IR 05000029/1976002
| ML20002A460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1976 |
| From: | Davis A, Haverkamp D, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002A458 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-76-02, 50-29-76-2, NUDOCS 8011170250 | |
| Download: ML20002A460 (27) | |
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W:. I Form 12
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'N an 75) (Rev)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUL\\ TORY CC:ctISSIO:t 4 2
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OFFICE OF II;SPECTIO:! 42.D EliFORCCiE::T
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REGIO:! I
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50-29/76-02 50-29 Docket !!o:
IE Inspection Report No:
Licensce:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company License No: DPR-3 20 Turnpike Road Priority:
Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 C
Ca tegory:
Safeguards Group:
Rowe, Massachusetts 01367
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"'rpe of Licensee PWR, 600 MWt (W)
- Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection:
January 12-16, 1976
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January 5-8, 1976 Dates of previous Inspection:
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Reporting Inspecter:
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e, UA D.R.Haverkamp,ReactorInspfetor
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decompanying Inspectors:
%1hE b I-/70 DATE J. F. Streeter. Reat.cor Inspector
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DATE
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
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- viewed By:
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A. B. Davis, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section
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No.1, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Suppot t Branch
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action
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None
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
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A.
Item of Noncompliance - Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-13, Detail 5.b.
B.
Item of Noncompliance - Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 15.b.(2).
The licensee's corrective action with respect to the above Items of Noncomplia'nce were reviewed and found to be acceptable and co=plete.
(Details 16 and 20, respectively)
Design Changes-
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Not Inspected
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Unusual Occurrences About 4:30 A.M. on January 13, 1976, ap electrical ground developed in one of four reactor coolant pump motor stators, causing a pcuer surge which resulted in tripping another coolant pump.
The 2 of 4 oper..ing reactor coolant pumps caused a low flow reactor trip from approximately eighty percent power. The electrical ground is suspected to be due to leakage of the primary coolant to the pump stator.
No spare pump is available at the facility.
The current core is limited to four pump operation by Technical Specif-ications since three pump operation was not analyzed in the core s,fety analysis. Duration of the outage is expected to be either three or four
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Other Significant Findings A.
Current Findings 1.
Acceptable Areas a.
Shif t Logs and Operating Records.
(Detail 3)
b.
Plant Tour.
(Detail 4, except Detail 4.c. (1))
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c.
Semi-Annual Report.
(Detail 5, except Detail 5.c. (1))
d.
Organization and Administration.
(Detail 6)
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Reportable Occurrences.
(Detail 7)
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Startup Program.'
(Detail 8)
Power Distribution.'
(Detail 9)
h.
Reactivity Balance.
(Detail 10)
2.
New Unresolved Items
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a.
Reported Radiochemistry Data.
(Detail. 5. c. (1))
b.
, Reportable Occurrence 75-11.
(Detail 7.d)
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c.
Reportable Occurrence 75-12.
(Detail 7.e)
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d.
Reportable Occurrence 75-17.
(Detail 7.1)
e Procedure Changes.
(Detail 12)
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3.
Licenaee Identified Items of Moncomo11ance a.
Infractions (1) Contrary to Technical' Specification D.2.d. (3), the high pressurizer level trip was found to be set in excess of 200 inches.
(Detail 7.e)
(2) Contrary to Technical Specification Table 1, the reactor was brought critical with one rather than
two operable intermediate range nuclear instrumenta-
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tion channels.
(Detail 7.j)
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b.
Deficiencies None
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B.
Status of Previous Unresolved Items i
1.
The following items were reviewed and are considered resolved:
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a.
Steam Generator Tube Failure Procedure.. (Detail 11)
b.
Quality Assurance Review of ECCS Modifications.
(Detail 13)
c.
Use of the Term "NA" in Procedures.
(Detail 15)
d.
Plant Records Program.
(Detail 19)
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e.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Flows.
(Detail 21)
f.
Polar Crane Control-Circuit Failure.
(Detail 22)
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Pressurizer Surge Line and ECCS Ring Header Hangers.
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(Detail 23)
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h.
Corrections to Reactor Containment Building Integrated -
IAtak Rate Test Report. -(Detail 24)
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Special (Night) Orders Log.
(Detail 25)
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Redundant Low Main Coolant Flow Trip.
(Detail 26)
2.
The following items were reviewed and remain unresolved:
a.
Switching Log.
(Detail 4.c. (1))
b.
Modification Drawings.
(Detail 14),
c.
Reportable _ Occurrence 75-7.
(Detail 17).
d.
Plant Ventilation System.
(Detail 18)
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Identification of Safety Related Instruments and Controls.
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(Detail 28)
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Deviation The licensee has completed corrective action on the Deviation identified in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail 75-03.
(Detail 27)
Management Interviews A.
Entrance Interview
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A pre-inspection interview was conducted onsite at the beginning of the inspection on January 12,-1976, with the following licensee personnel in attendance:
Mr. H. A. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. J. L. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent Mr. N. N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent
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The licensee was requested to identify any unusual operating events since the last inspection and. to discuss possible aircraf t over-flights of the facility.
The licensee identified no operational
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problems that related.co plant safety or radiological health.
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. licensee stated thtt aircraft overflights of the facility seidem occurred.
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During the pre-inspection =eeting,- the inspector identified the scope and objectives of the inspection and scheduled an exit meet-ing for January 16.
B.
Exit Interview
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An exit interview was conducted onsite at the conclusion of the inspection on January 16, with the following licensee personnel in attendance:
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Mr. H. A. Autio, Plant Superintendent
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Mr. W. D. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor Mr. R. L. Boutwell, Technical Assistant to TAPS Mr. T. P. Danek, Operations Supervisor
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Mr. D. J. Kauppinen, Engineering Assistant Mr. P. E. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor
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Mr. L. L. Reed, Quality Control and Audit Coordinator Mr. J. H. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor Mr. J. L. Staub. Technical Assistant to. Plant. Superintendent (TAPS)
Mr.' N. N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. D. B. Vassar. Assistant Operatio,ns, S. upervisor
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The scope and objectives of the inspection were discussed and the inspection findings were presented as they appear in this report.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Mr. H. A. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. R. L. Berry, Technical Assistant to TAPS Mr. W. D. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor Mr. T. P. Danek, Operations Supervisor
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Mr. M. W. Ebert, Reactor Engineer Mr. R. L. Eppinger, Technical Assistant to Reactor Supervisor Mr. D. J. Kauppinen, Engineering Assistant Mr. L. J. Laffond, Control Room Operator Mr. P. E. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. T. K. Henderson, Technical Assistant to Reactor Supervisor Mr. W. Howe, Security Chief Mr. W. H. Moynahan, Administrative Supervisor Mr. R. C. Pettengill, Control Room Operator Mr. L. L. Reed, Quality Control and Audit Coordinator Mr. I. R. Seybold, Plant Health Physicist Mr. J. H. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor Mr. J. L. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent (TAPS)
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Mr. N. N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent
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Mr. E. R. Taylor, Shif t Supervisor 2.
Inspection Purpose
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The inspector _ stated that the purpose of the inspection was to:
Review Unresolved Items identified,in previous inspections.
a.
b.
Review selected Nonroutine Event Reports.
Review selected items related to startup and power distribu-c.
tion measurements.
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d.
Review' licensee organization and administration.
e.
Review plant operations.
f.
Review semi-annual reports.
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The licensee acknowledged this information.
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Shif t Logs and Operating Records Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify s.
that:
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(1) Log sheets were filled out and initialed.
(2) Logs were being maintained and reviewed in accordance with plant procedures.
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(3) Operating Memos and Special Orders did not conflict with the Technical Specifications.
(4) Jumpers or Bypasses did not results in operations con-trary to the Technical Specifications.
(5) Plant Information Reports confirmed that problems addressed did not result in violations of-Technical Specification reporting or LCO, requirements.
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b.
The review included discussions ~ with licensee personnel and review of Technical Specifications and the following plant
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procedures, shift logs and operating records:
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l AP-0001 Plant Procedures, Rev. 4, dated 6/13/75.
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J AP-0004 Plant Information Reports, Rev. 2, dated 8/15/75.
AP-0018 Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control, Rev. 2, dated 9/5/75.
- AP-0021 Operating Memos, Rev. 1, dated 12/2'0/74.
AP-0219 Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Rev. 1, dated 6/15/74.
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AP-2006 Special Orders, Rev. O, da.ted 10/31/74.
Shift Supervisor (Operations) Log, 10/5/75 - 10/14/75 and 12/15/75 - 12/24/75.
Rowe Station Log 1, 10/5/75 - 10/14/75 and.12/15/75 - 12/24/75.
Rowe Station Log 2, 10/5/75'- 10/14/75 and 12/15/75 - 12/24/75.
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Primary Plant Log Sheet, 10/5/75 - 10/14/75 and 12/15/75 -
12/24/75.
Secondary Plant Log Sheet, 10/5/75 - 10/14/75 and 12/15/75 -
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12/24/75.
Operating Memos 2C-1, dated 8/27/75; 2P-1, dated 9/19/75; 2U-1, dated 11/15/75; 2U-3, dated 11/15/75; and 2DD-1, dated
. 11/9/75.
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Night Order Book, 9/1/75 - 12/31/75.
Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log, 10/1/75 -
12/31/75.
-Bypass of Safety Function Jumper Control Requests 75-73 through
,75-216.
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Plant Information Reports 75-6 through 75-12.
Minutes of Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Meetings
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- 75-44 through 75-87..
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The inspector determined from his record review and discuss-ions that the above inspection items were satisfied.
I d.
During the review of Control Room Log Sheet, the inspector noted that Control Room Logs 1.and 2 contained frequent write-overs and some illegible entries and.that these logs were not signed by individual operators.
The general quality of these logs was found to be in contras' with the Primary and Secondary
c P'lant Log Sheets which did'not exhibit ti.ese characteristics.
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The Operations Supervisor drafted a memorandum on January 13, 1976, to all Shif t Supervisor and Control Room Operators which required signing of the Control Room Logs and provided a method'of correcting entries.
The inspector reviewed this
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memorandum and had no further questions in this area at this
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time.
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During the review of' Operating Memos, the inspector noted that e.
the binder located in the Control Room which. contained the
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semos also contained three non-related copies of plant opera-ting procedures and miscellaneous data log sheets.
One of the procedures in the binder, OP-2103, Rev. 1, Reactor Startup
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and Shutdown, had been superseded by Rev. 2 on November 13, 1975, but was still available.for use by the operators.
The Operations Supervisor directed the removal of the above non-related procedures and log sheets from the Operating Memo binder and the destruction of the procedures. The above lack of procedural control appeared to be an isolated case.
Also, the of ficial procedures manual located in the control room contained the proper procedures.
The inspector had no further questions in this, area at this time.
a 4.
Plant Tour The inspector toured accessible areas of the planc, including a.
the Control Room, New Fuel Building, Spent Fuel Building, Safety Injection / Diesel Building Primary Auxiliary Building and Vapor Container on January 12 and 14.
The tours were conducted to verify that:
(1) Selected monitoring instrumentation was recording system /
component para =eters as required.
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(2) Radiation controls were properly established.
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(3) Plant housekeeping conditions were acceptable.
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(4) No unusual fluid leaks or piping vibrations, existed.
(5) Pipe hanger / seismic restraint settings and oil levels were satisfactory.
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(6) Selected valves were properly positioned.
(7) Selected equipment tags were properly authorized and logged.
(8) The control room operators were aware of the reasons for
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lighted annunicators and had taken action specified in applicable alarm procedures.-
(9) Plant tours conducted by the Plant Superintendent and Shift Supervisor are consistent with administrative procedures.
(10) Control Room manning was in conf 6rnance with the-Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.54(k).
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b.
The tours included disc,ussions with licensee personnel, obser-vation of the above conditions and components, measurement of actual _ radiation levels at selected areas of. the vapor Con _
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tainer and review of Technica1' Specifications and the following plant procedures and records:
-AP-0017 Switching and Tagging Rules for Plant Equipment, Rev.
1, dated 10/25/75.
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OP-8100 Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas, Rev. 2, dated S/2/75.
J Switching Log,-10/28/75 - 12/31/75.
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c.. The inspector determined from his record review, discussions and observations iuring the plant tour that the above inspec-tion items were satisfied, except as described below.
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(1) The format.of the Switching Logs is such that an in-dividual-cannot easily determine all of the outstanding
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equipment tags in the picnt.
This item was previously
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identified as unresolved in Inspection Report 75-10,
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The licensee had atte=pred to correct
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the pro.blem by issuing a revision to AP-0017; however, the resulting log format did not substantially* improve J
the ability to determine tag status.
The licensee had recognized the continuing problem an'd'is considering various methods for provid,ing individual tag accounta-
bility-as well as effective tag order control, and will subsequently issue another revision to AP-0017.
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This remains as Unresolved Item pendin'g completion of
the licensee's. corrective action.
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Semi-Annual Reports
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Semi-Annu'al Reports,and facility records relating to events,
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measurements or equipmentiperformance associated with indica-
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tions of failed fuel.were reviewed to verify that:
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(1) Information requested to be reported by the Technical Specifications has been reported.
(2) The report accurately reflects information documented in facility records.
b.
The review included discussions with licensee personnel and
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review of Technical Specifications and the following reports and facility records:
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Semi-Annual Operating Report, July - December 1974,Section V, Summary of Plant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry.
Semi-Annual Operating Report, January - June 1975,Section V, Summary of Plant System Che=istry and Radiochemistry.
Fuel Assembly Inspection Forms, Core X-XI Refueling for Assembly Nos. B-367, A-405, A-407, A-408, A-409, 3-410, A-411, B-414,,A-419, B-420 and A-423.
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Fuel Assembly Inspection Forms, Core X1-XII Refueling, for
Assembly Nos. A-443, B-444, A-451, B-462, A-463, B-468, B-470,
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A-473 and A-475.
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c.
The inspector determined f rca his record review and discussions that the above inspection items were satisfied, except as de-scribed below.
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(1) The reported values'of maximum Iodine-131 concentration <
in the reactor coolant for the months of April and June
1975 were not consistent with facility radioche=istry
records. The licensee will compare all radiochemistry data reported in Section V of the January - June 1975 Semi-Annual Operating Report with facility records and will submit a corrected Sect' ion V of the report.
This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's corrective action.
6.
Organization and Administrati'on
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The licensee's organization and administration was reviewed to verify that:-
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-11-(1) The licensee's onsite organization structure is as described in the Technical Specifications.
(2) Personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable. codes and standards.
(3) Authorities and resper.sibilities of licensee personnel are as delineated in the Technical Specifications and applicable standards.
e (4) Shift crew comoosition and requirements for licensed personnel are in compliance with Technical Specifica-tions.
(5) The onsite and offsite safety review committee =akeup is as required by Technical Specifications.
(6) Changes -in organization and structure have been reported to the NRC as required by Technical Specifications.
The review included disc'ssions with licensee personnel and b.
u review of Technical Specifications and the following stand-
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ards, plant procedures and records:
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ANSI N18.1, 1971, Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel.
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ANSI N18.7, 1972, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants.
- AP-0003 Plant Operations Review Committee, Rev. O, dated 2/11/74.
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YAEC Table of Organization dated 1/13/76.
Operational Quality Assurance Manual.
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Shift Assignrent Sheet, week of 1/11/76.
Minutes of Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Meetings 75-44 through 75-87.
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N1nutes of Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC)
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Heetings 75-1-S through 75-17-S.
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Semi-Annual Operating Reports, July - December 1974 and January - June 1975.
Personnel records of individuals assigned to positions accord-ing to the following functional-level categories:
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Functional Level Sample Size
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'_ Managers
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Supervisors
Professional-Technical
Operator-Technician-Repairman
The inspector determined from his record review and discuss-c.
ions that the above inspection items were satisfied.
7.
Reportable Occurrences Reportable Occurrences discussed below were reviewed to verify tha t :-
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--the details were clearly reported;
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--the corrective actions described were taken co prevent recurrences;
--the occurrences >were reviewed and evaluated; and
--Technical Specifications were not exceeded.
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These areas were satisfactory for the occurrences reviewed unless otherwise noted.
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a.
Reportable Occurrence 75-8
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References:
(1) Region I Inspection Reports 50-29/75-10-Detail 18, and 50-29/75-16, Detail 11 (2) Licensee letters to Region I dated August 18 and 22, 1975
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' This occurrence concerned the development of an increased con-tainment leakage rate while the plant was at 96% power.
The leakage path was discovered to be through an improperly in-stalled low pressure vent header flange.
The inspector stated
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that the radiological aspects of this occurrence were considered
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to be satisfactorily evaluated by the licensee in Region I Report 50-29/75-16, Detail 11.
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The inspector verified that the licensee's remedial actions of commencing a plant shutdown for the leak source in response to
the increased leakage race as indicated by the Vapor Container Continuous Leak Rate Monitoring System was in accordance with plant procedures during Region I Inspection 50-29/75-10.
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Followup action by the licensee to prevent recurrence included
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a revision to Procedure OP-2100, " Plant Startup from Cold
Shutdown," to require _ verification that a flange and new
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gasket is properly installed on the vent._ header.
The licensee
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also conducted a survey and determined two other penetrations (cavity purification line and demineralized water supply to the Vapor-Container) that need to be checked when containment
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integrity is being established.
The cavity purification line blank flange is now required by the latest revision of OP-2100 to be checked when containment integrity is being established and the demineralized water supply valve is checked closed and locked. The licensee is in the process of determining if it is necessary to a,dd a blank flange to the demineralized water supply line. The licensee is also incorporating the low
. pressure vent header into the local leakage (Type B&C) testing
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program.
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This is an Unresolved Item pending (1) completion of the
licensee's efforts and (2) inspector review of low pressure vent header penetration leak rate data.
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b.,
Reportable occurrence 75-9
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Aeferences:
(1) Licensee letters to Region I dated September 8 and 16, 1975 (2) Licensee -letters to Region I dated April 14 and
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23, 1975 This occurrence concerned an inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator (#1) caused by a blown fuse in the control circuit.
A similar occurrence on another generator (#3) was reported in Reference (2). The' licensee's investigation has led him to
believe that the blown fuses were initiated by control circuit" supervisory lamp failures caused by increased voltages during battery" charges.
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The licensee's actions to prevent recurrence included (1)
replacing the control circuit supervisory lamps with bulbs having a higher voltage rating, and (2) installing an alarm in the Control. Room to give immediate notification to operators of control circuit failure.
These actions are documented in PDCR 75-10, Procedure OP-5000.28, JO 75-123, JO 75-158, and MR 75-475 and were reviewed by the inspector. The licensee plans no further action at this time.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
c.
Reportable Occurrence 75-10
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References:
(1) Licensee letters to Region I dated November 7 and 21 and December 9,1975 (2) NRC letter to licensee dated December 11, 1975 (3) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-15 De -
tail 3 The. inspector noted that Licensing had stated in Reference (2)
that Licensing had reviewed the steam generator tube eddy current testing results for Steam Generators No. 1 and No. 4
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and concluded that the tubes were in acceptable condition for
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continued safe operation of the plant with Core XII. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
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d.
Reportable Occurrence 75-11
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References:
(1) Licensee letters' to Region I dated November 10 and 21, 1975 (2) Licensee letter to Region I dated October 27,
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1972 This occurrence concerned the failure during surveillance test-ing of two Vapor Container solenoid trip valves to actuate.
The two valves in question control the position of 7 contain-ment isolation valves.
Failure of the two solenoid valves to operate prevented the VC isolation valves frem closing as designed. The reactor was in a cold shutdown condition at the time of the occurrence.
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The-cause was attributed by the licensee to grooves worn in the trip latches.due.to vibration during normal operations.
Corrective action was to file the latches to remove the grooves and to retest.The valves operated satisfactorily when
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retested. These actions are' documented in Procedure OP-4610, JO 75-211, and MR 75-616 and were reviewed by the inspector.
The licensee stated that he would perform the test again during the' current maintenance shutdown for repair of a main coolant pump motor and evaluate the need for increased sur-
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veillance testing based on the test results.
Since one of the valves had previously experienced a similar failure in 1972 '(Reference (2)), the licensee has initiated a study into the feasibility of replacing the valves or relocating the existing valves to locations with less vibrations.
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This is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licen-
see's efforts.
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Reportable Occurrence 75-12
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Reference: Licensee letter to Region I dated December 12, 1975
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This occurrence concerned the high pressurizer level scram bistable setpoint being greater than the Technical Specifica-tion limit.
The setpoint was found out of tolerance by 3" by the licensee during refueling shutdown surveillance testing.
The cause was attributed to setpoint drif t and the setpoint
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was reduced to 7" below the maximum TS trip value of 200" to account for drift.
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The inspector reviewed Procedures OP-4626 and OP-6101 which
documented that the trip was found at 203" and left at 193";
however, in reviewing the previous (7/74) surveillance results, j
the inspector determined ^ that the setpoint had been incorrectly set at =203" and, therefore, setpoint drif t was not the cause of the occurrence.
The inspector. stated that it appeared that OP-4626 needed to be revised to make it very clear when the TS trips are or are not met.
The inspector also stated that a
- revised Licensee Event Report needed to be submitted.
The licensee stated that OP-4626 would be revised and a revised LI3t would be submitted.
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The inspector stated that plant operations during the interval 7/74 - 12/75 with the high level pressurizer trip set greater than the Technical Specification D.2.d. (3) value constituted
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an Item of Noncompliance and is considered to be an Infrac-tion.
Since the licensee identified this item and is taking timely corrective action to prevent recurrence, no response to this item is required; however, the licensees actions to revise OP-4626 and to submit a revised LER are considered to be an Unresolved Item.
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Reportable Occurrence 75-13 Reference: Licensee letter to Region I dated December 19, 1975
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This occurrence concerned the failure to open during surveill-ance testing of a redundant solenoid operated relief valve on the safety injection accumulator.
The redundant valve was operable. The cause of'the failure was an open in the holding coil. The coil was replaced and the valve tested satisfac-torily. These actions are documented in JO 75-226 and MR 75-638 and were reviewed by the inspector.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
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Reportable Occurrence 75-14 Reference: * Licensee letters to Region I dated November 24 and
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December 8, 1975
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This occurrence concerned excessive leakage in an electrical penetration determined during routine Type B electrical pene-tration testing with the plant in a refueling shutdown condi-tion. The penetration leakage was a result of a cracked gland nut sealing a cable passing through the penetration. The nut was replaced and a satisfactory leakage test was performed.
These actions are documented in Procedures OP-5761 and OP-4702, MR 75-649, Jo 75-233 and'0QCA Inspection Check List dated 1/7/76 and were reviewed by the inspector.
The licensee stated that a visual survey had been performed of all gland nuts as a followup on this occurrence and he had found no other nuts in need of replacement.
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The inspector had _no further questions concerning this matter.
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Reportable occurrence 75-16 Reference: Licensee letters to Region I dated December 1 and 12, 1975
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This occurrence concerned the failure of a containment isola-tion valve to pass a Type C surveillence test with the plant in a refueling condition.
The valve internals were repaired and a satisfactory Type C test was performed.
The licensee stated that the nature of the problem did not indicate a generic problem was involved.
The licensee's actions are documented in Jo 75-240, MR 75-664 and Procedure OP-4702 and were reviewed by the inspector.
. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
1.
Reportable Occurrence 75-17 Reference:
Licensee letter to Region I dated January 2,1976 This occurrence concerned the setpoint of the Loop No. 1
. isolated loop AT interlock being set at 100F greater than the Technical Specification value of 300F. The incorrect setpoint.
was attributed to the associated temperature channel being
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out of calibration. The channel was-recalibrated and the
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setpoints of all loop channels were reduced to 25 F to account for the drift.
The licensce's actions to reset the setpoints are documented in Procedure OP-6200 and were reviewed,by the inspector.
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The inspector stated that the licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence would be reviewed further during a subse-quent inspection.
This matter is an Unresolved Item pending completion of the inspector's review.
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Reportable Occurrence 75-18 Reference: Licensee letter to Region I dated January 13, 1975 This occurrence concerned the discovery. upon reaching crit-icality during the control' rod worth measurement phase of zero power physics testing, that one inter:cdiate range compensated
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. ion chamber was inoperable sea 53 power leads being reversed.
The cause was attributed to personnel error when the detector leads were incorre~ctly connected during the refueling shut--
down. Personnel were reminded of the need co exercise care in performing this operation to prevent recurrence.
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-18-The inspector stated that bringing the ceactor critical with
. only one of two intermediate channels operable was contrary to the TS Table 1 requirement for two operable channels.
This is an Item of Noncompliance and is considered to be an Infraction.
Since the licensee identified this item, corrected it, and has taken action to prevent recurrence, no response to this item
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is required.
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8.
Startup Program
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The inspecca-reviewed selected raw data to verify that the licen-see had ceaducted the startup program specified in Secti'en 9 of
" Yankee Faclear Power Station Core XII Perfor=ance Analysis." The inspector reviewed the portions of Procedures OP-1701, OP-4703 and OP-7103 dealing with control rod position and operability checks, control rod drop times, and measurement of dropped rod worth.
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The licensee is in the process of reviewing startup physics data and preparing the startup report required by TS E.1.a.
The in-spector stated that this, area would be reviewed further after the licensee submits that report.
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9.
Power Distribution
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The inspector reviewed an analysis of incore flux traces taken on December 30', 1975.
The results of that analysis limited pqwer to 7C.3% in accordance with the linear heat generatrion rate restric-tions imposed by Technical Specification D.2.c.
The licensee was using Supplement 6 to Proposed Change.No. 125 as a limit since that document was more conservative that the approved TS.
The Manager of Operations by memo dated December 16 had directed the use of the more conservative limit.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
10.
Reactivity Balance The inspector reviewed plots of excess reactivity data as a func-tion of burnup and time for Core XI and XII.
The data showed that there were no reactivity anomalies requiring reporting in accord-
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ance with Technical Specification D.2.a. (9).
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The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
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II. Steam. Jenerator Tube Failure Procedure Reference: Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-17, Detail 4
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The inspector reviewed procedure OP-3107, " Steam Generator Tube Failure," and the statements made in the Safety Evaluation issued with Amendment 21 to the operating license (DPR-3). The Safety Evaluation states that the loop isolation valves will be open during power operation but does not restrict the closing of these valves with the reactor shutdown.
The restriction is imposed to protect against the inadvertent actuation of these valves.
Procedure OP-3107 does not permit the closing of the loop stops in a loop having a steam generator tube failure until the operator has virified that the plant is shutdora ssuberitical) and definitely atermined from several steam generator para =eters that a steam generator tube has failed. OP-3107 calls for isolation of the affected main _ coolant loop within 30 minutes of the failure.
This timing is consistent with the analysis of the steam generator tube.
rupture analysis in the_ Final Hazards Su= mary Report (Page 410:02),
Yankee Nuclear Power Station Core XII Performance Analysis (Page 50, Section 7.9), and Technical Specification 3.3.
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The inspector stated that the use of the main coolant loop isolation valves as specified in OP-3107 after the plant is shutdown to ter-minate the loss of reactor coolan from a failed steam generator tube is not contrary to the Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment 21 and such isolation is consistent with the Performance Analysis incorporated by reference into Technical Specification B.3.
The
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licensee stated that he had concluded that use of the loop isolation valves in accordance with OP-3107 did not represent an unreviewe/.
safety' question.
The Unresolved Item ident'ified in the referenced report is considered resolved.
12.
Procedure Changes Reference : Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-17, Detail 3.a. (1)(c)
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The inspector reviewed the stat 73 of the licensee's efforts to revise procedures to remove references to 3 loop operation since 3 loop operation is not currently permitted by Technical
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Specifications.
The licensee had completed that review and revised procedures ~as necessary.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
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The licensee had drafted revisions to Annuncistor Alarm Pro-cedures affected by the recent ECCS modifications. These procedures are in the review process.
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The licensee had draf ted a revision to OP-5101, " Maintenance c.
of Motor Operated Valves," to include instructions for re-installing MOV cables lifted to comply with the Technical Specifications.
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The inspector stated that items b. and c. above are considered to be an Unresolved Item pending completion of the licensee's effects.
13. Quality Assurance Review of ECCS Modifications Reference: Region 2 Inspection Report 50-29/75-17, Detail 3.a.(2)(d)
The licensee informed Region I by telephone on December 12, 1975, that quality assurance personnel had reviewed the documentation, including drawings, associated with Attachcents A, B, and C of OP-5000.36, " Installation of Modifications to Prevent Single Failure,"
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and concluded that (1) the ECCS modifications covered by those
. attachments.were completed and correctly accomplished and (2) the
drawings were those intended for the modification. The inspector re. viewed documentation o' that QA review during the inspection and interviewed the QA personnel involved.
The inspector stated that the licensee's action resolves the concern identified in the refer-enced inspection report.
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14. Modification Drawings
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Refere,nce: Region I. Inspection Report 50-29/75-17, Detail 3.a. (2)(c)
During the. referenced inspection, tne inspector found that two draw-ings used in implementing Engineering Design Change Request 75 -28 were marked "Not Approved Copy."
As noted in Detail above, the licensee' verified that the drawings marke "Not Approved Copy" were the same drawings approved by engineering yarsonnel as part of the-T,e licensee stated that the stamp "Not Approved h
EDCR 75-28 package.
Copy" was only intended to inform personnel that the drawings were
- dot to be copi ed for distribution until final engineering drawings were made after completion of the field modificat' ion efforts,
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The inspector reviewed with the Manager of Operations the licen-see's practice of stamping drawings approved for EDCR implemen-tation. The inspector stated that each copy of drawines aprroved with an EDCR should be clearly marked to indicate that the drawings were approved for implementation of the design change but were not approved for copying for distribution.
The inspector stated that the practice of stamping drawings "Not Approved Copy" was confusing.
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The licensee agreed and stated that the appropriate procedures
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would be revised to give guidance on the marking of drawings to clearly indicate those drawings for implementation of design changes. The concern identified in the referenced report remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's revision of the precedures.
15.
U[se of the Term "NA" in Procedures Reference: Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-10, Detail 17 The inspector's review of completed procedures during the inspec-tion indicated that the licensee had begun annotating reasons on proce'dures when certain proce' dural evolutions are not required.
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These annotations are reviewed by department supervisien upon completion of procedures.
The licensee had drafted.a revision to
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" Procedure AP-0001, " Plant Procedures " to prohibit the use of NA (not applicable) and to give guidance on how to clearly cnnotate a procedural step or series of steps,that are not to be performed.
The licensee's actions in annotating procedures resolves the con-cern identified in the referenced report.
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16.
Inventory of Offsite Emergency Kit
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References:
(1) Region 1 Inspection Report 50-29/75-13, Detail 5.b
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(2) Licensee letter (WYR 75-132) to Region I dated November 18, 1975 The inspecto,r interviewed the individual responsible for conducting inventories of the offsite emergency kit and reviewed the results of Procedure OP-3304, " Emergency Equipment Readiness Check," completed on October 25, 1975.
The individual indicated that members of the HP organization had been reminded of the necessity to quarterly con-Sirm that the emergency equipment at North Adams Hospital is in place and in acceptable condition. The results of JP-3304 indicated
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that an acceptable readiness check had been made on October 25.
The inspector stated that the licensees actions resolve the Item of Noncompliance identified in Reference (1).
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17. Reportable Occurrence 75-7 Re ferences:
(1) Licensee letters to Region I dated August 8 and
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15, 1975
.(2) Region I Inspection Report 50-29 /75-10, Detail 6.b
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The subject occurrence concerned a vibration induced crack in a nozzle to flange weld on the charging header. The licensee has completed his evaluation of the occurrence and has decided to in-stall pulsation dampeners and sweep elbows to prevent recurrence.
This remains an Unresolved Item pending the licensee's completion of system modifications.
18.
Plant Ventilation System Reference: Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-16, Detail 10 Modification of the plant ventilation system is complete with the exception of minor flow balancing in cubicles in the Primary
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Auxiliary Building; total flow through the system has.been judged
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to be acceptable. The licensee is considering the installation of additio,nal flow rate monitoring instru=entation in the vent stack
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- and sample lines.
The inspector reviewed selected system operating procedu'res affected by the ventilation system modifications and noted that the procedures
had been revised to reflect the modifications.
Procedures reviewed were OP-2380, OP-2383, OP-2386, OP-2478, OP-2601 and'OP-3117.
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The inspector stated that the Unresolved Item identified in Refer-
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ence (1) would remain unresolved pending hinalsystemflowbalancing(i.e.,licenseecompletionofOP-a.
2000.22, "Preoperational and Acceptance Testing of the Filtered Ventilation Exhaust and V.C. Purge System.")
b.
' Inspector review of in-place testing results of HEPA and charcoal filters.
c."
Determination of need for additional flow instrumentation in stack and sample lines.
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Completion of EDCR 74-3, " Filtered Ex'haust Ventilatidn System."
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These items will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection..
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19. Plant Records Progre3 References:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 15.b.(1)
(2) Licensee letter (WYR 75-46) to NRC dated April 24, 1975 The licensee submitted as Reference (2) a proposed Operational Quality Assurance Program. This' program included the licensee's records system requirements. The submission of these proposed requirements resolves the concern identified in Reference (1).
20.
Fireproof Tiles References:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 15.b.(2)
(2) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail
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The inspector visually verified that the QA documents identified
in Reference (1) have been stored in fitcproof file cabinets. The
licensee's action resolves the Item of Noncompliance identified in Reference (1).
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21.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Flows
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References:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 30-29/74-14, Detail
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(2) Region 1 Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 2
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(3) Licensee letter (NYR 75-108) to Region I dated September 19, 1975
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The inspector reviewed Revision 2 of Procedures OP-4208, " Flow Test of Two LPSI Pumps on Normal A.C. Power," and OP-4206, " Flow Test of Two HPSI Pumps on Normal A.C. Power." These revised proccdures
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incorporate provisions to use both the Shield Tank Cavity level change and Safety Injecti:n Tank level change during the flow tests to make flow determinations.
The l'nspector reviewed test results of a flow test (OP-4208) of i
LPSI pumps 1 e 3 and a flow test (OP-4206) of HPSI pumps 1 and 3 on November
1975. These tests revealed good agreement be-tween the latest gallons / inch ~ calculation for tl4 Shield Tank
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Cavity and the gallons / inch calcularf on for the Safety Injection Tank.. The test ' results indicate ac ptable flows of approximately
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2350 gpm for the LPSI pumps and-600 gpm *for the HPS1 pumps. The
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inspector noted that the LPSI results were well above the 2150 gpm
flow value assumed in the Core XII ECCS analysis.
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-24-The licensee concluded in Reference (3) that based on a revised ECCS analysis using a reduced LPSI' flow value the plant was never operated in nonconformance with the ECCS requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.
The actions by the licensee as discussed above satisfactorily re-solves the concerns identified in References (1) and (2).
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Polar Crane Control Circuit Fa'ilure References:
(1)' Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-06, Detail 16.b (2) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail 12 The inspector reviewed documentation related to Plant Modification 75-17, "VC Polar Crane Redundant Upper Limit Interlock." On October 19, 1975, the licensee co=pleted this modificatien which included the installation of a redundant upper limit switch on the main hcok and the installation of overspeed limit switches on both the main and auxiliary hooks.
The concern originally identified in Reference (1) is resolved.
(1)' Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16 Detail 4.c.(8)
(2) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail 3.d. (4)
(3) Regiota I Inspection Report 50-29/75-10, Detail 10 The inspector determined from a review of completed procedures that the li,censee made cold setting adjustments to the pressuri:cr surge line spring hangers during che refueling shutdown.
Representatives from the licensee's corporate engineering office visually inspected the ECCS ring header pipe hangers (rigid) in August 1975 and con-cluded that the hangers as adjusted by the plant were acceptable.
These actions resolve the concern identified in Reference (1).
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24.
Corrections to Reactor Containment Building integrated Leak Rate Test Report
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References:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-10, Detail 5.b (2) Licensee letter (WYR 75-97) to Region I dated September 2, 1975
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-25-The licensee submitted as Reference (2) corrections to Summary Technical Report No.1074, " Reactor Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate Test."
That submittal resolves the concern identified in
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Reference (1).
25.
Special (Night) Orders Log Refarence: Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-10, Detail 3.c. (2)
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The inspector reviewed the Special (Night) Orders Log and found
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that the licensee had updated the log to enable operators to readily
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deternine all outstanding orders.
The licensee stated that he periodically reviewed the log and reminded operators of any old orders that are still in effect.
The concern identified in the referenced report is resolveo.
26.
Redundant low Main Coolant Flow Trip Re ferpnces:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b.(2)
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(2) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail 19
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(3) NRC letter (Technical Specification Change 118)
dated July 16, 1975
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The inspector verified that, during the 1975 refueling shutdown, the licensee reconnected the original low main coolant flow instru-mentation using SP signals across the steam generators.
Both the electrical current dependent and AP dependent flow trips have been set in accordance with Technical Specification Table 1 value's which were approved by Licensing in Reference (3).
The concern identi-fied in Reference (1) is resolved.
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27.. Individual Rod Position Indication References:
(1) Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-03, Detail
3.d.(3)
(2) Licensee letter (UYR 75-121)
The inspector verified * that the licensee had replaced the individual (primary) rod position indication lights with light emitting diodes.
The modified system appeared to be working reliably during the in-
spection. The licensee's action resolves the Deviation identified in Reference (1).
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-26-28. Identification of Safety Related Instru:nents and Controls Reference: Region I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b.(1)
The licensee stated that a document had Jeen drafted which identified safety related instruments and controls at the plant. The final document is expected to be issued by June 1976. This remains an Unresolved Item.
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