05000498/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow ASME Code Requirements |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to follow in-service inspection requirements of Section XI of the 2004 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee had not correctly applied Section XI, IWA-5250, to boric acid residues that were discovered under the base lip of the refueling water storage tank on September 20, 2011. The inspectors questioned the licensees operability determination of fully operable and engineering disposition of acceptable for use, because the degradation mechanism was not readily apparent and the licensee had not characterized the flaw. The licensee documented the issues in Condition Reports 12-20019 and 12-20026 and changed the operability determination to operable but degraded. This finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and if left uncorrected it would have the potential to become a more significant safety concern because the structural integrity of the safety injection systems primary source of cooling water could be compromised. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not result in the loss of a system safety function; it did not represent a loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed outage time; it did not represent a loss of one or more nontechnical specification risk-significant equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with decision making because the licensee did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained |
Site: | South Texas |
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Report | IR 05000498/2012003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Dixon G Guerra P Elkmann B Tharakan R Kopriva W Walker R Latta B Correll S Cumblidge |
CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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