IR 05000029/1974006
| ML19291C880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1974 |
| From: | Davis A, Oberg C, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291C879 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-74-06, 50-29-74-6, NUDOCS 8011050728 | |
| Download: ML19291C880 (11) | |
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U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIO:t DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
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RO Inspection Report No:
50-29/74-06 Docket No:
50-29 Licensec:
Yankee Atemic Electric Company License No:
DPR-3 20 Turnpike Road Priority:
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Category:
C Location: Rowe, Massachusetts TydeofLicensee:
PkR, 600 "L't (to
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Type of Inspection: Routine. Unannounced Dates of Inspection:
June 25-27,1074 Dr'es of Previous Inspection:
Mav 29-31, 1974
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7/IM/~79 Reporting Inspector; D %DDxh
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s J. Streeter, neactor inspector Date
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't 7 /bd Accompanying 1.nspectors:
/J, C. Oberg, Keactor inspector
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Other Accc=panying Personnel:
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Reviewed By:
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B. D.wis, Senior Reactor Inspector (PL*R)
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Reactor Operations Branch
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S170tARY OF TINDINGS Enforcement Action Technical Specification D.2.e(8) - Two of three high containment pressure switches set great er than Techn.. cal Specification limit.
(Licensee report to Region I dated June 19.197t )
(Details, Paragraph 2)
' Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Enforcement Items A.
Radiation Area Ecundaries !,)t Proner3v Established Licensee action to prevent recurrence is described in licensee letter to Rcgion I dated >!ay 8, 1974.
B.
Primary System Leak Rate Determination Licensee action to prevent recurrence was verified by the inspector.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
Design Chances A.
Pr'essurizer Safety and Relief Discharge Piping Restraints.
(De tail s,
Paragraph 11)
B.
Incore Instrumentatien Package.
(Details, Paragraph 12)
C.
Postulated Pipe Rupture Outside Centainment.
(Details, Paragraph IS)
Unusual occurrences A.
False auto-initiations o f the Saf ety Inj ection System.
(Details, Paragraph 16.a)
B.
Polar crane control circuit failure.
(Details, Paragraph 16.b)
Other Sirnificant Findines A.
Unter.n1 red and 0 - Ite~s 1.
Pressurizer Safet; Valve.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
2.
Incore Instrument Package.
(Details, Paragraph 12)
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B.
Current Findings 1.
The plant was shutdown for refueling on May 11, 1974.
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2.
The estimated startup date is now July 19, 1974, versus the original date of July 3, 1974.
(Details, Pacagraph 12)
3.
The Integrated Containment Leak Rate Test was conducted May 12-15, 1974.
(Details, Paragraph 10)
4.
The licensee completed action requested in RO Bulletins 74-03 and 74-03A.
(Details, Paragraph 6)
5.
Spent fuel storage space is becoming an important concern to the licensee.
(Details, Paragraph 17)
C.
Status of Previous 1v Renorted Unresolved and Ocen Itens 1.
Failure of Battery Charger remains unresolved.
(Details, Paragraph 5
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2.
Plant Chemistry Routine remains open.
(Details, Paragraph 7)
3: Missing Information from Semi-Annual Report remains open.
(Details, Paragraph 8)
4.
Pressurizer Safety and Relief Discharge Piping Restraints remains open.
(Details, Paragraph 11)
Manarement Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, an exit mecting was conducted with the follcwing personnel in attendance:
Mr. H. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr.
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Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. N.
St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent The following items were discussed:
A.
Containment Isolation Actuation System Setpoint Drift.
(Details, Paragraph 2)
B.
Primary Systen Leak Rat e Determination.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
C.
Radia tion Area Boundaries Not Properly Established.
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_3-D.
Pressurizer Safety Valves.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
E.
Failure of Battery Charger.
(Details, Paragraph 5)
F R0 Bulletins 74-03 and 74-03A.
(Details, Paragraph 6)
G.
Plant Chemistry Routine.
(Details, Paragraph 7)
H.
Missing Information from Semi-Annual Report.
(Details, Paragraph 8)
I.
Information on Radiation Exposures According to Duty Function.
(Details, Paragraph 9)
J.
Integrated Containment Leak Rate Test.
(Details, Paragraph 10)
K.
Pressurizer Safety and Relief Discharge Piping Restraints.
(Details, Paragraph 31)
L.
Incore Instrument Package.
(Details, Paragraph 12)
M.
Scram Function Permissive Sensor.
(Details, Paragraph 13)
N.
Scram Circuit Modifications.
(Details, Paragraph 14)
O.
Diverse Initiation of Safety Inj ection System.
(Details, Paragraph 15)
P.
Logs and Records.
(Details, Paragraph 16)
Q.
Fuel Storage.
(Details, Paragraph 17)
R.
Postulated Pipe Rupture Outside Containment.
(Details, Paragraph 18)
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A0 Reporting Format.
(Details, Paragraph 19)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Centacted Yankee Atomic Electric Companv Mr. H. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. G. Eaird, Control Room Operator Mr. W. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor Mr. R. Danek, Operations Supervisor Mr. S. Durfey, Engineering Assistant Mr. M. Ebert, Plant Reactor Engineer Mr. J. Flanigan, Plant Health Physicist Mr. W. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. K. Jurentkuff, Shift Supervisor Mr. B. Kirk, Shift Supervisor Mr. J. Shippec, Instrument and Control Supervisor Mr. J. Staub, Technical Assistant Mr. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent Westinchouse Mr,. G. Calhoun, Lead Enginect Stone and "ebster Mr. G. Harper, Enginec't Mr. R. Hunt, Engineer 2.
Containment Isolation Actuation System Setooint Drift (A0 74-2)
Reference: Licensee letter to Region I dated June 19, 1974 During routine refueling interval surveillance testing of the Containment Trip Valve Isolation Systen, two of three containment pressure suitches were found to operate at pressures greater than the setpoint value specified in the Technical Specifications.
The licensee reported this as_a violation of Technical Specif. cation Sec tion D.2.c(8) and identified the problem as drif t of the switch setpoints.
To prc'. cat recurrence, the licensee has set all of the switches below their ma:cimum allowable setpoint to compenrate for setpoint drift.
The licensee also conducted a survey and deterrined that this particular model of switch was not used elsevhere in the plant to perfo rm a saf ety related f unction.
This iten is rescived.
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Primary System Leak Rate Determination References:
(1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/74-02
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(2) Licensee letter to RO:I dated May 8,1974 The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in Ideensee's lett er of Muy 8,1974.
This item is resolved.
4.
Pressurizer Safetv Valves The inspector reviewed the surveillance test results for the pressurizer safety valves and found that the high set valve had been set to relieve at approximately 7 psig above the Technical Specification limit f 2560 paig.
The licensee stated that the valve would be removed and reset to be within Technical Specifica-tion linits.
The inspector stated that he would review the test results during his next inspection. The inspector also stated that had the Technical Specification limit and the corresponding nitrogen test pressure been explicitly listed under the procedure acceptance criteria this situation nost probably would not have developad.
This item is open.
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5.
Failure of Battery Charrer
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Refercnce: RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-04, Details, Paragraph 11.d The licensee stated that his investigatien of additienal methods of detecting bloun charger fuses has not been cenpleted.
In conjunction with this item, the inspector questioned (1) the use of a 5 year inter-
val for the conductance of battery performance discharge tests, and
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(2) the use of a blown fuse indicator as a measure of charger avail-ability rather than using a monitor on the output of the charger.
The licensee stated that he would consider the inspector's com ents.
This item remains unresolved.
6.
R0 Bull etirs 74-03 and 74-03A References:
(1) Region I letters to licensee dated March 26, 1974, and May 1, 1974 (2) Licensee letter to Regien I dated April 8,1974 The inspector reviewed the licensce's procedures and inspection resul t:. relating to seismic support bolts and vessel supports on Cla ss I c c:tpo ne nt s.
The licensee had excmined t he bolts and sun-ports on the pressurizer and a st can generator. The examinatien and satisf ac tery examinat ion rec,ul ts were in accordance wi th t he inteot of 1:0 I;ulletins 74-03 and 74-03A.
.The ins;)ector had no
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Plant Chemistrv koutine
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Reference: RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-04, Details, Paragraph 5.b The inspector incuired about the status of the precedure establishing primary ond secondary chemistry surveillance schedules. The licensee stated tl at the document was still in preparation. This item remains open.
8.
Missine Information f rom Semi-Annual Report Reference: RO Inspection Report 50-29/74-02, Details, Paragraph 2.c The licensee provided the inspector with information on Decetber 1973 radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents. This information was not included in the licensee's semiannual operating report.
The licensee stated that this data would be transmitted to DL.
The licensee also stated that missing information concerning reactor coolant system Icak rate was being assembled and would be sent to RO:
and DL.
This item remains cpen.
9.
Information on Radiation Exposures Accordine to Duty Tunction References: Directorate of Licensing letters to licensee dated April 13, 1973 and February 20, 1974 The licensee stated that the information requested in the referenced letters had been provided to DL.
The inspector had no further cues-tions concerning this matter.
10.
Intecrated Containment Leak Ra te Test The inspector rc'iewed the preliminary results of the integrated containnent leak rate test (Type A test) conducted Fay 12-15, 1974, and the results of the latest local leak rate tests (Type B and C test >).
The Type A test was conducted at both the calculated ne-accident pressure (32 psig) and at the reducad test pressure (le psig).
The preliminary data indicate acceptable results when ecm-pared to the provisions of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
The results were 0.041 weight percent ~ per day at 16 psig and 0.0729 weight ner-cent per day at 32 psig.
These values do not include any adjustments for instrument error analyses.
The results of the Type 3 and C tests al;p indicated acceptable results.
The result was 0.08939 weight percent per day.
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The licensca stated that he intended to submit a summary technical report on the leak rate test in accordance with Appendix J.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
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Pressurizer Safety and Relief Discharce Pipine Restraints Reference: RO Inspecticn Report 50-29/74-02, Details, Paragraph 5.f The inspector reviewed the progress of the installation of pipe restraints on the pressurizer safety and relief valve discharge piping.
The licensee stated that clearance problems were being encountered in installi_ig some of the restraints recommended by his consultants.
Installation modifications are being considered by the licensee and he intends to issue an engineering change on th3se modifications. The licensee stated that all of the restraints would be installed prior to startup. This item remains open.
12.
Incore 1.'strumentation Packace The inspector reviewed the installation status of the new incore instrumentation pacLage. The licensee stated that a two week delay in de31very of the package and problems encountered in the disassembly of the old package has delayed his scheduled date for return to opera-tipn from July 3 to July 19, 1974.
The new package was installed with little difficulty. The only problem encountcred was lack of adecuate clearance for a control rod guide tube.
This was rectified by bending one of the thermo-couple housing tubes to the correct location.
This item is open pending RO:I review of the package documentation.
13.
Scram Punction Permissive Sensor Reference: Directorate of Licensing letter to licensee dated September 13, 1973 The 'i.ensee ius completed the relocation of the reactor permissi.e relay pressure suitches f rom the turbine first stage pressure sensing line to the No. 1 no::le pressure sensing line. The inspector had ne further quest sns concerning this matter.
14.
Scran Circuit 'todificationg References:
(1) Directorate of Licensing '.etter to licensee dated September 13, ic73 (2) Licensee letter to DL dated November 26, 1973 (3) Licensee Ictter,,to DL datqd February 20, 1974
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-8-The licensee stated that this modification, which is intended to increase the scram circuit reliability, was approximately 20% com-plete and would be completed and tested prior to startup. This
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item is open.
15.
Diverse Initiation of Safety Injection Svstem Reference: Directorate of Licensing letter to licensee dated March 5, 1974 The licensee stated that the installation of the system for containment pressure initiation of the ECCS was complete.
The system is scheduled for checkout during pre-startup checkouts.
This item is open.
16.
Locs and Records The following logs and records were reviewed:
a.
Shift Supervisors Log - April 22, 1974, through June 26, 1974.
b.
Plant Information Reports - Report Nos.14 through 19.
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(1) Mos.17 and 18 - These PIR's describe two auto-initiations of
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the Safety Inj ection System on April 16, 1974, which were caused by (1) a nuclear recorder ground and (2) a subsequent erratic main coolant pressure channel signal while trouble-shooting for the recorder ground.
The plant tripped frem the ground and was shutdown while the troubleshooting was
in progress. Main coolant pressure remained above the
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injection system pressure when the signals were received; therefore, no water vas injected.
The licensee noticed several displaced pipe hangers for the Safety Inj ection Systcm piping during a Vapor Container inspection severr.1 i,"c after the plant was returned to operation. The liucasee assumed that water hammers had resulted from the initiation signals and caused sone shift in the injection piping "st..'
A complete inspection of the Vapor Container Sa fety Inj ection piping was then per-fo rned.
Vo abnormalities other than the displaced hangers were notec.
The Westboro Methanical Engineering Croup (MEG) evaluated the incident and sup ;csted that liquid penetrant examinations be perforned on the velds joining the Vapor Container penetra-tions (for the 5 f et !"Jectica S.ystem lines) to the injec-
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tien lines on either side of the penetrations. This was to
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verify that no damage had occurred to the Vapor Contriner penetrations.
(The inspector noted that the Integrated Containment Leak Rate Test had been successfully conducted at the calculated peak accident pressure after this occurrence.) The licensee stated that the examination of the penetration for the low prassure piping had been satisfactorily completed and thrt examination of the high pressure piping penetration would be conducted and evaluated prior to startup.
The MEG a2 so recommended replacement of bent hangers on an as time permits basis. This recommendation was accepted by the plant.
The MEC performed a safety evaluation of the occurrence and concluded that no unreviewed safety issue exists.
The PORC was notified of the incident during meeting 74-20.
The inspector reviewed the occurrence to determine if it should have been reported as an abnormal occurrence and concluded that it was not reportable as an abnormal occur-rence. The inspector stated that documentation of the penetration testing and plans for hanger replacement would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
This item is
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open.
(2) No.19 - This FIR describes a failure in the polar crane control circuitry which caused the hook to move in the opposit e direction. The reverse direction occurrence was caused by a diode failure which also disabled the upper limit interlock.
The hook was thereby driven in the reverse direction until its motion was arrested by the crane's upper nest. This caused damage to the cable.
The cable was replaced and tested before the crane was returned to full cr-!:e.
The PORC revieued the occurrcrro and recorrended that the plant evaluate a redradant upper limit interlock for the crane.
The inspector stated that there appeared to be a design deficiency in the control circuitry.
The licensee stated that he vould investigate the centrcl circuit failure to determine if anything can be done to prevent recurrence of the problem.
This matter is unresolved.
17.
Fuel Sterqte to the attintion o'f t' e inspector a potential
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The licennee brought h
problem in storage space for spent fuel.
The licensee stated that
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he would have shipped spent fuel approximately 2 years ago if he had been able to secure a contract with a reprocessor. According to the licensee, the two private reprocessors in the U.S. have filled or have contracts for all of their spent fuel storage space and are therefore unable to accept fuel from other utilities.
The licensee currently has space available for 44 spent fuel assemblies.
By borating the storage pool or by reanalyzing storage methods to take credit for burnup in spent fuel assemblies, the licensee indicated he can justify the use of 53 additional spaces. Any additional space would have to be created by the fabrication of new fuel racks to place in the spent fuel pool.
The licensee's currcnt refueling plan is to remove approximately 1/2 of the fuel assemblies in the core at 18 month operation inter-vals.
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= and the assumptions that no fuel is shipped and that the 53 extr. positions are usable, after 4-1/2 years of operation the licr asee will be unable to remove his normal number of assemblies without fabricating additional fuel racks.
18.
Postulated Pice Runture Outside Containment Reference: Directorate of Licensing letter to licensee dated December 13, 1973
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The inspector visually verified the status of plant modifications relating to a postulated rupture of high energy fluid piping curside containment.
All codifications centioned in the referenced letter have been nade with the exception of the installation of jet inpinge-ment plates to protect vital cable conduits. The licensee stated that these codifications would be ccmpleted prior to startup. This iter is open.
19.
AO Reportinc Fornat The licensee stated that he had recently revised his reporting +'er at for a.. normal oc currenc es
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.ccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.1,
Appendix A.
The inspector recuested that the licensee include fail-use data as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.16 in all future abnormal occurrence reportr. The licensee agreed to provide such infortation.
The inspector had no further cuestions concerning this matter.
20.
Tour of Facility The inspector toured the f acility including the Vapor Centainer and observed the final stanes of the new incore instrument package instal-latien.
':a deficiencies were identified during the teur.
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