IR 05000244/1983023
| ML17255A657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1983 |
| From: | Lazarus W, Reynolds S, Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17255A654 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-83-23, NUDOCS 8402020399 | |
| Download: ML17255A657 (16) | |
Text
I.S.
NUCLEAR REGVLATORY COSSI VII NOTICE
'Region I
"
gpt g q Ig83
, Rcport Ho.
50-244/83-23 Docket No.
50-244 License t'o.
DPR-18 Priority
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Category Ir
~ 4 Licensee:
Rochester, Gas and Electric Cor oration 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 irma Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:.
Ontario, New York Inspection conducted:
October 18, 1983 through November 18, 1983 Inspectors:
R.
P.
i erman, Senior Resident Inspector da e signed
'.Appro'd by:
M. J.
a rus, ing Chief, Reactor Projects Secti 2C ivi ion of P ject and Resident Programs Err 5p S.
D.
R ynolds, Le d Reactor Engineer Div of gineering and Technical Programs M. J zaru ting Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2C, Division of Project.and Resident Programs date signed jR/9j83 date signed date signed Inspection'U'nmar t
Ins ection on October 18, 1983 throu h November 18, 1983 (Re ort No. 50-244 83-23 reas ns ecte
- Specia
, unannounced inspection by t e resident inspector an two egion-ase inspectors (159 hours0.00184 days <br />0.0442 hours <br />2.628968e-4 weeks <br />6.04995e-5 months <br />), in response to allegations made to the NRC concerning inadequate contractor guality Control of modifications performed at the Ginna site.
Results:
Three problems were identified relating to modification turnover controT 5(paragraph 4); material storage control (paragraph 5.a}; and several instances of failure to adhere to plant administrative controls for completing procedures (paragraph '3.b.l).
O4OROROSV9. S4O555 5 '.
POR PDR ADOCK'05000244
I
DETAILS l.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among those contacted:
2.
S.
Adams, Liaison Engineer B. Brinkman, Chief Site'ngineer, Bell-Schneider (B-S)
N.
Chapman, Melding Engineer
. (B-S)
C. Christopher, Support Craft Services Supervisor (B-S)
D. Filion, Radiochemist D. Filkins, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager D. Fleming, Project Quality Assurance Manager (B-S)
J. Gashlin, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager (J.
P. Bell)
N. Goodenough, Project Quality Control Engineer B. Hill, Project Engineer (B-S)
C. Hambretti, Responsible Engineer S. McCullough, Project Quality Control Inspector G. Nelson, Quality Control Engineer (B-S)
J. St. Martin, Liaison Coordinator B. A. Snow, Plant Superintendent S.
M. Spector, Assistant Plant Superintendent D. Travis, Operations Aide B. Vanderwell, Project Manager V. Vergason, Project Quality Control Inspector J.
VonEsch, General Superintendent (B-S)
The inspector also interviewed and talked.with other licensee per'sonnel during the course of the inspection.
Back round 3.
Several allegations were made to the NRC during October, 1983, in regard to
'ork performed by Bell-Schneider (B-S) Corporation pertaining to the installati of the Post Accident Sampling System and modifications made in the Seismic Up-grade Program.
Specific allegations concerned various QA documentation problems improperly trained and qualified QC inspectors, inadequate control of material storage, various welding discrepancies, and evidence of offsite drinking by con-
.tractor personnel during their assigned night shift.
This report documents the results of the special inspection conducted to evaluate these allegations.
Post Accident Sam lin S stem-Procedural Review of Installation and Testin a ~
The inspector reviewed the following procedures and data sheets associa'ted with the Post Accident. Sampling System modification to verify: procedures, and changes to procedures, were reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the licensee's, admin-istrative controls; technical content was adequate to,provide detailed.
instructions for installation and testing of the system; procedures were properly adhered to, including administrative implementing procedures;
P repositioning of valves and breakers associated with systems interfacing with PASS tie-ins and testing did not conflict with Technical Specifications;,
and functional testing acceptance criteria was satisfied or properly dis-positioned.
Station Modification Procedure (SM)-2606.1, Mechanical Installation of the Post Accident Sampling System, Revision 1, March 22, 1983.
SH-2606.1A, Steam Generators lA and lB Blowdown Sampling Line Installati Revision 1, March 22, 1983.
SM-2606.3, PASS Equipment Mounting and Masonry Work, Revision 0, March 31, 1982.
SM-2606.4, Flush and Hydrostatic/Pneumatic Test of Post Accident Samplin System Tie-Ins, Revision 1, October 29, 1982.
SH-2606.4B, Hydrostatic Test of the Post Accident Sampling System Panels and Associated Piping, Revision 1, November 3, 1982.
SH-2606.4C, Flush and Hydrostatic/Pneumatic Test of Post Accident Samplin System Balance of Piping, Revision 0, November 3, 1982.
SH-2606.5D, Pre-Operational Test-Pass Waste Evacuating Compressor, Revis 0,
December 3, 1982.
SM-2606.5E, PASS Waste Transfer Pump and PASS Waste Tank Level,Switches
.
Preoperational Test, Revision 1, December 16, 1982.
SM-2606.5F, Post Accident Sampling System Heat Trace System Test, Revis&
0, December 3, 1982.
SM-2606.5G, PASS Panel Functions and Calibration Test, Revision 2, June 15, 1983.
SM-2606.5K, Post Accident Sampling System-Final Acceptance Test, Revisio 1, July 13, 1983.
Bell-Schneider (B-S) Engineering Work Request-2606-1, Work Procedure for the Hechnaical Installation of the PASS, Revision 1, February 25, 1983.
I'-'S Weld Data Sheets (sample)
B-S Support Installation Control Forms (sample)
B S Anchor Bolt/Melding Inspection Forms (sample)
Stockroom Material Requisitions (sample)
b.
The
'.
Pipe and Tubing Installation Inspection Reports Surveillance Reports Nonconformance Reports following findings were identified during the above review.
/
Several examples of failure to adhere to administrative controls for
'he proper completion of plant procedures were identified:
SM-2606.5D contained numerous instances where portions of steps were crossed out or marked "not applicable" without a procedure change being initiated and approved as required by Technical Specification 6.8.3 and Administrative Procedure (A)-503, Plant Procedure Adherence Requirements.
Separate pages from SM-2606.1, Revisions 0 and 1 were combined into one procedure rather than completely filling out and signing off each procedure separately as required by A-503.
Similarly, SM-2606.1A, Revisions 0 and 1 were also combined.
The failure to properly complete the above procedures is considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.3 and A-503 requirements.
(83-23-01)
The inspector noted that the procedures listed in paragraph 3.a above had not yet been fully completed and submitted to Central Records.
Significant procedural steps remained unsigned for the procedures reviewed.
The inspector required assistance from cognizant licensee personnel in determining the current completion status of many of the procedures.
In some instances the guality Control inspector had not yet signed a specific step due to problems incurred during its perfor-mance. In other cases, a particular step was redundant to an identica step in another procedure-and was inadvertently signed in only one procedure.
There were also examples where steps had not yet been per-formed such as final walkdown inspections and reviews. by the Project (}uality Control Engineer, Liaison Engineer and Plant Operations Review Comnittee.
3.
Additionally, procedure signoff and turnover from B-S to RGKE was not timely.
Examples included: SM-2606.1, step 7.11.1 for performing in-stallation of the majority of system piping was not signed o'ff until August 12, 1983 approximately one month after the system was declared operable; SM-2606.1, step 7.13 requiring a final field walkdown in-spection by Project gC could not be performed until B-S turned the pro cedure over to RG8E on August 13, 1983; and, B-S weld data sheets and inspection forms were not turned over to RGEE for review until Novem-ber 15, 1983.
P Pipe and Tubing Installation Reports served as the licensee's docu-mentation of interim walkdown inspections.
A large number of the
.inspection reports completed during November-December, 1982 did not receive supervisory review until November-,
1983.
4.
Functional testing of the pH meter, in accordance with SM-2606.5G, was signed off by the Project gC inspector as acceptable; however, the accuracy specifi'ed in the Design Criteria was not satisfied when a pH of lu was used as the standard.
The inspector noted that
, althougn SM-2606.5G included all the PASS functional testing, the acceptance criteria was not adequately specified (only mentioned indirectly as a referral to De'si n Criteria, in the reference sectio of the procedure).
This led the C inspector into assuming the data
'was acceptable, eased on persona judgement, rather than comparison with valid acceptance: criMria Items 2 through 4 above represent weaknesses in the station modification
. process.
These weaknesses are considered to have been contributors to the problems documented in paragraph 4 which made it difficult to determi system status and ascertain operability.
Items 2 through 4, collectively, will be reviewed for improvement in a subsequent inspection after the licensee
)as had adequate time to evaluate and implement correction actions.
(83-23-02)
4.
Post Accident Sam lin S stem-Turnover to Plant The Plant Operations Review Committee meeting on July 13, 1983 discussed the remaining issues for final turnover of the PASS.
PORC determined that"com-pletion of two functional tests remained to be completed prior to Ginna Sta acceptance.
Although Project gC had concerns with results from functional testing to.date, no representatives from Project gC were in attendance at tP PORC meeting.
The Plant gC Engineer and L'ia'tson Engineer. were present at the meeting; however, based on subsequent discussions with the individuals, th'
inspector did not consider them sufficiently involved with PASS testing resu to'xplai'n the concerns of Project gC to the PORC members.
The Liaison Engineer had not reviewed and was not familiar with the status of the installation and testing procedures at the time of system turnover.
- His signature on the Station Modification. Turnover Form to Ginna Station on July 15, 1983 signified that the construction activities for PASS had been functi ally completed, inspected and accepted by'he Modification Project.
Project gC; however, had not completed inspections ot'esolved installation open it including field changes, surveillance reports and non conformance reports as the poss'ible effect, if any, on system operability.
Further, gC witnessing of functional testing raised questions concerning the ability to.achieve sam accuracies. within the Design Criteria for the following'arameters:
high ra boron; oxygen; conductivity;. dissolved hydrogen; and liquid 'dilution;.
The f ure to ver ify acceptable inspection and test results, prior to considering th PASS operable, through a review of the station modification procedures and o~
items circumvented Project gC.
This is contrary to Technical Specification
.6.8.1 and Administrative Procedure (A)-301, arid is considered a violation.
(83-23-03)
The inspector noted that the licensee's Design Criteria foremost accident sampling capabilities was more restrictive than the NUREG 0737, Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements, and NRC letter D. Crutchfie1d to J. Maker (RGAE) dated September 22, 1982.
Following a review of Project gC testing concerns, the inspector was unable to locate any acceptable data regarding the licensee s ability to perform a liquid dilution within the accuracies given 'in NVREG 0737 and the above letter.
The licensee subsequently contacted the primary contractor for the PASS, who in turn provided test data from May, 1983 that appeared acceptable.
Concurrent with this inspection the contractor was onsite troubleshooting difficulties in achieving repeatibility of liquid dilu-tions. It was determined that an improperly set relief valve on the liquid recirculation loop and several
"dead legs" in the system were major contributor to the inability to achieve repeatable results.
Operability of the PASS will be reviewed, in detail, during a subsequent inspection.
Material Stora e-Pro ect Grou a..
The Project guality Assurance Storage Area contains material and equipment procured by both Bell-Schneider (B-'S) and Rochester Gas and Electric Cor-poration (RG&E) for Project modification activities.
The area is under th direction of the B-S Support Craft Services Supervisor.
On October 18, 1983 the inspector toured the storage area and the below listed deficienci were identified:
Access to the storage area, which was noted to cont'ain ANSI 45.2.2 Level B,CKD type material, was not controlled.:
Three. of the four entrances to the area were observed to be unlocked and open.
Stock room personhel did not appear to be responsibl.e for assuring only designated personnel entries.
Cleanliness and general housekeeping was poor.
An accumulation of dirt and trash was evident.
Severe/
4tqms,were noted W-have, end caps'issing;allowing internal contamsnatlon.'wo mechanical snubbers were impro'perly sealed and stacked such that the full weight no longer appeared to be carried by their packing crates; Both crates were open and a thick oil/dirt film was observed on the snubbers.
Approximately twelve, 3-way solenoid valves requisitioned from stock and not used, were not returned to stock for future use.
The valves were noted to be piled in a wheelbarrel in the adjacent fabricating area.
The valves, which still maintained their "accept" tags, were uncapped with the, internals contaminated with dirt.
Followup by licensee and B-'S representatives determined that the valves had initia been requisitioned'from stock during the Spring, 1983 outage.
gA parts were also stored on, shelves'n a section of the fabricating shop.
B-S representatives explained that equipment requisitioned from the stock room might be temporarily stored on the shelving until used in a prefabricated assembly prior to field installation.'ased
on conversations with licensee and B-S representatives, the inspectop determined that the use of the intermediate shelving appeared pract>
for short periods of time; however, the present control of the parts was inadequate.
No individual appeared responsible for the cleanlin accountability, and return to stock, if applicable, of the equipment maintained on the shelving.
a The inspector noted that Administrative Procedure (A)-203 states it is th responsibility of the Project gC Engineer to assure performance of surveil lances of B-.'S and Project activities.
Failure to perform adequate surveil lance to verify whether material storage activities were being conducted in accordance with B-S implementing'rocedures is contrary to 10 CFR 50.
Appendix B, Criterion X, and the Ginna Station guality Assurance Hanual, Section 10, and is considered a violation.
(83-23-04)
Corrective action was initiated immediately by the licensee arid B.:S to return the storage area to acceptable conditions.
Additionally, at the request of NRC Region I, RGKE began a gA Audit (83-42) of Project material storage on October 25, 1983.
Based on the extensive corrective actions taken by the licensee and B-'S, and the recomnended resolution of gA Audit 83-42 findings, no response to the above viola-tion is required.
The following actions were among those taken:
Improved access controls to the storage area were initiated.
These included replacement of one door lock; maintaining all doors locked
.
closed or stationing an individual at open doors to ensure only
'esignated'ersonnel are permitted entry and, improved posting limit ing access to the area.
A large scale cleanup of the storage area was performed.
Hajor improvement in cleanliness and housekeeping was evident within two days.
All gA material and equipment was verified to be properly stored and sealed.
This included cleaning, sealing and properly stacking the above mentioned mechanical snubbers.
'-S Plant Procedure Manual-3.7 is being revised to include ANSI 45.2.2 level classification guides A through 0, and to detail instruction's for storage of specific items.
A monthly B-S gC surveillance of material storage nctiVities has been initiated to identify potential problems.-
The solenoid valves discussed above were moved to'a hold area until dispositioned.
The vendor has been contacted to determine a suit-able means of cleanin The'B-"S and liceosee'represeptatives.committed M institute the necessary controls to.-assure that cleanliness and accountability are-maintained whenever gA-material -is temporarily stored in the.;
=..
fabricating shop-6.
Seismic U
rade-Me1din Activities The inspector reviewed welding activities associated with the licensee's 2512 seismic upgrade program designed to meet 1974.ASHE Section III, Subsection NF.
The welding activities started in early 1980 and continued until 1983.
The welding fabrication and'installation, contracted to B-S, utilized'he st8hdard Schneider Power Corporation welding documentation system.
This welding system with its Melding Procedure Specification (MPS), Procedure gualification Record (PgR)
document system received only a brief review as it had been previously reviewed in detail by the NRC and found to be acceptable.
In 1983, the John P. Bell organization completely requalified the MPS documents and repeated the MPg qualifications under their own system.
Melder stencil numbers did not chan The 2512 program utilized only mild steels (ASTH: A500 and SA36) and SA240, Typ 304 stainless steel for Pl to Pl, Pl to P8, and P8 to P8 fabrications utilizing the SHAM and GTAM processes for ASHE Section III, Subsection NF weldments.
The basic design was in accordance with RGKE HE-121, Technical Specification for th Fabrication and Installation of Seismic Category 1 Pipe Supports (ASHE Section III, Subsection NF).
The fabrication design does not utilize. high strength low alloy Code Case Materials, does not utilize special notch toughness tested ma-terials requiring supplementary. essential variable rules of the ASHE Code, and does not require post weld. heat treatment of weldments.,
The inspector vis'ually inspected supports and hangers, associated with Class
?.
or lower piping systems, installed as part of the 2512 program in the fo11owing
..
locations: Auxiliary Building intermediate leyel, basement, (including the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger, Sodium Hydroxide Tank, and Charging Pump Rooms)
~
and sub-basement.
'Supports and hangers for the safety injection, component cooling, residual heat removal, serv'ice water, and chemical volume control systems were inspected.
The fabrications were essentially all. Pl to Pl carbon steel with some Pl lugs welded to P8 stainless steel pipes as a part of the support to prevent lateral movement.
The weld. joints inspected consisted of a large number of fillet welds with some butt welds and tubular steel flare bevel joints..
The tubular steel structural members were produced by forming and weld-ing at the material vendor's production facilities and contained the; as-welded in'side surface flash.
Although a variety of welding irregularities were observe including: uneven fillet weld leg lengths, grinding marks on base plates, local areas of undercut, warped base plates, melted feather edges on angular tubular pipe intersections, irregular bead tie-ins, lack of welding on most tubular steel radius sections, irregular fillet shape for mu1tipass fillets, irregular weld surface for horizontal welds over large radius tubular flare joints, and minor porosity, close examination of these welds in accordance with ASHE Section III NF indicated that the welds examined met NF Code requirements.
During the in-spection it was noted that the fit-up workmanship for the supports was excelle'n In most cases there appeared to be close metal to metal contact.
As the structural design assumes a 1/16"'fillet joint gap for determinatiion of fillet weld size, the excellent fit-up provided additional effective throat.
7.
Seismic U
rade-Procurement 8.
Haterials of construction, including filler metal, were purchased by B-S.
The materials were procured with.Certified Material Test Reports for all structures even though HF-2130(b) permits Certificates of Compliance for all structures other than Class 1 piping supports.
B-S provided for receiving inspection of
'urchased.
materials including filler metal.
The inspector reviewed sample purchase orders and receiving inspection records.
The review indicated the materials purchased for the 2512 program met or exceeded HF requirements.
The B-S system provided for weld filler metal heat and lot identification on each joint and also for base metal heat identification for all joints even though the HF specification requires only Certification of Compliance documentation.
Seismic U
rade-Filler Metal Control S stem 9.
The inspector re'viewed and inspected the B-S filler metal control system in-cluding receipt, quarantine prior to receipt inspection approval of'test reports general warehouse storage, issue to filler metal withdrawal areas, storage 'oven control, portable coated electrode storage and the issue slip system.
Mith the exception of E6010 cellulose coated SHAM electrodes all loose electrodes are stored in ovens upon removal from the hermetically sealed cans.
It was noted that a copy of the MPS document is issued with the gC paperwork for each weld.
The inspector found t$e material control system to meet applicable Code re-quirements.
Although weld oven temperatures were acceptable, calibration records for two of the four thermometers were not available.
The licensee agreed to either verify the accuracy of the existing thermometer. or purchase new calibrated thermometers It was also noted that.the B-S Project guality Assurance Manager identified and documented on a recent surveillance report that guality Control inspectors had failed to perform periodic verifications of proper oven temperatures, as required, during the first six months of 1983, HRC inspector review of the current storage oven logs verified that weekly gC review is presently occurring.
Seismic U
rade-A Document Packa es The inspector reviewed the gA document packages for the welds visually inspected in the Auxiliary Building.
Only visual weld inspection (YT) was required except for attachment welds to Class 2 piping which required surface inspection.
This review revealed several examples of poorly maintained paperwork, especially on filler metal withdrawa1 slips,.where there were markover's and strikeouts with-out proper initialing, and "void" notations without explanations.
Closer revi'ew of these documents indicated that heat and lot number. entries adequately explaine
10.
the electrodes utilized and that the questionable entries were not considered significant.
In all the cases where irregular paperwork was observed, re-view of the fabrication indicated the structures were not Class 1 pipe supports and HF minimum requirements were met.
The inspector determined that although some improvement appears warranted on the part of B-S regard-ing the proper method of documenting work activities, this finding was not considered to be indicative of a programmatic weakness, and was not cited as a violation.
Seismic U
rade-Pi e Su ort Thread En a ement The inspector reviewed the methods used by the licensee to insure that pipe supports employing threaded turnbuckle designs were installed with proper thread engagement.
During a visual inspection., it was noted that the (turn'
buckle designed) struts had small viewing ports on only one end.
The inspector questioned the licensee on the control of thread engagement on the opposite end from the viewing ports.
The inspector reviewed 'this question with the B-S engineer responsible for the pipe support installation.
The threaded lugs are not cut except for very short struts where the construction drawing indicates cutting, e.g., pipe support MK-AFU-2, drawing S-382-352, Sheet 002B for analysis line AFM-30.
Nere the lugs are not cut, the strut is installed with essentially equal exposed threaded areas on both ends.
As the thread engagement can be observed'on one end and the lugs are equal in length, the thread engagement on the opposite end can be sat-'sfactorily estimated.
The inspector reviewed this question with the cognizant licensee Project gC Engineer who personally conducted surveillance gC inspections and final walk-down inspection of the subject supports.
The inspector verified the B-S ex-planation based on his own inspections.
The:licensee's inspector stated that in cases where his inspection indicated uneven exposed thread, he instructed the fabrication an'd installation contractor to readjust the struts.
The HRC inspector verified that the struts were adjusted with essentially the same exposed thread on each end, based on visual. i.nspection in the Auxiliary Build-ing.
The inspector had no further questions in regard to this matter.
11.
ualifications-B-S ualit.Control Ins ectors Welders 5 Weldin Su ervision The inspector reviewed the qualification records of the B-S gC inspectors who conducted the VT examinations of the subject supports.
The qualification and certification was in accordance with B-S PPM 4. 1.
Unlike the other NDE test methods, there is no standard question bank for qualification of YT inspectors to SNT TC-1A requirements.
The B-S organization followed the general procedure methods for penetrant examination in SHT TC-1A to establish the training, ex-.
perience and testing methods.
The examinations consisted of general, specific and practical tests with graded percentages for each, with an overall average.
SNT TC-1A prescribes an 80 percent average for the three tests, with no less than 70$ on the individual tests.
The inspector reviewed the tests.and test, results.
The "specific" test which required welding and metallurgical answers
12.
was graded twice.
The original 'grades were all greater than 70~; however, in all but one case observed, the grades were raised when it was determined that answers to some questions were technically correct, but not the answers originally desired.
The ambiguity of these questions was:responsible for the upgrading.
The YT inspectors were determined to be correctly qualified in that they met both SHT TC-lA guidelines and the contractors administrative require-ments.
Bell-Schneider agreed to review the exam in question to eliminate ambig uity.
The inspector interviewed and reviewed the technical qualifications of the B-S'orporate Melding Engineer responsible for site welding engineering acttviti'es.
Mis educational and job experience in welding, QA, QC, and NDE areas were con-sidered fully acceptable for his job position activities.
The inspector also interviewed and reviewed the technical qualifications of the RGSE Melding Tech-nician reviewing and signing the B-S welding documents.
During this review, it was determined that the licensee's cognizant reviewer is performing activitie of an Assistant Melding Engineer for both nuclear and non-nuclear welding activ-ities of RGSE (including their gas system activities). It was determined that the licensee's mvgewer. was adequately qualified to review MPS, PQR and MPQ records for conformance to applicable Codes and Standards requirements.
Mhile conducting the visual inspection of hangers and supports the inspector noted the welder stencil markings adjacent to the welds and on a random basis listed these'tencils.'eview of the welder performance qualification (WPQ)
. records for these welders indicates that all of the welders passed 6G position pipe groove weld test assemblies, and in accordance with ASNE Section IX QM303.1 are fully qualified to make fillet welds in all positions and thicknesses.
The WPQ documents reviewed indicated the acceptance of the test coupons was deter-mined by third party testing, i.e., Alliance Industrial Testing Services.
Of the test assemblies welded, approximately 20$ were evaluated by guided bends and 80$ by radiography.
Approximately 60K were;combination gas tungsten arc and shielded metal arc welders and 70$ had welded test assemblies with both F3 (E601 and F4 (E7018) electrodes which exceeds minimum code requirements.
The document reviewed met ASME Section IX requirements.
Alle ation Concernin Offsite Alcohol Consum tion The inspector informed plant management of an alleged occurrence during the last refueling outage, in which several contractor construction personnel left. the site for drinks at a local bar during. their assigned night shift, and then re-turned to the site to complete their shift.
The licensee agreed to'valuate this allegation through the provisions of their drug and alcohol abuse program.
13.
Exit Interview N
The inspectors met with licensee, management at the conclusion. of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection as detailed in this report.
It was explained, at that time, that. the scope of the inspection Ment beyond the specific allegations due.to the significance of the discrepancies identified in review of documentation associated with the installation of the Post Accident Sampling Syste ~
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