HNP-06-127, Report of Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59
| ML063250390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/2006 |
| From: | Corlett D Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-06-127 | |
| Download: ML063250390 (6) | |
Text
Progress, Energy SERIAL: HNP-06-127 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)
NOV 1 3 2006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REPORT OF CHANGES PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.59 Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), Carolina Power & Light Company (doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.) submits the attached report for the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP). The report provides a brief description of changes to the facility and a summary of the evaluations required per 10 CFR 50.59 for those items, regardless of implementation status, between January 1, 2005 and September 15, 2006.
This letter also informs the NRC that there have been no unreported changes in commitment made during the period from January 1, 2005 through September 15, 2006.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this submittal at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, D. H. Corlett Supervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs Harris Nuclear Plant DHC/khv
Attachment:
- 1. 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments c: Mr. P. B. O'Bryan, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. C. P. Patel, NRC Project Manager Dr. W. D. Travers, NRC Regional Administrator Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P, 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 Sin<-/,7
Document Control Desk HNP-06-127 , Page 1 of 5 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number/ Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document 05-0006 Radiation monitor RM-*1 FR- The function of this radiation monitors is to generate an AP-557 3565ASA detector failed isolation signal for the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) normal (RM-*I FR- check source testing and the ventilation and initiate emergency ventilation in the event of 3565ASA) associated FHB radiation a fuel handling accident. There are eight monitors in the monitors was declared FHB with three detectors per monitor. Technical inoperable for a period of Specifications state that a channel is operable when one or greater than 30 days until more detectors are operable. This activity does not maintenance was performed. increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
05-0169 EC 60425 is a Temporary The function of the Essential Services Chilled Water EC 60425, Rev 1 Modification to manually (ESCW) expansion tanks is to accommodate system isolate A and B ESCW volume changes, maintain positive pressure in the piping expansion tanks and provide loop and provide a means of adding makeup water to the a means to repressurize the system. This Engineering Change (EC) temporarily ESCW tanks when required. replaces the automatic air makeup system with manual This Temporary Modification actions to repressurize the ESCW expansion tanks due to will remain in place only until leakage past the check valves. The temporary manual a Permanent Modification (to actions meet requirements of NRC IN 97-78 and NEI 96-relocate the ESCW expansion 07. This activity does not increase the frequency, tanks to a higher elevation) likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or can be developed and a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than implemented. minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
05-0497 EC 60881 incorporates two The first change, which accounts for the +/- 10% range EC 60881 changes to the FSAR Chapter around the nominal 4000 cfm allowed by TS 4.7.6.d for 15 dose analyses. The first Control Room recirculation in the Alternate Source Term change accounts for the +/- (AST) dose analysis using the assumption of linear effects 10% range around the between dose and recirculation flow, is considered to be a nominal 4000 cfm allowed by change in methodology. The dose consequences were TS 4.7.6.d for Control Room evaluated to be not more than minimal per NEI 96-07 and recirculation in the AST dose the linear assumption methodology is not a departure from analysis. This change approved methodology since it yields conservative results.
resulted in a slightly increase The second change, which accounts for High Head Safety in the DBA LOCA event dose Injection (HHSI) miniflow leakage to the Refueling Water consequences for the control Storage Tank (RWST) did not "screen in"per the criteria in room. The second change 10 CFR 50.59. This activity does not increase the revises the AST dose analysis frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an to provide a means to accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety account for potential HHSI more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an miniflow leakage back to the accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different RWST against the 1.5 gpm result, does not result in a design basis limit being "total effective" back leakage exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of limit, evaluation.
Document Control Desk HNP-06-127 , Page 2 of 5 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number / Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document REG 177833 EC 62463 is an updated The change in FSAR Section 1.8 to commit to Regulatory EC 62463 evaluation of the potential Guide (RG) 1.78, Rev. 1, which replaced RG 1.78, Rev. 0 impacts on control room and RG 1.95, to which HNP was previously committed, is habitability from accidental considered to be a change to an FSAR described releases of hazardous methodology. RG 1.78, Rev 1 is approved by the NRC and chemicals at or near the HNP provides results for the Control Room Habitability Analysis facility as of 2005. The which are essentially the same as the results obtained evaluation was performed in using RG 1.78, Rev. 0; therefore, this activity is not a accordance with Regulatory departure from an FSAR-described method of evaluation.
Guide 1.78, Revision 1, and is This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of based on information and occurrence or consequences of an accident or a data available as of malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than December 2005. Although no minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a new impacts were found, the different type or a malfunction with a different result, does EC recommends changes to not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, the FSAR text on hazardous and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
chemical accidents, and recommends changing the HNP commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95.
REG 196952 Revision 3 of EC 48433 Revision 3 to EC 48433 (Spent Fuel Pool Vendor Weld EC 48433, Rev. 3 documents the final as-built Repairs) accepts the as-built condition of a small configuration of the Spent percentage of weld without repair. The design function of Fuel Pool weld repair. Partial the liner leakage detection system is to limit and detect penetration welds were leakage from the pools. The fuel pool liners are classified originally made instead of the as non-Nuclear Safety. The fact that approximately 21 ft full penetration welds required (<1% of the total weld length) is not being repaired is by the design. Some of the conservatively considered as an adverse affect to the partial penetration welds were design since all steps to limit leakage were not being taken.
also found to have linear Almost 20 years of operating experience indicates leakage indications through NDE is consistently well within limits with slight variations in testing. Weld joint repairs trend. There are no increasing trends in any of the using an alternative weld joint detection locations. The Spent Fuel Pool leakage design were implemented monitoring program is adequate to detect changes in the under PCR-4443 and ESR leakage and allow for corrective action. This activity does 9501009. Less than 1% of not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or the Fuel Pool and Transfer consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC Canal weld length remains important to safety more than minimally, does not create a unrepaired due to possibility for an accident of a different type or a inaccessibility, malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
Document Control Desk HNP-06-127 , Page 3 of 5 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number / Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document REG 190799 Calculation 3-A-05-001, HNP- AR 148143 revises the Containment Analysis, HNP-AR 148143 M/MECH-1008, and FSAR Table M/MECH-1008 and Calculation 3-A-05-001, to 6.2.1-8 were revised to evaluate the evaluate the possible effects of maximizing the possible effects of maximizing the coating thicknesses from the current values in the coating thicknesses from the current containment analysis to the maximum thicknesses values in the containment analysis allowed by the Ebasco specifications. This to the maximum thicknesses evaluation is a "case study" that considers the effect allowed by the Ebasco of the change in containment coating thickness on specifications. next free volume, the overall heat capacity of containment, and the ability to transfer heat from the containment atmosphere to the heat sinks. The change in these parameters based on coating thickness variations allowed by Ebasco specifications is a minute fraction of the containment values in question and cannot reasonably be determined to increase the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. This activity concludes that the thickest allowable values of coatings per the Ebasco specifications have no significant effect on the containment analysis. FSAR Table 6.2.1-8 is revised to reflect this conclusion.
This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
REG 163247 EC 60541 corrects the condition Revision 1 to EC 60541 permanently adds a new EC 60541, Rev. 1 identified in Temporary Modification manual action to repressurize the ECSW expansion EC 60425 by installing new manual tanks using compressed air bottles in the event of an isolations valves for the ESCW extended loss of service air. This new manual action expansion tanks, restoring the meets the requirements of NRC IN 97-78 and NEI automatic air makeup system, and 96-07. This activity does not increase the frequency, formalizing an alternate method to likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an manually repressurize the ESCW accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to expansion tanks in the event of an safety more than minimally, does not create a extended loss of service air. possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
Document Control Desk HNP-06-127 , Page 4 of 5 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number / Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document REG 176038 EC 60828 addresses the Revision 1 to EC 60828 locks open the MOV control power EC 60828, Rev. 1 potential for hot shorts and breakers for 1CS-1 68, 1CS-1 69, 1CS-1 70, and 1CS-1 71 subsequent spurious with the valves in the open position. These Charging operation of CSIP Suction Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) Suction Cross-connect Cross-connect valves 1CS- valves are normally open with no automatic functions.
168 and 1CS-169 by locking Their design function is to remain open to provide open the MOV control power adequate suction to the CSIPs. This EC adds a new breakers for all CSIP Suction manual action to close the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)
Cross-connect valves at their control power breakers before the CSIP Suction Cross-MCCs. connect valves can be closed from the Control Room as needed for maintenance, leak isolation, and periodic testing. This new manual action meets the requirements of NRC IN 97-78 and NEI 96-07. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
REG 181554 Revision 11 to OP-1 16.01 Revision 11 to OP-1 16.01 allows for purification of the OP-1 16.01, Rev. 11 adds a new manual action RWST in Modes 1-4 by maintaining the RWST operable and evaluates maintaining while aligned to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Purification operability of the RWST while system. This revision adds a new manual action for a aligned to the SFP dedicated operator to shut 1CT-23 to isolate the RWST Purification System. from the non-seismic SFP Purification System in the event of a seismic event. This manual action meets the requirements of NRC IN 97-78 and NEI 96-07. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
Document Control Desk HNP-06-127 , Page 5 of 5 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number/ Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document REG 192783 EC 60257 installs a manual Revision 5 to EC 60257 changes the design of the C CSIP EC 60257, Rev. 5 transfer switch for C CSIP to 1C-SAB from a dual-cubicle, single-breaker arrangement facilitate realignment of power (i.e. cubicles that are uniquely configured to accept only the with a shorter time period, designated breaker that is shared between the two thus reducing the vulnerability divisions) to a design that utilizes a 6.9 kV circuit breaker to a loss of charging flow from for each circuit to C CSIP. Key interlocks at the breaker loss of a running CSIP. This cubicles ensure that only one power circuit to the pump EC includes features to motor can be energized at any given time. This EC prevent inappropriate changes the maintenance evolution of powering the C electrical connection of CSIPs CSIP from one where power is determinated and and upgrades the fire barriers reterminated to connect the CSIP to the appropriate bus to as needed for the C CSIP one that utilizes a manual transfer switch to accomplish this room. function. Per EC 60257, the connection between the 6.9 kV switchgear cubicle 1B-SB-7 and the manual transfer switch, will be spliced in Box B5028-SB in the C CSIP room. EC 60257 ensures that the design and installation of the C CSIP manual transfer switch meets design and fire protection requirements and does not increase the likelihood of accident or malfunction of any component.
This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
REG 199061 FSAR Section 4.4.4.6.1 was FSAR Section 4.4.4.6.1 previously required four operable FSAR 4.4.4.6.1 revised to clarify the thermocouples per quadrant per train, for a total of eight requirements for the number thermocouples per quadrant. This doubled the number of and location of Incore thermocouples required by TS 3/4.3.3.6 to ensure that a Thermocouples required to radial temperature gradient could be obtained as required meet TS 3/4.3.3.6 and the by RG 1.97 and NUREG-0737. FSAR Section 4.4.4.6.1 requirements of RG 1.97 and was revised to require two operable thermocouples paired NUREG-0737. so that one is near the center of the core and one is located near the perimeter, per train. This alternate method continues to meet the requirements of TS 3/4.3.3.6, RG 1.97, and NUREG-0737 by ensuring the capability to indicate radial temperature gradients across the core. This method is also consistent with Improved Technical Specifications (NUREG-1431, Rev 3). This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety more than minimally, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.