05000446/LER-2003-003, Regarding Spray Additive System Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Valves
| ML033640501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2003 |
| From: | Blevins M TXU Electric, TXU Generation Co, LP |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CPSES-200302511, TXX-03194 LER 03-003-00 | |
| Download: ML033640501 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4462003003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
h TXU TXU Energy Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station P.O. Box 1002 (EO1)
Glen RoseTX 76043 Tel: 254 897 5209 Fax: 254 897 6652 mike.blevins@txu.com Mike Blevins Senior Vice President & Principal Nuclear Officer Ref: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
CPSES-200302511 Log # TXX-03194 File # 10010 December 23, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50-446 CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 446/03-003-00 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 03-003-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 2, "Spray Additive System Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Valves."
This communication contains the following new commitments which will be completed as noted:
Commitment Number 27303 27304
Commitment
The applicable Operations procedures will be revised as required to provide additional information on the operation of "knocker" type valves.
Operations will also provide training during the upcoming training cycle on the specifics of this event.
A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance
/
yd Callaway
- Comanche Peak
- Diablo Canyon
- Palo Verde
- South Texas Project Wolf Creek
TXX-03 194 Page 2 of 2 The commitment number is used by TXU Generation Company LP for the internal tracking of CPSES commitments.
Sincerely, TXU Generation Company LP By:
TXU Generation Management Company LLC, Its General Partner Mike Blevins GLM/gm Enclosure C:
B. S. Mallett, Region IV W. D. Johnson, Region IV M. C. Thadani, NRR Resident Inspectors, CPSES A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Aliance Caliaway Comanche Peak
- Diablo Canyon
- Palo Verde
- South Texas Project
- Wolf Creek
Enclosure to TXX-03194 NRC FORM 366 U.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3W1500104 (7-2001)
EXPIRES 731120M the NRC may not conduct or asonsor.
and a son rt equired so esPond to the information collection.
Facility Name (I)
Docket Number (2)
Page (3)
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 2 05000446 1 OF 6 Title (4)
CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Evem Date (
LER Number 6)
Repott Date (7)
Other Faciities Involved (8)
Month Day Year Year 1Serpenti Revision Month Day Year Faciity Name Docket Numbser Number Number N/A 05000 111 02 03 003 00 12 23 03 05000 Operating repon submitted pursuant to the requsenent of 10 CPR: (aeck all that
()
t 1)
Mode (9) 1 l 20.2201(b)
I 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2XiXC) 50.73(a)(2Xvii)
Power 20.2201(d)
I 20.2203(aX3Xii)
S0.73(al2)ii)(A) 50.73(aX2)(viii)(A)
Lin 77 20.2203(aXl) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2Xii)(B) 50.73(a)l2)(viii)(B)
.2203(aX2Xi)
S0.36(c)(2)i)(A) 50.73(aX2)(iii) 50.73(aX2)(ixXA) 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 50.36(c)(lf(ii)(A) 50.73(aX2)(ivXA) 50.72(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2)
I 50.73(aK2)(vXA)
I 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 5 0.46(aX3Xii) 0.73(aX2)(vXB) 73.71(aX5) 20.2203(aX2Xv) 573(aX2XiXA) 50.73(a(2vXC)
_ OTHER
_20.2203(a2_vi)
X 50.73(a2iB)
X2Xv)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Fon 366A LicenseeContact For lis LER (12)
Nam Teephrne Numiber (Incude AaCode)
Tim Hope - Regulatory Performance Manager l254-897-6370 Complete One Line For Esch Component Failure Described in Ths Report (13)
Cause
System Component Manufacturer Reportable
Cause
System leComponent Marufictur Reportable j
I I
I To EN TO EPIX Supplemental Report Expected (14)
Month Day Year EXPECIED YES I
I NO SUBMISSION tlf YsS.
)ete EXPECTEDlSUBMISSION DA)
X lDATE (15)
ALSb I
.Ako (LAtIll to 14U spaces, i.e., approxirnately i sfngie-spacea typewrtten UfnS) t10)
On November 2, 2003, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, operating at approximately 77 percent power. At 0934 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.55387e-4 months <br />, Operations personnel discovered that two valves in the Containment Spray system were mispositioned. With these valves mispositioned, the Spray Additive system was determined to have been inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications.
TXU Generation Company LP (TXU Energy) believes that the cause of this event was the lack of specific training and procedural guidance for verifying the status of valves with a remote "knocker" operating mechanism. This type of valve has a Roto-Hammer impactor and bridle fitted to the valve stem. Corrective actions include verification of the position of other similar valves, Operations procedure revisions, and training of Operations personnel on the specifics of this event.
All times in this report are approximate and Central Standard Time unless noted otherwise.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2WI)
Enclosure to TXX-03194 (if wme ape. required use additlotu copies of NRC Fon36A) (17)
I.
DESCRIPTION OF REPORTABLE EVENT A.
REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION
Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
B.
PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT On November 2, 2003, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, operating at approximately 77 percent power following the Unit 2 seventh refueling outage.
C.
STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT There were no inoperable structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
D.
NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES On October 21, 2003, CPSES Unit 2 was in Mode 6, Refueling Operation, during the Unit 2 seventh refueling outage. Plant Equipment Operators (utility, non-licensed) removed clearance 2-03-01277, which involved placing two Containment Spray system valves (2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034) [EIIS:(BE)(V)] in the open position. The sequence outlined for removing the clearance was to first release 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 locally in the closed position and then, at the remote operator [EIIS:(BE)(VOP)], place the two valves in the open position.
One of the Plant Equipment Operators (PEO 1) released valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 locally in the closed position and the other Plant Equipment Operator (PEO 2) performed the independent verification. Then, at the remote operator location, PEO 1 attempted to manipulate the valves to the open position, but noticed that the tee handle did not move much. PEO 1 stopped and questioned PEO 2 about this unanticipated condition. PEO 2 checked the valves locally to verify their open position status and recognized that the valves had a "knocker" type operating mechanism. Valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 have a Roto-Hammer impactor and bridle fitted to the valve stem, and Operations personnel typically refer to this type of mechanism as a "knocker." Remote operation for these type valves is performed using a tee handle, and the handle normally rotates about 180 degrees before engaging the "knocker" mechanism.
Of me Wace is require use addiunail copies of NRC Fonn 366A) (17)
At the local position, PEO 2 attempted "knocking" the valves in the open direction, but felt some resistance and convinced himself the valves were in their open position. Both PEOs then incorrectly statused valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 position as open on clearance 2-03-01277. It should be noted that PEO 1 had not previously remotely operated a valve with a "knocker" mechanism.
On October 24, 2003, CPSES Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, during the Unit 2 seventh refueling outage. A Plant Equipment Operator (PEO 3) performed Section 8.1 of procedure OPT-205B, "Train B Containment Spray System Valve Position Verification."
At the remote operator for 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034, the PEO 3 noticed a gap between the open indication and the positioner. Using a tee handle, the PEO 3 moved the remote operator 1/4 to 1/2 turns, felt some resistance, and convinced himself that the valve was open and incorrectly statused valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 as open. It should be noted that PEO 3 also had not previously remotely operated a valve with a "knocker" mechanism.
On October 26, 2003 at 0610, CPSES Unit 2 changed from Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, to Mode 4, Hot Shutdown.
On November 2, 2003 at 0900, CPSES Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, operating at approximately 77 percent power. A Plant Equipment Operator (PEO 4) was performing Section 8.1 of procedure OPT-205B, Section 8.1 "Train B Containment Spray System Valve Position Verification." At the remote operator location for valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034, the PEO 4 noticed that the valve position indication looked different than indicators he had seen on the other valves being verified. Using a tee handle, PEO 4 attempted to close valve 2CT-0034, but no movement was observed. PEO 4 then attempted to open valve 2CT-0034 and observed some movement. PEO 4 locally checked the valves and noticed that the valves had a "knocker" type operating mechanism. Because of the unanticipated condition, PEO 4 contacted the Control Room and at 0934 valves 2CT 0030 and 2CT-0034 were determined to be in the closed position and the Spray Additive system was declared inoperable. With valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 closed, one of the four chemical eductor [EIIS:(BE)(EDR)] flow paths was isolated which rendered the Spray Additive system inoperable. Operations personnel (utility, licensed) opened valves 2CT-0030 and 2CT-0034 and at 1005 the operability of the Spray Additive system was restored. It should be noted that PEO 4 had previously operated valves with a "knocker" mechanism.
NK-IRUKM SOOA -AIL)
Enclosure to TXX-03194 NRC FORM 346A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-20EI)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FacilkyNane (1)
Docket IR Numbe6) l PAge(3) l Year a
Sequential Revision COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 2 l05000446 u03 H
Numt OF 6 NARRATIVE Of mm spce is equired. use additional copies of NRC Form 36A) (17)
E.
TIE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL OR PERSONNEL ERROR A Plant Equipment Operator (utility, non-licensed) discovered during the performance of a Containment Spray System Valve Position Verification procedure that two valves in the Containment Spray system were mispositioned.
I.
COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES A.
FAILURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECTS OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT Not applicable - No component or system failures were identified during this event.
B.
CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE Not applicable - No component or system failures were identified during this event.
C.
SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS Not applicable - No component or system failures were identified during this event.
D.
FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION
Not applicable - No component or system failures were identified during this event.
II.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
A.
SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED Not applicable - No safety system responses occurred as a result of this event.
B.
DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY The Spray Additive system was inoperable from 0610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br /> on October 26, 2003 until 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br /> on November 2, 2003 (a total of 171 hours0.00198 days <br />0.0475 hours <br />2.827381e-4 weeks <br />6.50655e-5 months <br /> and 55 minutes).
NKL iKM36A (I-Jl)
Enclosure to TXX-03194 (If m space is requid us dditnal copies of (If more ace I required. use addibonal copies of NRC Fom 366A) (17)
IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
TXU Generation Company LP (TXU Energy) believes that the cause of this event was the lack of specific training and procedural guidance for verifying the status of valves with a remote "knocker" operating mechanism.
V.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Upon discovery, Operations personnel immediately opened valves 2CT-030 and 2CT-034, restoring the Spray Additive system to an operable status. Shift Operations issued a Lessons Learned to Shift Operations personnel outlining the specifics of this event and immediate notification to department personnel was made by adding an entry into the Shift Orders. Also, a position verification lineup was performed on similar remotely operated "knocker" valves in Units 1 and 2 to confirm that the valves were in the correct position. No other mispositioned valves were identified.
The applicable Operations procedures will be revised as required to provide additional information on the operation of "knocker' type valves. Operations will also provide training during the upcoming training cycle on the specifics of this event.
VL PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS There have been no previous similar events in the last three years.
NKL 5UM 366A 1-AUI)