdays and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building CCW Intake Structure Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Penetration Rooms Units 1, 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Keowee Hydro Station b. Plant Status During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 operated at power for the entire reporting perio Unit 2 operated at power for the entire reporting perio Unit 3 operated at power for the entire reporting period. On January 16, 1991, Reactor Coolant Pump 3A2 experienced a low oil pot level on the motor. This resulted in the pump being secured and a power reduction to 40 percent.
No oil leak was identified. Oil was added to the motor, the pump restarted and the unit returned to 100 percent power on January 17, 199 c. Potential Single Failure Resulting in Potential Loss of Both Keowee Hydro Units On January 9, 1990, the licensee determined that the station was susceptible to a single failure in the Keowee Hydro Station underground feeder breaker control circuits that could result in both underground feeder breakers being closed with the Keowee hydro units not synchronized electrically. This could result in damage to one or both of the hydro units and result in the inability of the units to
supply power during a loss of offsite power event. The immediate corrective action to prevent this potential failure was to manually open and tag the electrical disconnect switches for the Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) which was not aligned to the underground feeder path to prevent the possibility of a malfunction causing both Keowee units to tie to the underground path while not synchronized. This item was reported to the NRC via a red phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72b.1.ii.b which requires notification within one hour of a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant. This item was discovered as a result of the licensee's Operating Experience Review Program that reviewed INPO Operations and Maintenance Reminder 371, "Single Failure Potential in Safeguards Switchgear Tie Breakers."
The potential problem was originally identified at Point Beach Nuclear Plant during an NRC Electrical Distribution System Function Inspection and was reported to the NRC via LER 50-266/90-0 The licensee's emergency power system consists of two hydro unit Under normal conditions one of the units is aligned to the underground feeder path which supplies the standby buses and the other unit is aligned to the overhead path which feeds the 230 KV switchyard. The electrical circuitry is such that for the Keowee unit that is aligned to the underground feeder through its respective ACB (ACB-3 for Keowee Unit 1 and ACB-4 for Keowee Unit 2), the associated units ACB to the overhead path (ACB-1 for Keowee Unit 1 and ACB-2 for Unit 2) cannot automatically close. The Keowee unit's underground feeder breakers are also interlocked such that only one unit's underground feeder (either ACB-3 or ACB-4) breaker can be closed into the underground path at a tim Neither ACB-3 or ACB-4 receive any automatic close signals. The potential single failure postulated would result in the spurious closure of the open feeder breaker to the underground path. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's short term corrective actions to preclude the possibility of the potential single failure from occurring and found the actions acceptable. The long term correction of the potential single failure problem and followup of this item will be accomplished via the licensee's LER that is required to be submitted prior to February 9, 199 d. Problem Investigation Report 1-90-07 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's resolution of Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 1-90-0 On July 3, 1990, following removal of an underground air line leading to a vehicle service island, a red tag for the isolation valve on the air line was inadvertently returned to operations. The valve was not labeled and was not believed to be an Instrument Air (IA) valve. A detailed flow diagram is not available for this system. Upon opening this valve, a low pressure IA statalarm was received and also the air leak was
spotted by personnel near the vicinity of the termination of the
III
line. The valve was immediately closed and a new red tag was hun IA does not normally serve areas such as the vehicle fueling statio This event was a "near miss" and normal plant operation was not impacted. However, a degradation or loss of IA has potential for the onset of complex and unpredictable transients on primary and secondary systems that are difficult to diagnose and contro At the time of the event, three Worthington IA compressors rated at 489 CFM each fulfilled the IA needs for all three Oconee unit Following the event, the PIR was initiated and identified corrective actions were taken. The corrective actions were limited to addressing the problem with the processing of red tags and disconnecting the specific air line which supplied the vehicle fueling station. Although IA is not a safety related system, in view of other problems associated with this system, the inspectors considered that the lack of a detailed IA system flow diagram is a weakness. The unavailability of a detailed flow diagram and the lack of a detailed walkdown of the system following this event reduces the confidence that other similar IA lines do not exist Since the occurrence of this event, a new primary IA compressor system with a capacity of 2200 CFM has been placed into operatio The Worthingtons are now operated in a standby status. This added capacity is designed to withstand losses due to a pipe rupture of up to 1 1/2 inches on any IA lin Cold Weather Checklist (71714)
The inspectors reviewed OP/O/A/1102/20, Shift Turnover, Enclosure 5.13, Cold Weather Checklist, conducted on January 25, 199 This checklist is required to be performed whenever ambient air temperature is less than 35 degrees F. The checklist requires in part that the outside non-licensed operator check Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) level impulse lines and cabinets, the BWST trench covers, Turbine Building roll-up doors and dampers, heaters in the mulsifier valves; block houses, and the Safe Shutdown Facilty duct heaters at least once per shift. No discrepancies were noted during this revie No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected
(III5 to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
IP/3/A/305/3 RPS On Line Test PT/O/A/290/04 Turbine Stop Valve Movement PT/2/A/0600/13A MDEFW Pump Test MP/O/A/1720/010 System/Component Hydrostatic Test Controlling Procedure PT/1/A/0600/13A MDEFW Pump Test IP/O/A/310/013A ES On Line Test No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures, and work requests were examined to verify; proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
31724C Investigate Shorting Smell Near U-2 CRD Voltage Regulator 99397C Remove TM-833 Per Attached Engineering Instructions 36115B MP/O/A/1210/010 Mechanical Inspection of Valve Operator 55535A HPI Pump Discharge Header Pressure and Motor Temperature Instrument Calibration (IP/O/B/202/1N)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Failure to Provide Emergency Plan Changes to the NRC On January 2, 1991, the licensee identified that Revision 90-12 of the ONS Implementing Procedures Manual was approved for distribution on November 28, 1990, and not submitted to NRC within 30 days as required by 10 CFR 50.54q. These changes had been immediately upgraded in the Control Room Manual but due to an oversight, distribution of this manual was not made to the remaining holders including the NRC. The licensee recognized this problem and took immediate action to implement the required distributio CFR 50.54q requires a report to be submitted to the NRC within 30 days after a change is made to the emergency plan This
failure to provide a report to the NRC within 30 days is identified as Licensee Identified Violation 50-269,270,287/91-02-0 This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie One licensee identified violation was identifie. Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)
The inspectors observed and reviewed activities associated with the loading and transfer of spent fuel from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool to the Dry Shielded Cannister (DSC) and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility. This was the fifth canister of spent fuel transferred to the dry storage facility. During the loading of the DSC in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool, the inspector questioned the operators on the process of how the fuel assemblies were verified prior to loading into the canister. The inspector was informed that the fuel assemblies were independently verified to be in a specific fuel pool location prior to commencing fuel movement into the DSC. The operators verify that the fuel assemblies are removed from the specified fuel pool location into the DSC. After the fuel assemblies are loaded they are independently verified and the fuel assemblies are video taped for further verification that the proper assemblies are in the canister. Review of the TS associated with materials license SNM-2503 determined that the identity of the spent fuel assembly is required to be independently verified by two individuals immediately prior to insertion of the assembly into the DSC. The spent fuel assemblies had been independently verified to be in the proper fuel pool locations approximately three days prior to loading the assemblies into the canister and no spent fuel movements had been accomplished in the spent fuel pool after the verification had been completed. The inspector questioned whether verifying pool locations met the TS requirements of verifying the fuel assembly immediately prior to insertion of the assembly into the DSC. The licensee agreed to review the requirement for loading the DSC prior to the next scheduled loading to determine if the procedural requirements could be enhanced. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-269,270,287/91-02-02:
Review of Process to Verify Fuel Assembly Verification Prior to Loading into DS No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspection of Open Items (92700)(92701)(92702)
The following open items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate: (Closed) IFI 50-269,270,287/89-03-03: Discrepancies Between One-line Drawings and Elementary Wiring Diagrams. This item addressed concerns by the Augmented Inspection Team following the fire in the 1TA switchgear in January 1989. The inspectors identified several drawing discrepancies between one-line drawings and elementary wiring
diagrams (OEEs).
As a result, the licensee reviewed all switchgear, load centers and safety related 600 volt and 208 volt motor control center OEEs. A total of 18 drawings containing errors were found and documented in Station Problem Report (SPR) No. 2612. These errors were brought to the attention of the various operating groups to determine if procedure or equipment changes were needed as a result of these findings. There were no procedure or equipment changes necessary as a result of these error Editorial changes were made to the identified drawings and the SPR was closed on August 29, 199 The inspector reviewed the results of the actions to resolve the SPR and also reviewed the drawings to assure required changes had been implemented. The drawings had been corrected. Based on this review, this item is close (Closed) LER 269/90-05:
Design Deficiency/Unanticipated Interaction of Systems Resulting in the Potential Closure of the Startup Transformer "E" Breaker on to a Degraded (Low Voltage) Switchyar This LER was submitted in correspondence dated May 24, 199 The corrective actions taken by the licensee to correct this problem were to develop and implement a program to establish and maintain control of relay setpoint The program has been established by the licensee with relay settings identified on drawing series OEE-081-1 through 0EE-081-36 issued December 21, 1990. Based on these actions, this item is close (Closed) LER 287/89-06, Revision 1:
Polar Crane Technical Specification Violated Due to Management Deficiency, Inadequate Policy. This LER was submitted in correspondence dated March 7, 1990. The corrective actions for this item have been reviewed by the inspectors. All corrective actions have been completed with the exception of delineation of canal boundaries in each containmen Maintenance personnel have committed to completing this item during the next refueling outages on each of the units. Based on this review and the commitment by maintenance management, this item is close (Closed) P2190-04:
10 CFR 21 Report From Rosemont Regarding Detectors Which Exhibit Premature Degradation. In correspondence dated August 17, 1989; October 10, 1989; and December 1, 1989; Rosemont notified the NRC of a potential problem with Rosemont Model 710 Trip/Calibration units and 414 E/F resistance bridge The licensee was also notified by Rosemont in VIL-0-90-03. The Oconee Instrumentation and Control personnel reviewed this issue and identified that no Model 710 units were installed or in stock at Oconee. They did find four resistance bridges in stock that were returned to the manufacturers. The resistance bridges in use were reviewed and found not to be included in the affected lots identified by Rosemont. Based on these actions, this item is close.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 28, with thos'e persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 269,270,287/91-02-01 NCV - Failure to Provide Changes to the Emergency Plan to the NRC, paragraph,270,287/91-02-02 IFI - Verification of Spent Fuel Assemblies Immediately Prior to Loading Into the DSC, paragraph 6.