05000528/LER-2008-003, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown - Safety Injection Tank 1A Inoperable
| ML082250455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/2008 |
| From: | Mims D Arizona Public Service Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 102-05875-DCM/DFH LER 08-003-00 | |
| Download: ML082250455 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 5282008003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
10 CFR 50.73 L-*
A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Dwight C. Mims Mail Station 7605 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President Tel. 623-393-5403 P.O. Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs and Plant Improvement Fax 623-393-6077 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05875-DCM/DFH August 04, 2008 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 License No. NPF 41 Licensee Event Report 2008-003-00 Attached, please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-528/2008-003-00 that has been prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER reports a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) and the completion of a shutdown required by TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.1, Condition C, for Safety Injection Tanks (Operating).
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the NRC Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact James A. Proctor, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5730.
Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter.
Sincerely, DCM/JAP/DFH/gat Attachment cc:
E. E. Collins Jr.
NRC Region IV Regional Administrator M. T. Markley NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper)
R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway 0 Comanche Peak 0 Diablo Canyon 0
Palo Verde
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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
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- 3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 05000528 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Required Shutdown - Safety Injection Tank 1A Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED LFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NON MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER' 06 05 08 2008 - 003 -
00 08 04 2008 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
[3 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
IE 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii).
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0l 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 [1 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) for LCO 3.5.1, Condition B and C. The expectation for the Operations Department to participate in containment entry activities while the unit is at power was unclear. Operations personnel did not attend the pre-entry brief where the entry team had discussed the potential impacts to SIT 1A operability. As a result, when the entry team exited the containment to notify the control room of their findings, the CRS believed the call was primarily to inform the control room staff that the team had exited containment. Although he acknowledged that some details of the leak location were provided, he did not have a clear understanding of the leak nor its location. He also knew that the SIT IA was not currently exhibiting any indication of abnormal leakage and relied on the corrective action process to ensure that the information was routed for impact and operability review.
7. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The following corrective actions have been implemented:
" A repair consisting of adding a new weld with a reinforcing partial fillet weld to attach the nozzle at the outer surface of the vessel was completed. The design of the new configuration complies with the design and construction Code (ASME Section III, 1974 edition through Winter 74 Addenda).
- An analysis performed on the original flaw and determined that the worst case flaw would not propagate such that the structural integrity of the new weld or the tank boundary would be affected.
- ASME Relief Request 39 was submitted on July 11, 2008, for the original weld on the inner surface that was left in place.
9 The vent nozzle connections on the other three SITs in Unit 1 were inspected using the snoop method and no leakage was detected.
- The Containment Entry at Power procedure, 40DP-9ZZ01, will be revised to add expectations for Operations personnel regarding operational impact of negative findings in containment.
Work Orders were initiated to evaluate the condition of the SITs in Units 2 and 3.
Any additional corrective actions taken as a result of this event will be implemented in accordance with the APS corrective action program. If information is subsequently developed that would significantly affect a reader's understanding or perception of this event, a supplement to this LER will be submitted.
8. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
No similar conditions have been reported in the prior three years.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER