05000483/FIN-2014003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Extent of Condition Review |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to perform an adequate extent of condition assessment. While performing an evaluation of pitting corrosion identified on buried refueling water storage piping, the licensee failed to provide an adequate technical justification for not expanding the scope of their review beyond th
specific piping when pitting corrosion was identified in the original sample selection Licensee procedural guidance for a Significance Level 3 adverse condition requires th reviewer to identify other potentially susceptible systems or components and fully explai the boundary for the extent of condition, but this was not done. This finding does no represent an immediate safety concern. The licensee entered the finding into thei corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201402168. This finding affecte safety-related piping in which pitting was observed and repaired prior to being returned t service. The licensees failure to perform an adequate extent of condition review of the pitting of the buried 24-inch refueling water storage tank piping in the essential core cooling system supply line is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected, it has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if other welds on this same pipe render it susceptible to pitting corrosion in the weld heat affected zone. The finding affects the Mitigating System Cornerstone because the performance deficiency is related to the essential core cooling systems ability to conduct short-term decay heat removal. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of safety function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the conservative bias component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not use conservative decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable [H.14]. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2014003 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Hartman Z Hollcraft A Allen D Proulx G George J Braisted N O'Keefe P Elkmann P Jayroe R Strobled Proulxg George J Braisted N O'Keefe P Elkmann P Jayroe T Hartman Z Hollcraft |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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