05000498/FIN-2011005-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Design Change on Class 1E 4160 Vac ESF Transformers |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control, for the failure to ensure that design standards were correctly translated into drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the design specifications of the Class 1E 4160 Vac buses were not maintained with the installation of a new transformer. The root cause investigation determined that the design change package that installed the new transformers on Units 1 and 2 in October 2009 and April 2010, respectively, was not modeled correctly. The licensee captured this event as Condition Report 11-10205 and implemented immediate compensatory measures of increased monitoring on the Class 1E 4160 Vac buses by implementing temporary logs to ensure that the Class 1E loads were within their technical specifications surveillance procedure acceptance criteria until the new design change package could be implemented on each unit. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inadequate design change package resulted in the licensee declaring the Unit 2 Class 1E 4160 Vac E2B bus inoperable because it was outside of the technical specification surveillance procedure acceptance criteria for longer than allowed by technical specifications. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of functionality per Part 9900 Technical Guidance, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, dated April 16, 2008. In addition, this finding had human performance cross-cutting aspects associated with work practices in that the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2011005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Carson S Garchow J Kramer J Watkins N Greene D Bradley J Dixon K Clayton B Tharakan |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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