IR 05000269/1991029
| ML16148A582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1991 |
| From: | Rankin W, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A581 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-91-29, 50-270-91-29, 50-287-91-29, NUDOCS 9112120039 | |
| Download: ML16148A582 (22) | |
Text
it REGbo UNITED STATES o 0NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 DEC 02 1 Report Nos.:
50-269/91-29, 50-270/91-29, and 50-287/91-29 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269 50-271, License Nos.:
DPR-38 and DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted:
October 28 to November 1, 1991 Inspector:
<-9 Q
/
2,/
F. N. WiTight, Team Leader Date Signed Team Members:
G. Arthur B. Desai proved by: q'&)
U v9 W. H. Rankin, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) including: th Simulator Control Room (SCR); Technical Support Center (TSC);
Operational Support Center (OSC); and Oconee Crisis Management Center (CMC).
The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critiqu Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were identified. Exercise strengths included use of a new rameter/information system in the ERFs;,informative command in th ERs;inoraivcmm
o urnovers; use of the SCR; and command and control of facility managers in the OSC, TSC, and CM Players attitudes were good and employees exercised their roles seriously, concentrated on assigned task, were innovative, and conducted their task professionally. The licensee had some communication problems which included incomplete notification forms and erroneously programmed telephone numbers for offsite communications. Overall the licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee meeting their exercise objectives and demonstrating a capability to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergenc II
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. Barron, Station Manager, Emergency Coordinator
- R. Brown, Production Specialist II, Station Exercise Director
- J. Davis, Manager, Safety Assurance W. Foster, Superintendent of Maintenance
- C. Hamlin, Lead Controller -
SCR B. Hasty, McGuire Emergency Planner, Lead Controller -TSC
- C. Jennings, Station Emergency Planner B. Knight, Shift Supervisor -
- 0. Kohler, Licensing Coordinator, Compliance J. Long, Lead In-Plant Health Physicist B. McRee, Exercise Director -
CMC
- S. Perry, Licensing Coordinator, Compliance D. Powell, Superintendent of Station Services
- G. Rothenberger, Superintendent of Work Control D. Simpson, Corporate Emergency Planner
- D. Sweigart, Superintendent of Operations M. Tuckman, Vice President Nuclear Operations, Recovery Manager Other licensee employee 's contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, O technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commissio *B. Desai, Resident Inspector
Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewedto determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability ada major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section
. The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representative The scenario was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the license The exercise scenario was well organized, detailed, and adequate to exercise the participant i No violations or deviationswere identifie Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key organization positions were clearly defined. The inspectors also observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the SCR, TSC, the OSC, and the CMC. The inspector determined that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures. Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was notrequire No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Licensee procedure RP/0/B/1000/01, Emergency Classification, Revision (Rev.) 0, dated September 12, 1991 was used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario simulated event The following emergency classifications were correct by procedur The Alert was declared at about 8:41 a.m. because of loss of AC electrical powe The Site Area Emergency was declared at about 9:24 after the loss of sub-coolin A General Emergency was declared at 11:23 a.m. based on the known loss of two fission product barriers (Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and Containment) and suspected failure or imminent failure of the third barrier (Fuel Cladding).
The fuel cladding was threatened from a loss of low pressure
cooling capabilities due to increased RCS pressure and a fire around 4160 volt switchgear for the single operating low pressure injection pum No violations or deviations were identifie.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State, local, licensee, and other response organizations by the licensee; and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were establishe This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementing procedures for notifying offsite authorities and the NRC. The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used promptly to provide information concerning the simulated emergencyconditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. Notifications to the State of South Carolina and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following the classification and declaration of the emergency even A review of the licensee's notification activities and records completed during the exercise noted several errors or omissions from notification form Errors included:
o missing date of approval signature on message 2, o
power of 10 error on 2 mile child thyroid dose on message 5,
0no radiological release data on message 8,
no status of site evacuation from 9:30 a.m. to 11:24 on messages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and
no status of fire reported on ECCS switchgear on messages 9 and 1 The inspector discussed the identified errors with licensee representatives. The licensee identified the notification errors as a problem needing assessment and correction. The inadequacies were documented and placed into the licensee's corrective action program for resolutio The alert notification system for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) was not actuated during this exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authoritie During the exercise the licensee had problems with programmed telephone numbers used to notify licensee and offsite emergency response personnel. These problems included:
o The telephone number to activate the beepers for Charlotte based emergency response personnel was incorrect causing about a 30 minute delay in their notification and response to the exercise. The alert classification was made at 7:41 a.m. and the pagers did not activate until 8:17 The staff began arriving at the CMC about two and a half hours after the alert was declare o A wrong telephone number programmed for a FAX used to transmit notifications to the State caused the licensee to transmit notifications verbally by phone. The problem pressed the limited communications staff available in the Oconee CMC during initial activatio The licensee immediately corrected both problems following their discovery and discussed possibility of reviewing programmed telephone numbers in a routine communication surveillanc Miscellaneous communication problems identified by the licensee and NRC inspectors included:
o problems with Health Physics personnel not hearing messages on the TSC/OSC intercom, O
exercise participants, particularly in the CMC, did not bracket messages with "This Is A Drill" statements,
status board in the CMC did not have a time label for posted radiological data, and
0 announcements of plant conditions and emergency plan status were not made by the shift supervisor in the SCR during the first hour of the emergency exercis The licensee reported that they intended to review the above items and correct as necessary. The radiological status board was modified prior to the exit to include a time label for posted radiological dat No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response was provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and CMC. In addition, the inspector observed the emergency medical dril. Emergency Medical Drill This area was observed to determine whether first aid to a contaminated injured individual is effectively provided and to assure appropriate actions are taken to transport the worker to the offsite hospital. First aid team responsed properly and no significant problems were identified with effort No violations or deviations were identifie Simulator Control Room Overall, operations personnel adequately assessed the problems faced during the exercise and their responses were appropriate to the circumstances. Actions, classifications, and notifications were effectively accomplished. Both reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of the normal, abnormal, emergency operating procedures, and the emergency plan implementing procedures throughout the exercis The Shift Operations Supervisor (SOSs) command and control appeared to be effective despite the lack of announcements or briefings to the SCR staff during the first hour of the exercise. The first announcement by the SOS was that the TSC had been activated at 8:20 There was a three minute time difference in the SCR clock and actual time utilized elsewhere that led to some confusion during the exercise. Licensee representatives acknowledged the problem and committed to standardizing the clocks in future exercise No violations or deviations were identifie Technical Support Center The TSC was activated and staffed promptly at 8:20 a.m. upon notification by the Shift.Supervisor of the Alert classification made at 7:41 The inspector observed good command and control of the TSC emergency organization. Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively and properly pursued by the TSC staff and periodic briefings regarding the incident status and on going mitigating actions were frequently given. TSC work prioritization was good. Round table discussions between the Emergency Coordinator and the Superintendents in the TSC were timely and very informative. These discussions effectively stated current status and generated good questions about alternate methods of problem solvin Excellent use was made of the new parameter information syste No violations or deviations were identifie Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the OSC. Upon the direction by the EC, the OSC was activated, fully staffed, and functional in a timely manner. The OSC Supervisor was well qualified and assumed the responsibility in a professional and very organized manner demonstrating excellent command and control. It was apparent that personnel were prepared to implement the necessary actions requested by management to assist in the mitigation of problems incurred during the emergency exercis No violations or deviations were identifie Crisis Management Center (CMC)
The licensee's CMC exercise objective was to demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and staff the-CMC. The CMC was promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel. The Recovery Manager (RM) provided timely and accurate status, updates to the CMC staff. Emergency classifications and notifications were timely and correct. The RM provided the
CMC staff with emergency status briefings at appropriate interval The licensee's CMC staff is organized into two specific groups. The initial organization that reported to the CMC located in Clemson, SC consist of a small group of trained individuals assigned to the Oconee station. They reported to the CMC facility in response to automated pager activation Their role was limited to basic support functions including classifications, notifications, protective action recommendations, and accident assessment. The initial CMC staff was supplemented by group of trained personnel from the corporate office in Charlotte, NC. The corporate emergency response personnel enabled the CMC's Recovery Manager to expand the capabilities and responsibilities of the CMC to include dose assessment, field team monitoring/direction, expanded accident assessment capabilities, and other emergency related activitie The request to activate the CMC was made at 7:40 a.m., at or slightly before the SCR SOS declared the Alert at 7:41 Security staff members activated the pagers through an automated phone device. The calls were placed immediately and the local CMC staff received their message to activate the center at 7:43 a.m. The initial staff activated the CMC at about 8:51 a.m. However, the telephone number utilized in a programmable phone for activating the corporate emergency response personnel pagers was incorrect. The incorrect number caused a delay in the staff's notification to report to the CMC. They were not notified by pager until 8:17 a.m. That delayed their response and their participation in the exercise. The Charlotte based corporate staff began arriving at about 10:40 The licensee demonstrated good command and controls in the CMC as evidenced by the licensee's approach to the turnover of responsibilities from the interim Recovery Manager to the Corporate Recovery Manager. The Corporate Recovery Manager assumed command of the CMC from the interim Recover Manager at 11:35 a.m. During the turnover period, changing plant conditions caused the interim Recovery Manager to upgrade the emergency classification from a Site to General Emergency. The Corporate Recovery Manager assisted in the decision and assumed command shortly-thereafter. Th turnover of responsibilities was not hurried during critical segment of the exercise and was deliberate and cautious. The turnover was made when both managers agreed that the change could be made safely and that proper control of the emergency activities could be continue Due to the shortness of the exercise, not all functions of the licensee's CMC were operational when the exercise terminated. While not a specific exercise objective, the CMC staff did not demonstrate its ability to make dose projections. During the exercise the dose assessment staff in the TSC made dose projections based upon plant conditions. The licensee's procedures required the CMC dos assessors run two parallel test with the TSC dose assessors utilizing identical data before dose assessment responsibilities could be transferred to the CMC. Due to the late arrival of the corporate staff and the length of the exercise the CMC dose assessment capabilities were not fully demonstrated when the exercise terminate No violations or deviations were identifie.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Recovery Manager concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency conditio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating PARs for offsite populations within the 10 mile emergency planning zone. The Recovery Manager in the CMC provided timely and accurate PARs to State personnel. PARs were routinely reevaluated for accuracy and status updates were
provided to the offsite authorities. Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those personnel inside the protected.area. The site accountability process was achieved and reported within 30 minute No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers and observers also conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on October 31, 1991. The critique process, including the critique to management, included a review of weaknesses and strengths identified. Issues identified during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during O the critique. The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above and considered a program strength. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspection No violations or deviations were identifie.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-269, 270, and '87/90-26-03:
Failure to demonstrate the adequacy of the new Oconee CMC during an annual evaluated exercise. The licensee demonstrated that minimal command and control functions could be achieved at the center and that Charlotte corporate emergency response personnel could reach the site within 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 1, 1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov Licensee management was informed that a previous open item
(listed in Paragraph 11) was reviewed and considered close Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Narrative Summary, and Time Line SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES Scope The 1991 Oconee Nuclear Station annual exercise is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The exercise will be conducted on October 29, 199 This exercise will involve participation of Oconee Nuclear Station and Crisis Management Center emergency response personne The State and Counties will receive communications onl The medical drill will be held in conjunction with the annual exercis The fire drill will not be conducted during the annual exercise wee Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)
Emergency Management Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classifications in accordance with procedure.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the counties and state within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to state and countie.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or higher emergency.clas.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TS.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classe.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a
simulated emergency and provide accountability for any.not present at the assembly location.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, intercoms, and on-site radio syste.
Test primary off-site communications equipment to the county and state warning points and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste.
Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment/supplie. Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools, as applicable:
1. Drawings 2. Data Display Boards 3. Maps 1 Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the CMC after declaring a Site Area Emergency or higher emergency class (or after a decision by the Recovery Manager during an Alert).
1 Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the Recovery Manager in the CM.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate information to the news media in a timely manner and to provide effective rumor control according to the Crisis Management Implementing Procedure. Demonstrate access control measures to the plant sit Accident Assessment 1 Demonstrate the ability to transmit and access data using the Data Transmittal Syste.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposur.
Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airborne radioiodine concentration.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with procedure.
Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated, radioactive plume and to measure the off-site radiation level.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC, and the CMC (if applicable).
2 Demonstrate the ability to collect air, soil, water and vegetation samples in accordance with procedure Protective Action Recommendations 2 Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site officials in accordance with procedure Plant Operations 2 Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategie Medical Drill 2 Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical emergency involving a potentially contaminated patient to be transported to Oconee Memorial Hospita Other 2 Demonstrate resolution of previous exercise findings (weaknesses/deficiencies) identified by NR Exercise Weakness 50-269, 270, 287/90-26-02:
Communication problems between the TSC and the State Forward Emergency Operations Center reduced the effectiveness of the State's ability to perform timely independent analysis and draw conclusions from scenario generated event (\\ons9l3\\scop&obj.913)
Rev. 0 / 07-15-91
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
DRILL 91-6 REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 @ 100% power. 30 EFP IC LPSW pump isolated to inspect/replace couplin Expected to be returned to service by noo The unit is presently under a 7-day LCO pursuant to Tech Spec 3.6.3.a, as the personnel hatch is inoperable due to a defective gasket on the outer door. At 1735 yesterday, the personnel hatch was declared inoperable after failing to meet the acceptance criteria of PT/0o/A/0150/0 9 (RB Personnel Hatch Outer Door O-Ring LRT)e The hatch was opened yesterday to allow RB entry for CF tank level instrument calibration The inner door is closed and sealed. Preparations are being made to replace and shim the outer door gaske The unit is presently under a 72-hour LCO pursuant to Tech Spec 3.3.1 and its interpretation, as the lB HPI pump is isolated for inspection and repair At 0900 yesterday, the lB HPI pump was declared inoperable after receiving high motor bearing temperature alarms, high motor stator temperature alarm, and low cooling water flow alar The 1A HPI pump was started, and the 1B HPI pump was secured. Subsequent investigation suggests that a foreign material was introduced into the HPI pump cooling water supply piping after 1HPSW-24 7 (HPSW Crossover to HPI Pumps Cooling Jacket) was stroked following a packing adjustment. This cooling water source is not protec 'ted with a cuno filte Maintenance and Transmission personnel have disassembled the 1B HPI pump motor to clear the cooling lines and the motor coole A motor bearing inspection for potential damage is alsoin progress. Cooling water flow to the aA HPI pump motor has been observed to be reduced since the last performance of PT/0/230/15 (HPI Motor Cooler Flow Test); however, cooling flow remains above the required 1 gp IC HPI pump motor cooling flow appears to be unaffecte Unit 2 @ 100% with no major problem Unit 3 P 100% with no major problem OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
DRILL 91-6 REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0710 Spurious MFB
- 1 and MFB
- 2 lockout caused by Relay Department personnel performing wiring verifications in the MFB breaker compartment Main FDW pumps tri Reactor trip. Main turbine tri TDEFWPT start cCW gravity flow to tailrace establishe iTA and 1TB buses transfer to CT- :30 Keowee units have started on MFB undervoltage and energized the STBY buses. MFBs remain de-energized, as the startup breakers (El and E2) and the standby breakers (Sl and S2) are locked out. Load Shed initiate Operators respond to the reactor trip in accordance with EP/1/A/1800/0
(Emergency Operating Procedure).
They also reference AP/l/A/170 0 /11 (Loss of Power)
and AP/1/A/17 0 0/19 (Loss of Main FDW).
0711 NLO dispatched to start and align diesel air compresso Operators dispatched to activate the SSF and supply RCI seal flow via the RCMU.system. RCPs may be trippe.d as a result of loss of HPI and C Relay personnel call control room to report their observation of the MFB lockout. MFB lockout may also be diagnosed while performing Loss of Power AP and from Events Recorder printou Relay personnel instructed to reset spurious MFB lockout relay As the lockout relays are reset on the respective MFBs, the startup breakers (El and E2) automatically close to re-energize the. MFBs. ES Switchgear (1TC, lTD, lTE) are manually energized by closing feeder breakers from the control roo OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
DRILL 91-6 REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0720 -
Unit at hot shutdown with SGs (supplied from 0740 EFDW system) removing decay heat via the MS relief valves.
operators pefit~binit assessment and begin to restore systems (HPI, FDW, CCW, CC, LPSW, HPSW, CVP, SFC, RCW, GWD, SO) to normal operation in accordance with Loss of Power AP and Loss of Main FDW A B2 RCP seals fail resulting in an RCS leak of
=100 gp Operators reference AP/1/A/1700/02 (Excessive RCS Leakage).
EOP may be referenced if ES actuation occurs or SCM is los Emergency Coordinator (Shift Supervisor) may declare an ALERT based on one or both of the following conditions:
- LOSS OF OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER (MFB 1 and 2 de-energized above cold shutdown for
> 1 minute but < 15 minutes)
- RCS LEAKAGE Z 50 GPM (Unit @ Hot Shutdown with leak 50 gpm and SCM > OF and leak cannot be isolated).
TSC/OSC activation and Site Assembly are initiate State and county emergency agencies notifie A cooldown to cold shutdown is initiated in accordance with OP/1/A/1102/10 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown).
If not operating, one RCP/loop (minimum) is restarted. Refer to OP/l/A/1103/06 (RCP Operation).
0800 TSC/OSC established. All personnel at site assembl RCS boron sample requested to support RCS cooldow Normal sample point (letdown line)
is blocke Pzr sample point is unavailable due to failure of 1RC-7 (Pzr Sample Block).
Alternate means of boron concentration determination must be utilize PALS may be placed in servic NRC notified of emergency classificatio I&E Man;acer.collapses in OSC. MERT activate.
0845 Interim CMC establishe OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
DRILL 91-6 REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0900 High motor bearing temperature alarms, high motor stator temperature alarm, and low cooling water f low, alarm received on 1A HPI pump. NLO dispatched to investigat JC HPI pump may be started after HPI discharge headers are cross-connected, and 1A HPI pump may be secure RCS leak rate increases greater than available HPI/RCMUP capacit If not secured, 1A HPI pump performance degrades to failur B HPI pump remains unavailabl RCS subcooling cannot be maintained. Operators respond to loss of SCM as directed by EO Interim CMC may declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based-on RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THA N AVAILABLE MAKEUP PUMP CAPACITY (Full HPI unable to maintain subcooling > 0*F).
1020 RB EMERG HATCH IDOD DOOR OPEN (lSA-4, D-5) receive Alarm on CAD Door #312 received in CA NLO & Security officer dispatched to investigat CAD Door #312 & emergency hatch outer door found ope Doors are secured, and investigation is starte Primary CMC personnel (Charlotte) arrive at CM H Multiple auxiliary building anu unit vent process monitor alarms are received in the control roo Security officer reports that leakage can. be heard. at the personnel hatc C HPI pump breaker fault Fire alarm received at lTD switchgear. NLO dispatched to investigat Fire brigade dispatched to extinguish small fire in breaker cabinet using CO 2 extinguisher No other compartments are damage Total HPI flow is less than EOP requirements. Operators initiate rapid cooldown on SGs to enable CFT and LPI injection to the cor OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
DRILL 91-6 REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS/SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1130 CMC may declare GENERAL EMERGENCY based on one or both of the following conditions:
LEADS TO CORE MELT (LOCA SAE #1 EAL and loss of all injection or imminent loss of injection capability)
- LOSS OF 2 OF 3 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF 3RD BARRIER (LOSS OF CONTAINMENT BARRIER -
RB penetration(s) not isolated, LOSS OF RCS PRESSURE BARRIER -
LOCA ? 50 gpm).
1200 IC LPSW pump returned to servic Terminate annual dril DRILL 91-6 TASK LISTING 0700-1200 iC LPSW pump inspection and coupling replacement 0700 Replace and shim RB Personnel Hatch Outer Door 0-Ring Gasket 0700 1B IPI Pump disassembled: Maintenance and Transinissions working on it Maintenance - Cleaning cooling lines and motor cooler: Transmissions Motor bearing nspection 0700-0710 Relay Departmcnt personnel working in MFB hreaker compartments performing wiring vcrifications 0711 NLO's dispatched to check on lock out of U 1&E2 and SI&S2 0711 NI O dispatched to start and align diesel air compressor 0711 NI O's dispatched in response to [OP and As for Loss of Power and loss of Main FDW 0715 Operator's and NIXOs dispatched to activate the SSF and supply RCP seal flow via the RCMU syste Relay personnel instructed to reset spurious MFP lockout relays 0720-0740 NLO s dispatched as needed to restore, systems (1 lT W VI W. CC, I I PS (VP. SVC. RC )
. SO) to normal operation in accordance with applicable AP Roo RCS. sample for boron re(icsted. Clienistr inidinics compling 0800-1230 Field Monitoring leams dispatched and locating plume 0R30 I&T dispatchcd to repair IR( '-F 0835
\\11FRT activation 000 NL(O dispatched to investigate IA Ill1 pump liarmscross-connect Il PI discharge headers 1020 N1 0 and security dispatched to respond to CAD Door alarms 1025 Security initiates investigation of open emergency hatch outer door 0720-1230 RP personnel dispatched as needed to cover jobs
1) R IIL,91-6 TASK LISTING 1105 R R persotincl dIispatched to pci-forin rur%'cyr In pectraitioi room and at RB1 Per-,onnc1 Match 1115 NI.) dklpalchcd to invert i2alc firc alarm il I I'D SwItch~car 1115-1145 Fire flrigadc (11-paIiced to iI ID ",witchgear to ext inglmkh fiiw 1115-1i230 I&Fr/Transmnsso1; w~orkin12 on -1pplyinfw power to ill' p'mp from A\\mx Service Water Swit chgear