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CENTE~ LOR ENERGY PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Mail Address, Robert A. Stratman PO BOX 97 10 CENTER ROAD PE RRY, OHIO 44081 VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR PERRY, OHIO 44081 (216) 259-3737 February 16, 1994 PY-CEI/NRR-1757 L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C.
20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50 440 LER 94-001 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 94-001, " Reactor Vater Cleanup Isolation Due To Loss Of Auxiliary Building Ventilation."
If you have questions or require additional information, please contact Henry Hegrat - Regulatory Affairs, at (216) 280-5606.
Very truly yours,
/
Robert A. Stratman RAS:DHL:sc
Enclosure:
LER 94-001 cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III
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4 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (S 9:')
EXP!RES 5/31/95 ESi! MATED BURDEN PER DESPONSE TO COMPLY Wr1H TH!S INFORMATION E'OU.ECTION REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.
FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) cOMuENTs REGARxG suRDEN EsTwTE TO mE mOnem AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BR/.NCH (MNBB 7714), U R. NUCLEAR Mf GJLATOHY COMMICSiON, V* ASHVJTON. DC 20f:tS 0301, AND TO THE FAPERINORK REDUCTION PG1ECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits / characters for each block)
MANAGEMENT AND suooET. v miNGTON, DC 20503 F ACILITV NAME (1)
DOCMI NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 05000 440 10F 3 Tll'Lt (4)
Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Due To Loss Of Auxiliary Building Ventilation EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
N H NAML DOGul NUUUL R se Out NT A ArvisiON uoNTn DAv vt An vtan uotan cAv vCAR 05000 f AC,IulY NAML DOCKET NUMBER 01 18 94 94 001 0
05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or morel (11)
MODE (9) 20 502(b) 20.405(c) x 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b) 3405(a)(1Hi) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) l POWER 20 405(a)(1 Hn) 50.36(c)(2) 50 73(a)(2)(vii)
OTHER LEVEL (10) j pc)7 20 405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73 ta)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) thP'cW la Ab*'t below and in Text NRC 20 405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(u) 50.73(a)(2)(vin)(B)
F orm 366Al 20 405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) l NAME ILLE PHONL NUMHLH pnclude Area Code)
David H. LockwOOd, Compliance Encineer Extension 7539 (216) 259-3737 COMPL.ETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAU!T SYSTE M COMMENT MANdFACTURER
CAUSE
SYG'EM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER O RS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED "WT H DAY
- H vts SUBMISSION NO prr., WmPW EXPECTED $UHMIS90N DAfE) y DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewntten knes) (16) i On January 18, 1994 at 0737 and 0738 system containment isolations occurred due to Reactor water Cleanup (RVCU) system valve nest room high differential temperatures.
I The high differential temperature occurred as a result of tripping of the Auxiliary Building (AB) Ventilation system supply fans due to lov inlet air temperature. The loss of cooling air to the valve nest room resulted in the high differential temperature.
At the time of these events outside air temperature was approximately minus 20 degrees Fahrenheit. The RUCU system was isolated at 0736 by plant operators in anticipation of the isolation signal. Plant operators verified that no leakage existed and the RVCU system was returned to service on January 21,1994.
Corrective actions were to replace the AB Ventilation system supply fans inlet temperature switches and relocate the associated *tapillary tubing.
NRC f-OHM 3% 5 98
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THE FAPEAWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150C104, OrFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGE 7 WASH!NGTON, DC 20503 f ACILJTY NAME 0)
DOC All NUMBL H (2)
LE R NUMBE R (5)
FAGE (3) bEQUEGAi 8 LVt5 TON 1
NUMOER NUMBER 05000440 OF Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit ]
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Introduction
On January 18, 1994 at 0737 and 0738 Reactor Vater Cleanup (RVCU) [CE] system containment isolations occurred due to valve nest room high differential temperature. At the time of these events the plant was in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) with reactor thermal power approximately 100 percent of rated and reactor vessel pressure approximately 1018 psig.
Notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).
This event is being reported in accordance 10CFR30.73(a)(2)(iv).
II.
Description of Event
On January 18,1994 at 0736 the RVCU system was shutdown with all containment isolation valves closed in anticipation of an isolation signal due to valve nest room high differential temperature. The valve nest room high differential temperature alarm vas received at 0735.
Prior to receiving this alarm the Auxiliary Building (AB) [VF] Ventilation system supply fans [ FAN] had tripped due to lov inlet air temperature.
Attempts to restart the supply fans were unsuccessful. At 0737 a Division 2 RVCU isolation signal was received due to RVCU valve nest room differential temperature. At 0738 a Division 1 RVCU containment isolation signal was also received.
Plant operators verified that no leak existed and the RVCU system was returned to service on January 21, 1994.
Investigation of the supply fans tripping indicated that one of three inlet air temperature switches (TS] in the common supply plenum had failed and that the associated capillary tubing for the switches required relocation to provide a more representative sample of inlet air temperature at the heating coils. At the time of the event outside air temperature was approximately minus 20 degrees Fahrenheit.
III. Cause of Event
These events are attributed to the failure of one of three inlet air temperature switches in the common supply fan plenum and a non-representative temperature indication at the inlet air heating coils.
The purpose of the temperature switches and associated capillary tubing is to protect the inlet air heating coils from freezing. The associated tubing was located in areas which sensed unheated supply air bypassing the heating coils.
The tubing was relocated to areas which ensured that air exiting the heating coils was properly mixed and heated prior to reaching the sensor.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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DOCAET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YE,AR NUMBER NUMBER 05000440 OF Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit i 94
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n,,-.-...-.~..__....--,n Investigation of the fan tripping determined that the failed switch could not be calibrated. A vork order, V.O. 94-0345, was generated and the switch replaced and calibrated successfully.
i IV.
Safety Analysis
The RVCU system is used to control reactor chemistry, reduce reactor water inventory during startup and shutdown, minimize temperature gradients when recirculation pumps are not operating.
A RUCU containment isolation at high reactor power may cause reactor coolant conductivity to slowly increase until the system is returned to service. In this event, RVCU was returned to service before Technical Specification action requirements were exceeded. The RVCU system valve nest room differential temperature detection is part of the Leak i
Detection system, designed to isolate the RUCU system containment penetrations should a RUCU system leak develop.
Since no system leakage existed and the RWCU system was not challenged due to being manually isolated prior to the isolation signal, this event had no safety significant consequence.
V.
Similar Events
Previous RVCU isolations as a result of AB Ventilation problems are documented on LER's88-010, 88-016, and 89-004. However, none of these events involved problems with the inlet air temperature switches and associated capillary tubing.
I The RVCU system was not manually isolated prior to the isolation signal being
{
generated for any of the previous events.
VI.
Corrective Actions
At the time of the AB Ventilation fans tripping investigation was initiated to determine the cause. Replacement of the temperature switch and relocation of the associated capillary tubing was completed and the AB Ventilation system returned to service on January 19, 1994.
Similar capillary tubing location problems were identified in the Intermediate Building Ventilation (VE] system and corrected.
]
Four other plant ventilation systems utilizing similar switches and tubing did not experience tripping due to lov inlet air temperature and therefore relocation of the tubing for these systems was not performed.
Further corrective actions are addressed on Condition Report 94-032.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
NnC FonM assA e e.,
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| 05000440/LER-1994-001, :on 940118,sys Containment Isolation Occurred Due to Reactor Cleanup Sys Valve Nest Room High Differential Temp.Caused by Failure of Inlet Temp Switches.Ab Ventilation Sys Fans Inlet & Temp Switches Replaced |
- on 940118,sys Containment Isolation Occurred Due to Reactor Cleanup Sys Valve Nest Room High Differential Temp.Caused by Failure of Inlet Temp Switches.Ab Ventilation Sys Fans Inlet & Temp Switches Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000440/LER-1994-002, :on 940128,both Reactor Recirculation Sys Pumps Automatically Downshifted from Fast to Slow Speed.Caused by Equipment Failure.Alarm Cards w/1C34-K618B & Alarm Card in Redundant Trip Sys 1C34-K618A Replaced |
- on 940128,both Reactor Recirculation Sys Pumps Automatically Downshifted from Fast to Slow Speed.Caused by Equipment Failure.Alarm Cards w/1C34-K618B & Alarm Card in Redundant Trip Sys 1C34-K618A Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000440/LER-1994-003, :on 940129,lower Air Lock Inoperable,Inner Door Opened in Containment Area for One Minute.Caused by Failure of Outer Door Seal to Deflate as Result of Broken Stem.C/A:Ball Valve Repaired |
- on 940129,lower Air Lock Inoperable,Inner Door Opened in Containment Area for One Minute.Caused by Failure of Outer Door Seal to Deflate as Result of Broken Stem.C/A:Ball Valve Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1994-005, :on 940209,lost Both Trains of Control Room Recirculation Due to Low Emergency Closed Cooling Temperature.Revised Appropriate Sys Operating Procedures to Maintain ECC Temperature Above 55 F |
- on 940209,lost Both Trains of Control Room Recirculation Due to Low Emergency Closed Cooling Temperature.Revised Appropriate Sys Operating Procedures to Maintain ECC Temperature Above 55 F
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000440/LER-1994-005-01, :on 940209,loss of Both Trains of Control Room Emergency Recirculation Occurred Due to Low Emergency Closed Cooling Temp.Appropriate Sys Operating Procedures Revised |
- on 940209,loss of Both Trains of Control Room Emergency Recirculation Occurred Due to Low Emergency Closed Cooling Temp.Appropriate Sys Operating Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1994-006, :on 940210,RCIC Sys Inboard Containment Cooling Isolation Occurred During Isolation of Logic Sys Functional Surveillance Instruction.Caused by Inadequate Procedure. Surveillance Instruction to Be Revised |
- on 940210,RCIC Sys Inboard Containment Cooling Isolation Occurred During Isolation of Logic Sys Functional Surveillance Instruction.Caused by Inadequate Procedure. Surveillance Instruction to Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000440/LER-1994-007, :on 940217,passive Seismic Instrument Failure Occurred Due to Intrusion of Water.Affected Instrument, Peak Acceleration Recorder Replaced |
- on 940217,passive Seismic Instrument Failure Occurred Due to Intrusion of Water.Affected Instrument, Peak Acceleration Recorder Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000440/LER-1994-008, :on 940225,two SRV Unexpectedly Opened Eight Times.Caused by Inadequate Instructions.Training Provided & Review of Preparation Process for Appropriate Enhancements Performed |
- on 940225,two SRV Unexpectedly Opened Eight Times.Caused by Inadequate Instructions.Training Provided & Review of Preparation Process for Appropriate Enhancements Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000440/LER-1994-009, :on 940319,DG Returned to Rated Speed During Shutdown.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedures. Personnel Trained on DG Pneumatic Controls |
- on 940319,DG Returned to Rated Speed During Shutdown.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedures. Personnel Trained on DG Pneumatic Controls
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000440/LER-1994-010, :on 940414,unanticipated Automatic Start of ESW Pump a & ECC Pump a Occurred.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Rev to PDB Load List Will Be Implemented as Appropriate |
- on 940414,unanticipated Automatic Start of ESW Pump a & ECC Pump a Occurred.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Rev to PDB Load List Will Be Implemented as Appropriate
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000440/LER-1994-011-01, Forwards LER 94-011-01 Re Containment Isolation Valve Actuations During Restoration from Divisional Bus Outage | Forwards LER 94-011-01 Re Containment Isolation Valve Actuations During Restoration from Divisional Bus Outage | | | 05000440/LER-1994-013, :on 940518,noted That LPCI C Loop Injection Valve Was Closed Due to Program Weakness.Suspended Core Alternations from Time Valve Was Discovered Until Compliance W/Ts 3.6.4 Action Requirement |
- on 940518,noted That LPCI C Loop Injection Valve Was Closed Due to Program Weakness.Suspended Core Alternations from Time Valve Was Discovered Until Compliance W/Ts 3.6.4 Action Requirement
| | | 05000440/LER-1994-015, :on 940609,plant Operator Reported That ESW Loop Keepfill Pressure Less than Required Due to Deficiency in SW Sys Design Change.Esw Keepfill Sys Aligned to Altenate Supply Until Final C/As Completed |
- on 940609,plant Operator Reported That ESW Loop Keepfill Pressure Less than Required Due to Deficiency in SW Sys Design Change.Esw Keepfill Sys Aligned to Altenate Supply Until Final C/As Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000440/LER-1994-016, :on 940609,keepfill Pressure for ESW Loops B & C Was Reported as Out of Specification Low.Caused by Deficiency in SW System Design Change.Design Change Is Being Developed |
- on 940609,keepfill Pressure for ESW Loops B & C Was Reported as Out of Specification Low.Caused by Deficiency in SW System Design Change.Design Change Is Being Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1994-017, :on 940711,automatic Isolation of RHR Sys Shutdown Cooling Suction Outboard Containment Isolation Valve Occurred Due to Inadequate Work Order.Work Order Process for I&C Work Orders Will Be Reviewed |
- on 940711,automatic Isolation of RHR Sys Shutdown Cooling Suction Outboard Containment Isolation Valve Occurred Due to Inadequate Work Order.Work Order Process for I&C Work Orders Will Be Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000440/LER-1994-018, :on 940729,standby Train of Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System Automatically Started Due to Low Flow Condition on AEGTS Train.Caused by Failure of Signal Selector Card.Replaced Signal Selector Card |
- on 940729,standby Train of Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System Automatically Started Due to Low Flow Condition on AEGTS Train.Caused by Failure of Signal Selector Card.Replaced Signal Selector Card
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000440/LER-1994-019, :on 940620,determined That Credit for RCIC as Closed Sys Outside of Containment Relief.Caused by Failure of Licensing & Design Basis.Discovery of Addl Bypass Leakage Pathways Have Been Identified |
- on 940620,determined That Credit for RCIC as Closed Sys Outside of Containment Relief.Caused by Failure of Licensing & Design Basis.Discovery of Addl Bypass Leakage Pathways Have Been Identified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000440/LER-1994-020-01, :on 940831,diesel Generator Was Inoperable. Caused by Personnel Error.Disciplinary Action Was Taken Against Control Room Unit Supervisors |
- on 940831,diesel Generator Was Inoperable. Caused by Personnel Error.Disciplinary Action Was Taken Against Control Room Unit Supervisors
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000440/LER-1994-020, :on 940831,control Room Operators Identified That Div III Diesel Generator Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Div III Diesel Generator Operable Status Restored |
- on 940831,control Room Operators Identified That Div III Diesel Generator Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Div III Diesel Generator Operable Status Restored
| | | 05000440/LER-1994-021, :on 941108,maint Mechanic Identified Bridge Clamp Installed on Div 2 DG Testable Rupture Disc.Caused by Inadequate Work Procedure & Personnel Error/Failure to Follow Procedure.Restored Div 2 DG |
- on 941108,maint Mechanic Identified Bridge Clamp Installed on Div 2 DG Testable Rupture Disc.Caused by Inadequate Work Procedure & Personnel Error/Failure to Follow Procedure.Restored Div 2 DG
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1994-022, :on 941111,determined That Testing of Diesel Generators Did Not Meet Definition of Staggered Test Basis. Caused by Failure of Surveillance Test Program to Properly Schedule DG Testing.Testing for DG Revised |
- on 941111,determined That Testing of Diesel Generators Did Not Meet Definition of Staggered Test Basis. Caused by Failure of Surveillance Test Program to Properly Schedule DG Testing.Testing for DG Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000440/LER-1994-023, :on 941212,TS LCO Action Exceeded When Plant Not Placed Into Hot Shutdown Condition.Caused by Degradation of Batch 314 Viton Seating Matl Located in Disk Holder sub-assembly.Seating Matl Replaced |
- on 941212,TS LCO Action Exceeded When Plant Not Placed Into Hot Shutdown Condition.Caused by Degradation of Batch 314 Viton Seating Matl Located in Disk Holder sub-assembly.Seating Matl Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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