05000498/FIN-2012004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct a longstanding leak from the body-to-bonnet gasket on the safety injection system hot leg check valve 1N122XSI0010A, a portion of the reactor coolant system Class 1 pressure boundary. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Because the finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, evaluates the finding using Appendix A. Using Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; and did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 11-23693. Because the licensee evaluated the condition during the recent refueling outage in November 2011 prior to NRC involvement and considered actions to repair the seal cap enclosure weld adequate without considering the condition of the pressure retaining boundary, this issue was considered indicative of current plant performance. In addition, this finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with decision making, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions when making decisions and did not demonstrate that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2012004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Dixon B Tharakan W Walker J Laughlin N Hernandez J Wingebach |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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