ENS 48277
ENS Event | |
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17:36 Aug 22, 2012 | |
Title | Missing Flood Seal |
Event Description | During flooding walkdowns being performed on August 22, 2012, with the unit at 100 percent power, South Texas Project Unit 2 discovered the potential for water intrusion into the 10' Elevation Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) via a 2-inch underground conduit that was found to be missing its flood seal. It has been determined that the missing flood seal compromised the external flood design controls for the EAB. If flooding of the 10 [foot] EAB were to occur as a result of the missing flood seal, the operability of the Train A Engineered Safety Features (ESF) switchgear and the ESF Sequencers for all three Standby Diesel Generators could have been affected. Additionally, the Qualified Display Parameter System process cabinets (which control Auxiliary Feedwater flow and Steam Generator PORVs) and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are also located on the 10' Elevation.
Repairs have been made and the 2-inch conduit is sealed. The event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for Unit 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this call is to retract the notification made on 09/05/2012, Event Number 48277. Further analysis indicates that water intrusion resulting from the missing 2-inch conduit seal would not have been sufficient to affect the operability of the equipment located on the 10-foot elevation of the Unit 2 Electrical Auxiliary Building. It has been determined that the maximum water depth would not have exceeded 2 inches in depth and all safety related equipment on the 10-foot elevation is greater than 2 inches above the floor, therefore there would be no impact to any safety-related equipment. Accordingly, this event notification is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller). |
Where | |
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South Texas Texas (NRC Region 4) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+334.98 h13.958 days <br />1.994 weeks <br />0.459 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Robert Brinkley 16:35 Sep 5, 2012 |
NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
Last Updated: | Sep 20, 2012 |
48277 - NRC Website | |
Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
South Texas with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 570192024-03-10T08:53:00010 March 2024 08:53:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Essential Chilled Water Trains Declared Inoperable ENS 569442024-01-24T01:02:00024 January 2024 01:02:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Accident Mitigation - Relief Valves Inoperable ENS 568612023-11-16T21:41:00016 November 2023 21:41:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Essential Chiller Trains Inoperable ENS 568482023-11-10T20:13:00010 November 2023 20:13:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Essential Chiller Trains Inoperable ENS 542572019-09-06T02:15:0006 September 2019 02:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material En Revision Imported Date 11/8/2019 ENS 541902019-07-30T20:21:00030 July 2019 20:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident En Revision Imported Date 8/22/2019 ENS 494902013-10-31T22:12:00031 October 2013 22:12:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Fire Event Could Result in a Hot Short That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment ENS 482772012-08-22T17:36:00022 August 2012 17:36:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Missing Flood Seal ENS 474912011-11-20T11:46:00020 November 2011 11:46:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material Turbine Trip Protection Disabled While in Mode 3 ENS 461462010-08-03T20:06:0003 August 2010 20:06:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Potential Safety System Functional Failure of the Accident Mitigating Function ENS 456312008-07-08T03:47:0008 July 2008 03:47:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Loss of Fire Suppression Capability ENS 406122004-03-27T04:30:00027 March 2004 04:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Regarding Hhsi Flush Line Isolation Valve Leakage - ENS 403802003-12-09T21:38:0009 December 2003 21:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unable to Achieve Cold Shutdown Using Natural Circulation at a Cooldown Rate of 50 Degrees Per Hour 2024-03-10T08:53:00 | |