05000423/LER-1996-021, :on 960628,components Not Included in IST Program as Result of Programmatic Deficiencies,Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Commitment.Existing IST Documents & Procedures Will Be Reviewed & Revised
| ML20249A141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1998 |
| From: | Danni Smith NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20249A138 | List:
|
| References | |
| LER-96-021, LER-96-21, NUDOCS 9806160104 | |
| Download: ML20249A141 (17) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4231996021R00 - NRC Website | |
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NRC f ORM 366 U.s. NUCLEAR REGULAToHY COMMisslON APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPlRES 04/30/99
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PACIUTY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1 OF 17
%TLEIda l
Components Not included in The in Service Test Program As A Result of Programmatic Deficiencies l
l EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7) oTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) sE AL E
N MONTH DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NU U
R 06 28 1996 1996 -- 021 --
02 06 09 1998 OPERATING THis REPORT is SUBMITTED PURSUANT To THE REQUIREMENTsoF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 5 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aH2Hv)
X 50.73(aH210) 50.73(a)(2)(vin)
POWER 20.2203(aH1) 20.2203(a)(3)0)
~
50.73(aH2)Di) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(aH2Hi) 20.2203(aH3Hii) 50.73(a)(2)oii)
~~
73.71 20.2203(a)(2)0s) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)0v) oTHER 20.2203(a)(2)0ii) 50.36(cH1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)0v) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
MCj($A at LICENSEE CONTACT FoR THis LER (12)
TELEPHONE NUMeER (include Area Code)
At David A. Smith, Manager Unit 3 Regulatory Compliance (860)437-5840 COMPLETE ONE LINE FoR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THis REPORT (13) 0
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER p g MONTH DAY YEAR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED submission YEs Uf yes, complete EXPECTED submission DATE).
[ No DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately 15 single-spacedtypewntten knes) (16)
On June 28,1996 with the unit in mode 5 of an extended cold shutdown, a Configuration Management Program f
(CMP) review of the inservice Test Program was conducted. This review identified multiple Inservice Test (IST) 1 Program deficiencies which consisted of incomplete implementation of several licensing commitments, the omission of valves from the program, testing inadequacies for valves already in the program, inconsistent or missing documentation within the Inservice Test Manual and IST surveillance procedures, and lack of adequate process control procedures which would ensure effective maintenance of the program. Based on the results of this IST j
Program review it was determined that the IST requirements had not been performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(f) and the unit Technical Specifications. Because this condition was discovered when the unit was in an extended cold shutdown, no immediate operator action was required.
The causes of this condition were a lack of management commitment to support these programs, inadequate program monitoring, and a failure to evaluate the program effectiveness. Correction of individual discrepancies and programmatic enhancements to prevent recurrence have been incorporated into the IST manual and applicable l
surveillance procedures.
9906160104 990609 PDR ADOCK 0S000423 8
POR NRC f ORM 366 (4-95)
- N iC FoHM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN l
(4-95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL Revision YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT Ut more space is required. use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11) 1.
Description of Event
On June 28,1996 with the unit in mode 5 of an extended cold shutdown, a review of the Inservice Test (IST) Program w:s conducted. This review identified multiple inservice Test Program deficiencies which consisted of incomplete l
implementation of several licensing commitments, the omission of several valves and specific testing for valves already in th3 program, inconsistent or missing documentation in the Inservice Test Manual and IST surveillance procedures, and lick of adequate process control procedures which would ensure effective maintenance of the program. The initial identification of these deficiencies was made during the 10 CFR 50.54(f) review effort of the Inservice Test Program in l
I June 1996.
In accordance with the Northeest Utilities Configuration Management Program (CMP) the Inservice Test Program was I
rsviewed. The focus of the review concentrated on: 1) identification of Inservice Test Program licensing commitments, 2) a review of implementing procedures for each component in the program, including those components and additional t: sting identified in the IST Bases Document,3) a sample audit review of component test methods of selected systems, and 4) a review of inservice Test Program process controls.
The inservice Test Program review was conducted over a several week period in June 1996. The deficiencies identified consisted of several issues in which corrective actions are considered necessary prior to unit startup. The other issues hzve been identified as long term which are primarily enhancements to the program which will be prioritized accordingly.
The following items were identified as deficiencies in the IST Program:
A.
USE OF ROOT MEAN SQUARE (RMS) VIBRATION VALUES AND COMPARISON TO A SINGLE POINT This item is being reported since the original IST Program Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety l
Evaluation Report (SER) states that
- ANSI /ASME OM-6, draft 10, provides a set of allowable ranges for pump vibration velocity measurements that has been found to be acceptable by the NRC". The Safety Evaluation Report granted relief from pump vibration amplitude measurement and allowable range requirements of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, provided that pump vibration velocity measurements were performed in accordance with draft 10 of ANSI /ASME Operations and Maintenance (OM)-6 standard which specifies acceptance criteria in peak values. The relief request and SER referenced the pump vibration acceptance criteria as root-mean-square (RMS) and as a result the Inservice Test Program specified acceptance criteria in RMS rather than in peak values.
The ANSI /ASME OM-6 standard also requires that velocity measurements must be compared at multiple points and must not exceed absolute values. Although multiple point measurements were taken, only one vibration point was compared to the reference value and the maximum absolute value.
B.
COMPONENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE IST PROGRAM 1.
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System (CCP) valves CCP*AOV31C/D, CCP*AOV178A-D and l
CCP*V27,V38,V63,V74.
2.
Charging System valves CHS*AV8146, CHS*AV8147, CHS*V396, CHS*V397, CHS*V436, CHS*V437, CHS*V469, CHS*V470, CHS*V503, CHS*V504 CHS*FCV111 A/B and Reactor Coolant System check valves RCS*V31, RCS*V32, RCS*V147, RCS*V148.
3.
Charging System valve CHS*V42.
NMC FORM 366A (4 9M
e NRC foHM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMisSloN 14 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) sEoVENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 1 EXT fit rnore space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC forrn 366A) (17) 4.
Charging System control valve CHS*HCV182, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System valves l
CCP*TV32A/B/C, CCP*LV61 CCP*LV91 and Control Building Chilled Water System valves HVK*PDV32A/B, HVK*TV39A/B, HVK*1V41 A/B, HVK*TV68A/B, HVK*TV69A/B, HVK*TV70A/B, HVK*TV71 A/B, HVK*TV72A/B, HVK*TV73A/B, HVK*TV74A/B, HVK*TV75A/B, HVK*TV76A/B, HVK*TV77A/B.
5.
Emergency Diesel Generator System excess flow check valves EGA*EFV35A1/A2/B1/B2.
6.
Service Water System motor operated butterfly valves SWP*MOV57A-D.
7.
Hydrogen Recombiner System valves HCS*V4,VS,V11,V12, Control Building Chilled Water System check valves HVK*V1,V39,V37,V75 and Service Water System check valves SWP*V104 and SWP*V109.
8.
Service Water System check valves SWP*V836 and V837.
C.
ADDITIONAL TESTING NOT INCLUDED IN IST PROGRAM The following is a list of valves and their additional tests that were not included within the IST Program.
1.
High Pressure Safety injection (SlH) check valves SlH*V81 and V83 have an exercise to close safety function to prevent diversion of water through an idle SlH pump.
2.
Service Water System valves SWP*MOV54A-D have a safety function to close to prevent release of radioactivity from the containment recirculation coolers.
3.
Charging System motor operated valves CHS*LCV112D/E have a safety function to close on recirculation to prevent sump recirculation water from being diverted to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
4.
Charging System check valves CHS*V394,V434,V467,V501 in the RCP seal injection flowpath have a safety l
function to open to provide a flow path for safety grade cold shutdown.
5.
Charging System check valve CHS*V58 in the normal charging supply path has a safety function to open to l
provide flow during safety grade cold shutdown.
6.
Charging System check valve CHS*V261 has a safety function to close to prevent containment sump l
recirculation water from being diverted to the RWST.
7.
Safety injection System check valve SlH*V11 has a safety function to close to prevent containment sump l
recirculation water from being diverted to the RWST.
8.
Reactor Coolant System valves RCS*HCV442A/B, RCS*SV8095A/B, RCS*SV8096A/B have a safety function l
to close to isolate the reactor from the Primary Relief Tank (PRT).
9.
Reactor Coolant System motor operated valves RCS*MV8000A/B have a safety function to isolate the Pressurizer in the event a Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) is leaking.
- 10. Containment Recirculation motor operated valves RSS*MV38A/B have a safety function to close when the applicable RSS pump reaches a discharge flow rate of 2000 gallons per minute (gpm).
p NHC FORM 306A 14 95)
s e NRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACluTY NAME (1) oOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 4 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT (11more spaceis required, use addstronalcopios of NRC form 366A) (11)
- 11. Safety injection System motor operated valves SlH'MV8801 A/B have a safety function to close to provide containment isolation.
- 12. Safety injection System motor operated valves SlH*MV8802A/B have a safety function to close to provide containment isolation in the event the Safety Injection pump was not operating.
- 13. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System valves SFC*V3 and V6 have a safety function to close to prevent diversion of flow through an idle Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump.
l
- 14. Main Steam System motor operated valves MSS *MV74A-D on the Main Steam relief lines have a safety l
function to close to control decay heat removal during safety grade cold shutdown.
- 15. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Starting Air System valves EGA*V4,V11,V30,V37 have a safety function to l l
l close and remain leak tight to assure sufficient starting air.
I l
- 16. Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System valves EGF*V1,V3,V7,V9 have a safety function to l
close to prevent reverse flow through an idle EDG fuel oil transfer pump.
I
- 17. Control Building Ventilation System valves HVC*AOV25 and AOV26 have a safety function to be able to be opened manually one hour after an accident to allow natural ventilation of the control room.
Since the unit was in a cold shutdown at the time of completion of the review, there were no operator actions required as a result of these conditions.
II. Cause of Event
The cause of this condition was initially identified as a programmatic deficiency due to lack of adequate resources to essess the quality of the existing program, evaluate the interpretations employed during development of the program, implement more effective process controls, and complete required changes to implementing procedures. Due to the significant number of discrepancies, a root cause evaluation was performed to identify the underlying deficiencies that led to this event This evaluation determined that there were two pnmary causes for this event:
1.
A lack of management commitment to support the IST Program.
2.
Inadequate program monitoring and a failure to evaluate the program effectiveness.
Contributing causes that led to the failure of the IST Progrivc. are:
1.
Insufficient detail contained with the procedures utilized; 2.
Inadequate supervisory oversight; 3.
Inadequate documentation of component level credited safety functions.
N.iC FORM 366A (4-95)
e NRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-9 51 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) sEouENTIAL REVISloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 5OF17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT (11 more space is required, use addetionalcopies of IVRC Form 366A) t17) 111. Analysis of Event This condition was reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which identifies any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires that inservice testing of ASME Class 1,2 and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(f).
Implementation of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) Configuration Management Program inservice Test Program review, and 1
(
d;velopment of the Inservice Test Bases Document have provided an assessment of the overall condition of the IST l
Program. Multiple deficiencies were identified, some requiring the addition of new components to the program and some l
l involving additional testing of components already included within the IST Program. The number of deficiencies was l
significant in that the failure to adequately test components had the potential to allow reliance on components that may not have been capable of performing their intended safety functions. A description of each of the identified deficiencies follows:
A.
USE OF RMS VIBRATION VALUES AND COMPARISON TO A SINGLE POINT Millstone Unit 3 has upgraded the IST Program to implement the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code, l
1989 Edition. A review of previous pump vibration analysis results showed that acceptance criteria were not exceeded when the data was converted from RMS values to peak values.
B.
COMPONENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE IST PROGRAM i
1.
CCP*AOV31C/D are radiation sample isolation valves located off the CCP pump's discharge header. These valves provide the boundary between the safety related and the non safety related portions of the system and were initially identified for inclusion in the program to verify an isolation function. The valves will fait closed on a l loss of control air. Depending upon which CCP train is in service, one of these valves is normally open and the other valve is normally closed. Further review of the qualification of sample isolation valves CCP*AOV31C/D to perform their identified safety function revealed the need to substitute upstream normally open manual valves CCP*V965 and V966 for the credited closure function.
CCP*AOV178A-D and CCP*V27, V38, V63, V74 are required to isolate a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier leak within a small section of piping rated to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure. CCP*AOV178A-D will automatically close on a high flow indication and fait closed on loss of air. A review of the maintenance history for CCP*AOV178A-D did not indicate any conditions which would have prevented the valves from functioning. The supply tubing for the four air operated valves was replaced during the current shutdown. Each of the four valves was stroked open and closed during the retest to ensure proper operation. CCP*V27, V38, V63, V74 provide automatic isolation on the inlet to the thermal barriers. Initial Section XI testing of these valves was satisfactory except for valves CCP*AOV178C and V74. Stroke times were longer than expected for AOV178C. The valve was repaired and successfully retested. Check valve V74 failed to close when tested.
The valve was disassembled and found stuck open. It was repaired and successfully retested. The impact of the failed check valve is that, given a 'B' RCP thermal barrier failure, the 'B' train of CCP providing cooling to the CAR fans would be lost. Therefore, increased reliance would be placed on ECC systems. Historically, there were no safety consequences from this event in that the unit has not experienced an accident condition that challenged the active safety function of these components._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _.
s e NHC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-90 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVislON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 6 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT tif more space os required, uw additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 2.
CHS*AV8146, CHS*AV8147 and RCS*V31, RCS*V32, RCS*V147, RCS*V148 are injection valves in the normal charging flow path and have a safety function to open for safety grade cold shutdown. CHS*AV8146 and CHS*AV8147 will fail open on loss of air. Valves in the operating flow path are normally in service during modes 1 through 5. ASME Section XI does not require any additional testing for these components as long as the observations otherwise requied for testing are made and analyzed during such operation. System Engineering does trend this information, however no evaluation or acceptance criteria has been established.
Further evaluation of the Reactor Coolant System check valves (RCS*V31, RCS*V32, RCS*V147, RCS*V148) identified a closure function to prevent interaction between Loop 1 and Loop 4 in the event of a charging line high energy line break. Failure to include this valve testing in the IST Program was reported within LER 98-021-00.
CHS*V396, CHS*V397, CHS*V436, CHS*V437, CHS*V469, CHS*V470, CHS*V503, CHS*V504 are injection valves in the RCP seal injection flow path and have a safety function to open for safety grade cold shutdown.
These check valves are normally in service during modes 1 through 5. ASME Section XI does not require any additional testing for these components as !ong as the observations otherwise required for testing are made and analyzed during such operation. System Engineering does trend this information, however no evaluation or acceptance criteria has been established.
CHS*FCV1108,1118 are isolation valves in the flow path from the boric acid blender to the Volume Control l
Tank (VCT) and have a safety function to close to prevent diversion of boric acid flow to the Volume Control Tank. These valves are normally closed and will fail closed on loss of air. The closure function is verified during normal operations. The valves are periodically opened to allow for boron concentration adjustments in the VCT. Position indication is available on the main control board in the event these valves fail to close.
CHS*FCV111 A isolates the non-safety related Primary Grade Water System from the Chemical and Volume Control System and has a safety function to close to prevent an uncontrolled dilution event. Failure to include this valve in the IST Program was reported in LER 97-042-00.
3.
CHS*V42 is a check valve on the discharge of the VCT and has a safety function to open to provide Charging pump minimum flow and to close to prevent diversion of ECCS flow away from the charging pump suction.
CHS*V42 closure can only be verified by disassembly. The valve was already included in the check valve inspection program and was last inspected in May 1993, during the refueling outage. No adverse conditions were identified during that inspection. The open function is verified during pump operability testing. The valve was disassembled and inspected this outage for closure verification. No adverse conditions were identified during this inspection.
4.
The ASME Code,1983 Edition, specified that control valves were exempt from testing. As a result, control valves that also had a fail safe function were excluded from the Inservice Test Program. However, subsequent clarification, provided by the NRC within Generic Letter 89-04, stated that control valves that also have a fail safe function should be included in the Inservice Test Program. Millstone Unit 3 was not required to respond to the Generic Letter because the NRC had recently reviewed the IST Program and issued a safety evaluation report.
Charging System control valve CHS*HCV182 is normally modulated to regulate seal injection flow rates to the reactor coolant pumps. The valve fails open on a loss of control air pressure._____-_
=
. NRC FORM 300A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISsloN
' (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REvlSloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 7 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT Uf more space ts required use edditionalcopies ot NRC Form 366A) (17)
Temperature control valves CCP*TV32A-C open to regulate CCP heat exchangers outlet flows. The valves normally modulate and will fail safe in the open position on a loss of air. A modification was necessary to facilitate open stroke time and fail safe testing. In lieu of a solenoid valve which would allow isolating and venting supply air, a manual valve has been installed instead to facilitate the required Section XI testing.
CCP*LV61 AND CCP*LV91 regulate the water levelin the Charging pump cooling and Safety injection pump cooling surge tanks. These valves are normally closed and would fail in the closed position on a loss of control air These valves are occasionally opened to increase surge tank level. Whenever the valves are opened, subsequent closure of the valves is verified by a stable surge tank level. The valves are closed by de-energizing the solenoid valve controlling the air pressure to the actuator. This simulates a loss of control air and verifies the valve goes to its fail safe position. A review of the maintenance history for these valves did not indicate any conditions which would have prevented the valves from functioning. Further review of the qualification of these regulating valves (CCP*LV61 and CCP*LV91), to perform their identified safety function revealed the need to substitute upstream normally open manual valves CCP*V981 and V986 for the credited closure function.
Valves HVK*TV68A/B, HVK*TV69A/B, HVK*TV70A/B, HVK*TV71 A/B, HVK*TV72A/B, HVK*TV73A/B, HVK'1V74A/B, HVK*TV75A/B provide a cooling flow path for the east and west switchgear rooms and isolation for an off line train. Components failing to operate properly would be identified by indication on the main control board. During initial Section XI testing valves HVK*TV71 A/B failed to stroke open fully. The failures was investigated, necessary valve repairs performed and the valve successfully retested. The impact of these failures was that the cooling flow to the west switchgear room coolers would be limited. Isolation capability was not impacted.
Valves HVK*PDV32A/B provide a recirculation flow path and will fail closed to prevent diversion of cooling flow.
These valves ensure maximum cooling to the air coolers.
Valves HVK*TV39A/B, HVK*TV41A/B, HVK*TV76A/B, HVK*TV77A/B isolate the individual air coolers in the east and west switchgear rooms, control room area and the computer and instrument rack area and will fail open on a loss of power. There are two trains, one of which is normally in operation, with the cross tie valves open. The valves automatically actuate on a chilled water pump start or stop. The trains are started and stopped on a periodic basis, which causes each of the train related valves to exercise. During initial Section XI testing valve HVK*TV76B failed to stroke. The failure was investigated, necessary valve repairs performed and the valve successfully retested. There was no impact from this failure since the valve cycled satisfactorily in the auto mode.
5.
Emergency Diesel Generator System excess flow check valves EGA*EFV35A1/A2/B1/B2 are required to remain leak tight to assure adequate starting air. The valves are located in a sensing line from the air receiver to the air compressor. In addition, air receiver pressure is monitored by operations personnel. A low pressure l
alarm is generated when the air pressure reaches 350 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). Diesel Generator alarms are monitored on the main control bomd. The air compressors are set to start at 375 psig to refill the air receivers. A leak test has been developed to verify the air receivers can maintain adequate volume on a loss of the air compressors. All four of these valves have been successfully tested.
6.
Service Water System motor operated butterfly valves SWP*MOV57A-D have a safety function to close to l
isolate containment recirculation cooler leakage. The valves were previously considered passive. The valves are normally open during operation and do not receive a safety signal to close. These valves are included in l
the GL 89-10 program.
N-4 FORM 366A (4-95) l J
e e NRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN (4-9 51 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) sEouENTIAL Revision YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 8 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
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02 TEXT til more space is required. use additionstcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11}
7.
Hydrogen Recombiner valves HCS*V4,V5,V11,V12 are manual process valves that have a safety function to open to allow operation of the Hydrcgen Recombiners. These valves are cycled quarterly during the Hydrogen Recombiner operability test. These valves have been tested at the code required frequency by existing unit procedures however the data had not been recorded or analyzed.
HVK*V1,V39,V37,V75 are check valves on the discharge and suction sides of the Control Building Chilled Water pumps and have a safety function to open to provide system cooling flow. These valves have been tested at the code required frequency by existing unit procedures however the data had not been recorded or analyzed.
SWP*V104 and V109 are check valves on the bypass line around the Control Building Air Conditioning water chiller and have a safety function to open to supply heated service water to the inlet of the booster pumps and to close to prevent diversion of flow from the water chiller. Both valves were disassembled during the current l
shutdown with no degradation identified. Valves V104 and V109 were also inspected in 1995 during RFOS.
Valve V109 was found not seating properly. A new seat was installed and the valve was re-inspected.
8.
SWP*V836 and V837 are check valves in the cross-tie lines between the A and B trains of service water and have a safety function to close to provide train isolation. These valves were disassembled and visually inspected during the current shutdown V836 was identified with severe erosion of the disc body and as a result the valve was replaced. Because of the excessive erosion both valves will be inspected during RFO6.
However, based on the inspection, it was determined that the valve could have performed its safety function to close. Valve SWP*V837 was inspected with satisfactory results.
C.
ADDITIONAL TESTING NOT INCLUDED IN IST PROGRAM 1.
High Pressure Safety injection check valves SlH*V81 and SlH'V83 are : o the SlH minimum fiow lines and have been verified to open during the quarterly safety injection pump fiow test. However, the closure function can not be verified unless the valves are disassembled. Further evaluation of the closure function for these valves has determined that the valves do not perform a closure safety function which meets the requirements
{
for inclusion in the IST Program. This item does not require any changes to the IST Program.
j 2.
Service Water System valves SWP*MOV54A-D are normally closed motor operated butterfly valves on the inlet side of the containment recirculation coolers. These valves may have to reclose in the event of a leak in the containment recirculation coolers. They were stroke tested in the open direction on a refueling outage frequency prior to this extended cold shutdown. The valves were exercised to the closed position during the restoration phase of the surveillance procedure. Subsequent reviews have determined that quarterly testing can be performed. These valves are also part of the Generic Letter 89-10 program which verifies adequate design of the motor actuator.
3.
Charging System valves CHS*LCV112D/E are normally closed motor operated valves which are on the charging pump suction header and are stroke tested in the open direction on a quarterly basis. The valves are exercised in the closed direction after the stroke testing. These valves are also part of the Generic Letter 89-10
. program which verifies adequate design of the motor actuator. These valves would automatically open, on a safety injection signal, to align the charging pump suction to the RWST. Dunng the recirculation phase of a large break LOCA event these valves reclose to prevent diversion of containment sump water back to the RWST.
NmC f ORM 306A 44 B5) lL
r$c f OHM $66A U.S. NuCLr AH HtGULAloHY COMMISSION 14 9M UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION f ACILITY NAME (1) ooCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAoE (3)
SEQULNiiAL REVISION YEAR NUMBEH NUMBER 9 OF 17 j
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996 021 ~
02 i
T LXT lit enore spaceis requored, use additionalcopoes of NHC f vern 366A) t17) 4.
Charging System valves CHS*V394,V434,V467,V501 are in the RCP sealinjection flow path. These valves are exercised to close and Appendix J leak tested Normal operation has venfied that these valves can open to provide the required seal flow.
5.
Charging System check valve CHS*V58 is in the normal charging supply path. This valve is exercised to close and Appendix J Ieak tested.
6.
Charging System check valve CHS*V261 is on the Refueling Water Storage Tank supply line to the charging pumps and has been exercised in the open direction during the full flow test of the Charging pumps each refueling outage. This valve would be required to close in the event the downstream motor operated valves CHS*LCV112D/E failed to close. The valve can not be easily disassembled for inspection because it would require isolation of the RWST, which is used for a water inventory source during modes 1 through 6.
7.
Safety injection System check valve SlH*V11 is on the RWST supply line to the SlH pumps and has been partially stroked open dunng pump testing. During this extended cold shutdown valve closure has been venfied by radiography. Surveillance procedures have been revised to utilize non-intrusive techniques to venfy valve closure during future testing This valve would be required to close in the event the upstream motor operated valve SlH*MV8806 failed to close.
8.
Reactor Coolant System valves RCS*HCV442A/B, RCS*SV8095A/B and RCS*SV8096A/B are on the reactor head vent to the Primary Relief Tank and have been stroke time tested in the open direction on a cold shutdown frequency. During this testing the valves are exercised to the closed position which venfies the fail safe position of the valve. However, the stroke time of the valves in the closed direction was not measured.
9.
Reactor Coolant System motor operated gate valves RCS*MV8000A/B are on the Pressunzer relief line and are stroke time tested in the open direction. These valves are used to isolate a leaking or stuck open power operated relief valve. The valves are normally open dunng operation and are exercised closed prior to stroke time testing in the open direction. Additionally, these valves are included in the Generic Letter 89-10 program.
- 10. Containment Recirculation Spray System (RSS) motor operated gate valves RSS*MV38A/B are on the RSS pump minimum flow lines and have been stroke time tested to open quarterly. The valves would have to reclose to prevent a diversion of RSS flow following an RSS pump start, when the discharge flow rate exceeded 2000 gpm. The valves are closed during the performance of the open stroke time surveillance. These valves are included in the GL 89-10 program.
- 11. Safety injection System motor operated valves SlH*MV8801 A/B are on the charging pump discharge to High Pressure Injection line and are stroke time tested in the open direction. These valves are identified as containment isolation valves and would have to close in the event a Hi h Head Safety injection (charging) l 0
pump is not operating These valves automatically open on a safety injection signal to align for cold leg In addition, these valves are included in the Generic Letter 89-10 program. These valves were successfully stroke time tested in the closed direction.
- 12. Safety injection System motor operated valves SlH*MV8802A/B are on the SlH pump discharge to hot leg injection line and are stroke time tested in the open direction. These valves are identified as containment isolation valves and would have to close in the event a Safety injection pump is not operating These valves open ta align for long term recirculation. In addition these valves are included in the Genenc Letter 89-10 program These valves were successfully stroke time tested in the closed direction.
Nz.C FORM 306A (4 9M t
.U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN (4-94 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVislON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 10 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
- - 021 -
02 TEXT (If more space os required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
- 13. Fuel Pool Cooling System check valves SFC*V3 and SFC*V6 are located on the pump discharge prior to a common discharge line and are exercised to open during the quarterly pump operability test. The manual isolation valves downstream of each check valve are normally open during operation, creating a cross-tie between the two trains. Therefore, the check valves are required to close to prevent diversion of flow. These valves are exercised to close during the pump surveillance test, however the close test was not included in the l
IST Program.
- 14. Main Steam System motor operated valves MSS *MV74A-D on the Main Steam relief lines, are credited as a decay heat removal path during a safety grade cold shutdown. The valves are closed during operation and are exercised closed each quarter during the restoration from the stroke to open surveillance test In addition these valves are included in the Generic letter 89-10 program.
- 15. Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System check valves EGA*V4,V11,V30,V37 are located on the supply line to the diesel starting air receiver tanks and have a safety function to remain leak tight to assure sufficient starting air. These valves were disassembled to verify closure, during RFO4 or RFOS. In addition, air receiver pressure is monitored by operations. A low pressure alarm is generated when the air pressure reaches 350 psig. Diesel Generator alarms are monitored on the main control board. The air compressors are set to start at 375 psig to refill the air receivers.
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System check valves EGF*V1, V3, V7, V9 are on the discharge of the fuel oil transfer pumps and have a safety function to close to prevent diversion of flow. The proper I
performance of the fuel oil transfer pump surveillance verifies that the idle pump check valve is closed by monitoring pump discharge flow rates. These valves are exercised to close during the pump surveillance test, however the close test was not included in the IST Program.
- 16. Control Building Ventilation valves HVC*AOV25 and AOV26 are inlet isolation valves to control room ventilation I
and are stroke time tested open and closed on a quarterly frequency. The valves will fait closed on a loss of
{
control air pressure. The air supply to these valves is not safety related. These valves are credited in the i
FSAR to open manually one hour into a design basis accident to allow control room ventilation.
IV. Corrective Action
This condition was discovered when the unit was in an extended cold shutdown and as a result no immediate operator action was required. The results of the Inservice Test Program review were documented in an internal report. This report es part of the 50.54(f) Configuration Management Program effort. Completion of the following corrective actions and l
cssignment of specific programmatic responsibilities will effectively implement and maintain the IST Program.
GENERAL INSERVICE TEST PROGRAM RELATED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l
l The existing IST documents and procedures will be reviewed and revised as required to ensure the program addresses all of the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f) by May 31,1997.
Status: Deficiencies in the IST, documentation which were identified under the 50.54(f) Configuration Management Program review have been incorporated into.ae IST Program Plan, IST Bases Document and administrative l
l procedures.
I l
N.,C FORM 306A 14 9M 1
_________._______-.m____
e N c FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4 95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEouENTIAL REVIStoN YEAR NUMBER NuMPER 11 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
~ 021 ~
02 TEXT U1more space os required, use additionalcopoes of NRC Form 366A) (17l 1.
A procedure will be developed and implemented to administer and monitor the IST Program by May 31,1997.
Status: The IST Program Manual, Revision 0, has been approved and issued. This manual provides administrative and technical guidance for implementation of the IST Program.
2.
Staff will be assigned to implement and manage the IST Program by May 31,1997.
Status A permanent IST Coordinator and support personnel have been assigned to implement and manage the IST Program. IST personnel responsibilities are described within the IST Program Manual.
- 3. The seventy one (71) individual discrepancies identified during the review of the IST Program against surveillance procedures will be corrected.
Status: The IST Program Plan, IST Bases Document and surveillance procedure (SP) revisions required to correct the deficiencies identified during the Configuration Management Program review have been completed.
The seven (7) licensing commitment discrepancies identified during the review of the Inservice Test Program will be corrected.
Status: These items have been corrected by the IST Program Plan, IST Bases Document, and SP revisions.
l 4.
The IST surveillance procedures, the IST Manual and IST Bases Document will be revised to include the components identified during the review of the Inservice Test Manual, Revision 4.
Status: The IST Program Plan, IST Bases Document and surveil'ance procedure revisions required to correct the identified deficiencies have been completed.
The twenty eight (28) individual discrepancies identified in the selected system review of the IST Program component test methods performed as part of the Inservice Test Program review will be corrected.
Status: The IST Program Plan, IST Bases Document, surveillance procedures and administrative activities required to correct these items have been completed.
5.
The IST Program component test methods will be reviewed and identfied deficiencies will be corrected.
Status: Surveillance procedure revisions have been completed for the test method deficiencies identified during the 50.54(f) Configuration Management Program review.
In addition the following specific corrective actions were taken to correct the deficiencies noted prior to initial entry into mode 4 following this extended cold shutdown.
A.
USE OF RMS VIBRATION VALUES AND COMPARISON TO A SINGLE POINT l
1.
The pump vibration velocity measurements test procedures will be revised to incorporate the acceptance criteria of ASME Section XI 1989 Edition.
Status: Acceptance criteria which meets the requirements of ASME Section XI,1989 Edition, for vibration velocity has been developed and is documented on the IST Pump Test Plan Forms.
NRC FOHM 366A (4.95)
- - ___-_--_____-______-___2____
e.
NHc foHM 366A u.S. NUCLE AH REGutAToRY Commission 44 95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAoE (3) stouE*FIAL REvlSloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 12 OF 17 Millstono Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996 021 02 TEXT (11more space ts required use edditionalcopies of NRC form 366A) (17)
B.
COMPONENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE IST PROGRAM 1.
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System (CCP) valves CCP*V965 and V966, CCP*AOV178A-D and CCP*V27,V38,V63,V74.
Sla.t.ug Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System valves CCP*V965 and V966, CCP*AOV178A-D, and CCP*V27, V38 V63, V74 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
2.
The following Charging System valves and Reactor Coolant System check valves.
a)
A procedure will be implemented to verify the open safety function for valves CHS*AV8146, CHS*AV8147, RCS*V31, V32. V147 and V148.
b)
An exercise to open test, which can be verified quarterly by normal operation, will be added to the IST Program for Charging System valves V396, V397, V436, V437, V469, V470, V503, and V504.
c)
A procedure will be implemented to venfy the closed safety function for Charging System valves CHS*FCV1108 and 111B.
StatqE These valves have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
3.
Charging System valve CHS*V42.
Status Charging System valve CHS*V42 has been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance Procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of CHS*V42. Testing of this valve has been successfully completed.
4.
The following Charging, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water and Control Building Chilled Water System valves.
a)
A procedure will be implemented to test Charging System control valve CHS*HCV182 dunng refueling outages or whenever seal injection is not required.
Status: These components have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
b)
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System valves CCP*TV32A/B/C will be modified to include a solenoid valve which will allow adequate testing of the fail safe function.
J Status: These components have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. CCP*TV32A/B/C have been modified to include a manual valve on the air supply hne which will abw adequate testing of the fail safe function. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves.
Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
NHC FoNM 306A (4 9M e____----------____________.
e 9 NRC F oRM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Commission (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REvislON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 13 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
- - 021 ~
02 TEXT (11more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11) c)
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System valves CCP*V981 and CCP*V986.
Status: These components have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
d)
Control Building Chilled Water System valves HVK*PDV32NB, HVK*TV39A/B, HVK*TV41 A/B, HVK*TV68A/B, HVK*TV69A/B, HVK*TV70A/B, HVK*TV71 A/B, HVK*~iV72A/B, HVK*TV73A/B, HVK*TV74A/B, HVK*TV75A/B, HVK*TV76A/B, HVK*TV77A/B.
Status: These components have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
5.
Emergency Diesel Generator System excess flow check valves EGA*EFV35A1/A2/B1/B2.
Status: EDG excess flow check valves EGA*EFV35A1/A2/B1/82 have been included in the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these check valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
6.
Procedures will be revised to require that data be recorded and analyzed for Service Water System Valves SWP*MOV57A-D.
Status: Service Water System valves SWP*MOV57A-D have been included in the IST Program Plan, Revision
- 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully performed.
7.
The Hydrogen Recombiner, Control Building Chilled Water and Service Water System valves hsted below.
a)
Procedures will be revised to require that data be recorded and analyzed for:
- 1) Hydrogen Recombiner valves HCS*V4, VS, V11, V12, and
- 2) Control Building Chilled Water valves HVK*V1, V39, V37, V75.
Sta*us: These valves have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of these valves. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed, b)
Service Water System valves SWP*V104, V109 will be added to the check valve disassembly and inspection matrix.
Status: These valves have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. SWP*V104 and V109 have been incorporated into the check valve disassembly and inspection program. Testing of these valves has been successfully completed.
IU__
O e N) C FORM 366A U.s. WUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMisslOM 14 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVisloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 14 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
- - 021 -
02 TEXT (11more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 8.
Additionally, the Service Water System valves SWP*V836 and V837 will be inspected during RFO6.
Status: Service Water System check valves SWP V836 and V837 have been included in the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. The valves have been added to the check valve program. These inspections were performed this shutdown and will be performed again during RFO6.
C.
ADDITIONAL TESTING NOT INCLUDED IN IST PROGRAM l
1.
High Pressure Safety injection check valves SlH*V81 and SlH*V83 will be disassembled, inspected, and added to the check valve disassembly and inspection matrix.
Status: Further evaluation of the closure function for these valves has determined that the valves do not perform a closure safety function which meets the requirements for inclusion in the IST Program. This item does not require any changes to the IST Program.
2.
The measurement of the closed stroke time for Service Water System valves SWP*MOV54A-D will be added to the IST Program.
Status: Service Water System valves SWP*MOV54A-D have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5.
Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate closure stroke time testing for valves SWP*MOV54A-D. This testing has been successfully performed.
3.
The measurement of the closed stroke time for Charging System valves CHS*LCV112D/E will be added to the IST Program.
Status: Charging System valves CHS*LCV112D/E have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5.
Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate closure stroke time testing of CHS*LCV112D/E. This testing has been successfully performed.
4.
An exercise to open test, which can be verified quarterly by normal operation, will be added to the IST Program for Charging System valves CHS*V394,V434,V467,V501.
Status: Charging System valves CHS*V394,V434,V467,V501 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to document open testing of these valves. This testing has been successfully performed.
5.
A procedure will be implemented to verify the open safety function for Charging System check valve CHS*V58.
Status: Charging System check valve CHS*V58 has been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5.
Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of this valve. Testing has been successfully completed.
6.
A procedure will be implemented to test Charging System check valve CHS*V261 and Safety injection System check valve SlH*V11 during refueling outages.
Status: Charging System check valve CHS*V261 and Safety injection System check valve SlH*V11 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Valve closure was verified by radiography during this extendedk
tbC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY coMMissioM O
(4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL Revision YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 15 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
- - 021 ~
02 TEXT fit more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) cold shutdown. Surveillance procedures have been revised to utilize non-intrusive techniques to verify closure of Charging System check valve CHS*V261 and Safety injection System check valve SlH*V11 dering future testing.
- 7. The closed function of Reactor Coolant System valves RCS*HCV442A/B, RCS*SV8095A/B and RCS*SV8096A/B will be added to the IST Program and the valves tested.
Status Valves RCS*HCV442A/B, RCS*SV8095A/B and RCS*SV8096A/B have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate testing of the closure function for these valves. Testing has been successfully performed.
8.
The measurement of the closed stroke time for the Reactor Coolant System motor operated gate valves RCS*MV8000A/B will be added to the Inservice Test Program.
Status: RCS motor operated gate valves RCS*MV8000A/B have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to perform closure stroke time testing for RCS*MV8000A/B. Testing has been successfully completed.
9.
The measurement of the closed stroke time for the Containment Recirculation valves RSS*MV38A/B will be added to the Inservice Test Program.
Status: Containment Recirculation valves RSS*MV38A/B have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision
- 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to perform closure stroke time testing for RSS*MV38A/B.
Testing has been successfully completed.
- 10. The surveillance procedures will be revised to add the stroke time to close function for Safety injection motor operated valves SlH*MV8801 A/B and SlH*MV8802A/B.
Status: Safety injection motor operated valves SlH*MV8801 A/B and SlH*MV8802A/B have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to perform closure stroke time testing for these valves. Testing has been successfully completed.
11, An exercise to close requirement for the Fuel Pool Cooling check valves SFC*V3 and SFC*V6 will be added to the Inservice Test Program.
Status: Fuel Pool Cooling check valves SFC*V3 and SFC*V6 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Testing has been successfully completed.
l
- 12. A stroke time to close test will be added to the inservice Test Program for Main Steam motor operated valves MSS *MV74A-D.
Status: Main Steam motor operated valves MSS *MV74A-D have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to perform closure stroke time testing MSS *MV74A-D.
Testing has been successfully completed.
- 13. A surveillance procedure to verify leakage limits for the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System check valves EGA*V4,V11,V30,V37 will be implemented.
l l
NRC FOf4M 366A 14-965
e e t[AC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISsloN (4-95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVisloN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 16 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
~ 021 ~
02 TEXT (1f more spaceis required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Status: EDG Starting Air System check valves EGA*V4,V11,V30,V37 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to perform leakage testing of EGA*V4, V11, V30 l
and V37. Testing has been successfully completed.
1
- 14. An exercise to close requirement for the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System check valves EGF*V1, V3, V7, V9 will be added to the Inservice Test Program.
Status: EDG Fuel Oil Transfer System check valves EGF*V1, V3, V7, V9 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Testing has been successfully completed.
- 15. A test to manual exercise Control Building Ventilation valves HVC*AOV25 and AOV26 on a refueling frequency will be added to the surveillance program.
Status: Control Building Ventilation air operated valves HVC*AOV25 and AOV26 have been added to the IST Program Plan, Revision 5. Surveillance procedures have been revised to incorporate a manual exercise test of HCV*AOV25 and AOV26. Testing has been successfully completed.
V. AdditionalInformation None
Similar Events
Listed below are other Inservice Test Program related events:
LER 93-006-00 Inadequate Surveillance of High Pressure Safety injection Check Valves LER 96-021-01 Components Not included in the In-Service Test Program as a Result of Programmatic Deficiencies LER 96-024-00 Missed inservice Testing of a Stop Check Valve in the Steam Supply to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Due to Programmatic Weakness LER 96-050-00 Range of Controlled Building Chilled Water Pump Suction Pressure Gauges Used for Surveillance Not IN Accordance With ASME Section XI Requirements LER 97-040-00 Historical Event: Quarterly IST Closure Testing of Service Water System Check Valves 3SWP*705,706,707 and 708 Not Performed LER 97-042-00 Reactor Coolant Dilution isolation Valves inoperable Due to Missed Surveillance LER 98-011-00 Failure to Adequately Test the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump at a Fixed Speed and Test the Position Indication of Two Valves Per Section XI of the ASME Code Results in TS 4.0.5 Violations LER 98-017-00 3SIL*V15 Testing Contrary to Technical Specification 4.0.5 Requirements LER 98-019-00 Inservice SurveillanceTest Acceptance Criteria Do Not Assure that the Design Minimum Check Valve Flows Are Obtained LER 98-021-00 Several Manual Valves and Check Valve Tests Not included in The In-Service Test Program l
l
0
, NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON I4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 17 OF 17 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 1996
~ 021 -
02 TEXT (11more spaceis requored, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (11)
Manufacturer Data Ells System Code Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater System..
..BA Reactor Coolant System..
.. AB Post Accident Monitoring System..
..lP Low Pressure Safety injection System..
..BP l
Containment Spray System..
..BE Chemical and Volume Control System..
..CB l
.. AB Closed / Component Cooling Water System..
..CC Chilled Water System..
..KM Diesel Cooling Water System..
..LB Essential Service Water System..
..Bl Non-Essential Service Water System..
..BD Hydrogen Recombiner System..
..lT High Pressure Safety injection System..
.80 Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System...
..DA Main / Reheat Steam System...
..SB Diesel Generator Starting Air System..
..LC Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System..
..DE Control Building / Control Complex Environmental Control System..
..VI Ells Component Code Pump.....
..P Valve...
..V Valve, Isolation..
..lSV Tank..
..TK Generator, Steam..
..SG NRC FOnM 366A (4*Sb)