05000445/LER-2013-001, Regarding Inoperability of Unit Emergency Airlock Exterior Door
| ML13079A331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/2013 |
| From: | Madden F, Flores R Luminant Power, Luminant Generation Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CP-201300166, TXX-13026 LER 13-001-00 | |
| Download: ML13079A331 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4452013001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
a Luminant Rafael Flores Senior Vice President
& Chief Nuclear Officer Rafael.flores@Luminant.com Luminant Power P 0 Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 T 254 897 5550 C 817 559 0403 F 254 897 6652 CP-201300166 Log # TXX-13026 March 7, 2013 Ref. # 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-445 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 445/13-001-00, INOPERABILITY OF UNIT 1 EMERGENCY AIRLOCK EXTERIOR DOOR
Dear Sir or Madam:
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 445/13-001-00, "Inoperability of Unit 1 Emergency Airlock exterior Door," for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 1.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.
Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Tim Hope at (254) 897-6370.
Sincerely, Luminant Generation Company LLC Rafael Flores By:
"d
ý rý red W. Madden Director, Oversight & Regulatory Affairs A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway - Comanche Peak - Diablo Canyon - Palo Verde
- San Onofre
- South Texas Project
- Wolf Creek
U.S. NucLear Regulatory Commission TXX-13026 Page 2 03/07/13 Enclosure c -
E. E. Collins, Region IV B. K. Singal, NRR Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak
Enclosure to TXX-13026 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NO. 3150-0104 (10-2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 1 05000445 1 OF 5
- 4. TITLE Inoperability of Unit 1 Emergency Airlock Exterior Door
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER NUMBER NO.
01 08 2013 13 001 00 03 07 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[J 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1
[.7] 20.2201(d)
E]
20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[] 20.2203(a)(4)
H 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
_]
20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[
50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[]
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[]
50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
EJ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
IZ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[J 73.71(a)(4) 100 0l 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[]
50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 1J 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[] OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
VOLUNTARY LER
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Timothy A. Hope, Manager, Nuclear Licensing 254-897-6370CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE U
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX I
FACTURER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR l
YES (if yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) El NO DATE ABI STRA (Limit to 14UU spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On January 8, 2013, Maintenance personnel attempted to open the Unit 1 Emergency Air Lock (EAL) interior door, but it would not move. On January 14, 2013, it was determined the Unit 1 emergency airlock exterior equalization valve had been out of position from 12/22/2012 until 01/08/2013 resulting in the emergency airlock being inoperable. This condition exceeded the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.2 Condition A, resulting in a condition prohibited by the TS. The cause of this event was procedures did not provide adequate guidance for operating the Unit 1 EAL exterior door mechanism. Corrective actions include revising procedures to stipulate that the door handwheel should be operated in the close direction until tight.
NRC FORM 3e6 110-2010)
PRINTEO ON RECYCLEO PAPER NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER (If more space is required, use additional copies of SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES:
On December 22, 2012, a door seal test of the Unit 1 Emergency Air Lock (EAL) interior and exterior doors [EIIS: (NH)(AL)(DR)] was performed satisfactorily.
On January 8, 2013, Maintenance personnel (Utility, Non-licensed) entered the Unit 1 containment in order to perform preventive maintenance on the Unit 1 EAL. When attempting to open the Unit 1 EAL interior door, the door would not move. Investigation by the Maintenance personnel discovered the door position indication for the exterior door appeared to indicate the exterior door was not completely cycled.
Believing that the position of the exterior door's position indication might mean the interlock preventing both doors from being opened simultaneously was engaged, the Maintenance personnel attempted to operate the exterior door's interior handwheel in the close direction. That effort yielded handwheel movement of 1 to 1-1/2 turns, clearing the interlock. The interior door could then be opened as desired.
The Maintenance personnel completed their maintenance and exited the Unit 1 containment. Upon exiting the Unit 1 containment, the Maintenance personnel contacted their supervision and expressed their concern that under similar conditions personnel lacking knowledge of the EAL door interlock might not have been able to exit the Unit 1 containment via the Unit 1 EAL in an emergency.
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
Procedures associated with operation of the EAL doors did not provide adequate guidance to ensure Operators were successful in operating the Unit 1 EAL exterior door mechanism sufficiently to shut EAL exterior door equalizing valve and to clear the interlock.
During troubleshooting efforts, it was discovered that that in 1985, a decision to not activate the valve position limit switches for the EAL door equalizing valves was made by the utility. This eliminated the only positive means of ensuring the valves were shut when required.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Procedures for operation of the EAL doors will be revised to stipulate that when closing the EAL doors the door handwheel should be operated in the close direction until tight.
The EAL door equalizing valve limit switches will be activated and connected to the EAL door open alarms to provide Control Room personnel positive indication that the EAL doors and associated equalizing valves are shut.
VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no previous similar reportable events at CPNPP in the last three years.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER