:on 920227,loss of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred.Caused by Failure of EPA Logic Board.Logic Board Was Replaced Following Satisfactory Calibration & 6 H warm-up Period| ML20094M504 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Perry  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
03/27/1992 |
|---|
| From: |
Hegrat H CENTERIOR ENERGY |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML20094M507 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-92-001, LER-92-1, NUDOCS 9204010058 |
| Download: ML20094M504 (4) |
|
Similar Documents at Perry |
|---|
|
text
r rhmM 364 U 5 NUCLE AR Rt GULATD3Y COMMi$1 SON g,PROv t O OM3 NO 3160 0104 t mPIRil 4 30/97 ESTtMAT E D llVRD(N PE R RE SPONSI TO COMPL Y WTH TH1$
eNF OR M A T IO
$0 0 MR$ 80RW ARD UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CoMMt NT
.N COL L E C i. TON Rf Out ST icacio No vRotN { stimate To T-t RicoRos AND F EPORTS MANAGtME NT BR ANCM 4P 6301 US NUCLEAR RE GUL ATOHV COMMISSION W ASHaNGTON DC 20bt5 AND70 THE P APE RWO84lf REDvCTION PROJECT 43?6C 01041 08 F IC E Os M AN AGE ME NT AND BUOGtT. W ASa NGTON DC 20603 F ACILITV Naut til
' Doca lf NUM8t m (21 P A G E 5 3' Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 o l6 l o 1o l o l4 1 4l0 1 lorl0 l 3 finsp, ss of Beactor Protection System Bus Due to Electrical Protection Assembly Trip oo onru hr in P,bnce of' Phnt and PWCU Irein ione EVENT DATE ill L E R Nvusta isi atPoe t DAf t 17:
ofet a s Acitsf ait sNv0Lvt0 tel MONTM OAV YEAR
" * (M h* "
M MONTM OAy tfAR
- ACau f v N AMt3 DOC E { T NUM9 t R!$1 Opl01010 1 l l 0l2 2l7 9
2 9l2 0l0l1 0l0 0l3 2l7 9l 2 o isio io i o, i i T*i
={Pont is iv.MiTTt o PuasuaNt To T i a.Ouia:M( = T o, ie C, a i
,c, -e - --,,,...-,,, n u o,,,,,,,
I 20 402thI 2C 40 Gist Y
te 734eH2H.el 73 Pitti POWen 30 4068ed1Ha to 345ellit le f ateHirtel 73 711el L{viL 1
410i
= l g l l' m
70 406 te W1 Hul
$0 Enute WI 73 eH2Hval OTMi R #3peNy
- A 6s treer m e a. Te., v c r e,-
70 eneesittiWO to 73isat:H.1 60 736ert2Hv=H A6 lo6At 20 406 ta H 1 HMe to 734aHluel to 736eh318,mitti to 405 einliet 50 7 3teH2Hm!
to 73teH2Het LICE N8E t CONT ACT 70m YMal LT A Hit NAME
' t[f PHONE NuvetR i
art-not Henry L. Hn rat, Corolitnce Encinear, Extansion 9185 Pl116 P I E l 01 - l 31 71 31 7 COMPLETE Crit LING FOm i ACM COMPONiNT F Altuel Ot&C AiBED IN TMit AEPOR T M31
]yC n t PCR T,A LL cassg g y gy g,
cou,g,g g,
My C
pfPoaTaetL CAV$(
$Y 5T E M COMPONENT g pp g X
J, C C; B; D, G, 0; 8, 3 N
I I l !
! I I I
! l !
l I !
SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT E R'ECTIO Mel MONTu Day lvtAN sv.M.isio~
% F $ W ven covente LGECTiO SugMoSSION DA TE)
NO l
l l
AA n ACT a-,., m.. e e,m e-e,e.,
~,.e
. e _e e.,e.~.o-o., o m On February 27, 1992 the Reactor Protection System (RPS) distribution Bus B became deenergized, resulting in a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Balance of Plant isolation, along with a Reactor Vater Cleanup isolation. The operators responded in accordance with plant procedures to restore the affected systems.
The cause of this event was failure of an Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) logic board. Troubles 30 ting resulted in spurious trips of the EPA under load conditions, and identified unsatisfactory reading for the trip and time delays settings, The RPS Motor Generator Set was determined not to be a factor in this event.
The faulty EPA logic board was replaced and, following a successful load test, the EPAs were returned to service.
The board is being returned to the manufacturer for failure analysis.
Additionally, this event vill be reviewed with licensed and nonlicensed operators as part of routine opera sr requalification training-9204010058 920327 DR ADOCK 05000440 PDR
~,.C,e,.
.. m
~~
u. m.A..,-,..,c - oc gCgo.
A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
'.','g^4',%'=,g"o"'notti/%#W/,*o',",',';g o
TEXT CONTINUATION fy,,7,?,",tt'."ni,Mitu"T^,','g"l"Mf' P PERWO a a T N A J C 0 IC CF WANAGtMEhi AND $UDGET WA&MiNQTON DC 70W F ACita t t h aett 0 6 pocag,mynsegn gg (g,
pg q {g, pggg m
,"a
" Mi
$^.Y oF ob Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l 4 4l 0 ol p ol ol 1 o lo o lp j
rw n.~.. m _
- nac e ase,mn
I. Introduction
On February 27, 1992 at 2148 the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC]
distribution Bus B became deenergized, resulting in Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) fJH] Balance of Plant (BOP) isolation, along with a Reactor Vater Cleanup (RVCU) [CE] isolation.
At the time of the event, the plant was in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power. The reactor pressure vessel [RPV) was at 1026 psig and saturated conditions.
At 0053 on February 28, the required n7n-emergency four-hour notification was made to the NRC pursuant to the requirenients of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(li). This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
II. Event Description
At 1549 on February 27, 1992, the Reactor Protection System B Motor Generator [MG) and Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) were declared operable following routine maintenance and implementation of a design change. At 2132, the RPS Bus B was shifted from its alternate power supply to the normal MG supply.
At 2148, an EPA trip resulted in a loss of RPS Bus B.
The loss of supply power to RPS trip channels B and D resulted in an Inboard BOP isolation and a RVCU isolation.
The operators reacted appropriately by entering Off-Normal Instruction (ONI-C71-2) " Loss of One RPS Bus".
RFS Bus B vas transferred to the alternate power supply at 2151. The BOP and RVCU isolations were reset at 2156.
The RVCU system was restarted at 2318 and ONI-071-2 was exited at 2337.
Troubleshooting on the system continued unti) 1930 on March 2, 1992 when the EPA logic board was replaced and calibrated.
Following a successful retest, the system was declared operable at 0020 on March 4, 1992.
III. Cause Analysis The cause of this event was failure of one of two EPAs provided for RPS Bus B MG set.
Prior to the event, the EPA logic boards had been replaced as part of preventive maintenance.
Additionally, at that time, design changes were made to the MG set to facilitate calibration and testing. To determine the cause of the event, the MG set was subjected to load changes while the voltage regulator performance was monitored; no problems with the MG set operation vere identified.
A normal plant load was then applied at the output of the suspect EPA.
Vith the MG set operating properly, the EPA spuriously tripped after approximately one hour.
In an attempt to calibrate the installed EPA it was energized for fivt hours, at which time the overvoltage and undervoltage trips and the undervoltage and underfrequency time delays were determined to be out of tolerance.
Additional sputious trips of the EPA vere noted when the simulated input was at the normal supply conditions of 120 volts AC and 60 hersz. Therefore, the troubleshooting concluded that the trip was not related to the MG set and the component responsible for the loss of RPS Bus B was the EPA logic board [CBD),
Gene *-1 Electric, model number 147D8652G001.
Following replacement of the logic board, the EPAs successfully completed a four hour load test and were returned to service.
NRC Foes.i Je4A the
v.
iA..o u ro - =.oM ge,,ox.
,,,,,,,,,,,m,,,,,,
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
,,'l",^,11M,yM.E"o"'.T,l'./ w'?".7l TJ.".'.#
TEXT CONTINUATlON
! ""),"J,'."d." niU."f'.7d!,'c'.". ','!EFu*/ E',Efe"N OiM.eAGEMENT AND 900C4f. 0!?"nW/A A"JJ ""a'a*':
OF MA A8HIN0 f 0N, DC ;Ki603 8 4GiuTY haut til DOC E S T NUM.L N W ggn agwegn ite
, AG. (Si
" G '."
- 'J.*T ma Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 olstojojol4l4l0 9 l2 0{011 0l 0 013 oF 0 13 nn m
~.
~* a =cu mav.m
IV. Corrective Action
As described above, the EPA logic board was replaced following satisfactory calibration and a six hour varm-up period, and no further corrective r.ctions were necessary to return the system to service. To determine the exact cause of the logic board trip, the board is being returned to the manufacturer for failure analysis. Additionally, this event vill be revieved with licensed and nonlicensed operators as part of routine operator requalification training.
V. Safety Analysis
There are two EPAs in series between each source of power (a motot generator set and an alternate power transformer [XFMRj) and the issociated RPS bus.
Each EPA senses the supply voltage, and if voltage or frequency deviates beyond ret limits, the EPA vill trip open causing a loss of power to the respective bus.
Although the faulty EPA was demonstrated to be unreliable during this event, the redundant EPA remained operable and available to protect the RPS Bus.
In this event, all systems functioned as designed upon the loss of RPS power, including the appropriate NSSSS BOP and RVCU isolations received.
Operators acted appropriately and quickly to restore the systems.
Therefore, this event is considered to have no safety significance.
Previous losses of the RPS buses were reviewed for similarity to this event; no prior events within the past two years were related to EPA failures.
Additionally, no failures had occurred with newly installed EPA logic boards.
Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].
$gll( )p M% *nAu4)
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000440/LER-1992-001, :on 920227,loss of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred.Caused by Failure of EPA Logic Board.Logic Board Was Replaced Following Satisfactory Calibration & 6 H warm-up Period |
- on 920227,loss of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred.Caused by Failure of EPA Logic Board.Logic Board Was Replaced Following Satisfactory Calibration & 6 H warm-up Period
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-002, :on 920228,pre-modification Cable Installation Was Declared as Violation of Integrity of Control Room Envelope.Caused by Failure to Identify pre-modification Activity.Controls Will Be Implemented |
- on 920228,pre-modification Cable Installation Was Declared as Violation of Integrity of Control Room Envelope.Caused by Failure to Identify pre-modification Activity.Controls Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-003, :on 920228,RWCU Isolation Occurred as Result of High Differential Flow.Caused by Deficiency Associated W/Sys Vioding Phenomenon.Ts Change to Increase Differential Flow Timer Setpoint Implemented |
- on 920228,RWCU Isolation Occurred as Result of High Differential Flow.Caused by Deficiency Associated W/Sys Vioding Phenomenon.Ts Change to Increase Differential Flow Timer Setpoint Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-004, :on 920321,RWCU Sys Containment Isolation Occurred as Result of High Sys Differential Flow.Caused by Unexpected Steam Void in RWCU Regenerative Hxs.Ts Change Submitted on 911030 & Computer Monitoring Program Changed |
- on 920321,RWCU Sys Containment Isolation Occurred as Result of High Sys Differential Flow.Caused by Unexpected Steam Void in RWCU Regenerative Hxs.Ts Change Submitted on 911030 & Computer Monitoring Program Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-005, :on 920326 & 0421,four Containment Penetrations Exceeding Local Leak Rate Test Failure Criteria.Caused by Component Failure.Differently Designed Spring Loaded Lift Check Valve Installed |
- on 920326 & 0421,four Containment Penetrations Exceeding Local Leak Rate Test Failure Criteria.Caused by Component Failure.Differently Designed Spring Loaded Lift Check Valve Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000440/LER-1992-006, :on 920328-29,local Leak Rate Test Results Exceeded Primary Containment Leakage of Main Steam Lines A,B & D.Caused by Excessive Buildup from Oxide.Mods to Improve Seating Characteristics Discussed |
- on 920328-29,local Leak Rate Test Results Exceeded Primary Containment Leakage of Main Steam Lines A,B & D.Caused by Excessive Buildup from Oxide.Mods to Improve Seating Characteristics Discussed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000440/LER-1992-007, :on 920331 & 0406,full Scram Signals Received from Combination of half-scram Inserted for Planned Maint & half-scram Signal from Spiking Lprm.Caused by Bumping LPRM Cable.Design Change to Upgrade Cables Under Review |
- on 920331 & 0406,full Scram Signals Received from Combination of half-scram Inserted for Planned Maint & half-scram Signal from Spiking Lprm.Caused by Bumping LPRM Cable.Design Change to Upgrade Cables Under Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-008, :on 920415,loss of Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valve Resulted in TS Violation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Standing Order Issued to All Licensed & Nonlicensed Operators |
- on 920415,loss of Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valve Resulted in TS Violation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Standing Order Issued to All Licensed & Nonlicensed Operators
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-009, :on 920424 & 25,discovered That HVAC Sys Operated in Normal Instead of Isolation Mode of Operation W/ Control Room Airborne Operators Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Operators Trained |
- on 920424 & 25,discovered That HVAC Sys Operated in Normal Instead of Isolation Mode of Operation W/ Control Room Airborne Operators Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Operators Trained
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-010, :on 920430,inadvertent Outboard Balance of Plant Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Work Order.Personnel Assisted in Investigation & Have Been Made Aware of Errors |
- on 920430,inadvertent Outboard Balance of Plant Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Work Order.Personnel Assisted in Investigation & Have Been Made Aware of Errors
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-011, :on 920503,two IRM Channels Became Inoperable Due to Failure to Complete TS 3.3.1 Surveillance Requirements.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Licensed Operators Will Be Instructed on Lessons Learned |
- on 920503,two IRM Channels Became Inoperable Due to Failure to Complete TS 3.3.1 Surveillance Requirements.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Licensed Operators Will Be Instructed on Lessons Learned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-012-01, :on 920505,RHR Sys a Pump Tripped Due to Inappropiately Adjusted Valve Limit Switch.Caused by Program Weakness.Appropriate Switch Adjusted |
- on 920505,RHR Sys a Pump Tripped Due to Inappropiately Adjusted Valve Limit Switch.Caused by Program Weakness.Appropriate Switch Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-012, :on 920505,RHR Sys a Pump Tripped Due to Inappropriately Adjusted Valve Limit Switch.Caused by Program Weakness.Limit Switch Reset & Appropriate Design Drawings Being Revised |
- on 920505,RHR Sys a Pump Tripped Due to Inappropriately Adjusted Valve Limit Switch.Caused by Program Weakness.Limit Switch Reset & Appropriate Design Drawings Being Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-013, :on 920514,turbine Stop Valves Opened Greater than 90% W/Main Steam Line Drain Valves Opened,Resulting in Drain Line Isolation on Low Condenser Vacuum.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Work Order Revised |
- on 920514,turbine Stop Valves Opened Greater than 90% W/Main Steam Line Drain Valves Opened,Resulting in Drain Line Isolation on Low Condenser Vacuum.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Work Order Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-014, :on 920603,steam Supply Pressure Low Isolation Signal & Associated RCIC Sys Isolation Were Initiated.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Surveillance Instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1 Revised |
- on 920603,steam Supply Pressure Low Isolation Signal & Associated RCIC Sys Isolation Were Initiated.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Surveillance Instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1 Revised
| | | 05000440/LER-1992-015, :on 920701,HPCS Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Inoperability of Suppression Pool Suction Valve.Daily Instruction Written to Remind Personnel to Hold Control Switch in Appropriate Position |
- on 920701,HPCS Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Inoperability of Suppression Pool Suction Valve.Daily Instruction Written to Remind Personnel to Hold Control Switch in Appropriate Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000440/LER-1992-016-05, :on 920906,identified That Fhb HVAC Supply Fan B Tripped Due to Instrumentation Drift of Differential Pressure Switch.Caused by Equipment Failure.Fhb Exhaust Switches Will Be Shortened from 24 to 3 Months |
- on 920906,identified That Fhb HVAC Supply Fan B Tripped Due to Instrumentation Drift of Differential Pressure Switch.Caused by Equipment Failure.Fhb Exhaust Switches Will Be Shortened from 24 to 3 Months
| | | 05000440/LER-1992-017, :on 920910,RPS Scram Occurred Due to Reactor Water Level Reaching Level 3 Setpoint of 178 Inches.Oil Filter Gasket for RFPT B Servo Valve Inspected & Replaced.W/ |
- on 920910,RPS Scram Occurred Due to Reactor Water Level Reaching Level 3 Setpoint of 178 Inches.Oil Filter Gasket for RFPT B Servo Valve Inspected & Replaced.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-1992-018, :on 920708,hourly Fire Watch of Inoperable Fire Barriers Not Performed as Required.Caused by Personnel Error.Counseling & Disciplinary Action Administered |
- on 920708,hourly Fire Watch of Inoperable Fire Barriers Not Performed as Required.Caused by Personnel Error.Counseling & Disciplinary Action Administered
| | | 05000440/LER-1992-019, :on 921009,valve Positioning Error Resulted in Inoperability of Both SLCS Trains.Caused by Personnel Error. Operator Responsible for Valve Positioning Error Counseled Re Event |
- on 921009,valve Positioning Error Resulted in Inoperability of Both SLCS Trains.Caused by Personnel Error. Operator Responsible for Valve Positioning Error Counseled Re Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000440/LER-1992-020, :on 921023,inadequate Reset of Containment Air Lock Door Discovered Resulting in TS Violations.Caused by Drawing Discrepancy.Piping Sys Diagram Being Revised to Properly Identify Pressure Switches |
- on 921023,inadequate Reset of Containment Air Lock Door Discovered Resulting in TS Violations.Caused by Drawing Discrepancy.Piping Sys Diagram Being Revised to Properly Identify Pressure Switches
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-021, :on 921101,discovered That APRM Gain & Channel Calibration Had Not Been Calibrated Per TS 3.3.1.Caused by Multiple Personnel Error.Lco Tracking Sys Will Be Covered in Licensed Operator Requalification Training |
- on 921101,discovered That APRM Gain & Channel Calibration Had Not Been Calibrated Per TS 3.3.1.Caused by Multiple Personnel Error.Lco Tracking Sys Will Be Covered in Licensed Operator Requalification Training
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-022, :on 921105,TS 3.0.3 Limits for Secondary Bypass Leakage Exeeded Due to Failure of LLRT Surveillance Results. Caused by Component Malfunctioning.All Licensed Personnel Will Be Trained Re TS Action Requirements |
- on 921105,TS 3.0.3 Limits for Secondary Bypass Leakage Exeeded Due to Failure of LLRT Surveillance Results. Caused by Component Malfunctioning.All Licensed Personnel Will Be Trained Re TS Action Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-023, :on 921110,discovered Mispositioned Instrument Isolation Valve for Containment Atmosphere Monitoring Sys Pressure Transmitter.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Instruction.Instruction Revised |
- on 921110,discovered Mispositioned Instrument Isolation Valve for Containment Atmosphere Monitoring Sys Pressure Transmitter.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Instruction.Instruction Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000440/LER-1992-024, :on 921121,two SRVs Unexpectedly Opened During Maint/Surveillance Activity,Introducing Pressure Transient Which Caused Reactor Thermal Power to Increase.Cause Not Determined.Two Slave Trip Units Replaced |
- on 921121,two SRVs Unexpectedly Opened During Maint/Surveillance Activity,Introducing Pressure Transient Which Caused Reactor Thermal Power to Increase.Cause Not Determined.Two Slave Trip Units Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
|