IR 05000263/1993016
| ML20149D324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1993 |
| From: | Creed J, Kniceley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149D307 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-93-16, NUDOCS 9309210007 | |
| Download: ML20149D324 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report No. 50-263/93016 Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 facility Name:
Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Dates:
August 23-27, 1993 (onsite)
August 30-September 2, 1993 (in-office)
Type of Inspection:
Announced, Routine Physical Security Inspection Date of Previous Physical Security Inspection:
February 8-12, 1993 Inspector:
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9/L9 0 3 e
}P J. R. Knic)eley Date Physical Security Inspector
"th Mmhu Approved By:
Jam 6s R. Creed, Chief Date Safeguards and Incident Response Section inspection Summary Jnspection on August 23-September 2. 1393 (Report No. 50-263/93016(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced physical security inspection involving Management Support and Effectiveness; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Access Control-Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Security Training and Qualifications; Protection of Safeguards Information; and Followup on Previous Inspection findings.
Results:
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirenents within the areas examined. One unresolved item regarding the protection of Safeguards Information was identified.
A Computer Upgrade Project has begun and should be completed by the end of 1993.
The project includes a replacement of all computer equipment including multiplexers.
A new software package will also be created for the system.
Compensatory measures for the computer outage were discussed with Region III safeguards personnel.
In conjunction with the Security Computer
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Replacement Project, the Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station consoles will be replaced to create a better human factor work environment for the operators.
We have concluded that the security program continues to be well implemented and managed.
Licensee management attention and involvement in the security program are good.
Resources are ample and reasonably allocated. The training and qualification program is effective and met regulatory requirements.
Security personnel observed were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The professionalism, attitude, appearance, and performance of the security organization continues to be excellent. The housekeeping practices of the security occupied areas was good. Observed testing of the protected and vital area intrusion alarms,. access control search equipment and
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evaluation of the closed circuit television assessment system showed that the
security equipment performed as required and enhanced detection, assessment
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and response capabilities.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Key Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the
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inspector interviewed other employees, contractor personnel, and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*). denotes those present at the telephonic Exit Interview conducted on September 2, 1993.
L. Waldinger, Site General Manager
- B. Hill, Plant Manager i
- L. Wilkerson, Quality Assurance
- B. Anderson, Acting Superintendent, Security G. Miserendino, Manager, Corporate Security, Northern States Power Co.
M. Louden, Security Specialist, Stanley Smith Security, Inc.
E. Larson, Security Supervisor, Stanley Smith Security, Inc.
J. Bittner, Security Consultant, Northern States Power Co.
B. Schnetzler, Site Security Manager, Burns Security
- S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC Region III 2.
Entrance and Exit Interviews a.
At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. B. Anderson, Acting
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Security Superintendent, and other staff members were informed of the purpose of this inspection, its scope, and the topical areas
to be examined.
b.
The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Section 1, at the conclusion of inspection activities. A general
description of the scope and conduct of the inspection was provided.
Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview. The licensee representatives were' invited to i
provide comments on each item discussed. Those comments are included. The details of each finding listed below are j
referenced, as noted, in the report.
(1)
The licensee was advised that no violations of NRC requirements were identified but that one unresolved item regarding the protection of safeguards information was opened pending receipt and review of the licensee's investigation report. The licensee committed.to having their investigation report completed and sent to Region III-for review by September 20, 1993 (Refer to Section 5).
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(2)
The inspector commented that the protected and vital area
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security intrusion detection systems, closed circuit television assessment system and the gatehouse access
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control search equipment were evaluated and performed as
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required.
(3)
The inspector commented that the security program appeared to be well implemented and well managed.
Security force members who were questioned and observed were knowledgeable and proficient in performing their assigned duties.
Additionally, the housekeeping practices in the security occupied areas as well as the protected area were good.
(4)
The inspector commented that security equipment cppeared well maintained and performed as required when tested.
3.
Proaram Areas Inspected Listed below are the areas examined by the inspector in which no findings (strengths, violations, deviations, unresolved items or inspection followup items) were identified. Only findings are described in subsequent Report Details sections.
l The below listed clear areas were reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified " Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of the applicable NRC Inspection Procedure (IP). Sampling reviews included interviews, observations, and document reviews that provided independent verification of compliance with requirements. Gathered data was also used to evaluate the adequacy of the reviewed program and practices to adequately protect the facility and the health and safety of the public. The depth and scope of inspection activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the program area and operational status of the security system.
Additional testing of security systems was not requested by the inspector.
IP 81700-Physical Security Inspection Proaram for Power Reactors 01.
Manaaement. Plans. Audit:
(a) Degree of Management Support for Program; (b) Security Program Plans Changes; (c) Audits Program Corrective Action, Auditor Qualification.
02.
Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers. Detection and
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Assessment Aids:
(a) PA and VA Barrier Resistance; (b) Isolation Zones Maintained; (c) PA and VA Detection Functional and Effective; (d) Assessment Aids Functional and Effective.
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03.
Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel. Packaoes and Vehicles:
(a) Personnel Access:
(1) Identification and Authorization Checked Before Access; (2) Trustworthiness, Reliability Determined By Background Investigation and are Part of Behavioral Observation Program; (3) Changes Made for Terminations; (4) List / Computer Are Protected; (5) Personnel Are Searched; (6)
Badges Are Displayed; (7) Visitors Are Escorted; (8) Rapid Ingress and Egress in Emergencies; (9) Access Limited for Need.
(s)
Packaae Control:
(1) Packages Authorization Checked; (2)
Handcarried Packages Searched at PA; (3) Material Controlled at Containment.
(c) Vehicle Control:
(1) Vehicles Are Searched; (2)
Authorization Verified Prior to Entry; (3) Two Officers at Open Gates; (4) All Self-Propelled and Towed Vehicles Are Controlled.
04.
Alarm Stations and Communication:
(a) CAS and SAS Are Manned, Equipped, Independent and Diverse and Can Call For Assistance; (b)
No Interference of CAS activities; (c) CAS and SAS Have Continuous Communications With Each Onsite officer and Can Call Offsite.
05.
Security Trainina and Qualification:
(a) Each Individual Is Trained, Qualified and Equipped for Each Task Prior To Assignment; (b) Security Personnel Have Knowledge and Ability To Perform Duties; (c) Response Capabilities Are Adequate and Effective To Meet Plans and Protect Against Design Basis Threat; (d) Size and Leadership of Response Adequate.
IP 81810 Safeauards Information:
(a) Access To Safeguards Information; (b) Disclosure; (c) Protection While In Use; (d) Storage.
4.
Physical Security Proaram For Power Reactors (IP 81700):
Some observations were noted and are discussed below.
In early 1993, the nuclear site Security organizations were placed under the corporate security organization and given the new department name of Security Services. The Security Services department reorganized to use resources more efficiently and to reduce costs. The previous site security organization consisted of a Superintendent Security, a Security Administrator, a Site Access Coordinator, a Security Engineer, and six Security Shift Specialists (SSS) who rotated with the on-duty security force. The new organization consists of a Superintendent Security, a Site Access Coordinator, and three Nuclear Security Specialists (NSS).
There are no longer an NSP SSS's on shift with the security force.
The supervision of the security force on a shift basis is handled by the contract security force supervisors. Corporate Security Services will add two Nuclear Security Program Coordinators who will both NSP nuclear sites by coordinating activities to ensure consistency between the sites and to identify areas for improvement.
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All activities and responsibilities of the previous organization will be maintained by the new organization. Shift supervisory functions and i
other shift duties.previously accomplished by the NSP SSS will be performed by the contractor security force supervisors. The administrative responsibilities will be maintained by the new NSS positions.
The contract security force also assumed responsibility for security force training.
At the time of this inspection, the individuals selected for the various new positions had not'been announced. The effectiveness of the new organization will be reviewed and evaluated during future inspections.
5.
Safeauards Information (IP-81810):
One unresolved item was identified regarding protection of safeguards information.
On August 26, 1993, a contractor working in the NSP drafting section, which is located in the Administration Building outside the protected area, reported that he found a unmarked 3 1/2 inch computer disk on his desk.
He reviewed the disk and found what he believed was safeguards information drawings related to the licensee's safeguards vulnerability assessment targets. He stated he believed the information was dated 1990.
Current information was reviewed by the individual who verified the similarity.
Information of this type is considered extremely sensitive and significant.
Inadequate control could be considered a
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significant breakdown. He said he destroyed the disk but reported what he found to security personnel.
On August 27, 1993, the licensee began an investigation utilizing three corporate security investigators and the Corporate Security Manager.
Attempts will be made to identify where the disk came from and the personnel responsible. Additionally, the licensee will try and reconstruct the disk to identify exactly what is on the disk.
The licensee committed to complete their investigation and submit it to the inspector for review by September 20, 1993. (50-263/93016-01)
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