IA-89-309, Forwards Composite Narrative of NRC Observations Re Util Preparation for & Conduct of Natural Circulation Test
| ML20247N407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1989 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247N354 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-309 NUDOCS 8909260214 | |
| Download: ML20247N407 (15) | |
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g ,U, UNITED STATES
-* ( , gg( [ ,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISE....
,- , p e REGloN 1
%q ' %.< o[ 476 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRUSstA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 June 26, 1989 MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Regional Administrator FROM: Thomas T. Martin, Deputy Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
NRC OBSERVATIONS REGARDING SEABROOK NATURAL CIRCULATION TEST As requested, please find enclosed a composite narrative of NRC observations regarding the licensee's preparation for and conduct of the Seabrook Natural Circulation Test. The narrative was developed as a joint effort of Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector, Jim Trapp, Reactor Engineer and myself.
de- -
E Thomas T. Martin Deputy Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: J. Taylor, DEDO T. Murley, NRR J. Wiggins, RI D. Haverkamp, RI N. Dudley, RI J. Trapp, RI l
8909260214 890919 {
PDR FOIA PDR BROCKB9-309 l A /
ENCLOSURE NRC OBSERVATIONS REGARDING SEABROOK NATURAL CIRCULATION TEST Tim Martin, Deputy Regional Administrator, Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector. (SRI), and Jim Trapp, Reactor Engineer,
- representing the NRC, were present in the Seabrook Control Room on-June 22, 1989, to observe-the preparations for and conduct of the licensee's natural circulation test. All three NRC participants
- had reviewed and discussed the test procedure. The shift operating crew in.the Control Room consisted of a Shift Superintendent, Unit Shift Superintendent, Senior Control Room Operator and three Control' Room Operators. With the exception of the licensee's operating crew,. several operations department managers' and several test engineers, all personnel (approximately 40 total) were outside the immediate area of the controls and approximately 25 feet from the control panels. The observers maintained a minimum noise level throughout the test preparations and conduct.
In preparation for the test, the Lead Test Engineer (LTE) presented a.very general discussion of the test to be conducted. The LTE stated he would review separately with the operating crew the conditions requiring a reactor trip. (The SRI believes he subsequently observed this briefing taking place.) In recognition of the assembled observers' inability to read panel indications, the SRI requested a description of plant parameters presented on large CRT's that were observable from outside the operating area.
The operating crew identified the parameters displayed on each CRT to enable the observers to follow the transient.
Preparations for the test and conduct of the operating crew appeared to be conservative, cautious, and thorough. The initial operating conditions, needed to initiate this test, required time to establish. Key operating parameter oscillations required dampening while establishing the initial test conditions. These oscillations were normal and occurred because many controllers were required by the test procedure, to be placed in manual control.
At this point, there was no basis for any concern in the minds of the NRC observers.
When the plant was finally stabilized at - 3% power, the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) announced the test was starting. Two individuals were utilized to trip the four reactor coolant pumps nearly simultaneously. The transient was predicted to last 10-50 minutes and the operators appeared to conscientiously monitoring their controls. Neutron flux level was noted to decrease, initiating quiet discussion between Mr. Martin and Mr. Dudley, given the stated test prerequisite to reach a zero moderator temperature coefficient.
2 Jim Trapp, was the first NRC observer to detect a problem, noting panel indications of an automatic de-energization of the pressurizer heaters and isolation of letdown. From previous experiences as a licensed individual at another facility, he recalled this occurred at about 18% pressurizer level, just slightly above the 17% level that the test procedure instructed operators to manually trip the reactor. Mr. Trapp asked a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), who was also an observer and not part of the current shift operating crew, what their isolation setpoint was. He learned it was 17%, the condition under the current test procedure requiring the operators to manually trip the reactor.
Although the plant was not currently in danger, Mr. Trapp immediately went to the Startup Manager at the Test Engineer's table. Mr. Trapp advised the manager, who had authority to stop the test, that the heaters trip and letdown isolates at 17%
pressurizer level and that they were now operating below the criteria for manually tripping the reactor. The manager continued to watch the in-progress test, appeared to take no action, and gave no oral response; but did appear to hear Mr. Trapp's concern.
Mr. Trapp then went to Mr. Dudley and Mr. Martin, informing them of his concern that the licensee had met conditions requiring a manual trip, for about two minutes, and the lack of response to that information by the Startup Manager. This discussion took about thirty seconds. Pressurizer level, as shown on the CRT, was now offscale low and the Senior Control Room Operator (SCRO) appeared to be initiating additional makeup with a corresponding ,
increase in indicated pressure, showing that pressurizer level was being restored.
Mr. Trapp then went over to talk to the Lead Test Director (LTD) who had his back to the control console and was reviewing data from a printer. Mr. Trapp informed the LTD, an individual who could recommend halting the test, that they were operating below the level requiring a manual trip of the reactor. The LTD examined his printout, said something to the effect that he would get back to him, and turned, walked over to the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) and communicated to that individual. The USS, an SRO with authority to order a reactor trip, was directing the activities of the operating crew.
The SRI, noting that Mr. Trapp was not getting a satisfactory response, immediately went over to the Assistant Operations Manager l (AOM), an SRO with authority to stop the test, and advised that the l pressurizer level was below 17%, requiring a manual reactor trip.
During this period, the LTD returned to the printer, and the AOM asked was it true they should have tripped the reactor. When told yes, the AOM went to the Operations Manager, another SRO with I
l
e 3
authority to direct tripping the reactor, and the USS, and appeared to communicate with both individuals.
Subsequently, and without a clear impression of whether the response was or was not prompted by the expressed NRC concern, with pressurizer pressure and level now rapidly increasing and again on the CRT scale, the USS directed a Control Room Operator (CRO) to trip the reactor.
The SCRO, an individual who could independently trip the reactor, indicated he was about to re-establish control and requested a delay. The USS told him no and the CRO then tripped the reactor.
The NRC observers then watched the apparent smooth performance of the required Emergency Operating Procedures, discussed their perception of why the operaters initially failed and subsequently decided to trip the reactor, and discussed the safety significance of what had been observed. The role of the Shift Superintendent during the event was not apparent to the NRC observers.
Mr. Martin informed the Vice President (VP) of Operations, while utill in the Control Room, that the NRC staff was concerned that the operators did not follow their procedures and manually trip the reactor when pressurizer level fell below 17%. The VP acknowledged the concern, indicated they would review the event and offered no explanation for the operators' actions.
The NRC observers remained in the Control Room until the reactor coolant pumps were restarted and the plant was again stable. At no time during the event did NRC personnel grab a licensed individual, raise their voices or manipulate the controls. The NRC observers' concern during the entire event was that their was no safety reason for not following the procedure; therefore, it should have been followed. NRC actions were predicated on their concern, the fact that we were not authorized to order licensed activities and that, in this instance, the reactor was never in danger.
Subsequently, Mr. Trapp and Mr. Dudley were directed by Mr. Martin i
to observe the post trip reviews to assess licensee performance, but not to participate in the licensee's deliberations.
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f, PAPER: Tos s .cLOBE DATE:' PAGE: 1 y 13 6/30/89 Seabrook curtails official after shutdown" Globe Staff for the advice of federal safety in '
owners of the Seabrook nuclear plant spectam - that they took the high-
@- - eald they have relieved of all re- lyunusualstepare low-
^ the vice proofdent in charge .
tals
- / t about the cir- power tests. Seabrook
[ plant tions because of "inappro.
ent actions" involving ytances a
[ Thomas' leaving subsequently tests, which were in their lothdecided h:teweek ma[wed *e shutdown of the mac. for,,_c_ Thomas could not be day omment. .
reacheil and were nearly complete.
,7he action against Thomas Fourextra NRCinspectors now The emcla!. George S. Thomas, subee.
N) tly mangned. plant spokesman Ron- !
me he related to the inmusisten ' are at Seabrook reviewing events ,I cy' mports from the plant last em. d:sg the shutdown. New i
$J Sher said last night. Asked whether I d Hampshim Gov. Judd this i ~ ether neignations are planned. Sher said. I .
@ Thunday. Sher said the ' week miered the state A' elt to premature to speculate on any other _ shgtdown occurred because a generaltolaunch his own probe.
e at this tims." .
vain in the acanuelear part of Robert Backus. ~an attorney -
- The unprecedented and unexpected thEplant " remained open innger who has battled Seabrook for 17
~ tsieve osmos as the Nuclear Reguletory
-.- r thap required." And his re- years, said last night that Thom-
_ Commission and the New Hampshire at- lease said the plant was "in ae' leaving " Indicates that the
' torney general are investigating what accordance with the strict techn!- stakes are kind of high over during the shutdown. NRC om- cafhriteria governing the carmat there" from last week's troubles say Seabrook operators ignored their' Mr,. test program." involving the shutdown.
repeated advice to close the plant. .The next day, however, the , Since 1982. Thomaa. 48.- has Thomas, who worked at Seabrook for NRC ordered the M , .. tests been viet president for nuclear 12 years, was the senior plant ametal in s'w=Msayingplantoperatore ' production a post in which he the control room during the shutdown. haci. violated their own . ; oversaw all plant operations and
' But his being'reheved or duties stemmed in21osing the plant. And Edward operations supp6tt. Sher said. He from actions , subsequent to the June 22 Br5wn. president of New.Hamp- was one of two vice pneldents, reactor shutdown." Sher said. He decisned shire Yankee, which runs Sea- both ,of whom reported directly to to elaborate, saying detatie of what hap- brook, acknowledged that "we did Brown. the plant a top ametal. ,
pened would be revealed early next month notstrictly adhere to our test pro- Thomas worked for Public Ser-when Seabrook submits to the NRC its of- eedures." vice Co. of New Hampshire, the
- fletai report on the episode. in the days that followed. Dud- plant's primary owner,which has Noci Dudley, the senior NRC inspector ley provided a daeaW review of filed for bankruptcy. Brown and ct Seabrook said his agency had nothing what happened in the control many other Seabrook officials room June 22: NRCtoepeetors ad- work directly for New Hampshire to do with Seabmok.e a,cu'm against vloed three Seabrook omclals to Yankee, which le a division of Thornas. The Tactanding hdh turn the reactor off, but that ad- Pubile Service. Thomas began t, brook shu NRCinvestigation into the vice was ignored. It was not until working at the New Hampshire re-
,- down.should..be eernplete by the end steam pressure began that actor in 2977 when he was hired this week, he added. % we haw not pl t operators finally foi by the Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
ewn begun maching thef,r own procedural require- klanagers who reported to any recommendadons.,any 6 w ments and closed the plant. Thomas now wu! report diracuy to Officials at the 86 billion plant main- If preneurs had continued rie- Brown. Sher said.
tained an uncharacteristic silence last - Seabrook - hope to tually could have cracked or other full-power license thle fall,p but a pr6blema / 1, ped, fhet they must pamunde the NRC
'The delay lasted .fust 5 min- that they could safely evacuate utes, but NRC ometals felt it re- people from a 10-mile radius fleited a certous enough disregard around the reactor in the event of for' plant rules - and apparently an emergency.. ,,
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C008TESYOF 00W.10NES/REUTERSCONFIRMATION 4RNEWSWIRE
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SEABROOK - NRC c
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SEABROOK, N. H. -DJ- THE OPERATING COMPANY p (? g' ]
I FOR THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAID PLANT Ij l OFFICIALS GAVE INACCURATE INFORMATION TO THE k[pS (k j j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WHILE DEALING WITH A MISHAP THAT LED TO A JUNE EE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.
EDWARD A. BROWN, PRESIDENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE, WHICH RUNS THE PLANT FOR ITS UTILITY OWNERS, ALSO CONFIRMED THAT ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST GEORGE THOMAS, ITS FORMER VICE PRESIDENT l OF NUCLEAR PRODUCTION, WERE RELATED TO f
' ' INAPPROPRI ATE STATEMENTS' ' MADE TO THE NRC {
DURING THE MISHAP. THOMAS WAS RELIEVED OF HIS {
DUTIES AND LATER RESIGNED FROM PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, THE 35.6 PC OWNER OF CCABROOK.
BROWN SAID THE MISHAP, WHICH INVOLVED A ,
MALFUNCTIONING STEAM VALVE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT SHUTDOWN POSED ' ' NO RISK TO THE PUBLIC, PLANT <
tNIRSONNEL DR PLANT SYSTEMS. ' ' BUT HE SAID THAT
' OUR PROCEDURES WERC NOT STRICTLY FOLLOWED. ' '
REACTOR OPERATORS SHOULD HAVE SHUT DOWN THE PLANT SEVERAL MINUTES BEFORE THEY DID, BROWN CAID. HE SAID THEIR DELAY WAS CAUSED BY A ,
I MISREADING OF COMPANY POLICIES. HE SAID LETTERS OF REPRIMAND HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL PRESENT IN THE CONTROL ROOM AT THE TIME, TO PERSONNEL WHO SPOKE WITH THE NRC, AND TO CERTAIN ENGINEERS AND OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE TEST.
BROWN ALSO SAID THE COMPANY WILL BE j j
CNNDUNCING A ' ' MANAGEMENT REALIGNMENT' ' TO THE NhC BY JULY 28. {
l
I RECOGNIZE THE CREDIBILITY ALL OF US AT l CEABROOK STATION HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THREATENED BY THIS INCIDENT,'* BROWN SAID. ' ' OUR CLEAR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO IMPLEMENT NECESSARY CORRECTIVE i ACTIONS.
l -e .11 47 AM EDT 07-13-89:
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.NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE pFCSIDENT RCL car.CC REf*0HT ON JLINE 22 CE AERUOK j ,
SHl)TDOWN; G TATEt1FNT OF EDWAPC A. BROWN PRESIDENT SEABROODK, N.H., July 13 / 'RNewt.wi rb 1oday we are subrait t inq cur report to the U.S. Nticlear Regul at ory Comrdiss,1cr. (NRC) on the circuraztoreces surrour.:12 v'D the June re shut c10wn of our reactor, The day after this event occurred, I stated that we did not etrictly adher'u to our t e ;.t peccedures, and that we would be invsst igat ing t his inc2 dent thoroughly. The report we are releassing l todcy i n c 3 u d e t. a detailed chronology of tno incadent, an analysis of tr;anagerpent actions and comrounications, cind & corrective action plcn to ensure an ir.cido..t :,,u c h c a this will nol veeur again .at E xbrook Station.
We have spent thte last three wecku exhaustively reviewing all tha circumstances which occurt'ed be f' ore, during and at:ter the shutdown. .While there web no ritk to the public, plant personnel or plant syntems during thin incident, it is absolutely clear that our operators failed to follow a specttac tet,t procedure. Th a e, 1cck of comp 12 ante .is not excusable.
W2 recognize the trust and res.peensibility given to us by the NHL with the issuance of an operatang 12 cense. It as our commitroent to tcka all act 2cns neconsory to tulf t il our responsibility and maintain t htlt trust.
I would like to braefly review the efecumstancer surround;nD the ov;nt and therorrective actions we are taking.
The shutdown came following nine days of highly cuecessful low-power physs eu testing of Seabrook S;at ion' u reactor. Having completed low power phys.2 ew t et.t i ng, on Jurie 2,f, we were condstel ing a nfatural circulation test of the reactor. Au part of the procedure for this test, operatore, were required to chut down the reactor if the water invel in the presssura ger dropped below 17 percent of ,
capacity. The pecnt.t:ri re+t is a corop..ntant which regula tes prest.ttre in the reactor coolant system. ..
This 17 percent level 2s a very e...nwervat2ve limit. Duting '*
normal plant operations, the reactor would not be shut down untti /
tha level was at 5 ;)ercent .
During the testing on June 22, a steam valve on the nm enucacar cide of tht= plant ma l f unct i cined. This resulted in the preunuelose's.
wotor level dropping below 2/ pureent of capacity for Epproxitute'.y ,
five minuteu,. Wher. tha level dropped below 17 percunt , our vperators.
chould have foll.,wed their tent ptvcedurce and immediately shut d owr-
' the react or - but they did not. During this time, the operators were in complet e cent rcI ot the reactor and the lowet.tpoint ihe water lovel t-eached wts 3 4. S percent - well abovre the miniunor.
5 percent shut down les el csuring normal operations.
In our inter nal teview, we determ16ec: that our control room operators believedthat the shutdowr. criterion an the test procoduce wy. only a guadeline -- not requirement - ber:stice it was mut.:h more conservative t han the shutcown criterion contained in nor me) oparatinq procedures.
This intcepretatior, of toct procedures was unaceseptable. Our cornpany policy has been rew.-i t ten t o c learly st ate tnat all te L procedurn -- au notmel opereting p,uteduret. -
rno r.t be strictl'y foilowed.
We alt.o conc 1urbd that t he pre--test tir i P f i ny g i vs n t o cun t vs.71 room operators. was not effective, because the control room opnratorw believed that the shut down cratera.en in t,he t er.t pr oc edures. was, o ,
guidelina. Our pro tcat briefinD program will be revised to pr e ..L this misunderst and t ng f t om recurr a nta. 1
1 * * ,
DurinD tho five-minese period in which the precsurir.er' o water.
Icvel was below17 per ccent, perbohnel trorn the NRC approached three Ncw Hampahire- YanEce st af fmerobora to rum:nd them of the procedur.e1
,. requirement tu t, hut riown the react or wht n the wat er' level drup> !elow 17:purcent. The i espons6.:. by these New Hampahire Yankee perw..r.nel to .
the NI<C w m i nef fh:1 i ve becaute t ht Nr>w Hemps.hireYankee st rif f did not specifically reemmer.end to control room operators that the
, resetor be chut dvws. An .accordance with test proceduret..
I Letters of reprimand have been issued to the operations l
manageroent pertonnel present an the control room that day, to the L personnel spoken to by the NRC inthe control room, and to certain operators and engineers involved in the test.
Our internal repur't focused on the tecchnical circum t.ancer: .
surrounding the June EE shutdown, and we also reviewed our managemont rocponse to the shutdown. This re,vlew identified other problems I
which we will resolve to the satisfaction of the NRC and ourselves.
A number of actionc taken by various New HampshireYankee md neDernent
- personnel were inapper.apriate, and do not reflect New Harnpuha re Yorikuu pn cy.
Dur first oral report ta the NRC that day was not precibeirly wordert, contained inace-urate information and contributed to miscorntnunicat ion between Now Hampshare Yankee and the NRC. Wr.are e::tcblishing new reporting requirements to ensure that all futurv comsnunications with the NRC are revsewed for clarityand accur cey.
Five hours afteer the reactor shutdown, raembers of New Harapuh e. -r Yankan Lt of f conducted a cont er ence call with the NRC's Hwy l ure 1 Office an King of Prus.ia, Penn., to review the circurastancew of tht i nc i den t. . DurinD this phone conversation, corde New H m npr.h ir -
Yank.+e management personnel raaao z ne.ppropri a t es t at aroor.t s tv t ' n.
NRC in detende v f L f.e actions et our (c. .: 4 r ol evvm operatorw.
The Vice Prezident of Nuclear Production made unauthorized and inappropriate atuteraentc to the NtC cut ang the conference call regarding his desire to restart the reactor before the complet;:on of a feill evaluation of the shutdown. Thouc st at erent s wer e m.. d e without ray knowledDe, concurr'enca or . author 1::at ion, and I wau nul ,
told that i het.e bt et omt nt Were er. ado Oy NPW Harupuh.i e v Yankee personnel t o the NRC.
'i latur reliawed the Vice Pec sicient of ifucIt<m- Pr. duction of hi dutiea at Coabrvok Station. He sub.aequently resigned frora Public Service Company of New Hampnhare. Wo w211 be annc.uncing our taanayoment realignment plan to the NRC by July 28.
Wh:Ir the shutdown of Seabroelr Stat ion' c rcactve vre June 22 peed atmolutely novis!t tu the public, plant per onnel or plant v.ystetuu, our proL ed ures wew nat st ri ct ly f ol l owed and ".ome cutmnui.is.nt i....c, with the NRC following the shutdown wave i no ppe.; g:c i at e.
I reevgrii rc> t he credibility ali at ut at *'onbruvk E.tation heee worked so har-d to build over the years ha2 t:een thrnatened by th:,
Jncidtnt, ljur c:lene cnaliehDe nCW im to implement r.wevw ory cerr-t-tive artions, setsuty all of t hs.: NRC' n .::c e w e e n u, and m a i n '... b .
1,he public trust.
Speap i nD f or the m.snagoraent s n:: empluyees ..f Scabr.uk CLAsi:vr., M.
wei .1 .n tho Joint Ownorm, I want to make it cle.w that we w 1; be u.t ,faed with nothing icnn.
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