IR 05000155/1976001

IE Insp Rept 50-155/76-01 on 760105-09.Noncompliance Noted: Rod Drive Accumulator Removed from Svc on 751113 Using Improper Procedure & Safety Evaluations Not Conducted Prior to Mods Re safety-related Equipment

ML20002D748
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	02/11/1976
From:	Hunter D, Jordan E, Kohler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20002D749	List: IR 05000155/1976001
References
50-155-76-01, 50-155-76-1, NUDOCS 8101220304
Download: ML20002D748 (15)

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S.~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM'lISSION

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' 0FFICE. 0F INSPECTION ANIT ENFORCDIE';T :

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REGION III=

Report'of. Operations Inspection ~

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IE Inspection Report No. 050-155/76-01

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Licensee: ~ Consumers.PowergCompany 212 West Michigan. Avenue Jackson,' Michigan 49201 Big Rock Point..

License No. DPR-6 Charlevoix,. Michigan

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Type of Licensee:

BVR-(GE) 240 MLT Type of Inspection:

Announced, Investigation and Routine

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Dates of Inspection:

January 5-9, 1976 0 Nub

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Principal Inspector:--

D. R. Hunter

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1{td7b-Accompanying Inspector:

J. Kohler (Date)-

Other Accompanying Personnel:- None

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Reviewed By:

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Secti Leader

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Reactor Projects.No. 2

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SUMitART OF FIIDINGS

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection.of Jancary 5-9,L(76-01): 1 Review lof. reportable occurrences,_

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construction activities, procurement,' maintenance activitics,--pre-

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-refueling activities,nteview of operations, refueling operations,-

inspector identified.and outstanding items, and a ; facility tour. _ Two

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items of noncompliance were fdentified'concerning failure to meet a limi ag condition'for operationfand-failure to conduct safety.evalu-atiot for construction activities; Enforcement Items A '.

Violations

'None.

B.

Infractions

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1.

Contrary to' Technical Specification 5.1.3,L a rod : drive accu ulator -

was rencved from service on November 13, 1975, on~a rod, not fully inserted and valved out, with.the reactor systen pressure below 450 psig.

(Paragraph 1.a, Report: Details II)

2.

Contrary to-10_CFR 50.59, safety evaluations were not'~ conducted-as required prior _to performing construction activities relative to the following plant modifi.ations involving safety relat'ed.

equipment.

. The fire ' protection systen sprinkler header was modifie'd <nt a..

October 24, 1975,_without prior review and:docu=ented safety evaluation.

(Paragraph 1.e, Report Details II)

b.

Construction activity on Dece=ber 19 -1975, concerning excavation between the turbine building and the containment:

building -resulted.in damage to_ the turbine building venti--

lation exhaust line while the reactor was operating. No

review and documented safety evaluation was perfor=ed pre-

'eding this activity.

(Paragraph 1.f, Report Details II)

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C.

Deficiene as None.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items None.

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OtherSignificantFindings A.

Systems and Components.

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The licensee plans to inspect for leaking fuel elements by dry sipping.

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B.,

. Facility Items (Plans and-P'rocedures)

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The licensee ~has' postponed.the scheduled refueling outage until January 30, 1976, as.a result of delays in delivery of necessary modification equipment and components.

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The major plant changes concerning the Reactor Depressurization System and the High Energy Pipe-Whip modifications are in progress.:

The fire barrier modifications are scheduled to be performed'during the extended. refueling outage commencing January 30, 1976.

During the 1976 refueling outage, 24 fuel.acsemblies, representing approximately 25% of the core, will be replaced. The new elements consist of 9 x 9 and.11 x.11 arrays with 8 assemblies being mixed oxide.

The position of the containment vent valves during fuel movement'is being reviewed by NRR in relation to a postulated fuel cask drop accident.

This item will be resolved prior to any fuel movement.

C.

Managerial Items The licensee promoted Mr. A. C. Sevener to the position of Operations-

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Supervisor, effective January 1, 1976.

Mr. Sevener was previously a shift supervisor at the facility.

Facility key supervisory personnel title changes have been made to

. provide Quality Assurance Program and management uniformity in.

Consumers Power Company Nuclear Plants. The Operations Engineer, Technical Engineer, Quality Assurance Engineer and Maintenance Engineer titles are changed to the Operations Superintendent, Technical Superintendent, Quality Assurance Superintendent and Maintenance Superintendent, respectively..The facility has filled the position of Quality Assurance Engineer.

The licensee is in the process of developing an integrated schedule for maintenance related activities to be performed during the 1976 refueling outage.

D.

Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by the Licensee 1.

Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, the control rod drive timing test was initiated on December 5,1975, without utilizing the approved surveillance test procedure.

(Paragraph 1.b, Report-Details II)

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' Contrary to Tcchnical.Sptcification 6.4.3(b), the weekly

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analysis of the stack gas particulate and iodine filters was (

not performed on December 25, 1975, as required.

(Paragraph 1.g,

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Report Details.II)

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Deviations'

None.

F.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items'

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1.

The'_ operation of the shutdown cooling system with the system-available for remote service was reviewed'and no' apparent discrepancies were noted. This item isLconsidered resolved.

(Paragraph 4.d, Report DetailsLII)

2.

The identification of.ihe 1974' inservice inspection (ISI) test blocks was reviewed. No problems were noted. This item is considered resolved.

(Paragraph 5, Report Details II);

3.

The welder qualifications concerning the emergency condenser repair were reviewed. No proble=s were noted..This item is considered resolved.

(Paragraph 6, Report Details II)-

Management Interview

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The management interview was conducted on January 9,-1976, with the following

persons present:

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C. J. Hart =an, Plant-Superintendent C. R. Abel, Operations Superintendent D. E. DeMoor, Technical Superintendent G. C. Tyson, Maintenance Superintendent E. F. Peltier, Shift Supervisor R.'E. Voll, Reactor Engineer S. E. Martin, General Engineer J. J. Zabritzki Quality Assurance Engineer

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G. B. Szczotka, Quality Assurance Superintendent W. Clark, Project Engineer, CMPD A.

The inspector stated-that procurement of controlled materials as.

specified in the Big Rock Point QA Manual was being implemented.

(Paragraph 7, Report Detal.; I)

B.

The inspector stated that the development of a maintenance schedule for maintenance activities to be perforced during the 1976 refueling outage was not keeping pace with the scheduled reactor shutdown date of January 23, 1976. The licensee acknowledged this.

(Para-graph 8, Report Details I)

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~Tha-inspector etated that he'egratd with'the licensca's review; and subsequent' conclusion that the installation of the fuel sipping apparatus did not represent an unreviewed safety question ('

under 10 CFR 50.59, thus permitting the installation of the appa-ratus in the spent fuel pit prior to approval of its use from-NRR '.

(Paragraph 6, Report Details I)

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The inspector stated that-the licensee had no system that would D.

detect high particulate and gaseous activity on the refueling deck and ' initiate an automatic containment isolation. - The ' licensee stated that the criticality monitor located on the refueling deck-

-would alarm:in the control room and a procedure'wasLwritten to

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manually isolate the-containment.

(Paragraph 4, Report Details I)

The inspector stated.that there was no_ master. refueling checklist E.

which referenced all prercquisites needed to be accomplished before I

any movement of fuel. At the exit interview, the reactor engineer stated that he was in~the process of revising the existing proce-dure to include references to the pertinent refueling prerequisites.

(Paragraph 2, Report Details I)

The inspector stated that the position of_the containment vent valves F.

during refueling was being reviewed by NRR in conjunction with a He advised the. licensee to postulated fuel transfer cask accident.

substantiate the necessity of having the vent valves open during refueling -activities, and to work with Consumers Power Corporate Office to make the plant position clear to NRR. The licensee stated he will do this.

(Paragraph 3, Report Details I)

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G.

The inspector stated that a review of reportable occurrence reports identified five items of noncompliance concerning the removal of a

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control rod drive accumulator from service (AO.25-75), failure to utilize approved procedures -(A0 27-75), failure to perform the required safety evaluations for facility modification activities (A0 26-75 and A0 30-75), and failure to perform radioactive analysis vithin the time requirements of the technical specifications.

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graph 1, Report Details II)

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The inspector stated that a review of reportable occurrence reports and activities as a result of previously-reported reportable occur-rences indicated a continuation of construction activities without the proper documented safety evaluations being performed concerning the plant interface areas, and this activity was considered to be'in-noncompliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

(Paragraph 3, Report Details II)

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The inspector asked the licensee to consider an immediate review of the new and in-progress safety.related construction activities to assure that the reviews and safety evaluations had been performed.

The licensee stated that a review would be conducted anduthat no new

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' work adtivities T(work' packages)'would ha commenced until: the reviews-wzre completed. !Ths licenste stated that the status fof the : reviews.

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on work packages in' progress would be-examined..

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By' telephone communication with Mr. E. L." Jordan'of thel IE:III.,

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office on January 9, 1976, the: licensee stated that-docu.ented

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csafety evaluations concerning the-in-progress' safety.related work-vould be completed ir: mediately and'no safety related work-would be:

7 performed until the reviews and documented safety evaluations were!

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completed..

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The inspector.noted that the facility tour _and review of-operations:

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revealed-that two safety related-. annunciators were being momentarily

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-defeated due to sinterference. (sporadic alarm) created by velding.

. machines being used in the containment.. The licensee acknowledged ~

the concern by the inspector and indicated a:revier of.the:situationl

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would'be. considered. l(Paragraph;4, Report Details II)l

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The inspector discussed an offgas' explosion wh!ch-had occurred'at'

' the. Cooper Station on January:;7,.-1976, inf aLbuilding centaining the

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.offgas recophiner system. The licensee acknowledged the information.

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REPORT DETATLS-

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Prepared by: h b

V TJ.E.Koherfl

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. Reviewed by:

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N. 5.~ Li'ttle-

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~ Persons Centacted'

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.J.'Popa, Maintenance Engineer L. A. Cappell, Administrative Super +isor1*

G. C. Tyson, Maintanance Superintendent 7 R. E. Voll, Reactor Engineer.

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Preparation for Refueline

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i The licensee's. pre-refue1ing activities werelinspected to deter =ine-whether the appropriate technical-specificatica and approved refueling procedures' vould be folleved' during the present refueling cutage. - The following procedures were reviewed and found acceptable.

a.

Eefueling. Interlock Check b.

. Fuel Handling Equipment Safety Check (including crane. testing)

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. Fuel Transfer Cask Preparation for' Refueling'

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Co==unicarica Syste=s between Centrol Rec = and Loading Area 2.

Revision to Master Refueline' Checklist (RI-02)

The licensee is in the process of revising the = aster refueling outage precedure ERP-RE-02 to include all apprcpriate, technical specificaticns-.

and applicable refueling procedures as prerequisites requiring sign eff-prior to any fuel =cvement.

The revision to RE-02 should include reference to the following two Technical Specifications:

5.2.5 Shutdown Margin Checks 6.3.1 Trip Devices to be. Cennected to the heactor During Refueling The inspectors vill review the revisions to procedure RE-02 at the next scheduled inspection.

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3.

Ventilaeicn Recuircrenen in Fuel'Storace Arcas-During refueling, the containment vent valves are fully ohen.

Ehile-r these valves do have the capability to isointe'on a reactor trip,

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they vill.not isolate autc=stically en high-radiatien levels..

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The licensee stated that fuel =cve=ent'could not take place with the.

contain=en: 1solated, because airborne activity would reach the level ~

necessitating contain=ent evacuation within approxi=stely:15 =inutes

.(M?C) after contain=ent isolatien.-

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Refueline Radiation Deck Yoni:crs-

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There is no control roc = indicarica of high gaseous or particulate-activity on the refueling deck. Particulate radiation en the re- -

fueling deck will be =eni:cred by por:cble centinucus air =cnitors -

which locally annuciate by light (yellow sig nling a: _1/2 M?C and red signaling at.2 MFC)..Two criticality =enitors.in the region. of the spend fuel pi: vill alar = in the control roc = on high radiation at 15 millire= per hour.

used The centainment radia+'-- ---**crIng syste= at Big Rock ?cin:

during fuel =cverent is being reviewed by 573. in cenjunc:icn vi h :he

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fuel cask and fuel handling accidents, and vill be reviewed at the next inspectien.

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5.

Fuel Insrecticns-The ERP plant centai=s experi= ental fuel bundles in additic

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oxide bundles. These bundles vill be inspected by the apprcpriate vender under his.cwi criteria..-A fuel reper: vill be sub=itted to.

NRR by the vendors at the cenclusion of. the vender fuel inspecticas.

In addition to vender inspection, ER?' plans.tc sip all Si existing fuel ele =ents for the de:ectic of leakers. Elenents showing visual indica:icn of leakage vill not be sipped. The inspecter has no further questiens regarding this-ite=.

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Fuel Sippinz 0:erations The licensee plans to inspect the fuel for leaken. by dry sipping.

The preli=inary deter =inaricn by the Plant Review Co= nit:ee was

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l that the technique represents an unrevieved safety questien under 10 CFR 50.59.

As such, the dry fuel sipping pro-edure was subnitted to NK?.l_ for approval.

The inspector agreed at the =anage=ent _ exit that the Plant Review Cc==ittee's review, and subsequent cenclusien that the installatica 1/ C? to NRR, ler dtd 12/1S/75.

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. cf tha. dry. sipping apparatua-in the fuml pool did.not represent i

.thus prr=ittingf nstallation prior

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.an unrtviewed cafety question:

to NRR approval of dry sipping.

Subsequent' communication with NRR / by"the licensee indicated ;that the ' dry -fuel sipping ^ opera-

tion was.within the previous-analysis provided in Amen'mont 10-d to.the FHSR and did not represent an unreviewed safety-question..

' The. inspector has no further. question concerning this item at this:

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time.

7.

Procurement

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure for acquiring 0A ~

material.- Request for-QA material'were reviewed to determine wh' ether the appropriate OA reviews'and nacerial-receipt inspections' vere performed. The following procurement packages wereLreviewed for

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completeness:

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- "Rotork" Operators Steam Drum Plates-Yarway Level' Sensors l Replacement Parts Portable _ Pneumatic Calibrator

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The above caterial was traced'from the material request form-to the storage location in the warehouse. -No deficiencies were found and-the inspector has no further questions regarding-this item.

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Maintenance

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Maintenance packages involving safety related equipment were reviewed to determine whether approved procedures would be in effect during the outage. The following packages were reviewed for completeness.

No' deficiencies were found, a.

Recoval-of Reactor Vessel' Head b.

Reinstallation of Reactor Vessel Head c.

Setting of Limit' Switches on "Limitorque" Valves The licensee is in the process of_ developing an integrated ~ schedule for maintenance activities to be performed during -this outage. This-will be followed by the inspectors at the next inspection.

2/ CP to NRR, ltr dtd 1/14/76.

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1 REPORT DETAILS

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Part II'

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Prepared by: M '*/-Ny D., Hunter Reviewediby-[

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E. 'L // Jordan '-

. Persons Contacted

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C. J."Hartman, Plant Superintendent

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C. R. Abel, Operations Superintendent o

D. E.-DeMoor,' Technical. Superintendent.

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C. E. Axtell, Chemistry and-Radiolo~gical. Protection Supervisor-

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T. M. ' Brun, Assistant: Chemistry 'and Radiological Protection Sup'ervisor?

S. A.~Carlisle, Shift Supervisor.

~R. W. Doan, Shift Supervisor and Training Coordinator

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Sevener,' Shift Supervisor F

E. F.LPeltier,' Shift Supervisor.

H. E. Black Maintenance: Supervisor G. B. Szerotka, Qu'ality Assurance Superintendent :

W. Clark, Project Engineer, GPMD.

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. Review of Reportable Occurrence Rep' orts

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A0 050-155/25-75,- control-rod drive seram accunulator. removed from service during low reactor pressure operation, reported.onl

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November 13, 1975. The licensee repou:ed3_/ that the accumulator for -

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control rod E-4 was isolated for maintenance while ti reactor ~-

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pressure was at approximately 400 psig. Technical-Specifica-tion.5.1.3 (proposed Technical ' Specification 3.1.1.D) requires

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h accumulators to be~ operable on any rod, not fully' inserted and-

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valved -out, when the-reactor pressure.is below 450 psig. The=

inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee including discussion of the' incident with-the shift supervisor,

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'the revisions to Operations Memo 12-75, the Operating-

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Procedure B-50 revision,-and the Administrative Procedure revision requiring PRC review of Operations Memos after they have been issued.

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The inspector reviewed; with'the licensee representative, the-l procedure-requirements of ANSI-N18.7, indicating that maintenance l'

procedure controls would-eliminate errors of this type. 'The L

removal of the E-4 accumulator from' service with the reactor system pressure below 450 psig, with rod E-4, not fully' inserted and'

valved out, is considered'an item of noncompliance pursuant to l

,3_/. CP to NRR, ltr dtd 11/24/75.

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. Technical Spacification 5.1.3?(proposed Technical:Specifi '

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. cation-3.1.1.D)..Ths licensee basitaken correctiva: actions to

.. prevent 1this event from recurring.'

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J A0 050-155/27-75,Jtesting was'~ conducted ~ without properLuse of -

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reported _/ procedure,H reported. on' Decenber 6,,1975.: ;The.licensec a written

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4 'that_the-scram timing test vas-performed using.'a i

checklist rather than the newly:approvedLand' implemented..

rsurveillance test procedureE(TR-01). RThe inspectori reviewed.

'the corrective. actions taken by the711censee~1ncluding the:

issuance of a training meno to operations personnel en; J

December 2C, 1975. The-failure to use-the approved,(written-

^ ' procedure (TR-01)1during ;the initial, phase 'of; the control rod 1

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. testing-is considered anjitem of. noncompliance pursuantLto.

Criterion VLof Appendix-B. toe 10 CFR 50.

The licensee actions

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and corrective actions concerning this-event'were considered-

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acc'eptable.

AO 050 155/28-75,lrod drive y'th'drawalitime.less;than1the 23-

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second' technical spe'cificatio.. limit ~, reported:en-Decenber 8,1

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1975. 'The' licensee reported 5/,thatjthe control rod withdrawal times on-14~-drives were less than the 23-second'11mit. ;The'

-inspectortverified that:the control rod: speeds were= reset to approximately.36 seconds and' retested. : Thezcontinuous rod withdrawal: feature continues to remain defeated ec, prevent.

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.the possibility of continuous. rod withdrawal excep'l~under the performance of the specific testing'requirementsi contro11ed ' conditions 'of 'the surveillance procedure '(TR-01).

.d.

A0 050-155/29-75, failure of piping component in; control rod

drive' pump No I discharge pip /ing, reportedLon Decenber 9,

1975. The licensee:reportedl.that=a-leak had~ developed in a 1 inch' threaded nipple on the No. I control. rod drive pump;

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n discharge line, pipe-to-relief valve connection.- The leak

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appeared to be a' crack in the threaded. area of the nipple which was replaced and submitted'for offsite-failure analysis. Pre-lininary evaluation.by thel licensee indicated a. failure from.

fatigue due to vibrations resulting from.the positive-displace-ment CRD pumps.

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A0 050-155/26-75, improperlyauthorizedchangemadetothefiry-

system, reported on November 14, 1975. The licensee reported-that an unauthorized change was nade to fire protection system t-sprinkler header during an activity associated with plant

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I modifications (RDS)'on about October 24, 1975. - Subsequent plant =

review revealed the performance of!the activity outside thet 4/ CP to NRR, ltr dtd 12/16/75.

5/ Ibid.

[/ CP to DL, ltr dtd 7/1?/74.

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-7/ Ibid.

}/ CP to NRR, ltr dtd 11/24/75.

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.rcquired procedural controls ~and. procedures resultin;t fron.

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c failure to provide the' required review and documented safety 7JO va uation. This occurrence'is similar to previous-

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eventsi reported to the TIRC. The inspector-reviewed the corrective action as indicated in the licensee response to the occurrence to verify that Administrative Prgcedure.

Section 1.9 had been revised. The failure to' provide adequate review and doctmented safety evaluation, as a. result of a breakdown in adninistrative controls. is considered an item of-noncompliance pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59..

f.

AO 050-155/30-75, inadequate preparation and review of.a

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constructionactivipy,reportedonDecember 19,.1975. The licensee. reported 11 that during construction activities in the yard between the turbine building and the containment building a construction crew using a_ power.shovelzto prepare for the installation of a-blowout panel, contacted and damaged a 30 inch turbine building ventilation exhaust line..Th'e danage was only superficial and after ceasing the~activityi the' area was surveyed for possible da= age to other. equipment. No dc= age was revealed. The exposed ventilation line was insulated and covered to prevent freezing..The failure to provide an' adequate review and documented safety evaluation of:the construction activity as a result of a breakdown in administrative control'is considered-an item of noncompliance purcuant to'10 CFR'50'50 This occur-a12/13 14/. to'the NRC.

rence is similar to previous events reporte The inspector-reviewed the corrective actions associated with A0 050-155/24-75. The "0": list was issued and.being utilized at the facility.. The revision to plant and corporate procedures relating to modification control have not been completed at this time. The corrective. actions'in A0'050-155/24-75 stated that all

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facility changes are to be considered safety related until deemed otherwise by the Plant Review Co==ittee action just -prior to. the facility work.

g.

The licensee reported to the NRC inspector onsite on January 6,:

1976, that the stack gas particulate and iodine; filters were removed on December 23, 1975, for routine weekly analysis on December 25, 1975; and due'to an oversight,-the analysis was not performed until December 30, 1975. The inspector discussed the failure to review the surveillance items in a timely manner.

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uith-the chemistry and radiological protection supervisor and his assistant. The licensee representative indicated that the newly revised checklist and schedule will aid in preventing

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97 A0 050-155/22-75.

10/ A0 050-155/24-75.

31/ CP to NRR, 1tr dtd'12/26/75.

12/ A0 050-155/22-75.

13/ A0 050-155/24-75.

]l/ A0 050-155/26-75.

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cynrsight and failurcs to most.the requirnd technical speci-

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fication compling frequencie.s.' The inspector'noted that the analysis of the~ filters indicated no unusual conditions and

.the offgas release rates;had been-normal:during the week-t of December 25,'1975. LThe failure to: analyse the filters

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within Technical Specification (6.5.3(h)) requirements _is-considered an item.of noncompliance. 1The corrective' actions.

being taken by the licensee' appear adequate and no'further information' is required at this time.

By telephone communication with~the licensee this item was clarified to be a nonreportabic event with' respect to:the

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-newly issued Technical Specifications,~Section 10;'therefore, it is not considered a reportable _occurence.

3.

'Onsite Construction Activities-

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The inspector reviewed the management controls:associst'ed with the construction activities being controlled by-Consumers Power, GpMD, and subcontracted to a construction firm. The review was conducted as a result of an apparent problem area identified.through report-

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-able occurrences.and a stop work given onfa.particular construction activity when the turbine building exhaust line was damaged during.

digging activities. It was discovered.by the~ plant staff that the work activity was not covered by a work _ package including adequate drawings and specifications, and an adequate documented safety evaluation. A review of the work packages, documented safety evaluations provided the interface areas,-and the construction work

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in progress revealedfthis matter warranted-a'dditional control.

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Construction-activities within the_ work packages were continuing:

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without the required completed review and documented safety-dvalua-tions. The licensee's ad=inistrative controls systgm, committed-to as a result of previqus reportable occurrencesl5f]p/112 and an item of nonco=pliance18f associated with a modification, required that the Plant' Review Committee be directly involved in.the classi-fication of the work activities as well as the review and approval of _ the. documented safety evaluations being performed by the responsible engineer (refer to section 2.f, Re' ort D'etails -II).

p The inspector noted that the plant quality assurance department was involved in the evaluation and correction of the; discrepancies. ;The inspector verified through discussions with the licensee representa-

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tives and review of certain work activities that all work concerning the modifications (Reactor Depressurization System and the Main Steam Blowout Panel) were being performed.within the reviewed work packages.

These work packages included the prerequisites, the work-

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steps and all the applicable drawings and specifications. A plant review of these items by the responsible engineer and the Plant Review Committee. appears to provide adequate administrative controls since the review will be completed prior to commencing the work activity.

15/ A0 050-155/22-75.

15/ AO-050-155/24-75.

IY/ A0 050-155/26-75.

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18/ CP to NRR, 1tr dtd 12/19/75.

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4.

Facility Tour and Operations Review

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The inspectors toured the facility with a licensee representa-tive. The areas. reviewed' appeared acceptabic, with the inspectors noting construction scaffolding and gaterials in

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the controlled areas.. No discrepancies-vere noted.

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b.-

A review of the control room annunciators revealed two-questionabic items relating to safe operation of the' facility.

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.(1) The inspector noted the high. noise levels being created

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by the construction forces drilling holes through the concrete structures near the control room. For short periods of time during the activities the operator's ability to hear certain alarms was being degraded by. the coise.

The licensee indicated that the activity had been-rerieved.by plant management with no major problems revealed.

(2). Two safeuy related' annunciator plates vere noted by the

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inspector to be partially retracted, re=oving them from service. The inspector verified that the shift supervisor-and the control operator were aware of the deactivated annunciators, the reason for the action, and the actions to.

be taken if-the annunciators were required. The inspector indicated his concern to plant canagement and noted cor-rective action being taken to properly review and document the condition ~as an operating re=o.

The inspector revieved the control roo= materials including-c.

operating ce=os, administrative ce=os and control room staffing during two separate shifts.

The inspector noted that one operator at the facility was naintaining a backup =an in the control rrom with him at all timesLas required by his opera-tor license. No discrepancies were noted.

d..

The inspector reviewed the changes to the: operation of the shutdown' cooling system and determined that the new arra ofthesystemappearedto=eettheintent'oftheFHSR.19pgenent The review of Operating Frocedure 35, as' revised and approved on Dece=ber 6, 1975, places the No. I system in the isolated

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condition for normal use when the containment building activity

allows, and the No. 2 system in the standby condition and ready for remote operation from the control room if the entry into the contain=ent building is prohibited. The use of inhibited water, only as a long tera system shutdown iten, appears acceptable. This ite=r is considered resolved.

The inspector noted that the retest of the offgas isolation e.

system was'atte=pted on Dece=ber 6, 1975, and the test failed. The 19/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-15.

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licenssaisperformingfurtherreviewof[theprocedureand-

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. the isalt cion cystem in an attempt to datermine the location-of~the system unidentified bypass flow path which occurs during isolation. The licensec plans to retest the offgas.

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at the.next outage,' presently' scheduled for January 30, 1976..

5.-

The inspector reviewed the unresolved item 20/ concerning the iden 1

fication of thel 1974'ISI test blocks. 'A review.of a memorandum

from Southwest Research Institute to the quality assurance superinten :

dent. indicated that.no similar test blocks were brought to'the site; therefore, the Consumers Power Company test blocks, now serialized'

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.were used for.the inservice inspection. - The licensee.was asked to

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insure all of thefassociated drawings were updated with the ~

. appropriate test block information to provide'n complete ISI package.

~This matter is: considered resolved'and no further-information is.

required at this time.

J 6.

The inspector reviewed the unresolved ite 22/ concerning the velder

. qualifications for procedure SM-1-1 on the Emergency Condenser

. piping repairs.. The review of the velder's qualification docu-mentation indicated that the man was' qualified by-procedure.

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qualification and by. process from January 18, 1974,~ through February.16,

-1975.- The velder's qualification history-documentation was availabir in the'uork package. 'This matter is considered resolved and no.

further information is: required.at this time.

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20,/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-13.

21/ SWRI to CP, Itr dtd 12/19/75...

22/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-03.

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