05000440/FIN-2010005-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Evaluate System Functionality of Control Room Breathing Air |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to evaluate and maintain functionality assessments for the main control room emergency breathing air system, which is described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The inspectors determined that the leakage rate that existed on the control room breathing air system exceeded the allowed leakage rate for the system to maintain functionality from July through September 2010, as evaluated by a licensee engineering evaluation completed on December 16, 2010. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is similar to example 4.d of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and would significantly impact the operators ability to shutdown the reactor from the main control room using the breathing air system. In addition, the performance deficiency impacts the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was not a design/qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification-allowable outage time, did not result in a loss of function of non safety-related risk-significant equipment and was not risk-significant due to external events. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not maintain a system described in the USAR in a condition that would allow it to meet its described function. Specifically, operators would not be able to remain in the main control room using breathing air for the required time prescribed by the system description in the USAR due to excessive leakage from a system relief valve. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2010005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Marshfield D Reeser B Palagi M Phalen J Cameron P Voss C Scott T Hartman P Smagacz |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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