IR 05000237/1995011
| ML17180B416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1995 |
| From: | Caniano R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17180B415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-95-11, 50-249-95-11, NUDOCS 9510170383 | |
| Download: ML17180B416 (5) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill REPORTS NO. 50-237/95011; 50-249/95011 FACILITY Dresden Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 LICENSEE Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 DATES August 22 through September 29, 1995 INSPECTORS P. Louden, Radiation Specialist R. Paul, Senior Radiation Specialist APPROVED BY
. Caniano, Chief ant Support 2 AREAS INSPECTED
/td&.s Date This report contains the details of a special review performed to evaluate the events and circumstances surrounding an incident involving a radioactive waste shipment prepared for transportation at Dresden which arrived at its destination exhibiting radiation levels in excess of Department of Transportation limit '
9510170383 951004 PDR ADOCK 05000237 Q
- RESULTS The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation into the incident which was discovered on August 14, 199 Based on those reviews, the apparent cause of the excessive radiation levels was a small pipe inside one of the shipping bin The pipe was not properly secured to ensure that it would not shift during transpor The investigation also identified several programmatic problems within the station's shipping progra Confusion had developed regarding management expectations and directions mainly due to the changing number of individuals involved in the loading and preparation of the shipmen Oversight from the radiation protection shipping group was not effective in ensuring that the shipment was properly braced for transpor One apparent violation was identified for failure to ensure that radiation dose rates on the surface of a package do not exceed 200 mrem/hr in accordance with 49 CFR 173.44l(a).
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INSPECTION DETAILS Radioactive Waste Shipment In Excess of Department of Transportation Limits Event Description As part of the station's current Unit 2 refueling outage, the licensee undertook a major pipe replacement project for the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system. This project required the removal of piping and valves which were highly contaminate The licensee planned to ship the removed material to an offsite vendor for processin To help
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accomplish this task, the vendor provided an onsite representative to monitor the loading and preparation of the material for shipmen On August 14, 1995, the licensee was notified by a vendor representative that a shipment received at their Oak Ridge, Tennessee, facility exhibited radiation levels in excess of Department of Transportation (DOT) regulatory limits. The shipment was comprised of nine Low Specific Activity (LSA) shipping bins which contained scrap metal (valves and assorted piping) from the RWCU replacement project at the station. A small section of one of the bins exhibited radiation levels of 350 mrem/hr (3.5 mSieverts (Svs)/hr) on contact. The DOT contact radiation limit for an exclusive use open vehicle is 200 mrem/hr (2 mSvs/hr).
The licensee sent a health physicist to the vendor facility the following day to identify the cause of the high radiation level Due to the localized nature of the excessive radiation levels and the direct route taken between the station and the processing facility, no apparent unnecessary exposures occurred to the vehicle driver or members of the publi.2 Licensee's Response to the Event The licensee initiated an immediate investigation into the cause of the even The investigation noted that the shipment left the Dresden site on August 11, 1995, and surveys performed by licensee staff prior to departure indicated that the highest contact radiation level was less than the DOT applicable limit and the 160 mrem/hr (1.6 mSvs/hr) licensee established administrative limit. It was concluded based on reviews of the shipment at the vendor facility that a 40 inch long by 1 inch diameter piece of pipe, emitting 1,000 mrem/hr (10 mSvs/hr) contact radiation levels, had shifted in transit and caused the higher radiation levels on the external surface of one of the bin Inspection of the bin in question by the licensee revealed that the pipe had not been properly braced to prevent shifting during transpor Further, investigati.ons revealed that the survey of the pipe was performed by radiation protection technicians at the site but this survey was not made available for review by shipping personnel.
- Licensee's Corrective Actions The licensee took immediate corrective *actions which included stopping all shipping activities and reestablishing personnel responsibilities, for those individuals involved with the shipping program, through individual counselin The licensee also initiated a schedule for more routine shipments and limited the number of shipments per day to ensure adequate oversight could be provided by radiation protection supervisory personne However, subsequent to the implementation of the immediate corrective actions, a shipment of chemical decontamination equipment was released from the site on September 9, 1995, with one of the packages exhibjting radiation levels at the 200 mrem/hr (2 mSvs/hr) regulatory limit. Soon after the vehicle left the site, radiation protection personnel noted the contact dose rates during reviews of the paperwork for the shipmen The licensee recalled the vehicle to the station so that additional shielding could be placed inside the packag Wherein no regulatory limits were exceeded, the licensee's established administrative control margin (80 percent of the limit) was exceede Following this incident, the licensee suspended shipping activities during off hour The September 9, 1995, incident,brought into question the effectiveness of the licensee's initial corrective actions taken in response to the August 14, 1995 even.4 Regional Review of the Event The inspectors monitored the licensee's investigation process and received several in progress briefings. The inspectors noted that the licensee's responsiveness to the event and the thoroughness of the investigation was goo All relevant issues appeared to be addressed in the licensee's investigational revie The event brought into question the amount of collateral assignments that shipping personnel were involved with during this "high traffic" shipping time during the current Unit 2 refueling outage. This high work load, in addition to the many different individuals involved in the loading process, led to a lack of any one person maintaining ownership of the shipment preparatio The failure to ensure that radiation dose rates on the surface of a package do not exceed 200 mrem/hr (2 mSvs/hr) is an apparent violation of 49 CFR 173.44l(a). Specifically, the identification of radiation levels as high as 350 mrem/hr (3.5 mSvs/hr) on the surface of one of the shipping bins indicated a failure by the licensee to properly package radioactive material to ensure shifting did not occur durin~ transpor Exit -Meet i nq The inspectors met with licensee management on September 29, 1995, to discuss the event and provide the initial NRC interpretations and characterizations of the event with respect to enforcement actio The
licensee was informed that they would be given the opportunity to request a pre-decisional Enforcement Conference to present any additional information to the NRC regarding the shipping even.0 Persons Contacted The following individuals were contacted during the course of the inspection of the incident contained within this repor An asterisk indicates those individuals in attendance at the Exit Meeting held on September 29, 199 *S. Perry, Senior BWR Vice President
- T. Joyce, Site Vice President S. Barrett, Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Howland, Assistant Radiation Protection Manager M. Marcionda, Acting Lead Technical Health Physicist
- J. Place, Lead Radiation Protection Supervisor R. Koback, Corporate Health Physicist E. Carroll, *Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator 5