IR 05000244/1980001
| ML17249A840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1980 |
| From: | Kister H, Markowski R, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17249A839 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-80-01, 50-244-80-1, NUDOCS 8004210071 | |
| Download: ML17249A840 (20) | |
Text
Report No. 50-244/80-01 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Priority Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Cor oration 89 East Avenue Category C
Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:
Ontario, New York Inspection conducted:
January 15-17, 1980 J
Inspectors
. J.
Raymond, Reactor Inspector ate signed ar ows i, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
c
. B. Kister, hief, Reactor Projects Section dat signed No.'4,, R05NS Branch Ins ection Summar
Inspection on January'15-17; 1980 (Re ort'No.', 50-244/80-01)
~d<<d:
d, d
p d
d d by pd b
d inspectors of plant operations including operating records, tours of plant areas and plant status compliance with Technical'pecifications, licensee action on previous inspection findings, and followup review of licensee action on IE Circulars.
The inspection invol ved 34 inspection-hours onsite.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified in the three areas inspected.
Region I Form 12 (Rev.
Apr il 77)
8004glgD 7(
I
'ETAILS Persons Contacted
- Mr. W. Backus, Operations Supervisor Mr. J. Bodine, Station gC
- Mr. D. Gent, Results and Test Supervisor
- Mr. J.
Noon, Assistant Station Superintendent
- Mr. B. Snow, Station Superintendent Mr. T. Schuler, gC Engineer The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspec-tion, including members of the operations, maintenance, and general office staff.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s (Closed)
78-18-04 (CAR 1197):
Bus 16 Breaker failed to trip on EDG "B" testing.
LER 79-007/3L was transmitted to the NRC on 9/14/79.
The report indicated that the DC control power fuses were replaced and the holder stabs were straightened.
(Open) 77-21-01 (CAR 113):
Inspector review of facility documents revealed no documentation of licensee action in this area subsequent to IE Report 79-04.
Licensee personnel indicated'hat, review and investigation of the DB-50 breaker malfunction has been completed-and the subject documentation would be available on a subsequent, inspection.
(Closed)
78-21-01 (PAR 74-78):
PT-17.2 was changed to include a precautionary note requiring a trouble card be issued whenever particular limits are exceeded.
Inspector review of the subject discrepancies revealed no technical inadequacies.
(Closed)
76-16-06:
The minutes of PORC meeting 03-79 (1/8/79)
and NSARB Meeting 97 (4/8/79) documented licensee review of the revised design criteria and the determination that no Technical Specification change was required for AVT system operation.
(Closed)
79-08-02 (CAR 1233):.
The inspector verified that valve V-878-E is included in S-16A, Safety Injection System Alignment, Revision 18, December 14, 1979 (Step 5.3.1.3)
and A-52.2, Control of Locked Valve Operations, Revision 29, August 1, 1979.
Inspection of gA/gC controls associated with drawing changes and procedure changes subsequent to modifications will be inspected during subsequent NRC inspection (Closed)
79-08-05 (CAR 1234):
The inspector confirmed that two additional persons had been assigned to the Results and Test Section and that provisions had been taken to provide timely review of test data.
(Closed)
79-16-04 (CAR 79-79):
Procedures A-1104, Ginna Station Technical Specification Surveillance Program, Revision 2 (12/21/79)
and PT-13, Fire Pump Operation and System Alignment, Revision 20 (1/7/80)
have been revised
.
to require that samples be collected quarterly and forwarded to the Plant Chemist for analysis.
(Closed)
79-16-05 (PAR 80-79):
Procedure PT-13, Fire Pump Operation and System Alignment, Revision 20 -(1/7/80), Step 4.1.4.7 and T-32, Fire Water System,. Revision 5 (1/14/80)
have been revised to specify the required position of valve V-5131.
(Closed)
79-04-02 (PAR 19-79):
Alarm Response Procedure, K-29, Sperm; Fuel Pit High Temperature, Revision 1 (3/15/79)
was changed to require placing the Standby Spent Fuel Cooling System into operation (if connected)
and placing the plant in a cold shutdown mode if a high temperature alarm of 125oF was received via T/C 635.
S-95, Standby (Skid Mounted). SFP Heat Exchanger Operation, Revision 1 (3/1/79) states that the SFP maximum temper-ature is 150oF and that preparations to connect the skid mounted heat exchanger should be made when SFP temperature reaches 120oF.
(Closed)
76-16-05:
Amendment No.
29 dated August 24, 1979 to Provisional Operating License DPR-18 incorporates the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System (SAFS) into the plant Technical Specifications and provides NRC:NRR approval of SAFS operation in accordance with the Safety Evaluation accom-panying the amendment.
,-(Open) 78-27-01:
The inspector received from the licensee a January 16, 1979 letter to NRC:Region I presenting the RGSE position on the Environmental gualifications of Stem Mounted Limit Switches on Containment Isolation Valves.
This item will remain open pending completion of NRC staff review of the subject licensee evaluation.
3.
Plant 0 erations Review a.
0 eratin Lo s and Records (1)
The following facility logs were reviewed:
+
Official Record, December 20, 1979 to January 15, 1980;
+
Hold Tag Log, January'1-15, 1980; and,
+
Locked Valve Log Book,, active entries.
(2)
The logs were reviewed to verify that:
+
Log entries are filled out, initialed and reviewed by plant supervision;
+
Log entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently detailed; and,
+
Log entries confirm compliance with TS reporting and LCO requirements..
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Observation of Plant Status from Control Room On January 16, 1980, the inspector verified compliance with those Technical Specification items which can be determined from observation of monitoring instrumentation and. equipment switch positions in the
,
main control room.
The following observations and/or activities were conducted:
+
Both 'reactor coolant pumps were operable with tube sheet differen-tial temperature
< 100 F
(TS 3.1.T.2);
The, combination of thermal power level, coolant temperature and coolant pressure were below the limit. shown in TS Figure 2.1-1;.
Water volumes in the Refueling 'Water Storage Tank, Condensate Storage Tank, NoOH Tanks and Boric Acid Storage Tanks were within specifications;
Indicated axial flux'difference was within + 55 of the target value;,
t
+
Control Bank position was consistent with TS Figure 3.10-1 and individual rod positions were within 15 inches of the group demand position;
+
Indicated containment pressure was atmospheric;
+
SI Accumulator levels, pressure and indicated isolation valve positions were as required;
+
-
At least two licensed control. operators were in the control room with one at the controls;,
+
Procedures 0-6.2 and 0-6;13 were used to verify proper system alignment on:
the Diesel Generator Start Controls, Auxiliary Feedwater, Standby Auxil.iary Feedwater, Safety Injection, Contain-ment Spray, Servic'e Water, Residual Heat Removal (Low Pressure Injection), Containment and Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Component Cooling, SI Accumulators, and'ire System; and,
+
The control board was observed for annunciators that should not normally be lighted during existing plant'conditions.
The reason for each alarm was adequately explained by the control operators.
No items of noncompliance were identified.,
c.
Plant Ins ection Tours Inspection tours of. the Intermediate Building, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Battery Rooms,,
and Diesel Generator Rooms at various times during the period January 15-16, 1980, to observe/verify the following:
(1)
Radiation control zones and posting of radiation areas; (2)
General plant cleanliness conditions and the presence of fire hazards; (3)
Operability of emergency lighti'ng (selected sample);
(4')
Operability of local (in plant) monitoring instrumentation; and, (5)
Local valve positioning on the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Starting Air Systems, and the, auxiliary feedwater system.
Except as noted below, the inspector had no further comments in this area.
d.
Diesel Generator Governor S eed Settin During inspection tours on January 16, 1980, the inspector noted a
(woodward) governor hydraulic actuator speed setting of 15.35 on the lA Diesel Generator.
This setting differed from an apparently correct
speed setting of 14.92 as printed on a piece of dymo-tape affixed to the governor control box.
(Use of dymo-tape to display speed setting was a provision implemented by the licensee in 1977 as partial correc-tive action-for a 30-day Reportable Occurrence in which the lA diesel was rendered inoperable due to an incorrect governor speed setting-Reference:
LER 77-21/03L.)
When the difference between the dymo-'ape and governor setting was questioned by the inspector, the licensee reviewed the matter and concluded that the dymo-tape value was the'orrect setting.
The governor setting was adjusted to the dymo-tape value and the normal diesel surveillance testing was conducted to confirm diesel operability.,
Results of the surveillance testing were reported to the inspector in a telephone conversation with the Plant Superintendent on January 18, 1980.
With a governor speed setting of 14.92, the lA diesel would only load to 95% of the full load rating (1950 KW), and thus, was declared inoperable.
Further review and testing conducted by the licensee determined that the desired speed setting was 15.2 (vice 14.92),. and that the 15.35 value (setting originally observed),
although high, was acceptable.
The licensee stated that a 30 day LER would be submitted due to entrance into the TS 3.7.2 action statement on January 17',. 1980.
The inspector stated that this item was unresolved pending:
(i)
receipt of the LER from the licensee; (ii) subsequent review by NRC:
Region I of the bases for the licensee's determination of correct governor speed setting; and, (iii)'subsequent review of administrative and procedural controls established for assuring diesel generator operability (50-244/80-01-01).
4.
IE Circular Review
~dd d
Licensee actions taken for the Inspection and Enforcement Circulars (IEC's) listed below were reviewed to verify. that:
Licensee management received the Circulars and designated indivi-duals responsible for review; Information provided in the Circulars was reviewed for applicability to the Ginna facility; Each Circular was appropriately dispositioned as to whether further corrective/preventive actions were necessary; and,
Corrective/preventive actions were either completed or are planned by the licensee.
The Circulars reviewed during this inspection are listed'elow together with an associated Preventive Action Report (PAR).
The PAR is the licensee's mechanism for tracking followup actions. on each Circular and summarizes the scope of the reviews conducted, the review findings and dispositioning.of identified problems and station management approval of the actions taken.
IEC 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators, PAR No. 50-78.
IEC 79-02, Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies.
IEC 79-04, Loose Locking Nuts on Limitorque Valve Operators; PAR No.
12-79.
IEC 79-07, Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase, Hone.
IEC 79-08, Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium, PAR No. 28-79.
IEG 79-09, IEC 79-10, Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator Diaphrams in Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus,,
PAR No. 37-79.
Pipefitting Manufactured from Unacceptable Material, PAR Ho. 38-79.
IEC, 79-12, Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problems, PAR No.
39-79..
IEC. 79-13, Replacement of Diesel fire Pump Starting Contactors, PAR No 40-79..
IEC 79-15, Bursting of High Pressure Hose of Relief Valve and "0-Ring" in Certain Self-: Contained, Breathing Apparatus, PAR No. 51-79..
IEC 79-17, Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Metalclad Circuit Breakers, PAR No. 54A-79.
IEC 79-18, Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves,.
PAR No. 56-7 IEC 79-23, Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate, PAR No.
77-79.
IEC -79-24, Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break-Detection Equipment on BWR's',
PAR No. 76-79.
~Findin s IE Circulars 79-07, 79-18, and 79-24 concern problems associates with boiling water reactor facilities and are not applicable to Ginna.
IEC'78-16:
Licensee review of Limitorque Actuator valves used in the
~p ant identified eight limitorque operators that operate in the 3600 rpm range.
Of these, four valves have operators of the type identified in the Circular (SMB-2 and SMB-0) and were identified as:
the 1A and 1B accumulator isolation valves; the turbine building service water isolation valve; and, the turbine building service water supply isolation va'Ive.
The valves are normally open during routine plant operations, are seldom cycled open/closed and are operated manually even less frequently.
(Manual operation of the limitorque operators led to the problems identified in the Circular.)
The inspector verified that maintenance procedures used for valve and operator repair require electrical, (automatic) cycling of valves prior to returning affected systems to an operable status.
Based on the above, the licensee identified no need to an operator inspection program at the present.
The inspector had no further comments on this item.
IEC'9-02:
Licensee review of the loss of AC power event described in tte Circular, in consultation with Bechte1 and Solidstate Contro1s, Inc, identified pertinent, additional causal factors for the incident and concluded that the basic problem was not related to the inverter system-,
but to operational practices and electrical distribution system design.
Specifically,. in the-course of certain electrical switching operations during precritical functional testing, as many as three static tranfer switches had transferred to the alternate power source prior to degradation of the offsite power supply.
This condition had not been corrected since transfer switch operations did not interfere with the precritical testing.
With all vital fuses-being fed from a common source, the subsequent disruption of offsite supply resulted in voltage degradation on the vital buses.
The licensee concluded that a similar situation could not occur at Ginna since plant procedures and the Technical Specifications preclude operation with all vital buses fed from a common source.
Comparison of the Ginna electrical system design to that described in the Circular
identified significant design differences, including the use of regulated power sources to maintain voltage input to the inverters within pre-scribed design limits.
Finally, a review of previous system performance at Ginna identified no instance where switching operations caused static switch transfers at the present settings of 120Ã full load current and 705 nominal voltage.
The inspector had no further comments on this item.
IEC'79-04:
Problems with loose locking. nuts on limitorque valve operators were identified at the facility during the early stages of plant operations.
A program was initiated at that time to stake the locking nuts;, most (but not all) limitorque operators were reworked.
'owever, no facility records exist to identify-the remaining (unstaked)
valves.
A program has been initiated to identify and modify the remaining valves via Revision 3 to M-64.2, Limitorque Valve Operator Maintenance and Inspection, Step 5.19.1 and 5.19.2, which require inspection of the locking nuts or any valve disassembly and staking, as necessary.
During the interim period, monthly recycling of safeguard system valves per Procedure TP-2.3 would. detect any potential valve malfunction.
Subsequent continued plant operation would then be governed by the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Opera-'ions and action statements.
The inspector had no further comments in this area..
IEC 79-08:
The licensee reviewed the Ginna security system in light oait e events described in the Circular and identified provisions in effect at Ginna which would preclude a similar occurrence.
The inspector had no further comments on this item.
IEC 79-09:
The licensee; received vendor notifications in March, 1979, of potential problems with the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) in use at Ginna..
Inspection. of the SCBA units at that time identified a'll to be in satisfactory condition.
Continued verification of SCBA integrity, including the regulator diaphrams, is provided through periodic tests conducted in accordance with Procedures SC-
'3.15.7,, SC-3.16.11, and HP-12.5.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
IEC 79-10:
The licensee reviewed Ginna purchase orders initiated 3uring the period from March, 1978 through August, 1979, by both the Station and the Engineering Department, and found that none was issued to Liberty Equipment Company, Tube Turns Corporation, or Alloy Supply Company for the style of fitting identified in the Circular.
The inspector had no further comments on this ite IEC 79-12:
Review of the licensee's diesel generators revealed that turbochargers of the type described in the, Circular are not employed.
Further, facility procedures require that. the diesel oil pump be run following oil filter changes to assure proper operation prior to returning the diesels to an operable status.
The inspector had no further. comments on this item.
IEC 79-13:
The Station Diesel Fire Pump at Ginna is a Cummins Model IiS-1f and not of the type referenced in the.Circu'lar.
Additionally, the 118848 and 199573 DC Relay Contactors are not used in the Ginna Cummins engine..
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
IEC 79-15:
The licensee determined that no Surviv Air Mark I self-contained breathing apparatus systems are in use at Ginna.
The inspec-tor had no further comments on this item.
IEC 79-17:
A licensee review of this item identified that no GE mmeta c ad circuit breakers are currently in use at the facility and none were received onsite during the period from August, 1978 to July, 1979.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
IEC 79-23:
The licensee determined that no Gould, Inc. motor starters or-contactors are used at the facility; The inspector had no further comments in this area.
5.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine, whether the items are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 3 of this report.
6.
Exit Inter view A management meeting was held with licensee personnel (identified in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 17, 1980.
The-purpose, scope, and findings of the-inspection were discussed as they appear in this report..
The. inspector informed the licensee that effective January 17, 1980, lead responsibility for I8E project functions at Ginna are transferred from Mr.
R. Markowski'o Mr. W. Raymond.
The licensee acknowledged this information.