05000461/FIN-2012003-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Tornado Missile Protection for Safety |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, when permanently installed tornado missile barrier protection was removed without adequate provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and included in design documents and that deviation from such standards was controlled. The licensee failed to ensure tornado missile protection for safety related components prior to and during maintenance affecting Control Room Ventilation (VC) Train \\\'A\\\'. Specifically, when the permanent missile barrier was removed, the licensee failed to ensure protection for two safety related radiation monitors, 1 RIX-PR009C and 1 RIX-PR009D and did not satisfy requirements in modification documents for protection of VC panel OPL72JA. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program for evaluation and performed immediate corrective actions to resolve the design deficiencies at the time of identification. The finding was of more than minor significance because it was sufficiently similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 3(a) in that this modification was found to contain errors significant enough that the modification required rework to correctly resolve design basis tornado concerns. The performance deficiency was also associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. SpeCifically, the licensee failed to protect safety related components during work activities that modified the installed missile barrier required by the Clinton Power Station design. The finding was a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because the design deficiency was confirmed to not result in an actual loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors concluded that the finding affected the cross cutting area of human performance. Specifically, in the area of work control, the licensee did not appropriately plan work activities by incorporating job site conditions and the need for adequate planned contingencies. |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2012003 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker D Lords D Passehl J Beavers J Bozga J Draper M Ring R Ruiz S Mischkeb Kemkerd Lords D Reeser M Phalen M Ring R Walton S Mischke |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Clinton) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||