IR 05000267/1989023
| ML20005G743 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G740 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-89-23, NUDOCS 9001230018 | |
| Download: ML20005G743 (14) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/89-23 Operating License:
OPR-34 Docket:
50-267
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i Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
P.O. Box 840
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Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 o
Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
Inspection At:
FSV, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted:
November 16 through December 31, 1989 Inspectors:
R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector P. W. Michaud, Resident Inspector i
Approved:
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T. F. Westerman, Chief, Project Section B Date Division of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted November 16 through December 31, 1989 (Report 50-267/89-23)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup of
licensee event reports, licensee action on previously identified inspection.
findings, followup on items of noncompliance and deviations, operational safety t
verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, fitness-for-duty training, preparation for defueling, and defueling activities.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified, inoperable fire doors (paragraph 6).
Preparations for defueling were satisfactory and defueling commenced during the inspection period.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted D. Alps Supervisor, Security
- F. Borst, Nuclear Training and Support Manager
- H. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources t
- A. Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- D. Evans Operations Manager i
M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager
- M. Fisher, Defueling and Decommissioning (D/D) Project Manager C. Fuller, Manager Nuclear Production J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations
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- M. Holnes, Nuclear Licensing Manager i
- F. Novachek D/D Program Manager
- H. O'Hagan, D/D Project Manager
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- J. Reesy, Nuclear Support Engineering Manager
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- P. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance
- D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
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The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection, j
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted January 3,1990.
2.
Plant Status
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The plant permanently ceased nuclear power operation on August 18,.1989.
Defueling of the reactor core began during this inspection period.
3.
Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(92700)
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The inspectors myiewed selected LERs to determine whether corrective actions, as stated in the LERs, wem appropriate to correct the cause of the event and to verify that these corrective actions were implemented.
.c LER 88-15 reported a loss of power to the 480 VAC essential power buses during a loss of outside electrical power test. Both diesel generator
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l output breakers failed to close onto their respective 480 V buses r
l apparently due to bad contacts in the 1A output breaker hand switch. The
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licensee was unable to repeat the failure, and the loss of offsite power surveillance test was successfully completed on October 18, 1988.
Proper functioning of the 1A diesel generator output-breaker hand switch,
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HS-9244, is verified weekly during surveillance tests and no problems have been noted since this event. Procedural instructions for actions to be i
taken for recovery from a loss of 480 VAC electrical power have been
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incorporated into E0P-6, " Restoration of Essential Electrical Power,"
which was issued on August 9, 1989. The inspector considered these actions sufficient. This item is closed.
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,,e e-3-LER 89-05 reported pressurization of the reactor coolant system to greater than 100 psia with the Region 27 penetration interspace isolated, in violation of LCO 4.2.7.
This event was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/89-07.
Corrective actions included the addition of checks rior to pressurizing the reactor above 100 psia.
Procedure OPOP-1, p' General Plant Requirements," was revised to reflect this on June 26,.
1989.
The licensee also performed a Human Performance Evaluation System investigation of this event which is documented in licensee Memorandum PCC-89-0073, dated April 19, 1989. The inspector considered these actions acceptable.
This item is closed.
LER 69-06 reported that two Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were not performed within the required intervals.
Operability of the standby diesel generators and the gaseous stack monitors was not maintained due to the failure to perform these surveillances.
The appropriate tests were performed immediately upon the licensee's discovery of their omission, and no discrepancies were found.
On April 28, 1989, the licensee's computer generated report on
"Surveillances Past Schedule Date" was revised to more clearly identify surveillances which approach the TS compliance date.
Also, Step C.2(b)
was added to Procedure OPOP-III, "Startup Procedure." to require a scheduling department representative to verify that all required surveillances are complete prior to exceeding 2 percent power.
The inspector considered these actions acceptable to close this LER.
LER 89-08 reported the backup stack radiation monitor, RT-4801, was out of calibration such that it could not fulfill TS requirements.
This occurred due to an incorrect setpoint used in its calibration.
RT-4801 was immediately recalibrated and returned to an operable status when this condition was confirmed.
The licensee regarded this event as an isolated incident and no programmatic deficiencies were identified.
No recurrence of this type of event has occurred.
This item is closed.
LER 89-12 reported an unanalyzed gaseous waste release when plant personnel aligned the 1A Gas Waste Surge Tank for release when it was intended to release from the IB Gas Waste Surge. Tank.
The release lasted approximately 10 minutes and was terminated immediately upon discovery of the error.
The contents of the 1A Gas Waste Surge Tank were sampled and analyzed confirming that the release was within allowable limits.
The licensee reviewed the procedures involved and found them sufficiently clear.
The personnel involved were disciplined.
A local. valve lineup schematic and color-coded handwheels were added on November 3,1989, to aid operators in identifying the 1A or 1B release paths.
The inspector considered these actions sufficient-to close this LER.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)OpenItem 267/8913-01: During a review of a licensee QA audit,
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the inspector noted that the licensee's auditors had identified apparent violations of 10 CFR 71 concerning the spent fuel shipping casks owned by the licensee. The licensee's QA department had not received a response to their audit findings, and this open item was created so the inspectors could review the audit findings and the licensee's comitment to not use
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the casks until they were returned to their licensed configuration in
accordance with the Certificate of Compliance (C of C).
A task team was fomed by the licensee to address the four discrepant conditions identified by the licensee's QA department in Corrective Action Report (CAR)89-007. The first discrepant condition identified that the controlled copy of C of C No. 6346 was not the current revision at both
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the site records storage and the licensee's Denver office.
The correct revision of this C of C was placed in these locations, and the licensee's Document Distribution Handbook and Procedure NCR-5, " Control and Review of Government Correspondence," were revised effective August 28, 1989, to i
include clarifications for special handling of C of C No. 6346 revisions.
These actions were accepted by the licensee's QA department as corrective actions in response to Discrepant Condition No. 1 of CAR 89-007.
The second discrepant condition identified substitutions of materials without adequate technical evaluation or prior NRC approval. The licensee identified the root cause of this condition as inadequate control of design changes and nonconforming conditions. Corrective actions included a review of all changes, modifications, or substitutions made to the shipping casks to determine the status of the casks. This review was completed and documented in licensee Memorandum NFG-89-0408, dated July 27, 1989. Change Notice (CN) 2951 was issued to correct any improper
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changes and return the casks to the configuration referenced in the C of C.
The NRC was notified of the noncompliance in licensee Letter P-89306, dated August 7, 1989. Actions to preclude a recurrence included a licensee policy statement regarding review and approval of shipping cask related changes and an update to-Section 9.1.3 of the FSAR in Rev. 7, dated July 22, 1989, to clearly identify the need for prior NRC approval of any changes affecting the C of C.
The inspector verified that CN-2951 and CN-2951A were completed and all materials on the shipping casks were in conformance with the C of C.
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The third discrepant condition identified by the licensee was that materials, components, and' parts of the shipping casks were not identified withregardtosafetyimportanceinaccordancewith10CFRParts71.105(a)
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l and-(c). The licensee reviewed all parts, components, and materials to
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determine those items important to safety and documented this review in Rev. D of Engineering Evaluation EE-GA-QAL-0002, " Determination of Quality
Assurance Levels for Parts Supplied by GA Technologies." The root cause
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of this failure to meet 10 CFR 71 requirements was that procurement and engineering procedures were structured to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criteria
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without consideration of the additional requirements of 10 CFR 71. The l
licensee's actions should preclude this from hoopening in the future.
i The final discrepant condition from the licensee's QA audit findings l
required a review of the FSV QA program to ensure it meets the =
l requirements of 10 CFR 71 Subpart H.
This review was documented in
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j licensee Memo QAC-89-0299. As a result, licensee Administrative
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l Procedures APM-Q2, " Quality Assurance Program"; APM-Q3 " Design Control System"; and APM-Q4, " Procurement System" were reviewed. The inspector
't verified that these revisions were sufficient to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 71 Subpart H.
The inspector's review of the licensee's actions taken in response to.
CAR 89-007 revealed a sufficient level of assurance that the shipping casks met the requirements of 10 CFR 71.
The inspector observed portions
of the work done to restore the casks to conformance with C of C No. 6346.
- Additional steps taken by the licensee should be sufficient to preclude a recurrence of this problem. As a result of the inspector's verification
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l that the casks are now in conformance with the C of C, the licensee's commitment to not use the shipping casks until they conform to the C of C has been fulfilled and is no longer applicable. This item is closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
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5.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance and Deviations (92702)
(Closed) Violation 8902-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure - During perfomance of a surveillance test, the seven-region group of the reserve shutdown system was actuated, releasing reserve shutdown material into the
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core. The licensee took immediate corrective action to prevent a recurrence of this type of event, and no response to this violation was required.
Issue 5 of Surveillance Procedure SR 4.1.8.C.1/2/3-Q " Reserve i
Shutdown Hopper, ACM Disconnect, and Low Pressure Alarm Test," contains revised steps to require placing both reserve shutdown subsystems in test before perfoming continuity checks on either subsystem and requires independent verification of these steps. These actions are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of this type of event.
(Closed) Violation 267/8903-01:
Failure to Establish and Control Radiological Areas - This violation was 1ssued because potentially contaminated personnel were observed using a stairway which was also being utilized by personnel exiting an area after frisking clean. The contamination survey meter had been placed in a~1ow background area, but the area boundaries were not adjusted to reflect this. Upon notification by the inspector, the boundaries were adjusted and a survey confirmed no contamination was spread. The licensee's health physics staff was instructed in the establishment of control areas to limit the spread of contamination. This was viewed as an isolated incident and no recurrence of ~ this type has been observed.
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-6-(Closed) Violation 267/8907-01:
Failure to Comply with the Requirements of Technical Specifications (TS) - Two examples were cited where the conditions required by TS were not satisfied prior to changing to a plant mode which made the TS applicable.
The first example involved exceeding 100 psia reactor coolant system pressure with the Region 27 penetration interspace isolated.
Corrective action included a revision to Procedure OPOP-I, " General Plant Requirements," to include additional checks before increasing reactor pressure above 100 psia.
The inspectors reviewed these additional checks which included verification of penetration closures and interspace valve lineups as well as other verifications.
These actions were found to be acceptable and should preclude a recurrence of this type of event.
The second example involved operation of the reactor above 2 percent power without having performed Surveillance Test SR 5.6.1.D-M, " Diesel Engine Exhaust Temperature Functional Test," as required.
The surveillance test had not been rescheduled during a previous shutdown.
Upon discovery, reactor power was reduced below 2 percent power and the surveillance test successfully completed.
The licensee made improvements to their computer generated reports which show the status of rescheduled surveillances.
In addition, Procedure OPOP-III, "Startup Procedure," was revised to include a signoff by a scheduling department representative to verify that all required surveillance tests have been performed before changes in plant mode are made.
The corrective actions taken by the licensee are acceptable and provide a sufficient basis to close this violation.
(Closed) Violation 267/8907-02:
Inadequate Control of Replacement Parts for Safety-Related Equipment - An incorrect part number was specified and used to obtain a replacement part which was then installed in the "D" Emergency Diesel Generator Engine.
This occurred due to personnel error in reading the parts code list.
The two parts, an oil temperature switch and a water temperature switch, are physically similar and have nearly identical part numbers.
The licensee installed the correct part on the "D" Engine and verified the correct parts were in-service on the other three emergency diesel generator engines.
Discussion
of this event and its implications was conducted with all I&C and
Maintenance QC personnel.
The licensee considered this an isolated
incident and no recurrence of this type has been observed.
This violation
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is closed.
(Closed) Violation 278/8912-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure - An-incorrect valve lineup caused an unanalyzed gaseous waste release, j
Personnel error resulted in the.1A Gas Waste Receiver being aligned for release when it was planned to release the contents of the 1B Receiver.-
The release was secured as soon as this was discovered, and the contents j
of the 1A Gas Waste Receiver were sampled and analyzed to verify the
release was below allowable limits, which it was.
The stack monitors were in operation during the release.
The procedures involved were reviewed and,found to be adequate.
The two operators involved were disciplined by I
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No further actions are necessary, and this violation is closed.
(Closted) Violation 267/8915-01:
Failure to Provide Adequate Administrative Control of Plant Changes that Affect Safety-Related Procrsdures - A change was made to the method of secondary heat balance calculation by the licensee's reactor support group without an accompanying revision.to Procedure OPOP-IV, " Plant Operation Between 30%
and 100% Power." This resulted in operation above the authorized maximum power level of 82 percent for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Corrective actions included elimination of the requirement to manually. update the secondary heat balance calculation by programming in an automatic function.
Procedure OPOP-IV was revised to instruct operators to verify that the automatic function has' occurred.
The licensee issued an internal memo, PPC-89-2045, directing all computer changes to. require documentation of operations department procedure reviews and approval of operations department management.
These actions are acceptable to close this violation.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
f.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
General The inspectors made daily tours of the control room and refueling floor during normal working hours and at least once per week during backshift hours.
Staffing was verified to be at the proper level for the plant conditions at all times.
Control room operators were observed to be attentive and aware of plant status and reasons why annunciators were lit.
The inspectors observed operators using and adhering to approved procedures in the performance of their duties.
A sampling of these procedures by the inspectors verified current revisions and legible copies.
During control room tours, the inspectors verified that the required number of nuclear instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable.
The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power, meteorological, and fire protection systems was also verified by the inspectors.
The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were reviewed daily along with the TS compliance' log,' clearance log, operations deviation report (0DR) log, temporary configuration report (TCR) log, and operations order book.
Shift turnovers were observed at least once per week by the inspectors.
Information flow was consistently good, with the shift supervisors soliciting comments or concerns from the reactor operators, equipment operators, auxiliary J
tenders, and health physics technicians.
The licensee's station manager, operations manager, and superintendent of operations were observed to make routine tours of the control room and refueling floo. _ -
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-8-The inspectors made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to assess the overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant equipment, radiological controls, and security. During these tours, particular attention was paid to the licensee's fire protection arogram, including fire extinguishers, firefighting equipment, fire
)arriers, control of flammable materials, and other fire hazards.
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During a plant tour on November 29, 1989, the inspectors found Fire Doors 9 and 13 propped open by a welding machine cable. The doors are in series connecting the 480 Y switchgear room and Building 10.
The licensee's Procedure FPOR-14 requires that fire doors be closed.
except for periods of not more than 20 minutes.
If fire doors are propped open for more than 20 minutes, a continuous fire watch must be initiated. The procedure does allow the continuous fire watch to be replaced by a roving hourly fire watch if the fire protection engineer makes an evaluation that this is acceptable.
The fire doors in question were propped open since workers were using a welding machine located in Building 10 to do welding in the 480 V switchgear room. The welding cables ran through Doorways 9 and 13.
When the inspectors toured the area, all the workers were on break and no one was in the room with the propped open fire doors. The
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inspectors did observe the roving fire watch enter and then exit the 480 V switchgear room. The inspectors then visited the shift supervisor to determine if an evaluation had been made to replace the continuous fire watch with a roving hourly fire watch. The shift supervisor was unaware that Fire Doors 9 and 13 had been propped open. The shift supervisor contacted the fire protection program j
manager who had not been notified that the doors were propped open.
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Consequently, there was no evaluation relieving the licensee of the requirement for a continuous fire watch. ' Propping fire doors open without meeting the fire protection program procedural req)uirements is an apparent violation of NRC requirements (267/8923-01.
The inspectors also noted during the tour that the latch on Fire Door 14 was not functioning properly. This was brought to the attention of the shif t supervisor and the fire protection program manager. The licensee informed the inspectors that the latch on Fire Door 14 was a recurring problem and the licensee was seeking a permanent solution. The inspectors noted that an NCR on Fire Door 6, NCR 89-1732, was dated October 26, 1989. Questioning the timeliness of repairs, the inspectors learned that the fire protection program manager was awaie of the NCR and of delays in fixing the door.
An evaluation had been made that the roving fire watch was a sufficient j
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compensatory measure.
b.
Radiological Controls The inspectors observed health physics technicians performing surveys i
and checking air samplers and area radiation monitors. Contamination levels and exposure rates were posted at entrances to radiologically
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Health physics technicians were present to provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologically controlled areas.
The inspectors observed workers following the instructions on radiation work permits concerning protective clothing and dosimetry, and observed workers using proper procedures for contamination control, including proper removal of protective clothing and whole body frisking upon exiting a radiologically controlled area.
c.
Security The inspectors randomly verified that the number of armed security officers required by the security plan were present.
A lead security officer was on duty to direct security activities on each shift.
The inspectors verified that search equipment. including an x-ray-machine, explosive detector, and metal detector were operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was conducted.
The protected area barrier was surveyed by the inspectors to ensure it was not compromised by erosion or other objects.
The inspectors'
observed that vital area barriers were well maintained and not compromised.
The inspectors also observed that persons granted access to the site were badged and visitors were properly escorted.
NRC Region IV management requested that the inspectors observe the search of a food delivery vehicle transporting food into the protected area.
This request was to verify the adequacy of security searches of this particular type of vehicle.- The inspectors were aware and confirmed with licensee management that food delivery vehicles are not allowed inside the protected area.
The inspectors routinely observed food. deliveries during the inspection period.
Food items to stock vending machines inside the protected area are brought through the primary access point package search area on a hand powered dolly.
At the end of this inspection period, no food items were being placed in the vending machines.
The food vendor delivery person did not take mandatory fitness-for-duty training, and the licensee suspended his unescorted access pending completion of the training.
One violation of NRC regulations, inoperable fire doors, was identified.in
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the review of this program area.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726, 71714)
The inspectors examined the licensee's~ program for. protection of systems susceptible to freezing.
Procedure SP-0P-47a-A, Issue 1. " Preparing for Cold Weather Season," was reviewed by the inspectors to verify adequate measures are specified to protect safety-related and auxiliary equipment from freezing.
This procedure provides instructions for protection of the
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-10-circulating water, service water, chemical injection, firewater, and auxiliary boiler systems, as well as other systems.
The licensee completed this surveillance on November 3, 1989.
The inspectors independently walked down portions of these systems using Procedure SP-0P-47a-A to verify all required actions had been taken and that they were sufficient to prevent freezing.
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspectors observed conduct of Procedure SR 4.1.6.C/D-X, Issue 4,
" Shutdown Margin Evaluation for In-Core Maintenance," performed to verify adequate shutdown margin with the control rod removed from Region 29.
This was performed prior to defueling Region 29.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
8.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed work performed on the spent fuel shipping casks in accordance with Procedure MPF-1001, Issue 4, " Spent Fuel Shipping Cask."
This work included inspection of the cask surfaces, components, seals, and fasteners, followed by a vacuum leak test of the spent fuel shipping liner.
The inspectors witnessed this leak test which was performed properly.
Adherence to procedural hold points and QC involvement was observed.
In conjunction with the annual inspection of the casks, work under CWP 89-137, " Return Cask to Original Condition," and CWP 89-0202,
" Place Serial Numbers on Cask Components," was performed.
The inspectors observed portions of these effm.. as well.
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspectors monitored the licensee *s inspection and work on the defueling blocks which was performed in accordance with Procedure MPF-1280, Issue 1, "Defueling Block Inspection and Poison
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Loading." This inspection consisted of a visual examination, cleaning,
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and verification of proper dowel pin and socket location.' Following the inspection of each block, boronated graphite poison pellets were loaded into 12 holes in the graphite block.
The holes containing the poison were then plugged.
The inspector reviewed the procedure and found it well organized and sufficiently detailed to assume proper inspection and loading of poison.
In observing the performance of this work, no discrepancies were observed.
Continuous QC coverage of these activities was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
9.
Fitness-for-Duty Training Program (TI 2515/104)
The inspectors attended the' licensee's fitness-for-duty training session and-interviewed security personnel involved in conduct of the training and administration of the program.
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-11-The licensee reviewed the requirements for employee awareness training, escort training, and supervisor training.
The licensee allows anyone granted unescorted access to the protected area to function as an escort.
Consequently, all badged personnel received escort training.
Additionally, the licensee determined that there was minimal additional training required for supervisors beyond that required for escorts.
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additional required training involved how supervisors refer employees to the employee assistance program.
The licensee decided to develop one all-day training program that met the requirements of employee, escort, and supervisor training.
The licensee conducted several classes at various on-and offsite locations to allow all badged personnel, including contractors, to receive the required training.
As noted in paragraph 6, the licensee did suspend the unescorted access of persons who did not complete the training.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
10.
Preparation for Defuelina (60705)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's defueling preparations.
The licensee had not performed in-core fuel movements since 1984.
The fuel handling machine was completely refurbished and a personal computer has replaced the old process computer.
Additionally, defueling includes more and different operations than refueling.
At FSV defueling is not the straight forward operation it is at a water reactor.
The core structural integrity is dependent on the core barrel being full, i.e., no voids.
During refueling, new fuel is (
placed in the void created by the removal of spent fuel, as soon as
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possible.
Not filling the void created by removal of spent fuel
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invalidates the seismic qualification of the core.
The FSV core cannot be defueled by layers since the control rods travel through the fuel / moderator blocks.
Control rods must be removed from a region of the core before fuel can be removed from that region.
l The licensee developed defueling plans based on replacing fuel blocks with
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dummy fuel blocks as the core is defueled.
The dummy blocks are made of graphite and are the same size and shape as fuel blocks. The dummy blocks l
have coolant holes the same as fuel blocks for heat removal.
Instead of
fuel, the dummy blocks have pins of boron carbide.
This negative reactivity eliminates the need to insert control' rods into fuel regions
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replaced with dummy blocks.
The dummy blocks do not have holes for control rods or reserve shutdown material to pass through.
The licensee defueling plan is to remove fuel'from a region and replace
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that fuel with dummy fuel blocks.
The reflector blocks, plenum (metal clad reflector) blocks, core restraint devices, and control rod drive assembly with rods fully retracted into the control rod guide tubes are placed back in the defueled region.
The defueled region physically looks
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the fuel blocks to allow passage of control rods or reserve shutdown
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material. Thermal response of the dumy fuel blocks is the same as for
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fuel and the heat removal characteristics are not changed. The reactivity of the defueled region is negative due to the poison pins placed in each
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dumy block.
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e The reflector blocks, plenum blocks, and core restraint devices are
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replaced in the core as a convenient place to store these contaminated and
activated objects. The control rod drives are placed back in the core not only for storage but to utilize the shielding, and primary and secondary seals on the control rod drives.
The control rod drive is the refueling penetration closure.
During preparation for defueling the inspectors reviewed the following documents:
Procedure FHWP-201, Issue 1. " Fuel Handling Procedure Work Packet,
Activity:
Defueling of Region 33 and Preparation of Region'25" Fuel Handling Manual. Issue 12
GA Document No. 909902 N/C, "FMAE ASSESSMENT OF THE REACTOR CORE AND
GRAPHITE CORE SUPPORT RESPONDING TO A DBE DURING DEFUELING OF THE FSV REACTOR" Public Service Company Document EE-DEC-0017, Revision A, " Fort St.
- Vrain Standard Fuel Column Region Defueling Earthquake Stability Evaluation" Procedure CMG-2. Issue 6. " Fuel Safeguards and Accountability"
Procedure CMG-23, Issue 2. " Semi-Annual Fuel Accountability"
Procedure CMG-26 Issue 1. " Fort St. Vrain Fuel Accountability System
(FSVFAS)"
The licensee agreed, based on the seismic studies, not to remove fuel below the first layer of the active core, in the first region to be defueled, until the TS authorizing placement of dummy fuel blocks was approved.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's staffing plans, the status of
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licensed individuals making reactivity manipulations, and comunications
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between the fuel deck and the control room. The licensee revised the Procedure FHWP-201 in response to inspector concerns in several areas including comunication line responsibility, fuel accountability, and general workability. The inspectors found the licensee's revisions to the
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procedure addressed all their concerns.
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-13-The inspectors were satisfied with the licensee's preparations for defueling.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
11. Defueling Activities (60710)-
The licensee proceeded on November 27, 1989, to defuel the reactor. This was in accordance with the licensee's schedule calling for defueling to begin at the end of a 100-day cool-down period following the end of power operation. Power operation concluded August 18, 1989.
Based on the licensee's studies of core seismic response listed in paragraph 10 end in response to inspector concerns, the licensee agreed to remove only the first layer of active fuel from Region 33, the first region to be defueled, until the TS permitting use of the dumy fuel blocks was approved.
The inspectors, on the evening of November 26, 1989, and morning of November 27, 1989, observed completion of defueling preparation. The control rod drive had been removed from Region 33 and stored in an equipment storage well. The fuel handling machine had been placed on the reactor isolation valve over Region 33.
Tha inspectors observed the completion of fuel handling machine surveillances, the removal of the core restraint devices, the removal of the metal clad reflector blocks (plenum blocks), the removal of the two layers of half-length reflector blocks, and the removal of the top layer of active fuel from Region 33. As agreed, the licensee halted defueling at this point and used the time to l
refine the software controlling the fuel handling machine based on experience with the new controls gained while removing the reflectors, restraints, and first layer of fuel from Region 33.
On December 1, 1989, the licensee received Amendment 74 to the facility operating license,)which included a description of the defueling elements (dumy fuel blocks in Section 6 of the TS, thereby allowing their use.
Maintenance and testing of the fuel handling machine (FHM) continued through December 9,1989. Defueling activities were resumed on December 10, 1989. The inspectors observed the removal of fuel from Region 33 of the reactor, which was completed at 8 a.m. on December 11, 1989. The fuel was then placed in Fuel Storage Well No. 2, and defueling blocks were loaded into the FHM. The inspectors observed the placement of these defueling blocks into Region 33 on December 12 and 13, 1989. When this was completed, preparations were made to proceed with defueling of Region 25.
The control rod drive (CRD) from Region 25 was placed in Region 33. The CRD assembly makes up the primary seal on the reactor vessel penetration.
The defueling evolutions proceeded on schedule with only minor problems.
The licensed operators conducting the evolutions were observed adhering to procedures and had an overall cautious and conservative approach. When an
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occasional problem arose with the computer-controlled automatic system of the FHM, the operators took manual control'and completed the evolution
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with no problems.
Problems encountered with the computer included some incorrect input data which resulted in a pickup or deposit error due to a
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mismatch between actual coordinates and the program coordinates.
At each point where a discrepancy from nominal or expected coordinates was
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encountered, the evolution was stopped and avaluated before proceeding further.
The inspectors considered the 1 dsskee's overall conduct of fuel
removal and replacement'with defueling elements very good.
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The licensee has removed the fuel from Regions-33, 25, and 29.
There is
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sufficient spent fuel storage capacity for 11 of the 37 core regions.
When the fuel storage wells are full, licensee defueling will cease until fuel shipment to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory commences or an independent spent fuel storage facility is completed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
12.
Exit Meetino (30703)
An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph I on January 3, 1990.
During this interview, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not
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identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the
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inspectors.
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