05000416/FIN-2010002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Actions in Response to a Steam Leak Result in an Automatic Reactor Scram |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding involving the failure of site management to ensure that adequate corrective actions were implemented to resolve the effects of a large steam leak in the turbine building. Specifically, the reactor experienced an automatic scram on low reactor water level due to the B reactor feed pump minimum flow valve failing open and a subsequent trip of the A reactor feed pump. The scram investigation determined that the minimum flow valve failed open due to condensation in a cable routing box. The condensation was caused by a large steam leak on the second stage moisture separator re-heater drain valve. Cable splices in the box were submerged in water and eventually caused those cables to short to ground. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2010-01503. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the initiating events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and it affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and that challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as during power operations. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that the transient initiator did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This is because the reactor feed pump B was able to restore reactor water level post scram. As a result, the issue was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to prioritize and thoroughly evaluate the extent of the cause of the water grounding sensitive electronic equipment in the vicinity of the steam lea |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000416/2010002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra R Smith A Barrett W Sifre M Young V Gaddy B Rice |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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