05000445/LER-2003-001, From Comanche Peak, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by TS
| ML030720436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/2003 |
| From: | Walker R TXU Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 10010, CPSES-200300421, TXX-03018 LER 03-001-00 | |
| Download: ML030720436 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4452003001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
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,1V3 TXU Energy Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station P.O Box 1002 (E01)
Glen Rose,TX 76043 Tel 254 897 8920 Fax 254 897 6652 lance terry@txu corn C. Lance Terry Senior Vice President &
Principal Nuclear Officer Ref: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
CPSES-200300421 Log # TXX-03018 File # 10010 March 7, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50-445 CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 445/03-001-00 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 03-001-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1, "Unit 1 Train B Residual Heat Removal System Made Inoperable Due to Testing."
The subject issue was discovered on October 5, 2002. However, it was not deemed to be reportable until January 6, 2003. This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPSES Unit 1.
TXU TXX-03018 Page 2 of 2 Sincerely, TXU Generation Company LP By:
TXU Generation Management Company LLC, Its General Partner C. L. Terry Senior Vice President and Principal Nuclear Officer By:
_t ___
RogerD. Walker Regulatory Affairs Manager GLM/gm Enclosures c -
E. W. Merschoff, Region IV W. D. Johnson, Region IV D. H. Jaffe, NRR Resident Inspectors, CPSES
Enclosure to TXX-03018 NRC FORIM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (7-2001)
EXPIRES 07i3112004 Estimated birden per response to comply with this mandatory informsation collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> Reported lessons learned ure incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to mdustry Send cosmments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6). U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 0555-(.
or by ntenet e-mail to bjsl@ nrc gov. and to the Desk Officer. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. NEOB-10202 (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503 If a means used to Impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not rFeutred to respond to the mfortmation collection Facility Name (I)
Docket Number (2)
Page (3)
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 05000445 1 OF 5 Ttle (4)
CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Event Date (5)
LER Nurnoer (6) l Report Date (7)
Other Facilities Involved (8)
Month Day Year Year Sequential Revision Month Day Year Facility Nam Docket Numbers Number M
Number l
l N/A 05000 10 05 02 03 001 H 00 03 07 03 05000 Operath6g This report is nuibulted pursuant to the reclurements of 10 CFR, (Check all that applv) (I 1)
Mode (9) 6 20 2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(t)(C) 50 73(a)(2)(vii)
Power 20 2201 (d) 20 2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
Level (OIs 20 2203(a)(1) 20 2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ui)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20 2203(a)(2)(i) 50 36(c)(2)(i)(A)
=
50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50 73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20 2203(a)(2)(n) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(tv)(A) 50 72(a)(2)(x) 20 2203(a)(2)(iii) 50 36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73 71 (a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50 46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71 (a)(5)
N 20 2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER 20 2203(a)(2)(vi)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or
.acenee Co t Fo Ts R (1in (If more space is requred use additonal copes of SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES At 10:00 a.m. on October 5, 2002, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 during the ninth refueling outage with the reactor vessel [EIIS:(RPV)] head removed. The reactor core contained all of the spent fuel assemblies and the upper internals were in place. Core cooling was being provided by RHR [EIIS:(BP)] Train A and RHR Train B was aligned to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) [EIIS:(BE)(TK)] for refueling cavity fill. Operations personnel (Utility, Licensed) were preparing for Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator discharge check valve [EIIS:(BQ)(CKV)] testing which followed a plan whereby the two accumulators [EIIS:(BQ)(ACC)] associated with the RHR Train providing cavity fill would be discharged first and the remaining two would be discharged following realignment of the other RHR Train to provide cavity fill.
Simultaneous to the SI check valve testing preparations, Maintenance personnel (Utility, Non-Licensed) began Technical Specification required channel calibration testing on one of the two Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System channels. Permission to commence this testing was granted by both the Surveillance Work Window Manager (Utility, Licensed) and the Unit Supervisor (Utility, Licensed) based on the schedule predecessor logic tie (reactor vessel head removal) being met. Maintenance personnel were approved to commence the LTOP channel calibration at 10:02 a.m. with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [EHS:(AB)] level just above the reactor vessel flange. It should be noted here that the LTOP channel calibration testing renders the Train B RHR Pump Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation Valve [EIIS:(BP)(ISV)] interlocked closed to prevent RHR overpressurization.
(If niore space is equied, use addtlioral copies of (If more space Is requred, use additional copies of (If niore space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
During the time frame from approval to commence work until restoration of RHR Train B to an Operable condition, RHR Train A was providing shutdown cooling, RCS temperature was approximately 100 degrees F, RCS charging was in service at 200 gpm to the cold legs, the refuel cavity level ranged from just above the reactor vessel flange to 10 feet above the reactor vessel flange, and the reactor upper internals were in-place. At no time was the Train A RHR shutdown cooling system challenged by this event; therefore, this event did not adversely affect the safe operation of CPSES Unit 1 or the health and safety of the public.
IV.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
TXU Energy believes that the cause of the event was the Outage Work Schedule Report did not contain the necessary predecessor logic tie to ensure that the LTOP channel calibration would be performed in a timeframe that would ensure the operability of both RHR Trains in compliance with the Technical Specification requirements. Also, the LTOP channel calibration test did not contain specific references to the Refueling Operations Technical Specification requirements relevant to the conditions under which the testing was to be performed.
V.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
As a part of the CPSES Corrective Action Program, the following actions will be taken to address this event:
The Outage Work Schedule Report will be changed to contain the necessary predecessor logic tie to ensure that future LTOP channel calibration tests will be performed in a timeframe that will ensure the operability of the necessary RHR Trains in compliance with the Technical Specification requirements.
LTOP channel calibration test procedures will be clarified to note that the RHR Pump Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation Valves, if closed, cannot be opened from the Control Room, during performance of the test. References to the applicable Technical Specifications (3.9.5 and 3.9.6) will also be added to the procedures.
Other potentially impacted procedures will be reviewed to ensure that future LTOP channel calibration tests are not impactive to plant operations or system operability. A lessons learned regarding this event will be issued to Outage Scheduling and Operations personnel.
VI.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no previous similar events in the last three years.
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